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
# PHILOSOPHY TODAY

ESSAYS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE  
FIELD OF PHILOSOPHY

COLLECTED AND EDITED BY

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THE OPEN COURT COMPANY,  
PUBLISHERS,  
86, STRAND, LONDON, W.C.2.

1928

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**1928**

**PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

## PREFATORY NOTE

PHILOSOPHY, like religion, has sometimes been conceived as an expression of "what a man does with his solitude." It is then regarded as an utterance of the meaning which an individual's deepest experiences possess for him, or as a conceptual formulation of a man's fundamental attitudes to life and the world. Thus Fichte once declared that the kind of philosophy one chooses depends upon the kind of person one is. Inasmuch as personalities, in his conviction, divide according as they insist upon freedom or surrender to determinism, he adopted a corresponding classification of world-views, though sometimes describing their contrasting forms as doctrines of act or activity and doctrines of being or substance. Or, again, we find philosophers whose central concern is the question whether or not the universe is friendly to man and possesses qualities worthy of reverence and worship; for such thinkers philosophies pivot according as they hold that nature is throughout mechanical or maintain that it is teleological, and is inclusive of spiritual values and realities.

That this interpretation of philosophy possesses a large element of truth will not be questioned by any one who has penetrated far into the classic systems of history. Yet it is not likewise true that it is precisely the greatest of the philosophers who belong most truly to a given age and environment? It is in these thinkers that the life and aspirations of a particular generation and land come to clearest and most concentrated expression. Thus, for example,

Royce has said that "Plato and Aristotle, taken together, express for us, in their philosophical writings, the essence of the highest Greek faith and life." Somewhat similar is Gentile's recent insistence that "concrete personality is nationality"; that "not only every man must bear the imprint of his nationality, but that also there is no true science, no man's science, which is not national." Extreme as this statement from latter day Italy may be, does it not in itself exemplify the fact it asserts?

Only less deep, perhaps, than the national imprint are the traces made on doctrines by linguistic groups. The latter leave their mark on philosophical conceptions much more indelibly than on the theories of the special disciplines, especially those of the exact sciences. Hence it is these primarily that have functioned as the currency of international exchange in the domain of mind. And yet the very difficulty and magnitude of the philosopher's task, and his zealous quest for thorough objectivity and concreteness, make it supremely important that his intellectual resources include a knowledge of the most diverse standpoints and systems of thought. Thus, while national and linguistic boundaries have, on the whole, been perhaps more restrictive in the province of philosophy than in those of the special sciences, this is in no wise to be regarded as indicating a lesser need for interchange in the case of the former.

The cleavages arising from the Great War vastly increased the philosophical isolation of the linguistic groups. Then, shortly thereafter, arrangements were begun for the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. It was at about this time that the undersigned assumed the editorial responsibility for *The Monist*. Desirous that this journal make some special contribution to the success of the Congress and to the need on the part of philosophers for a wider knowledge of recent philosophical developments in countries other than their own, he solicited from authoritative

scholars surveys covering the main fields of philosophy especially cultivated by various linguistic groups since about the outbreak of the war. Unfortunately only a part of the promised material was received in time for publication before the Congress. Much of the rest gradually followed, though in some instances only after substitutes had been secured for persons who initially assumed the responsibility for essays.

The present volume is a collection of the various essays thus obtained and published in issues of *The Monist* beginning with April, 1926. It includes in addition an account of recent ethical developments in Germany, prepared by Professor Bruno Bauch for *The International Journal of Ethics* and published by the latter in January, 1926. For this coöperation on the part of Professor Bauch and *The International Journal of Ethics* we are very peculiarly indebted, for even with it we must accept a number of unexpected lacunae in preference to a longer delay in the publication of the rich material now in hand. Particularly regrettable are the unforeseen circumstances that disrupted arrangements which we considered made for accounts of present Italian philosophy.

Fortunately those who desire to fill the gaps in the present survey, or to secure fuller knowledge in the fields presented, have available a considerable body of recent material. We might single out for mention here: *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*; *Library of Contemporary Thought*, designed as a comprehensive series, of which the volumes on Italy, France, and Japan and China have already appeared; numerous articles in various issues of the newly established magazines, *Journal of Philosophical Studies* and *The New Scholasticism*, as well as in *The Philosophical Review*, which annually presents a survey of current French philosophy, and with the issue for September, 1927, has resumed its yearly accounts,

discontinued in 1914, of contemporary philosophy in Germany; a special number of the 1922 *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* devoted to American philosophy, and papers on Russian thought in recent issues of the *Kant-Studien* and the *Journal of Religion*; numerous surveys in the *Hibbert Journal*; and, to draw a line at this point, the bibliographic guidance in the *Literarische Berichte aus dem Gebiete der Philosophie*.

While the writers of the following papers have had an opportunity to make alterations and additions since the initial publication in *The Monist*, we have naturally desired to hold changes to a minimum. This same desire also accounts for numerous details in connection with the re-editing of the essays and for the manner of crediting those who labored at the tasks of translation.

We would here express our genuine gratitude to all the translators who have assisted us and whose names are attached to the various articles; also, and very especially, to Professor Emmanuel Leroux, through whose untiring efforts alone we are able to present so comprehensive a survey of French philosophy. There are many others who have extended encouragement and aid but of a sort such that they would probably feel embarrassment over other than words of appreciation expressed in private.

EDWARD L. SCHAUB.

December, 1927.

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CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
ENGLISH SPEAKING COUNTRIES



## IDEALISM AND EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM

R. F. A. HOERNLÉ

THE prominence of the concept of evolution in contemporary philosophy is due, by common consent, to the influence of modern biology. But this observation requires to be very carefully interpreted, if it is not to mislead those who know much of biology, but little of philosophy. It is a good many years now since Professor John Dewey wrote a paper on "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," in which he heralded a new approach to all problems of human thought and conduct by way of treating all human activities as responses to stimuli, as efforts of the human animal to adjust itself to, and master, its environment. Here were the foundations of a "naturalistic" treatment of psychology, ethics, epistemology—in general, of a naturalistic theory of man. And the impulse had come from Darwin's theory of "evolution." But it is curious to notice that, alike in Dewey's original statement of that influence and in its subsequent development into behaviorism in psychology, instrumentalism, naturalism and realism in philosophy, it has been the *naturalistic* rather than the *evolutionary* side of this influence which has been dominant and abiding. Or, to put this more precisely, the conceptual apparatus of Darwin's theory of evolution—accidental variations, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, etc.—has been dropped, nor have post-Darwinian developments in biology (e. g., theories of Mendel and Weissmann, with all the detailed researches to which they have led, or the rise of neo-Lamarckianism) exercised any marked in-

fluence on our evolutionary naturalists in philosophy. All that survives of evolution in the strictly biological sense in which it concerns the descent and differentiation of species, is a generalized *genetic* point of view, i. e., a method of studying the stages through which a character or function develops. On the other hand, even in the absence of the genetic point of view, it is the application to human life in all its aspects of the biological concepts of response to stimulus and adjustment to environment which makes psychology and ethics "naturalistic."

Moreover, biological concepts of evolution, after all, apply only to the phenomena of life, whereas the universe as a whole is the proper province of philosophy. Hence, the concept of evolution had to be stripped of its specific biological meaning and generalized by wider use. Thus, in actual fact, evolutionary philosophy owes much more to Herbert Spencer than to Charles Darwin. For, it was Spencer who, treating biological evolution as only one chapter in the whole story, expanded the concept of evolution to cosmic proportions and thereby made it the fundamental concept for a certain type of philosophical construction. True, no contemporary evolutionist has repeated Spencer's grandiosely futile attempt to sum up the whole story of cosmic evolution in a single formula. But many evolutionists at least try to set out the historical sequence of stages through which what Lloyd Morgan calls "the increasing richness in stuff and substance"<sup>1</sup> of the universe has been achieved, whether that sequence be Morgan's own pyramid of matter—life—mind, or Samuel Alexander's ampler progression from space-time to deity, and perhaps beyond deity—who knows?

Indeed, it seems to me that, of all the evolutionists whose writings I have read, Alexander is the only one who takes evolution seriously. He is the only one whose universe is

<sup>1</sup> *Emergent Evolution*, p. 206.

*still evolving*, and who is prepared from indications in its present condition to forecast what the next stage is going to be, viz., the emergence of the new quality of "deity" in the birth of which the world is now travailing. By contrast, Lloyd Morgan's universe strikes me as *finished*—matter-life-mind: there is the whole story. Not, of course, that Lloyd Morgan says so in so many words. But it is implicit in his whole attitude and, symptomatically, in the neatly pointed apex of his pyramid.<sup>2</sup> One misses in Lloyd Morgan, Alexander's sense of the present being big with cosmic novelties of great moment about to emerge. Again, Roy Sellars's interest in the plan of evolution does not, so far as I can see, extend even so far as that of Lloyd Morgan. What Sellars values in the evolutionary point of view is the aid it lends to a naturalistic theory of mind, by treating mind as a product of evolution in the context of the physical world. Bergson comes nearest to Alexander in regarding evolution as a *creative* process still going on, but he, too, has no interest in working out any ordered plan of evolution; and if he were to do so his view of matter as due to the detension, or slackening, of the *élan vital* would inevitably put his theory into a class apart. His distinction between instinct and intelligence offers divergent lines, rather than successive levels (or stages), of evolution. In general, Bergson concentrates his efforts on intuiting the creative urge at the heart of the universe and on sharing the exhilaration of its showers of unpredictable novelties.

In this connection, it is worth noting that, compared with Lloyd Morgan and Sellars, both Alexander and Bergson, for all their efforts to incorporate the findings of science in their theories, are "metaphysicians" rather than "naturalists." Indeed, if it is the mark of a "metaphysician" to go behind the scientifically ascertainable facts of

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 11.

evolution, whether on the biological or the cosmic scale, in the search for a source or cause (agent) of evolution, then even Lloyd Morgan is a metaphysician, and Sellars's type of theory the only genuine "naturalism." For, does not Lloyd Morgan confess: "From the point of view of a constructive philosophy, I, for one, am unable to see how one is to explain all that goes on from start to finish without activity [=God]. The more adequately we grasp the naturalistic and agnostic position, the more urgent is the call for some further explanation which shall supplement its merely descriptive interpretation."<sup>3</sup> And thus Lloyd Morgan is led on to "acknowledge" by an act of faith, which corresponds to the Kantian "postulates of reason," divine activity and purpose as *omnipresent* throughout the whole scheme and process of evolution. Proof of God is impossible: enough that the acknowledgement of him is not inconsistent with the naturalistic picture and is empirically based on the feeling of being drawn upwards by an ideal.<sup>4</sup> Whence it follows that "evolution" itself has two distinct meanings, viz., (a) a naturalistic meaning—"the outspringing of something that has hitherto not been in being" [=emergence]; (b) a metaphysical meaning—"the unfolding of that which is enfolded" (the timeless activity of God for whom plan and execution are one and indivisible).<sup>5</sup>

It is easy to imagine how many an ultra-modern "naturalist," proud of having adopted a purely "scientific" view, will give a pitying shrug of the shoulders at what he will perhaps call Morgan's resurrection of "old-fashioned" theism. But, speculatively considered, this combination of naturalism and theism raises some of the profoundest, if also oldest, problems of philosophy. Emergent evolution is essentially a process in time; yet it is the expression of

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 206-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 208.

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 111, 172.

an activity which is timeless. Such a view brings us full face against the problem of the "reality" of time—a problem made only the more urgent for us when we recall that for both Alexander and Bergson time is either the ultimate reality, or at least its essential mode of being. For Alexander, the whole evolutionary process is the outcome of the inherent "go" (so to speak) of time, of its creative restlessness. Bergson's *élan*, similarly, creates its inexhaustible novelties in the medium of real time. The Universe, as the Italian neo-Idealists say, is historical through and through. Yet, for evolutionists, its nature is historical in a peculiar sense. For, the past is not simply lost. Successive novelties emerge, but the results of earlier emergencies persist and condition the later. Matter comes before life in the temporal order of evolution, life comes before mind. But, also, life could not emerge except in material bodies, nor mind except in material and living bodies. Thus, the history is cumulative. The new emergents are added to, incorporated with, the pre-existing stock and the universe from stage to stage of these changes is enriched. Creative evolution clearly belies the old principle, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. For it there is always more in the "effect" (the later stage) than there was in the "cause" (the earlier stage). Yet, it might have been thought that the dialectical weaknesses of such a construction had been explored more than enough, and its inherent contradictions exhibited once and for all. When the concept of evolution is applied on a cosmic scale to the universe *as a whole*, and time is declared to be real in order that the universe *as a whole* may successively be enriched by emergent novelties, it becomes necessary to rehearse once again the familiar criticisms, if only lest the speculative alternative which they imply be overlooked by a generation which is apt to be better versed in science than in philosophy. Here is the logic of the matter: "The whole cannot change. The whole I take to mean the universe,

all that in any sense is. It cannot change, because any change introduces something that is, and this, *ex hypothesi*, falls within the whole. The whole, if it changes, was not the whole, but something less. All that is includes all that can be; there can be nothing more than it.”<sup>6</sup> Apply this to a cosmos in evolution. At any given stage we have “all that is.” Presently, something new emerges and *is* now, in addition to what was there before, and still continues to be. Moreover, the new emerges out of what was there before, and requires, for its own existence, the continuance of what was there before. Is this really intelligible? And why does the emergent emerge just when it does and neither sooner nor later? I have no wish to be guilty of caricature, but the recipe for the sort of “creative evolution” by which the universe is supposed to evolve as a whole seems to be this: Assume that, at the start, something is going on, and anything may happen thereafter. Does this criticism, then, deny the fact of evolution? On the contrary, dialectical arguments never deny any genuine fact. They only show it to be “appearance,” not “reality.” Or, to put this point less technically: the subject of which we can truly predicate that it evolves in time is something less than the whole universe. Logically, it is a question of the “context” within which such a judgment is true; and “context” means that the subject is not the universe as a whole. Such a series as Matter-Life-Mind, or whatever else we take the order of evolutionary stages to be, may easily deceive us on this point. If it is expanded into the judgment that there was a time when the universe *as a whole* was nothing but matter, that next it (the universe) became living matter, and finally mind-endowed matter, the result is a metaphysical blunder. If “life” and “mind” have evolved from “matter,” the only possible inference is that the universe was, and is, more than “matter.” Thus,

<sup>6</sup> B. Bosanquet, *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 177.



time and evolution fall within it, and its nature as a whole is still to seek, and all that we experience in time, and infer to have existed, or to have come to be, in time, helps to reveal (i. e., contributes to our knowledge of) its nature as a whole. "The histories which are within the universe bring an eternal world into our experience."<sup>7</sup>

Thus, the transference of the concept of evolution from its original biological context to the universe as a whole raises inevitably a complex of familiar speculative problems—the possibility of conceiving the existence of the whole universe as a temporal process; the unity of the universe in its self-enrichment by successively emerging novelties; the nature of the universe as a whole in the light of all its manifestations. It is where it raises these problems, openly or by implication, that evolutionism challenges comparison most pointedly with other types of speculative philosophy. In my judgment, the comparison is not in favor of evolutionism, for—speaking generally—the representatives of cosmic evolution ignore the dialectical difficulties inherent in their position, and, so far as they are "naturalists," they strive to fit their metaphysics into the framework of science, instead of treating the scientific view of the world in the wider context of what the whole range of human experience and thought reveals of the nature of the universe.

## II.

Next to evolution itself, the topic of most philosophical interest and importance in evolutionary naturalism is knowledge.

<sup>7</sup> Bosanquet, *loc. cit.*, p. 190. For brevity's sake, I have touched above only on the abstractly logical side of the argument. Its other sides, involving especially the interpretation of moral and religious experience, are worth following up in Bosanquet's *Meeting of Extremes*. Cf. also my article on "Neo-Realism and Religion" in *Harvard Theological Review*, April, 1918.

On its "naturalistic" side, the most prominent motive in evolutionary naturalism is to fit mind and knowledge as "natural phenomena" into the context of nature. To treat mind (and knowledge as one of the functions of mind) as a phenomenon among other phenomena, conditioned by others, conditioning others in its turn, is the program. On this side, therefore, evolutionary naturalism is "realist" in character and aligns itself with other forms of modern realism against all forms of idealism which assign to mind in one way or another the central position in the universe. The concept of evolution furnishes here a convenient weapon against the *esse est percipi* principle which realists regard as the cardinal principle of idealism. For, if mind is accepted as a late emergent in the course of evolution, it follows obviously that the existence of the universe, prior to the emergence of mind, cannot be supposed to consist in its being perceived by mind. Nor is it only the *esse est percipi* principle which is thus overthrown, but a whole host of other philosophical difficulties is cleared out of the way at the same time. Notably, so Professor Sellars tells us, we get rid of the metaphysical dualism of Descartes and with it the soul-body problem conceived in terms of the interaction of two heterogeneous substances; also of the further (Kantian) dualism of a world of *facts* distinct from a world of *values*. Again, in epistemology, we avoid the separation of subject (Knower) and object (Known) as if they belonged to different worlds, and as if the subject knew only its own mental states ("subjectivism" eked out by the fiction of a "copy-theory" of truth). In short, evolutionary naturalism, on its realist side, sets itself, in Alexander's words, to "order mind to its proper place in the world of things."

Now, broadly speaking, it is easy to agree with evolutionary naturalism in its denials. The question is whether

its affirmations will stand. Does it really succeed in explaining knowledge as a natural phenomenon?

Before, however, we can examine this question, we must, in passing, note the fact that realists, whilst agreeing on the program of treating mind as a natural phenomenon in a world which is independent of being apprehended by mind, differ widely from each other in what they assign to "mind" and what to "world" in their analyses of knowledge (or the "cognitive relation"). The "Critical" realists here oppose the "New" and the "Naive" realists, as we all know. Is the physical world, when object of apprehension, immanent in experience or does it remain transcendent? On this question the battle rages between "epistemological monists" and "epistemological dualists." Alexander limits mind to "enjoyed" acts of apprehension and treats whatever is apprehended as non-mental, independent reality. Sellars and Lloyd Morgan treat what is apprehended as mental, subjective, even "intra-organic," but referable to a non-mental independent reality. It would be easy to play the part of *tertius gaudens*, and point to this fratricidal conflict among fellow-realists as presumptive evidence of a fundamental instability in the whole realist position. But, though many a telling debating-point might be scored by playing off realist against realist, I would rather examine the position on its merits. Only, for reasons of space, I must confine myself on this occasion to the examination of the "dualist" position as maintained with substantial agreement<sup>a</sup> by Lloyd Morgan and Sellars.

I draw attention, at once, to what is the crucial point, viz., the "naturalistic" context in which the analysis of mind and knowledge is to be undertaken. All context amounts to so many *presuppositions* taken for granted, and determining, as points antecedently fixed, the course of the subsequent analysis. The theory of mind and knowl-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, Appendix, for the extent of this agreement.

edge to be constructed must square, so to speak, with the context initially assumed. Now, if this context is borrowed wholesale, as the "evolutionary naturalist" does borrow it, from the *sciences*—from biology, physiology, psychology—it follows that knowledge is used to explain and justify knowledge in a way which involves an illegitimate circle. For, the context of "nature," in which knowledge is to be explained as a natural phenomenon, is itself assumed to be known. Hence, whatever is said about knowledge as a phenomenon in this context must be consistent with the context itself being known, i. e., being what we think it to be. But if the account given of knowledge as a phenomenon in nature is such that it throws doubt on our knowledge of nature, i. e., on our claim that nature is what, in certain sciences, we think it to be, the argument destroys its own basis; the conclusion invalidates the premises on which it rests. Every science, as a branch of knowledge, reveals the nature of the objects with which it deals. To say that science "reveals" the nature of its objects is equivalent to saying that the objects really are what, as scientists, we perceive and think them to be, and this again, is equivalent to saying that we "know" the objects or that they "are known." To treat knowledge in *this* sense as a natural phenomenon, to be accounted for in a context conceived in biological and psychological terms, involves the circle of explaining and justifying our right to say that we "know," e. g., the physical world (i. e., that the physical world is what we think it to be), by means of an argument which, in employing as its premisses certain scientific theories of the nature of that world, takes that right for granted all along.

To put the criticism in another way: When we say that we "know," we claim for what we perceive and think a certain value, viz., "truth"-value, or a certain function, viz., the function of revealing the nature of the object as it is.

Now, under the title of "theory of knowledge" we may attempt one or the other of two things, but we must *not* attempt *both* together, on pain of committing the vicious circle argument which I am concerned to expose. (1) We may either offer a theory of knowledge (or knowing) as an *event* or a *sequence of events*, occurring under *known* conditions in an individual mind. We can then make these conditions as "naturalistic" as we like, i. e., we can bring in, and base ourselves on, all else that is known and is relevant to our problem. We can use, without qualms, all the resources of physiology and biology, for we shall be using their propositions precisely not as events in any individual mind, but as "truths," i. e., as revelations of the real world in its bearing on the events to be explained here, i. e., on the perceptions and thoughts considered as events in an individual mind. In explaining these perceptions and thoughts as events, we either abstract from, or take for granted—it does not matter how we put it—their cognitive function, their character as knowing, i. e., as revealing the nature of objects. (2) On the other hand, we may mean by "theory of knowledge" an inquiry into the truth-value, truth-claim, reality-revealing function—call it what we will—of perceiving, thinking, reasoning *as such*. If this is our problem, we have no right to take the reality-revealing function of *some* cognitive acts for granted in order to justify our faith in the reality-revealing function of *all* cognitive acts. We have no right to start by assuming of certain systems of perceptions and thoughts, viz., those constituting certain sciences, that they reveal the real world, in order, on that basis, to explain and justify the reality-revealing function of perceptions and thoughts in general, including those entering into the texture of those sciences. Such a procedure would be parallel to lifting oneself up by one's own boot straps. In short, the circular argument of which I accuse the evolutionary natural-

ists consists in this that they mix up the theory of the occurrence of cognitive *events* with the theory of their cognitive (reality-revealing) *function*.

At bottom, the evolutionary naturalist's difficulties are due to the fact that his theory is simply an instance of a class of theories the common character of which is that they treat knowledge, in its character of "truth" or of "revelation of reality," as an empirically observable and describable relation between empirically observable and describable existents. But all such relations between such existents are objects of knowledge, are known. And no analysis of them, however searching or subtle, can explain or justify our confidence that they really are what we think them to be. The study of the "cognitive relation," as an empirical relation between empirical existents, and, therefore, as an object of "science"—this study, I say, presupposes the truth-value or reality-revealing function of the acts of perceiving and thinking by which we study this relation or (for that matter) anything else. This truth-value, or reality-revealing function, cannot, therefore, be made to depend on the issue of an argument which presupposes it all the time, and which, without that presupposition, could have no possible issue at all.

My argument, so far, has been in the nature of prosecuting counsel's speech for the prosecution. It is high time that I should now substantiate my charge by outlining, however briefly, the essential features of the evidence. Both Lloyd Morgan and Sellars begin with the typical "naturalistic" context. From the point of view of emergent evolution, so Lloyd Morgan reminds us, consciousness, or "conscious relatedness," as he generally prefers to say, has a history of bewildering complexity, for it comes late in evolution, and "requires the effective go of life as that requires the primary go of physical events."<sup>9</sup> Similarly, Sellars tells

<sup>9</sup> *Emergent Evolution*, p. 90.

us that to understand knowledge we must regard it as a specialized activity on the part of percipients who, as psychophysical organisms, are scattered over the surface of the earth.<sup>10</sup> In such a context, the percipient or knower must obviously be identified with the organism, the living body, surrounded by other bodies existentially distinct from it. For the percipient to know any other body (incidentally, what about knowing his own?), his body must enter into some sort of physical relationship with the other body. There must be stimulation (Lloyd Morgan's "advenient influence") from the one side and response from the other. But always the body perceived will remain "existentially distinct" from the percipient organism: it will transcend the latter; it will be "external" to it; it will remain literally where it always was—outside the other's skin. Meanwhile, the perceiving, as a conscious process or experience, together with all the nervous processes which it "involves" (Morgan), or with which it "is identical" (Sellars), will be existentially *in* the percipient. Whence it follows that the physical body known can never be brought into the field of experience, can never be an existential component thereof.<sup>11</sup> Interest now shifts to what goes on in the percipient's mind. There will be an "object" (Sellars), a "content" (Morgan), but, as mental and intra-organic, it will be existentially distinct from the external physical "thing" (Sellars) or "object" (Morgan). It will be a mental sign of (Morgan), a "mental substitution for" (Sellars), the external thing. If we ask, How do we know it is a sign or what it is a sign for? we are told that we know it by an act of "acknowledgement," a "credal act," "not amounting to proof" (Morgan); by an act of "affirmation," which is not an inference, which is instinc-

<sup>10</sup> Paraphrased and abbreviated from an article on "Cognition and Valuation," p. 128 in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXV, No. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. here Sellars's article, "Concerning Transcendence and Bifurcation," in *Mind*, Vol. XXXI, No. 121.

tive, which constitutes the cognitive function of mind, which "grasps" the very object, existentially distinct though the latter remains all the time (Sellars). If we ask for evidence of these acts and of their power to transcend the contents of the individual's own mind, we are referred back to physiology and biology. Thus Sellars: "This approach enables us to discover the factors in the total experience of perceiving responsible for the element we called the affirmation of the object. The attitude or set of the organism in perception floods consciousness with a sense of something co-real to which it is responding."<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Lloyd Morgan, beginning with an "external world in which things lie at a distance from the organism," and distinguishing thus the minded (=what is present to consciousness) from the acknowledged thing which exists outside the organism and its consciousness, declares that "behaviour towards *this* or *that* thing is the natural progenitor, under emergent evolution, of conscious reference to *this* or *that* object." Such is the "epigenetic origin" of the "projicient reference" which turns mental signs into knowledge—by faith, be it remembered, not by proof—of the non-mental thing.

If, lastly, we ask, What is the nature of the transcendent thing and how far do mental contents reveal that nature? I must confess that I have found no unambiguous answer in Lloyd Morgan. We have to make the best we can of such a statement as the following: "The properties which render physical things objective in mind are projiciently

<sup>12</sup> See article on "Epistemological Dualism versus Metaphysical Dualism," in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXX, No. 5, p. 487. The phrase "total experience of perceiving," in the above quotation, can hardly be meant to refer to the content of the percipient's consciousness. For, even if it be granted that the organism's motor-set contributes something to the content of consciousness, this could amount to a knowledge of the existence of a "co-real" beyond the organism only after affirmation has done its work, not before it, or in lieu of it.



referred to these things.”<sup>18</sup> By comparison, Sellars is both clear and ingenious, in that, refusing to conceive the physical existent as a “thing” in which sensuous “qualities” inhere, and rejecting any copying of qualities by the mental content, he boldly asserts an “identity of pattern” between transcendent thing and mental object. The physical thing is “patterned or ordered stuff” (what sort of stuff?), the mental object is also patterned or ordered stuff, but a different sort of stuff. Thus the two stuffs are existentially and numerically different, but the pattern in both is identical (being a universal). Hence, so far as identity of pattern reaches, the mental object enables us to know the nature of the transcendent physical thing, the existence of which we already know by “affirmation.”

I submit that in this summary of Sellars's and Lloyd Morgan's views an attentive eye will discover all the symptoms of the fallacy which I diagnosed above. First, various natural sciences are used as premises for the conclusion that the objects (or contents) of consciousness occur within the organism as part of its response to stimulation by physical objects other than it. Next, we are reminded that these mental and intra-organic objects (or contents) have a cognitive function. By means of them the organism knows itself as a physical thing in a world of physical things. They are the stuff of which the sciences themselves are made. But how invest them with a function which, in themselves, they are patently incapable of discharging? The answer is, By affirmation or acknowledgment, because these are the equivalent in consciousness of motor-response outside of consciousness. In scholastic language: affirmation is the *causa cognoscendi* of motor response to an independent physical world, which world, evoking motor-response, is the *causa essendi* of affirma-

<sup>18</sup> This leaves obscure both what exactly these properties are (e. g., secondary qualities as well as primary), and whether the projicient reference of properties to things is meant to be equivalent to the judgment that things really *are* so, or implies merely the relation of sign to significate. I suspect the latter.

tion. If this is not a circular movement from mental event to cognitive function and back again, what is?

Hence, I can not agree with Sellars's criticism of Whitehead<sup>14</sup> for excluding theory of knowledge from his theory of nature, and restricting the latter to "the relations *inter se* of things known, abstracted from the bare fact that they are known." It is possible to include mind and knowledge in nature by treating them simply as events, as, indeed, they are treated by psychology. But it is not possible to answer, in the context of nature and of any natural science, the question, Is nature (or anything else) really what we experience and judge it to be? Yet this is what we mean when we say that we "know" nature (or anything else). So far as "idealists" have always seen the difference between these two points of view and pursued the latter on its merits into the distinction between "reality" and "appearances," which are yet "degrees of reality," they may claim to have done work of abiding value, which evolutionary naturalists, and others, forget or ignore at their peril.

<sup>14</sup> See *loc. cit.*, *Mind*, Vol. XXXI, No. 121, p. 39.

## CURRENT REALISM

R. W. SELLARS

THAT the first, genial period of the realistic movement in the English-speaking countries is over will, I believe, be granted me by those in touch with the literature. The possible lines of interpretation have been carefully canvassed and the various positions have been formulated with a fair degree of precision and definiteness. Thus we are able to contrast English neo-realism with American neo-realism and both with critical realism. It would appear to be the case that the preliminary exploration and search for possibilities has been carried through and that we are about to enter upon the stage in which there will be a struggle for survival among these suggested possibilities, a struggle which will involve clarification and modification, no doubt, but also the rejection of certain theses and analyses and the acceptance of others. It is in this fashion that philosophy slowly grows.

This realistic movement is likely to seem tremendously important to the thinker who has participated in it. He sees it as a right-about-face in Anglo-American philosophy. Not only was it a protest against the perspective and assumptions of traditional idealism; it was also an effort to build afresh upon the foundations of the sciences. It stood for an ingenious and persistent attempt to study perception with its associated meanings and beliefs and to pass thence to the higher reaches of knowing.

I have suggested that the first period of the realistic movement is over. There are many signs that this is true. First, no novel realistic doctrine has recently been suggested—a fact which is not surprising in view of the daring of the inaugurators of the movement who went to extremes which challenged probability; and, second, the attention of philosophy is already swinging to cosmology, as is illustrated by the increasing interest in the theory of nature and in the solution of the mind-body problem along monistic lines. It is highly probable that the struggle for existence among realistic doctrines will be affected by the results of this new development which will cast light back upon epistemology.

Assuming, then, that the stage of the formulation of realistic hypotheses is in the main past, it will be my endeavor to give a survey of them, linking them with the names with which they should be associated, and to add to this survey some measure of criticism, evaluation and suggestion. Though I myself represent a specific type of realism, I have always tried to be open-minded and to regard critically my own position as well as that of others, holding as my ideal that objectivity and tentativeness which characterizes science in its treatment of hypotheses.

## I

It is natural to divide current realistic doctrines in the English-speaking world in some measure along national lines because, when all is said, those who live together and know each other personally influence each other most strongly. Philosophy is international and yet in its growth bears the marks of its social environment. If a certain thinker makes an analysis, he is apt to be followed therein by those who come directly under his influence. There is in this the unavoidable effect of personal prestige. Thus we shall see that the English realists have usually

had a somewhat different notion of mind and mental acts than have Americans. To what does this go back? Perhaps to the influence of G. E. Moore and Russell, and perhaps from them to the work of Meinong and Brentano? In this matter, the American tradition has followed James, Hume, Mach and, perhaps, the empirical psychological and biological outlook.

There is, in short, a characteristic convergence in each country of international and intranational influences. The English thinker will not be surprised at this fact if he will bear in mind the differences between Oxford and Cambridge in these matters. Of course, we must not oversimplify the situation for there are exceptions to test the rule. Thus Mr. Russell has both influenced American thought and been in turn influenced by it. His book, *The Analysis of Mind*, illustrates this interaction very well. But, in Mr. Broad, we cannot fail to note the effects of inbreeding.

We must not forget that realism is, after all, a very old tradition in philosophy, far older than the idealism which submerged it during the latter half of the nineteenth century. This is not the place to investigate the reasons for this temporary submergence, and I shall content myself with pointing out the fact. Cartesianism passed into Lockian representative realism and thence into sensationism. Was this a degeneration, or an advance, or something of both? In any case, English philosophy lost its vitality and fell a prey to Kant and Hegel. Perhaps, there was much in the *Zeitgeist* of romanticism and in the struggle with the inordinate claims of a mechanistic science of a reductive type to reenforce this turn which philosophy took and to give idealism a strength which is already seeming curious to the present generation.

But such an historical study is not my present task. The plain fact seems that idealism was not equal to its task. It did not face up to the facts discovered by the

sciences, and seemed to consider itself an escape from their pressure. Dissatisfaction was certain to manifest itself.

This dissatisfaction expressed itself at almost the same moment in personal idealism of a pluralistic type, in pragmatism, and in realism. The spell was broken, and a new wave of thought swept over men's minds. Thinkers who were not by nature disciples came to philosophy with the problems of the sciences in their minds and with something of its logical technique controlling their methods of approach. They felt the need of a basic reformulation, of a fresh start. It was their task to analyze, reflect, and analyze again, yet always with some attention to the larger setting. Until the biographies of this generation are written, we shall not know the full forces which directed philosophy along realistic lines; but some of us can make a shrewd guess as to their nature. We must not, of course, make the mistake of assuming that too great a homogeneity of outlook existed. The influence of a plastic naturalism is evident in some; in others, we find an almost Platonic note.

So much for the setting of realism. We must now pass to our promised survey of actual positions. And I think it will be best to begin with the English phase of the movement. While the swing toward realism was practically contemporaneous on the two sides of the Atlantic, the formulation of it in England was more precise and clear-cut. American thought was more experimental and varied. Another reason for beginning with the English development is the recognition accorded to Mr. Russell's work in mathematical logic by the American new realists. Their theory of analysis seems to have been built up largely upon it as a foundation.

## II

Mr. G. E. Moore fired what is usually considered the opening gun of the attack upon idealism in his essay entitled, "The Refutation of Idealism." This was published in *Mind* in 1903 and has been reprinted with nine other essays of his in a book called *Philosophical Essays*, dated 1922. Mr. Moore, who is now professor of mental philosophy in the University of Cambridge, has not been a prolific writer but has been very influential. He owes this influence to his painstaking analysis of problems, his refusal to be satisfied with the superficial. Whether he has shown as much power in construction is doubtful. But he might well reply to a critic that he was persuaded that the first task was that of analysis since the foundation had first of all to be laid.

The distinction upon which Mr. Moore puts so much stress is characteristic of this English type of realism. It is that between the mental act of awareness and the object of that act. He speaks of this mental act as a sensation because he has in mind its difference from thought of a more developed kind. He argues that the mistake of the idealist has been the assumption that what we are aware of is the content of our sensations, an inseparable aspect of them. But such a position, he maintains, involves a denial that we can be *aware of* anything. The idealist is logically involved in solipsism. In contrast, Moore stresses the basic importance of a relation which he calls "awareness of anything." Every experience includes this factor. It is that which justifies us in calling any fact mental. This doctrine of a transparent cognitive relation which is mental but is not itself the object of a mental act stands out as a thesis which had tremendous influence upon other English realists. It gave a simple structure to their analysis of cognition. The act of awareness is mental, the ob-

ject is not necessarily so; and the object is unmodified by this act of apprehension.

Those who wish to read a characteristic exposition of his views at the present time should read his statement of them in the *Second Series of Contemporary British Philosophy*, which is entitled, *A Defense of Common Sense*.

Whether this distinction between act and object was suggested by Brentano and Meinong or was worked out by himself I do not know. His development of it is, however, peculiar to himself and had its influence upon Alexander, Broad, Laird and Russell.

Bertrand Russell has probably been the most conspicuous figure of the English movement. He owes his prominence to various factors among which we may mention his pioneer work in the fusion of mathematics and logic. It would, I think, be generally granted that his contributions to symbolic logic were marked by careful scholarship and ripe reflection. We would select for special mention *Principles of Mathematics*, *Principia Mathematica* (with A. N. Whitehead), and *Our Knowledge of the External World*. In the domain of theory of knowledge, his little book, *The Problems of Philosophy*, helped to direct attention to a position very similar to Moore's. Mr. Russell has been a prolific writer, seemingly able to touch upon almost every subject and gifted with a strikingly clear style. His very virtuosity may have robbed us of systematic works comparable to his *Principles of Mathematics*. His latest definitely philosophical contribution is his *Analysis of Mind*. In it he shows a swing in the direction of the American approach in so far as it took its departure from William James's famous essay, *Does Consciousness Exist?* The psychological position called behaviorism has also exerted influence upon him. In our summary discussion of Russell it will be best to confine our attention to his logic and to his view of mind.



In his contribution to the *First Series of Contemporary British Philosophy*, Russell describes his philosophy as logical atomism, preferring this description to that of realism. He has always stressed the importance of relations for logic and for our thought of reality. The tendency to monism in the past is, he believes, due in no small measure to the emphasis upon the subject-attribute structure. Logical atomism means distinction of type in facts and propositions. Terms must not be confused with relations. They are distinct and irreducible. Logic is the study of recurrent forms. The influence of mathematics is shown in his adoption of the expression, "propositional function", for the logical form which contains variables which may be replaced by specific terms. "X is mortal" is a favorite instance of such a propositional function. In place of  $x$  we may put Socrates or Wilson or John Smith.

It is his contention that a large number of the paradoxes which afflicted philosophy were due to bad logic and bad mathematics. On the whole, he seems to have established this contention, though it is probable that the last word has not been said in mathematical theory upon infinite numbers and upon continuity. This incursion of mathematical methods into philosophy has been most stimulating and useful.

In his theory of knowledge, Russell has moved from a position akin to that of Brentano and Meinong to one which approaches American neo-realism. He writes as follows: "My own belief—for which the reasons will appear in subsequent lectures—is that James is right in rejecting consciousness as an entity, and that the American realists are partly right, though not wholly, in considering that both mind and matter are composed of a neutral-stuff which, in isolation, is neither mental nor material. I should admit this view as regards sensations: what is heard or seen belongs equally to psychology and to physics.

But I should say that images belong only to the mental world, while those occurrences (if any) which do not form the part of any 'experience' belong to only the physical world."<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that this is a structural view of mind and consciousness.

S. Alexander deserves space in such a survey as ours because he was one of the first to work out realism in a systematic way and to connect it with cosmology. His two-volume work, *Space, Time and Deity*, has much in it that is admirable. We must, however, confine ourselves to the epistemological side of his speculation.

Alexander developed his realism gradually, and we have articles of his in the *Proceedings* of the Aristotelian Society and in *Mind* which reveal the line of his advance. It is clear that he begins by rejecting the possibility of a new type of representative realism. His statements to this effect are explicit. He finds himself in harmony, then, with Moore and with other English realists in the theory that the object of awareness is non-mental and that awareness is a contentless act. Even images are in some sense physical. It would seem that this theory leaves little to psychology. And it is not surprising to find that Alexander is favorable to behaviorism. A distinction of his which has attracted attention is that between enjoyment and contemplation. This distinction corresponds to the difference between the mental act and its object. The object is contemplated; the act is enjoyed. So long as we are concerned with the apparent structure of a simple act of cognition, this contrast seems a natural one. But it may be questioned whether it is any more than a functional division. We have already noted that Russell and the American neo-realists, following James, are inclined to question even its functional existence. In this they are probably going

<sup>1</sup>Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 25.

too far. But we should note that Alexander makes of it an opposition of stuff.

Having determined his epistemology and given it an empirical, immediate content, Alexander proceeded to disclose its cosmic context. Under the influence of relativity notions, he makes space-time the ultimate reality. It is the stuff out of which all particular things are made; even universals find their place in it as a spatio-temporal pattern. We now meet with the theory of emergence which postulates the rise of new qualities in an evolutionary way. Thus mind is a term for the mental acts intrinsic to the brain. So far as possible, we find Alexander seeking to merge knowing into the general relation of compresence, which characterizes all things in the world. Yet he recognizes the special nature of awareness and puts it high up in the scale of evolution.

Alexander is a systematic, ingenious and daring thinker. He has exercised marked influence upon the work of such important thinkers as Whitehead and Lloyd Morgan.

There are many other philosophers in England whose epistemological work deserves mention. Percy Nunn is one of the pioneers in the field. His little book, entitled *The Aim and Achievements of Scientific Method*, has been influential. John Laird is a defender of the essentials of common sense. His position savors very strongly of the traditional Scottish school. His *Problems of the Self* is probably his best work. As regards theory of knowledge, he follows fairly closely in the footsteps of Moore and Alexander. This is seen in his *Study in Realism*, which is a clear statement and defence of the essentials of neo-realism. Dawes Hicks is a keen critic much of whose work has been done in articles and reviews. He emphasizes the discriminative capacity of the mind. L. A. Reid has developed a position very close to that of American critical realism. His *Knowledge and Truth* is in many ways an

admirable piece of reasoning. C. D. Broad of Cambridge is a realistic thinker who has remarkable balance. He has shown himself able to follow the recent developments of mathematical physics and to interpret them to the general reader. In this ability he resembles Russell. In fact, no one could fail to place him in the group associated with Cambridge. His epistemology represents in many ways a return to Locke but, of course, with a difference. He accepts the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, thus breaking with neo-realism, and adds to the primary qualities such a factor as energy. In accordance with the English tradition, he makes much of the sense-data which are given in perception. These data seem to be thought of by him, not as discriminations but rather as definite entities which are non-mental, though not physical. He seems to continue to hold a restricted idea of mind. Sense-data are a *tertium quid* between mind and physical object. His chief works are *Perception, Physics and Reality*, *Scientific Thought*, and *The Mind and its Place in Nature*.

### III

In the United States the realistic movement began in a broad and tentative way. James, Santayana and Woodbridge were among the first on the field. Shortly thereafter, appeared most of those who have since made contributions. Gradually a division between the "new realists" and the "critical realists" became evident and was sharpened by means of the cooperative volumes which the two groups published. It will be most convenient to consider the doctrines as a whole and to mention the writings of the particular thinkers incidentally.

James and Woodbridge sought to interpret mind realistically as a kind of relation between objects existent in their own right. It was an attempted return to naive

realism combined with an attack upon the traditional realm of the subjective. In fact, the subjective has been in bad repute with American thinkers as a whole. James's doctrine was called by him radical empiricism and assumed that the raw stuff of reality was immediately given and that the difference between the physical and the psychical was merely one of relationship or perspective. We have already noticed that Russell has come under the spell of this theory.

Meanwhile, a younger group were working away at a systematic analysis of knowledge from the realistic standpoint. Distinctly intellectualistic in their approach, they laid emphasis upon symbolic logic and upon what Russell has called logical atomism. Their chief doctrine was similar to that of the English movement, *viz.*,—that the object itself is given in the field of experience. In other words, they, also, rejected the possibility of making a fresh start along the lines of a mediate, or representative, type of realism. It has become customary to call their position epistemological monism to signalize this literal presence of the object. Thus this book which I perceive is an actual external object in no sense dependent upon my perception for its existence. Its being perceived is just an external relation into which it has temporarily entered. This doctrine demanded the development of the logic of relations and it was for this reason that these thinkers gave so much time to symbolic logic, believing, as they did, that the logic of analysis gave their epistemology its foundation. It may be that they were deceived in this belief, but it cannot be denied that it helped to bring about that efflorescence of mathematical logic so characteristic of Harvard, as it is of Cambridge.

The new realists drifted in the direction of behaviorism by denying the peculiar mental act so conspicuous in the English theory. Mind is increasingly conceived in

terms of the response of the organism . Such a development led in the direction of the complete denial of consciousness as peculiarly private and subjective. The intra-organic is simply harder to get at and to make an object of knowledge.

One other point should be noted. Like all theories of immediate realism, the new realism holds that the very stuff of reality is given in the field of experience. And this stuff is analyzable into particulars, universals and spatio-temporal relations. There is the minimum element of skepticism and agnosticism in such an outlook. This perspective is also indicated by their dislike of the category of substance and their adoption of the mathematical term "function." In this they agree with Russell who rejects both substance and the non-legal conception of causality.

The chief exponents of the new realism in the United States are Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin, and Spaulding. Besides the cooperative work, to which they contributed in common, called *The New Realism*, we may mention Holt's *Concept of Consciousness*, Montague's *The Ways of Knowing*, Spaulding's *The New Rationalism*, and Perry's *General Theory of Value*.

I presume that it would be improper not to mention the work of A. N. Whitehead, who now teaches at Harvard. Yet his outlook is hard to classify for it combines cosmology with epistemology in a tantalizing way. Undoubtedly influenced by Alexander and Russell, he yet quickly made evident his own insights. Like all who have come under the sway of relativity views, he substitutes the category of events for that of substance. Does this simply mean an activating of the notion of substance? It is difficult to say. On the whole, Whitehead falls in line with English neo-realism. Take this statement from *Science and the Modern World*: "This creed is that the actual elements perceived by our senses are *in themselves* the ele-

ments of a common world; and that this world is a complex of things, including our acts of cognition, but transcending them." Whitehead has been of late a prolific writer, and we may mention his *Concept of Nature*, *Principle of Relativity*, and *Principles of Natural Knowledge*. His books are not easy reading because he develops his own vocabulary as he goes along. Many find a great stimulus in his work and lectures. I imagine his final influence will be greater in cosmology than in epistemology.

Critical realism arose almost contemporaneously with neo-realism, but it systematized itself later and partly in opposition to neo-realism's doctrines. It is a strict form of realism in that it teaches that we know objects which exist external to the fact of knowing and independent of it. But the division comes with the question of the actual presence of the objects themselves in the field of experience. Does knowing involve this? Do the facts permit such a belief? After carefully considering the whole situation, the advocates of critical realism decided that epistemological dualism was more plausible than epistemological monism. We make things objects, we mean, select, affirm them in a specific and definite way; and yet these objects do not literally enter our consciousness. Rather are they interpreted in terms of the meanings and characters which stand out in our perception and in our thought of them.

Perhaps the best way to get clearly in mind the difference between the new realism and critical realism is to note the divergent theories of consciousness. Critical realism thinks of consciousness as a function of the organism in its interpretative response to objects and regards it as an intraorganic realm of a peculiar kind, while the new realism thinks of consciousness as a term for a selection of entities. In other words, critical realism falls more in line with psychological tradition but adds a keener sense of the organic activities which find expression in the field of

consciousness and of the structure, distinctions and references which characterize such a domain. We may say that it puts an extrospective consciousness, engaged in knowing objects, in place of an introspective consciousness, such as traditional psychology has stressed in line with its purely analytic efforts.

This divergence in their theory of consciousness finds expression in their views of the nature of knowing. While the new realist holds that knowing is the givenness of the object, its literal presence to inspection, the critical realist regards knowing more as an interpreting of a selected and meant object by means of characters discriminated in the field of consciousness. Such knowing is a complicated affair with its meanings and its categories which have gradually been developed in the human mind in its continued response to things.

It may be well to contrast critical realism with English neo-realism also. One important difference lies in the greater scope which critical realism gives to the mental act. While neo-realism has traditionally limited the mental act to a peculiar, and almost transparent, activity of something thought of as mental in a substantial, cosmological way, critical realism does not introduce such problems at the beginning. It takes the mental act as an empirical affair and gives it the content and structure it apparently has. In other words, the mental act seems to the critical realist to be a complex process of interpretation rather than a simple awareness. This difference leads him to take the data of perception as discriminations within the field of consciousness in the act of knowing rather than as entities of a non-mental sort.

It is essential that the interpretation of knowing characteristic of critical realism be sharply distinguished from that of the older (and traditional) representative realism. It will be admitted, I think, that it was the inadequacies



of this that led to both idealism and its opponent, the new realism. Remove these inadequacies and the *raison d'être* of both of these positions is at the same time destroyed. This has at least been one of the convictions of the critical realist.

On the whole, representative realism has been tinged with subjectivism and has tended to assume that we know our ideas first and that it is by a sort of inference that we pass to the extra-mental object. Now this approach led to insuperable difficulties. It was impossible to justify such an inference as a purely logical matter, and it was equally impossible to verify the similarity between ideas as primary objects of thought and external things not given. Having carefully studied the actual situation in knowing, the critical realist stresses the direction of the complex act of knowing. He holds that a sense of an object is a specific ingredient in the act of cognition and that this sense of an object goes with the interpretation of the characteristics of the object. In other words, knowing has a definite structure and content and is by no means reducible to the two operations set up by Locke. It is the external physical thing which we from the first are engaged in interpreting, and this interpreting is a complex affair revealed in consciousness. We have pointed out the differences between critical realism and the new realism; let us now turn to the similarities.

For both, mind is conceived organically in terms of responses of the higher nervous centres. Thus the setting is psycho-biological. For both, the object is independent of the act of perceiving. There is a strong tone of naturalism in the outlook of both. And yet even here come the differences again. The new realism swings in the direction of extreme behaviorism and is skeptical of an intraorganic, subjective realm, while the critical realist accepts such a realm and considers it natural and intrinsic to the total

organic response. This choice in psychology reflects a choice in epistemology. If objects are given and so constitute consciousness, there is no need of a subjective microcosm. If, however, objects are not given but are interpreted in terms of given characters, then such a peculiar, intraorganic domain is needed. I do not see, therefore, how psychology can remain indifferent to epistemological disputes.

A similar comparison between critical realism and English neo-realism may be of value. It will be remembered that, for the English neo-realist, the mental act is simple and transparent—even for Alexander it is not much more than an enjoyed sense of direction. We may say that American neo-realism sought to do without even this mental act while keeping the direct givenness of the object, while critical realism enlarged the mental act to take in concrete content and to make of it a structured process of interpretation of an object meant and selected but not literally given. Since the basic theory of knowledge is so different in the latter case, I suppose that the natural line of evolution of English neo-realism is in the direction of the new realism. It would appear that both Alexander and Russell are turning toward it. On the other hand, it would seem equally natural for a position like Broad's to swing toward critical realism.

It would be unfair to the reader who wishes to understand the situation in realistic epistemology to-day not to refer to the differences among critical realists themselves.

There seem to be two trends which reflect a difference in cosmology itself. On the whole, Santayana, Drake and Strong maintain that the datum is an essence which cannot be regarded as a psychological existent and must therefore be considered a logical universal or subsistent. In adequate knowing, this essence is identical with the essence embodied in the object. There is no doubt that this group

has put its finger upon a very significant question for critical realism. In knowing, we are trying to interpret the object and an accepted interpretation is supposed by us to reveal the object somehow and in some measure. This claim seems to me the minimum and irreducible feature of knowing. Now the other members of the group are quite aware of the demands of knowing, but they are not persuaded that it involves the postulation of essences of this semi-Platonic sort. Let us examine the complex act of knowing and see whether we can give it a psychological interpretation which, at the same time, does justice to its logical aspect.

A complex act of knowing seems to me a configuration, or *Gestalt*, with specific characteristics. It is an achievement involving meanings and distinctions and is clearly a high mental level. At this level, the category of thinghood is functioning with its sense of objects and their characteristics. Note that it is within this kind of structure that we as conscious and knowing creatures work. We discriminate characters and at the same time think of them as characteristics of the object we are seeking to interpret. The point to grasp is this, that, in knowing, we assert a cognitional identity between the predicates which we hold before our minds and the characteristics of the independent object. We believe that we are cognitively grasping the structure and behavior of the object. Or, to put it another way, we believe that the structure and behavior of objects are revealed to us by these predicates. Does such a revelation or cognitional grasping involve an identity of essence? Does it imply that there is a something which is identically present in the mind and in the object? Here is the point in dispute. I, for one, cannot see that it does involve this. Moreover, it appears to me that predicates are distinctions in consciousness.

Ultimately, I suppose, the dispute involves a theory

of consciousness itself. Is consciousness a complex of mind-stuff? Is it a flux of essences? Or is it an emergent and configured stream of *quales* within which knowing takes place in an empirical way and in which we as conscious selves are? Drake appears to me to hold the first view, Santayana the second, and several of us the third view. I am inclined to think that epistemology has gone as far as it can without a definite cosmology and ontology. The question in my own mind is this, Which view fits in most aptly with an outlook of the type of emergent naturalism? It is clear that the nature and status of universals is also involved in this division within critical realism. Can universals be given a purely psychological interpretation in terms of discrimination and symbolism? Or must we assume genuine subsistents which have a non-psychological status? It is to the first position that I myself give allegiance, while the other wing of critical realism is evidently more in line with the traditions of Plato and Aristotle.

Those who have had the patience to follow my analysis of the various epistemological theories of a realistic perspective which the last thirty years have brought forth will, I believe, acknowledge the painstaking character of this development. All relevant questions have been raised and discussed. There has been no flinching from difficulties, no taking refuge in broad generalities. It is for this reason that I am persuaded that genuine advance has been made and that, with an equal advance in cosmology, something analogous to science in its finality will be produced. The realist feels that he is on the right track and it is his hope that, out of the struggle which is going on between different positions, something definite will crystallize.

## INSTRUMENTALISM

M. C. OTTO

LATE in the seventies of the last century two singularly gifted Americans, working on independent problems, arrived at original conclusions bearing on the nature and function of human thinking. Out of the amalgamation of their views a new philosophy took its rise. The better known published result of these labors is a paper by Charles S. Peirce. In recent philosophic literature frequent reference has been made to his article, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," which appeared in January, 1878. In this article he attacked the doctrine that the clearness of an idea is an abstract quality which the idea wears on its face, discoverable by sufficiently persistent introspection. In contrast to this notion, Peirce maintained that "there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice."<sup>1</sup> He insisted that at the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be, we come down to what is tangible and practical. "Our idea of anything," accordingly, "is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself."<sup>2</sup> Or, to put it in another way: "The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule

<sup>1</sup> Peirce, C. S.: *Chance, Love, and Logic* (New York, 1923), p. 44. (Reprinted from *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. 12, pp. 286-302.)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

of action, then no mere difference in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes."<sup>3</sup> The position was summarized by Peirce in this much-quoted passage: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."<sup>4</sup>

In so far as a philosophic movement may be said to have begun at a definite time, this essay has been taken to mark the beginning of Pragmatism. The word does not appear in the essay, although Peirce had been using it for two or three years in philosophical conversations;<sup>5</sup> but pragmatic doctrine is obviously there, and it is presented with perspicuity and force. As Peirce declares, his theory is the outgrowth of his laboratory experience. It is the expression of an attempt to slough concepts which have their "only true place in philosophies which have long been extinct," and to introduce the experimental, laboratory temper of mind into the whole range of human thinking. Thus the instrumental character of ideas is made to appear. They are shown to be rules of action, experimental means employed by man to get himself forward in the world.

In the same month and year was published the first essay from the pen of William James, under the title, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence."<sup>6</sup> The essay is sufficiently remarkable in itself, but it is even more significant as the prelude to all that James did as writer and philosopher. Not only is it written in the clean, fluent, urbane style for which James later became well known;

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>5</sup> *Monist*, Vol. XV, p. 166, note

<sup>6</sup> In the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, January, 1878, Vol. XII, pp. 1-18. Reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews*, New York, 1920, pp. 43-68. This paper had been preceded by book reviews and literary notices extending through a period of ten years in which, as we can now see, there were adumbrations of what was to come.

not only does it exhibit the same catholicity of interest, analytical keenness, and constructive imagination conspicuous in his maturer years; but it presents and defends the teleological conception of the human mind, of which his philosophy as a whole is the enriched and deepened elaboration. Rejecting the conception of mental activity which regards it as an act of corresponding to a world antecedently given, he argues that "interests which we bring with us, and simply posit or take our stand upon, are the very flour out of which our mental dough is kneaded. The organism of thought, from the vague dawn of discomfort or ease in the polyp to the intellectual joy of Laplace among his formulas, is teleological through and through." Again, in a penetrating passage prophetic of what James, as pragmatist, was to contend for, he says: "I, for my part, cannot escape the consideration, forced upon me at every turn, that the knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foothold anywhere, and passively reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply existing. The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers the truth which he helps to create. Mental interests, hypotheses, postulates, so far as they are bases for human action—action which to a great extent transforms the world—help to *make* the truth which they declare. In other words, there belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in the game, and not a mere looker-on; and its judgments of the *should-be*, its ideals, cannot be peeled off from the body of the *cogitandum* as if they were excrescences, or meant, at most, survival."<sup>8</sup>

This essay—which clearly enunciates the active, reconstructive character of human intelligence and emphasizes the validity of such non-cognitive elements of experience as preferences and ideals, and which presages the doctrine

<sup>7</sup> James, William: *Collected Essays and Reviews*, p. 61.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

that truth is a working-value of ideas—is a second source of Pragmatism. The word source is used in the face of what we know to have been James's intellectual obligations to Peirce. When, twenty years after this time, James inaugurated the pragmatist movement so to speak officially, he acknowledged his indebtedness to Peirce in the handsome manner characteristic of him.<sup>9</sup> And the acknowledgment had its basis in fact. He had known Peirce, who was only three years his senior, from at least his nineteenth year, and he was a member of the Metaphysical Club, started by Peirce, where in the early seventies "the name and the doctrine of pragmatism saw the light."<sup>10</sup> There can be no doubt that Peirce's logical genius had an influence on the more artistic temperament of James. But James did more than merely develop the ideas he got from Peirce—which is the impression one is apt to carry away from what has been written on the subject.<sup>11</sup> Letters and memoranda dating from the years 1869-1872—the critical period in James's emotional and intellectual life—make it sufficiently clear that the germinal idea of the philosophy advanced in his first printed essay was born out of a struggle so intimate, personal, and momentous that he hid the depth of it from those about him. The problem was a moral or religious, rather than, as with Peirce, a logical one. It con-

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 410.

<sup>10</sup> *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIII, p. 719.

<sup>11</sup> There are some exceptions. See especially A. K. Rogers: *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, New York, 1922, p. 359ff.

It is true that Peirce, repudiating James' brand of Pragmatism, says, "No doubt he derived his ideas on the subject from me" (*Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIII, p. 719). But the remark must be understood in its context. Peirce is not implying that James takes credit for ideas which he had in fact borrowed. On that question we have this statement from Peirce: "There never was the smallest disloyalty on James's part. On the contrary, he dragged in mention of me whenever he could." (*Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIII, p. 719.) He is objecting to the strange doctrines which James has introduced. He feels that he must acknowledge responsibility for such *true* pragmatic elements as James's philosophy may include, but he wishes it understood that the philosophy current under the name Pragmatism differs profoundly from the theory that had its rise with him. (Cf. Peirce's reasons for changing the name Pragmatism to Pragmaticism. *Monist*, Vol. XV, p. 162.) See also, Violet Paget's stimulating book, *Vital Lies*, London, 1912, more particularly Vol. I, Chap. 1.



cerned man's place in the universe, a problem which at the time was disturbing many thoughtful youths who had come under the influence of Herbert Spencer's universalization of Evolution.<sup>12</sup> Put in a sentence the problem was this: Is man impotent and meaningless in the whole of things or are human individuality and power of initiative real? And until he had hit upon what seemed at least a possible way of validating man's significance, James was weighed down by a sense of frustration. How deeply depressed he was is vividly suggested by his portrayal of the experience which, thirty years later, he incorporated in his treatment of the "sick soul" in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, there attributing it to an anonymous "French correspondent."<sup>13</sup> "If I had not clung to scripture-texts like *The eternal God is my refuge*, etc. [so the account concludes] I think I should have grown really insane."<sup>14</sup>

Under date of April 30, 1870, a new note is sounded. "I think," James writes, "that yesterday was a crisis in my life. . . . Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative, like daring to act originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external world to determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring into; now I will go a step further with my will, not only act with it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative power. My belief, to be sure, *can't* be optimistic—but I will posit life (the real, the good) in the self-governing resistance of the ego to the world. Life shall [be built in] doing and suffering and creating."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> James's friend, John Fiske, had no difficulty in turning Evolution to moral and religious account, but Fiske was incurably optimistic. The two friends debated a phase of the subject in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. XLVI, pp. 441ff.; XLVII, pp. 75ff. And in connection with this debate James good-naturedly acknowledged a "spanking." James's article is reprinted in *The Will to Believe*, Chap. 7. See also Clark, J. S., *John Fiske*, Vol. II, pp. 192-199. Mr. Clark does not understand James and he is too worshipful of Fiske ever to question his position.

<sup>13</sup> *Letters*, Vol. I, pp. 144-147.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 148.

This note of victory was immediately induced by the reading of Renouvier, and James, it is well known, remained all his life "endlessly thankful" for the decisive impression made upon him at this time by Renouvier's "masterly advocacy of pluralism," but for which he fears he might never have freed himself from what he calls the "monistic superstition."<sup>16</sup> James's debt to Peirce, as we have indicated, was not of a superficial sort; it is expressed with his unfailing aptness in the dedication of *The Will to Believe*.<sup>17</sup> But it was Renouvier who touched the deeper need of his being; who gave him a supporting push at a critical stage in the ascent to a point of vision.<sup>18</sup>

It must not be forgotten that the man who is influenced has something to do with the influence. Unquestionably the 1878 essay owed much to others. James was an extraordinarily wide, appreciative, and meditative reader. It owed even more to the unique genius of its author. And this is true of his work as a whole. The contributions made by himself not only far outweighed what he took from others, but he gave to his philosophy the rare quality peculiar to it. There can be no doubt that James would have acknowledged the important bearing of his own mental and emotional idiosyncrasy; would have admitted that he became the Pragmatist he did become because (borrowing words of his own) the instability of his brain was "such as to tip and upset itself in just that particular direction."<sup>19</sup> We, looking back upon his thought from a position which sets it in perspective, can recognize that the philosophic current which he caused to move into the spiritual life of his time, while affected by the confluence of streams of in-

<sup>16</sup> James, William, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 165.

<sup>17</sup> "To My Old Friend, Charles Sanders Peirce, To whose philosophic comradeship in old times and to whose writings in more recent years I owe more incitement and help than I can express or repay."

<sup>18</sup> See, among other things, *Letters*, Vol. I, 186. Cf. pp. 80, 149.

<sup>19</sup> "Great Men and Their Environment," in *The Will to Believe*, p. 249. This essay is of peculiar interest in this connection.

fluence, yet owed its volume, its contour, and its rhythm chiefly to James himself.<sup>20</sup>

When these essays by Peirce and James were published, a youth of nineteen was completing his college course in Burlington, Vermont, who was to give to Pragmatism the developed form by which it will probably be known in the history of thought. Graduating a year later, John Dewey had already heard the call of philosophy, but it was not a philosophy which reflected the American scene. That phase was still to come. Mr. Dewey began, as he himself tells us, as a Neo-Kantian.<sup>21</sup> As late as the beginning of the present century Peirce refused to accept him as a pragmatist, placing him with those who "hover between Absolute Idealism and Sensationalism."<sup>22</sup> This characterization overlooked developments which had been taking place for at least a decade. At the moment it was written Mr. Dewey was collaborating with Drs. Ashley, Gore, Heidel, McLennan, Moore, Stuart, and Thompson on a volume entitled *Studies in Logical Theory*, which, upon its publication in 1903, laid the foundation of the instrumental

<sup>20</sup> The limits set for this paper do not permit a discussion of Hans Vaihinger's *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, a notable work also dating from the period under discussion and showing striking affinities with Pragmatism. The teleological character of mental activity, the instrumental function of ideas, the creative conception of truth—these, and other doctrines congenial to the pragmatic temper, are brilliantly defended. The erudition and originality of the author are conspicuous. Unfortunately the book was not published until 1911, a year after James's death. One can easily imagine the reception he would have endeavored to secure for it. The English translation did not appear in America until 1924. The reception of Vaihinger's work by the American pragmatists has scarcely been hearty. He, on his side, seemed anxious (in the Preface written nearly a generation after the completion of the book) to avoid being classed with the pragmatists. In a letter to the writer in the spring of 1925, Vaihinger explains that his objections were not aimed at James, Dewey, or any form of "critical Pragmatism," but at the "uncritical Pragmatism" which ignorantly distorts and exaggerates what is valuable in this philosophy. This regrettable failure in mutual acquaintance and understanding is well considered in James Gutmann's recent review of Vaihinger's book. (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 77-80.) I think with him that "there seems to be here an interesting and unconsidered instance of a significant community of thought." And I hope with him that it may be replaced by "an international 'comparing of notes'."

<sup>21</sup> *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Vol. XXIX, p. 423. Reprinted in *Studies in the History of Ideas*, N. Y., 1925, Vol. II, p. 368.

<sup>22</sup> *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, p. 720.

school. James, with his usual sensitiveness and quickness of appreciation, hailed the book with enthusiasm. "I have the duty on Monday," he wrote, "of reporting at a 'Philosophical Conference' on the Chicago School of Thought. Chicago University has during the last six months given birth to the fruit of its ten years of gestation under John Dewey. The result is wonderful—a *real school*, and *real Thought*. Important thought, too! Did you ever hear of such a city or such a University! Here we have thought, but no school. At Yale a school, but no thought. Chicago has both."<sup>23</sup> Mr. Dewey's four chapters of thoroughly pragmatistic doctrine had been preceded, in 1900, by his equally pragmatistic paper, "Some Stages in Logical Thought," and the instrumentalism thus avowed has been expanded, deepened, and clarified during the intervening quarter of a century.

It is not without significance that Mr. Dewey, on completing college, broke with the tradition of going abroad for graduate work, and, instead, joined the small group of able young men who took advantage of the opportunity for graduate study then newly offered at Johns Hopkins. Nor is it without significance that he sought his career, although an academic one, not in the ripened East, but in the unformed society of the West. Although born in New England, he was a child of America. His academic service began in Minnesota only a decade and a half after the close of the Civil War, and his formative years, as a pragmatist, were spent in Chicago. From Michigan, in one of his earliest papers, published nearly forty years ago, at a time when democracy was under fire in the older centers of education, he became philosophic spokesman for the democratic ideal.<sup>24</sup> He was then a Neo-Kantian, and the paper shows interesting traces of this; nevertheless in his

<sup>23</sup> *Letters*, Vol. II, pp. 201-202.

<sup>24</sup> "The Ethics of Democracy," in *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, Second Series, No. 1 (1888).

defense and interpretation of democracy he laid down a cardinal principle of the philosophy now known as Instrumentalism. Democracy, as an instrument of a shared and progressively ennobled common life, has been and is the central aim of those who belong to this school of Pragmatism. A. W. Moore, one of the keenest, most valiant instrumentalists, finds it an implication of Pragmatism that "social organization be essentially (whatever its name) that of a social democracy as against all forms of hierarchism";<sup>25</sup> while B. H. Bode, another of the gifted leaders of this pragmatic persuasion, voices his faith in these words: "The whole drift of things has been towards the interpretation of the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness in the sense that we are members one of another, with a common share in our common life. No one, not even the humblest citizen is to serve simply as a hewer of wood and a drawer of water; but everyone is to be recognized as a member of a great brotherhood, and to share in the opportunities, the achievements, and the aspirations which are our common possessions. There are to be no peasants, no serfs, as there are no hereditary privileges and titles, because each citizen is to rise to the full stature of his spiritual manhood, even as a son in his father's house."<sup>26</sup> From J. H. Tufts, an outstanding member of the group, we have an illuminating study of the historical development of democracy intended to give us a juster and finer appreciation of our form of society;<sup>27</sup> T. V. Smith, one of the younger protagonists of the faith, has contributed a most illuminating, critically constructive examination of the democratic ideal in his recently published volume, *The Democratic Way of Life*; and it need scarcely be mentioned that one of Mr. Dewey's most influential books is

<sup>25</sup> *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, Chicago, 1910, p. 22. Cf. p. 72.

<sup>26</sup> From an address on "Our Great American Tradition," printed in *School and Home Education*, Vol. XLI, p. 94 (1922). See also *Fundamentals of Education*, New York, 1921, Chap. III.

<sup>27</sup> *Our Democracy, Its Origins and Its Tasks*, New York, 1917.

called *Democracy and Education*. One cannot read the writings of instrumentalists without sensing the depth of their democratic convictions. They think of Pragmatism as the philosophic counterpart of the democratic movement in modern society, and it would not be wrong to say that for most of them Democracy is Religion.

This interest in democracy is no more characteristic than the sort of democracy it is attached to. In the early article by Mr. Dewey he stresses the necessity of making a distinction between the numerical and the ethical concept. "To define democracy simply as the rule of the many," he there says, "as sovereignty chopped up into mince meat, is to define it as the abrogation of society, as society dissolved, annihilated."<sup>28</sup> Against this conception, conceived after the analogy of the abstractions of physical science, he objects throughout the paper. "There is an individualism in democracy," he admits, "which there is not in aristocracy; but it is an ethical, not a numerical individualism; it is an individualism of freedom, of responsibility, of initiative to and for the ideal, not an individualism of lawlessness. In one word, democracy means that *personality* is the first and final reality. . . . It holds that the spirit of personality dwells in every individual and that the choice to develop it must proceed from that individual."<sup>29</sup> And this he goes on to show involves democracy of wealth and industry, a society in which "all industrial relations are to be regarded as subordinate to human relations," in which economic and industrial life shall be a social function.<sup>30</sup> In more recent writings the emphasis is upon *distinctness* of personality. Society is deemed democratically efficient to the extent that it develops the incommensurable something which constitutes its citizens individuals. For "if democracy has a moral and an ideal meaning," says Mr. Dewey

<sup>28</sup> *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, as cited, p. 7.

<sup>29</sup> *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

now, "it is that a social return be demanded from all and that opportunity for development of distinctive qualities be afforded all."<sup>81</sup> But this is the same conception fashioned in response to contemporary needs. It is at any rate democracy after this pattern—a life together which shall enhance the significance of each life—that these gentlemen have at heart and aim to conceptualize. Under the spell of this vision they speak in glowing terms such as these: "Democracy and the one, the ultimate, ethical ideal of humanity are to my mind synonyms."<sup>82</sup> "This great national faith in the common man is the first political recognition, on a large scale, of the immeasurable worth of the individual human soul. It is our national holy of holies, the shining ideal which we call America the Beautiful."<sup>83</sup> And if it be objected that such interests, while becoming to a social reformer, derogate from the dignity of a philosopher, an answer is at hand in Mr. Dewey's latest book. "Social Reform," he says, "is conceived in a Philistine spirit if it is taken to mean anything less than precisely the liberation and expansion of the meanings of which experience is capable. . . . Nothing but the best, the richest and fullest experience possible, is good enough for man."<sup>84</sup> What therefore can be nearer to philosophy than the problem of rendering this best more general, more significant, and more secure, through the comprehensive criticisms of values?

Closely related to the social theory of Instrumentalism is its psychological theory. On the face of it, this is behavioristic. "I should also like to point out," says Mr. Dewey in reference to a series of articles, "that the essays in their psychological phases are written from the stand-

<sup>81</sup> *Democracy and Education*, p. 142.

<sup>82</sup> Mr. Dewey, in *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, p. 28.

<sup>83</sup> Bode, in *School and Home Education*, *loc. cit.*, p. 94.

<sup>84</sup> *Experience and Nature*, pp. 411, 412. For some direct applications of this interest see Smith, T. V., *Notes on the American Doctrine of Equality*, Chicago, 1925; Thayer, V. T., "Democratic School Administration," in *Educational Administration and Supervision*, Vol. II, 361ff.

point of what is now termed behavioristic psychology."<sup>35</sup> And this is certainly supported by many passages that might be cited from his writings, such as this one: "Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging, conceiving, and reasoning that is done."<sup>36</sup> Or again: "A mind or consciousness or soul in general which performs these operations is a myth";<sup>37</sup> and "the scientific man and the philosopher like the carpenter, the physician and politician know with their habits not with their 'consciousness'."<sup>38</sup> Yet in close proximity to these passages appear others of a different purport. The reader is told that "habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not of itself stop to think, observe, or remember."<sup>39</sup> And a few sentences further on, the knowledge which lives in habits is denied to be knowledge, except by courtesy; and knowledge, in the strict sense, is said to be "knowledge *of* and *about* things, knowledge *that* things are thus and so, knowledge that involves reflection and conscious appreciation."<sup>40</sup> To which must be added the fact that the most widely known behaviorist is peculiarly anxious to protect behaviorism from being contaminated by pragmatic psychology,<sup>41</sup> and that the leading pragmatist reciprocates by accusing behavioristic psychology of "aping the manners of physics."<sup>42</sup> It is clear, then, that the movement with which the behavioristic tendency originated and which has steadily extended the range of the behavioristic principle of explanation, is yet fundamentally antagonistic to *pure* behaviorism.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>35</sup> *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. vi.

<sup>36</sup> *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 177.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 182. A thoroughly characteristic discussion is Ethel Sabin's brilliant paper, "Giving Up the Ghost," in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVII.

<sup>39</sup> *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 177.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>41</sup> Watson, J. B.: *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Phila., 1924 (2nd Ed.), pp. vii-viii.

<sup>42</sup> Dewey, J., in *The New Republic*, Vol. XLV, p. 361.

<sup>43</sup> This antagonism to behavioristic exaggeration is already suggested in Peirce's criticism of James's sensationalism, and James's criticism of Spencer's mechanical conception of mental action.



The difference between pragmatic and pure behaviorism has developed three main foci. The latter theory reduces human behavior solely to "a segment of the cosmic movement continuum,"<sup>44</sup> making psychology a branch of mechanical physics; the former insists upon the presence in human behavior of experimental, purposive, and meaningful activity, without which, according to this view, psychology is deprived of subject-matter. Back of this divergence and responsible for it is the determination of one set of investigators to take experience at its face value, and an equal determination of another set of investigators to reject so-called experience as a tissue of illusions and to accept as real only the world of electrons and protons.

If experience is taken as it comes, the instrumentalists hold, and not illegitimately reduced to something else, we must recognize a tentative, feeling-its-way kind of behavior met with nowhere in the realm of mechanics. In such cases the stimulating environment calls forth a variety of competing responses; these block one another, thereby disintegrating activity. The resulting state of the organism is one of equilibrium, of hesitancy. The process of changing this equivocal stimulus into a univocal one, thus making possible a unified response, is thoroughly experimental in character. The various possible competing actions are imaginatively projected and compared, until a mode of activity is achieved which can serve as a direct stimulus to overt action.<sup>45</sup>

Out of this type of experimental behavior grows purposive action, action guided by the thought of foreseen consequences. When a consummation has once been hit

<sup>44</sup> Weiss, A. P.: *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior*, Columbus, 1925, p. 80. See also Chap. XVII.

<sup>45</sup> Dewey, J.: *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 189-198; Bode, B. H.: "What Is Psychology," in *The Psychological Review*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 250-258 (especially pp. 255ff.); "Consciousness and Psychology," in *Creative Intelligence*, New York, 1917, and "Intelligence and Behavior," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 10ff. See also, in the same volume, the highly suggestive discussion of a germane phase of the subject by H. W. Stuart.

upon it may thereafter become an objective, an end of conscious endeavor. These ends do not exist outside of, or distinct from, action; they are instrumental functions of behavior; but *in* this behavior they are deliberately employed to shape the course of events. Ends are aims, or, rather, *aimings*, by means of which activity is steadied and directed. Unique in their individual operation, they may nevertheless incorporate past experiences of the actor or draw upon those of others. They are conscious devices which, when employed, transform mere sequence of behavior into coherent projects for attaining foreseen consequences.<sup>46</sup>

A third divergence from Behaviorism grows out of radical disagreement on the subject of meaning. Instrumentalism holds that meanings indubitably occur. They are not psychic entities, though in view of their significance for life it is natural that some thinkers should hypostatize them as essences, thinking of them as by right subsisting eternally in the unchanging realm of spirit, though fortunately captured now and again in a brief, imperfect actualization, bringing sweetness and light to an earthly existence that is brutal and meaningless without them. Meanings are properties of behavior; they have their origin in language, in discourse. Mr. Dewey looks upon communication as the world's supreme wonder, because "it changed dumb creatures—as we significantly call them—into thinking and knowing animals and created the realm of meanings."<sup>47</sup> But language must not be confused with the signal reflexes of animals to which behaviorists would reduce it. Signaling acts are ego-centric, language is participative. A hen's clucking may call forth a response from a chick but it is not induced in any way by the response it calls forth. A gesture, say, gets meaning, as Mr. Mead

<sup>46</sup> See *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part 3, Sections 6-7; *Experience and Nature*, Chap. III.

<sup>47</sup> *Experience and Nature*, p. 166.

well expresses the matter, when "the individual takes the attitude of another toward himself, and in some sense arouses in himself the tendency to action, which his conduct calls out in the other individual."<sup>48</sup> For "it is not enough that he should indicate this meaning—whatever meaning is—as it exists for himself alone, but that he should indicate that meaning as it exists for the other to whom he is pointing it out."<sup>49</sup> Signals become signs, sounds become words, when they occasion action which takes its specific character from being the common endeavor of at least two centers of activity; when they induce reciprocal cross-reference and joint anticipation which, when acted out, result in a conjoined undertaking, regulated, as to each partner, by his participation in the partnership. And when meanings have developed, they may, as Mr. Dewey says, "be infinitely combined and rearranged in imagination, and the outcome of this inner experimentalism—which is thought—may issue forth in interaction with crude or raw events."<sup>50</sup> Through the experience and expansion of meanings human life attains to the coherence of growth and the enrichment of culture.<sup>51</sup>

The views adumbrated in this too brief survey involve others. If in experience, taken as authoritative, genuine deliberation occurs and issues in the choice of an alternative that adds meaning to existence, then we live in a world which is in a real sense indeterminate; "a real world," as Mr. Mead puts it in one of the profound

<sup>48</sup> Mead, G. H., in *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIX, p. 161.

<sup>49</sup> Mead, G. H., *ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>50</sup> *Experience and Nature*, p. 166.

<sup>51</sup> Mead, G. H.: "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," in *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIX, pp. 157-163. Compare with this his "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," in *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VII, pp. 397-405; Dewey, J., *Experience and Nature*, Chap. 5. The coming decade should supply us with important data throwing light on the problem of meaning. Mr. Koehler's and Mr. Yerkes' studies of higher apes are reopening the question of the place of deliberately adaptive behavior in animal life. It would seem that pragmatists face the dilemma of granting more "mind" to apes or less to men.

documents of philosophical literature, "which consists not of an unchanged universe, but of a universe which may be continually readjusted according to the problems arising in the consciousness of the individuals in society."<sup>52</sup> There is, then, freedom of action; not freedom to act unconditionally, but freedom in "formulating the ends toward which our conduct shall be directed."<sup>53</sup> In such a world the real and the ideal will be conceived to be continuous in the flux of events; *things* being achieved objects on which we can depend, *ideals* possible objects yet to be made into dependable things. And if the objects of experience are features of reality, ideas which lead us into propitious relation with them are true—true to us in our need. Critics assert that instrumentalists confuse truth with the test of truth. This is a misinterpretation. What they actually do is to define truth with direct reference to, rather than in disregard of, the tests of truth. After the same manner Logic is defined in direct relation to thinking as it concretely occurs, thus becoming the study and systematic formulation of the procedure of thinking, with the aim of arriving at the description and use of superior method. In a similar spirit the whole subject of value is approached from the side of desire, the objective being knowledge of the conditions under which the desired becomes the desirable, the valued the valuable.

There is, consequently, no quarrel between pragmatistic philosophy and nature. Nature, it is true, is not assimilated to man's desires, but it is recognized as the condition of all achievement; and knowledge is the articulate awareness of the conditions. The quarrel of Pragmatism is with those social, industrial, and economic circumstances, those blind prejudices and customs, those inhibiting concepts regarding man and his environment which stand in the way of higher individual and communal attainment. Its goal is

<sup>52</sup> Mead, G. H., in *Creative Intelligence*, p. 223.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

not narrowly utilitarian, as has been so often asserted and as often denied. Room is left, *most* room is left, in Mr. Moore's words, for "objects of contemplation, adoration, love, and worship."<sup>54</sup> It welcomes the opportunity to assist in redeeming knowledge from materialism, and appreciation from tribalism.<sup>55</sup> Rooted in American soil, growing in response to a newer civilization's hunger for higher satisfaction, Pragmatism is precisely the philosophy that strives to discover and to render pervasive and secure all that makes life meaningful and precious. The aim of philosophy so conceived, as we have been told by Mr. Kallen, "is the liberation and enlargement of human capacities, the enfranchisement of man by the actual realization of values. . . . Where it is successful, beauty and use are confluent and identical in it. It converts sight into insight. It infuses existence with value, making them one. It is the concrete incarnation of Creative Intelligence."<sup>56</sup> Clearly not a philosophy of ascetic detachment, it is even less a philosophy of action for the mere sake of action. Its central concern is that every power and device of man shall be intelligently employed to make life liveable, noble, and joyous.

<sup>54</sup> Moore, A. W.: "Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism," in *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XVII, p. 515.

<sup>55</sup> Moore, A. W., in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVII, p. 129.

<sup>56</sup> Kallen, H. M., in *Creative Intelligence*, p. 467.

## VALUE THEORY AND AESTHETICS

WILBUR M. URBAN

THE category of value is in a sense as old as philosophy, but in another sense the realm of values is new to exploration. During the last quarter century all the resources of psychological and logical analysis have been brought to the solution of problems of the relation of value to existence and reality, problems which if not new in their essence are new in their manner of formulation. The causes that led to the gradual shifting of the philosophical center of gravity from being to value need not be recounted here—to enumerate them would be to tell the story of the philosophy of the last decades. Enough that, in the words of Münsterberg, “through the world of things shimmered first weakly, and then ever more clearly, the world of values.” This realm of values is “there” to quote a recent writer. It is the sense in which it is there which constitutes the key problem of our epoch.

The beginning of the serious discussion of value in this country is connected by many writers with the appearance of Münsterberg’s *Eternal Values* and Urban’s *Valuation*, both having appeared before the English-speaking public in the same week. And indeed it may be conveniently dated from the appearance of a special *Value* number of the *Psychological Bulletin* in October, 1909, in which these two trends in value theory were brought into sharp contrast. A review of *Valuation* and an article by Münsterberg on “The Opponents of Eternal Values,” defending his own position, served to set in clear relief problems which

were to determine the direction of discussion. In the meantime had appeared a new point of view and a new idiom (I refer to the pragmatic use of the value concept inaugurated by William James in the Lowell lectures), which served at the same time to make value a popular word and to introduce an approach to the problem which was to influence greatly the direction of thought on the question, at least in this country. The phenomenological, the axiological and the pragmatic points of view represented the three chief currents of value theory.

## II

The application of all the resources of psychology, analytic and genetic, to the value problem, was the natural result of a period in which the psychological-biological point of view was uppermost. The first and most important condition, both of the origin and development of ideas and judgments of value, lies obviously in human desires and feelings, and ultimately in the impulses, instincts and tendencies which they presuppose. Every assertion of value, it is immediately evident, is dependent upon the experiences of the affective-volitional life. The answer to the question, what goes on in consciousness when we value anything, seemed to offer the clue, not only to the nature, but also to the validity of the values themselves. An answer to the question of genealogy—how values came into being—seemed to offer the clue not only to the question of what our human values are, but also to the evaluation of these values. These problems of the phenomenology of values were in fact set specifically by the investigations of the Austrian value philosophers. The thesis of Meinong (involving essentially questions of analysis) that value is feeling, but the content of feeling only when it is mediated by judgments or assumptions, not only gave the impetus to

numerous psychological studies, but served to raise the entire question of the relation of valuation to cognition. The second thesis, that of Ehrenfels, that value is desirability, and that this quality is to be determined by reference to underlying biological dispositions, gave impetus to a method which was essentially genetic and evolutionary in character, and which, in its turn, served to set the problem of the relation of genesis to validity and value. Urban's *Valuation* may be described as an attempt to unite these two points of view in one phenomenological method.

During this period of value discussion a special department of "Values" in the *Psychological Bulletin* and a special rubric in the *Psychological Index* indicated the status of the subject, and the inclusion of values as a special field of psychology by James Ward in his monumental *Principles of Psychology*, served to give the new subject a certain standing. The outcome of the studies of this period, although not without permanent and valuable results, was, nevertheless, in the main, to transfer the problem from the psychological to the logical and philosophical domain. The reasons for this lie partly in the history of psychology itself. The development of the purely biological conception of the mind with its extremes of "Behaviorism," led naturally to the dropping of the value problem. If, as a certain wit has said, Psychology first lost its soul, then its mind, and finally consciousness, it must by that very fact, lose values. But there was another and deeper reason. The enthusiastic studies of the psychology of values were really based on the assumption that if we knew what goes on in consciousness when we value, we should know what value is; if we knew how values "come into existence," we should also be in a position to determine their nature and validity. The psychological-biological foundation of values appeared therefore to be not only the most natural, but also that of primary and, one might say, of absolute significance. The



gradual recognition of the insufficiency of this foundation—not the least on the part of most of those who had inaugurated the study of values—gave rise to what may be described as the *axiological* point of view, of which the recognition that value is a logically primitive concept, that can be neither defined nor validated in terms of anything else, was the determining character. The essential *petitio principii* of the psycho-biological point of view is the first axiom of these later developments.

### III

As all the resources of psychology had been brought into the service of the value problem, so now all the resources of logic and philosophy. This second stage in the development of value thinking in America may also be conveniently dated—from a meeting of the American Philosophical Association in December, 1915, at which the topic "Value and Existence," set by the Association itself, was vigorously debated. That the discussion itself did not take us very far, was the feeling of many of the members of the Association, but its real fruits were to be gathered in a series of articles which owed their origin largely to the stimulus of this meeting.<sup>1</sup> By this time fructifying germs of thought had come both from the neo-Kantian value philosophers in Germany and from the New Realists in England, who went at the problem from the logical and epistemological rather than the psychological point of view. The writings of Mr. G. E. Moore and Mr. Bertrand Russell, with their doctrine of the logically primitive character of value, and the investigations of the axiologists, Windelband and Rickert, with their discussions of the relation

<sup>1</sup> Prominent among these were: R. B. Perry, "The Definition of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI; W. H. Sheldon, "The Empirical Definition of Value," *ibid.*; W. M. Urban, "Value and Existence," *ibid.*, Vol. XIII.

of value to validity, served both to broaden and deepen our thinking on values.

One thing appeared clearly from the very first. The value concept was showing itself to be of extraordinary significance, not only in the technical discussions of the philosophers, but also in the more popular and semi-popular writings of the period. Only by use of the new idiom, popularized largely by the pragmatists, did it seem possible both to focus and to formulate the real problems which were forcing themselves upon the reflective consciousness of the time—the problems namely of the place or fate of values in a world as it was conceived by evolutionary naturalism. But it was also clear that this extensive popular use was made possible largely, if not wholly, by the vague and equivocal character of the term. A considerable portion of the effort of this period was, accordingly, devoted to the problem of definition.

Space will not allow me to consider the confusions of this period and the heroic efforts to clear up these confusions—the six different meanings of value distinguished by Dewey;<sup>2</sup> the “equivocation” in value pointed out by Pepper, and his distinction between immediate and standard values,<sup>3</sup> or the distinction between immediate and contributory made by Picard.<sup>4</sup> Of this phase, I will merely say that, although to some such discussions seemed to lose themselves in arid controversy and unmeaning refinement of distinctions, this does not really represent their general import. Clarification came at many points: all these studies were of value and have resulted, not only in significant distinctions in terminology, but also in bringing to light

<sup>2</sup> “Valuation and Experimental Knowledge,” in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXI, p. 333.

<sup>3</sup> “The Equivocation of Value,” Berkeley, *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. 4, p. 107.

<sup>4</sup> “Value and Worth,” in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. IX, No. 18, and *Values, Immediate and Contributory*, New York, 1920. Cf. also, R. B. Perry, “The Definition of Value,” in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI; and W. M. Urban, “Value and Existence,” *ibid.*, Vol. XI.

the implications and ultimate intentions of value thinking. I shall confine myself, however, to those points in definition which have finally become determinative of ultimate issues.

The lines have gradually formed on three main issues. There is the issue with regard to extension, between those who take the narrower view, confining the concept of value to the a-logical notions of the good, the useful and the beautiful, and those who take a broader view, including in the concept the logical values of existence and truth. As regards intension, the issues are more complicated, between those, in the first place, who define value as the relation between an object and the interest of a sentient subject, and those who define it in terms of relations not necessarily psychical; and secondly, between those for whom value is definable in terms of some relation and those for whom it is ultimately indefinable, either because it is a unique quality or some non-existent form of objectivity.

These differences have far-reaching implications and are determinative of ultimate philosophical positions. It is, however, from the last distinction that the maximum consequences flow. Those who say that ultimate values, i. e., the good, the beautiful, and the true, are ultimately indefinable, mean by this that they are individual concepts and that their nature can not be apprehended by such general propositions as form the material of natural science. There is no higher genus to ascribe them, as species, and no simples into which they may, as complexes, be analyzed. All of which means that value is not reducible to non-value terms.

The category of "value," it must be admitted, like certain other fundamental notions (including existence itself) seems to be one of those things about which we know well enough, so long as we are not asked what it is. The idea that definition is always "stipulated," would, of course,

make it allowable to take any one of these current meanings of value, provided only that we use it consistently throughout our discourse. But the problem is not so simple as this. The problem of definition is not merely a question of verbal definition, of avoiding ambiguity. It has been much more the question how value, as understood by the modern philosophical consciousness, is to be conceived, whether it is to be subsumed under categories of being, such as quality or relation, or whether it is itself a unique category not reducible to non-value terms. It is the fact that all the metaphysical and epistemological questions of value are already predetermined by our definitions that has made the problem of definition so important.

#### IV

That which more than anything else, perhaps, raised the problem of value to its significant and determining role in the thinking of the present, is the question of the relation of value to cognition. The thesis of Meinong, that value is the content of feeling only when feeling is mediated by judgments or assumptions, implies that valuation at least involves cognition, even if it is not itself cognitional. The contention of the axiologists, on the other hand, that cognition itself always involves evaluation or the acknowledgment of the value of truth, implies that in this act of acknowledgement is involved a knowledge of value. On either view, the relation of valuation to cognition is very close and the determination of this relation has been from the start in a sense diagnostic of theories of value.

Now I think it is fair to say that the very emphasis from the beginning, on values as contrasted with facts, involved the vague but implicit assumption that some element of cognition of "reality" is involved in valuation. When for instance it is said that "the values are there" whatever

"science" or naturalism may say of the world, it is assumed that they are entities, objects to be known in some way. This immediately raises the question of cognition of value, and with it the question of a distinctive value judgment, or of a noetic character to feeling.

The idea of "valuation as a logical process," asserted by the pragmatists (Dewey and Stuart), involves the notion of value as judgmental—"immediate appreciations being not values in the strict sense of the word." "Judgments of value are, then, objective in their import in the same sense as are the factual judgments in which the conditions of action are presented . . . In structure and in function the judgment in which the outcome of this process (of valuation) is presented, is *knowledge* [italics mine] and objective in the only valid acceptation of the term."<sup>5</sup> For the axiologists also valuation is judgmental. Value is predicated of an object by means of the same verbal form as a quality is predicated, but there is a difference in the mode of predication not brought out by the verbal expression. When we predicate value of anything, we pass from the mere concept of the essence of a thing, with its qualities, to a bearing which this essence has on existence. It is worth existing or ought to be. It is the acknowledgement of this "ought to be," or *Sollen*, that constitutes the cognitive element in valuation. Finally, if value is an indefinable quale, analogous to sense data, as in the view of certain realists, there must also be for them a unique type of cognition of these essences, namely, a cognition through feeling and emotion. On this view, "appreciation" is itself noetic and "judgments" of value are truth judgments.

Without going into these differences, it may be said that the issue is clearly drawn between those who say, in the above ways, that valuation is itself cognitional and those who say that while valuation involves cognition, it is itself

<sup>5</sup> H. W. Stuart, "Valuation as a Logical Process," an essay in *Studies in Logical Theory*, by John Dewey and other writers, p. 317.

not cognitional. Those who take the latter position may argue with Perry,<sup>6</sup> that interest (feeling and desire) creates values, but does not and can not cognize them; or, with Sellars, that valuing is always an operation supplementary to knowing and has no part in the knowledge process.<sup>7</sup> In either case, the position follows, it is clear, from the relational definition of value and the conception of value as a subjective *addendum* to reality. There is knowledge about value, but no knowledge of value. On the other hand, it is, perhaps, equally inevitable that those who hold that value is ultimately an indefinable quale or "objective," should also hold that it is the object of a unique form of knowledge, whether the knowledge process be emotional and intuitive or judgmental. Any discussion of the details of this debate is wholly beyond the province of this paper. Enough for our purpose to point out the great divide in modern philosophical thinking that results from the two different answers to this problem. The issue thus clearly drawn, like that involved in the definition of value, cuts deep. It is the question whether values are entities, objects or objectives to be apprehended or known—whether there is knowledge of value, or merely knowledge about certain relations to which we have given the name values. The values are "there," *are* in some sense, but the sense in which they are is largely bound up with this question of cognition. If valuation is not cognitional of reality in some sense, they remain simply a subjective *addendum* to reality. If valuation is cognitional, then the values cognized are constituent elements of the world.

Even more fundamental than this question of the cognitional character of valuation, is the question as to whether cognition itself is essentially a valuational process. The saying of G. P. Adams, that "we miss the true inwardness of the epistemological problem itself unless we

<sup>6</sup> "The Definition of Value," in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI, p. 152.

<sup>7</sup> "Cognition and Valuation," in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXV.

realize that it is but part of the problem of values at large," expresses the matured convictions of a large number of those who have followed the value thinking of the last decades. It is the "value character of the theoretical" itself, the result of pragmatic and axiological developments in logic, which, more than anything else, has served to give significance to the value problem. Deeper than any judgment, in the sense of merely bringing contents together in relations, there is, it is held, a "reflexive" act in which the judgment is claimed or acknowledged to be true or false. This act is essentially valuational in character, the point at issue between pragmatist and axiologist being mainly whether the values are relative or absolute.

The relation of cognition to valuation remains one of the unsettled problems of value theory. Yet it may be said without prejudice, I think, that the drift of opinion is towards what we may describe as the axiological point of view. That valuation has something of the noetic in it is probably the conviction of the majority of those that think about these questions. That the noetic has something of the nature of valuation in it, that significant judgments of existence and truth can not be made without acknowledgment of values, is perhaps the conviction of an equal number. However this may be, it is generally recognized that on the solution of this perplexing question—the relation of the "normative" to the "factual"—turns the entire problem of the metaphysical status of values.

## V

With regard to this metaphysical question—of value and reality—our discussions have, as might be expected, reflected all the tendencies current in present-day philosophies. Indeed all the main divisions reappeared in the universe of value discourse. It is precisely the great signifi-

cance of value philosophy, as I view it, that it has forced all these philosophies to declare themselves on ultimate issues and to make themselves intelligible. From this point of view, three main types of value theory may be distinguished: the idealist tendency, the realist tendency, and the pragmatic tendency.<sup>8</sup>

Of the two tendencies represented in the value number of the *Bulletin*, Münsterberg had said that they are complementary, that they completely supplement each other, representing the two fundamental aspects under which value can be studied. It is the position of pragmatism, however, that both of these positions, the psychological or phenomenological and the axiological, represent a vicious abstractionism. The one fixes its eyes on the consciousness of value, the other on the objects of value, but neither has its eye on the value situation. The result is a cross-eyed effect instead of clear vision.<sup>9</sup> For the pragmatist, it is not fair to ask whether values are subjective and relative to human feeling, or objectively real. They are both. When the social nature of valuation is considered, the alternative between objectivity and relativity to human feeling is unsound. "As the outcome of the process of valuation is knowledge and objective in the only valid acceptance of that term, so the realms of fact and value are both real, but that of value is logically prior and so the more real."

Whatever may be said of pragmatism's approach to values and its handling of the problem (I am not concerned here with evaluation) the fact remains that the significant issues continue to be between realistic and idealistic theories of value. Perhaps the same "instability of pragmatism" of which Perry speaks makes itself felt here also.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. David W. Prall, "The Present Status of the Theory of Value," Berkeley, *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Herbert W. Schneider, "The Theory of Values," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV.



Such at least in my own belief.<sup>10</sup> In any case, the pragmatic solution of the problem of value and existence has not proved satisfactory and the real debate continues to be between the idealists and the realists.

In general, the most significant feature of the last decades has been the preoccupation with values combined with the revival of realism, and what the new realisms make of values is perhaps their most serious test. As regards value, there is no agreement among contemporary realists. There are those who, like Perry, hold the view that value is a psychological character which the object acquires only by a relation to the liking or disliking of a sentient subject. There are others who regard value as an indefinable quality which attaches to existences in the same sense that natural qualities, such as red, attach to their objects. Others, again, (Santayana) hold that value attaches to essences rather than to either physical or psychical existence. Values are immediately objective, but to mistake them for existences is to suffer illusion. To enjoy them, one must appreciate them without imputing existence to them.

Despite these marked disagreements, all realists are one in being realistic in a popular and important sense. All reject the axiological point of view, that value is in any sense an ultimate character or condition of existence. The differences among the realists are significant, especially on the question of the relation of valuation to cognition, but all agree that value, whether a psychical character or a non-mental essence, ~~is~~ in some sense an *addendum* to existence.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See my paper on "The Pragmatic Theory of Value: A Reply to Herbert W. Schneider," in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV; cf. also Mr. Schneider's rejoinder in the same number.

<sup>11</sup> Statements of the realistic position may be found in Perry's different articles; cf. also J. F. Dashiell, *The Philosophical Status of Values*, New York, 1913.

Like the realists, the idealists also disagree on many points. One of the more important differences turns on the question of the relation of value to personality. Are values independent of persons or do they exist only in and for persons? There are those who, like Leighton, hold that while "the problem of values is pre-eminently the problem of philosophy," this means merely that "the fundamental philosophical problem is that of the mind's valuing, purposing, attitude-taking in knowing, contemplating, doing, worshipping in the course of reality and that we do not evade metaphysics or issue in a new era of thought, by talking about values in the abstract, rather than valuing selves."<sup>12</sup> Others hold that values are over-individual and over-personal, and that if values are dependent upon mind, they are dependent only in the sense that truth and existence themselves may be said to be thus conditioned.

Yet here again, despite these differences, all are idealists in the important sense that value is an ultimate character or condition of existence. All agree that it is not a mere *addendum* to existence but part of the nature of the perceptual, the aesthetic or the historical object. This view may be based on the assumption that reality of any kind arises from an act of mind and that, since mind is essentially purposive, or directed to the good or value, reality, as the creation of mind, will necessarily be the embodiment of value. But it may also be based on something much more fundamental, on the axiom, namely, that "to separate value and reality is essentially contradictory." This axiom of idealistic metaphysics, however expressed, whether in the terms of Bosanquet's identification of totality or individuality and value (that the clue to both reality and value is individuality and completeness) or in the more modest statement of the axiologists that while existence and value are not identical, they are inseparable (Windelband),

<sup>12</sup> J. A. Leighton, *Man and the Cosmos*, New York, 1922.

brings with it the belief that "the recognition that the givenness of objects and their existence involves valuation, is the first step towards a theory of values."<sup>13</sup>

## VI

From the very start, one of the chief motives of the philosophies of value was to work out the relations of the various values, economic, ethical, aesthetic, logical and religious, and ultimately to construct a system of values. In the words of Münsterberg, "a mere belief in values and a preaching of them does not suffice. With a mere transvaluation of values little is accomplished until the deepest essence of valuation is revealed. What is lacking in our modern philosophy is a closed system of values."

The idea of a system of values is, however, ambiguous and for the same reasons that the term value itself is ambiguous. Whether value be taken in the narrower or broader sense, in its relative or absolute meaning, determines our conception and principle of system.

What are the values of life and how are they to be classified? How may we determine what is the most valuable end of human living, i. e., what is the standard, the scale of values? In answer to these questions books on ethics have been rewritten from the value point of view and, beginning with Ehrenfels' *System der Werttheorie*, systems of values have been constructed. The basis of classification here becomes human needs and desires and the system is inevitably constructed from the genetic psycho-biological point of view. One may proceed purely empirically (for instance by the questionnaire method) and find out what men actually do value and an actual scale of values. Or one may follow the genetic method, and in showing how

<sup>13</sup> For a statement and critique of idealistic views, including those of Münsterberg, Bosanquet and Urban, see G. P. Conger, "Some Idealistic Evaluations of Values," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 20.

as evolution runs its course, there emerge certain adaptations which we call values, and as mental evolution supervenes upon physical evolution there emerge on the reflective level of mind certain tertiary qualities, ideals of goodness, beauty, truth, etc., also by that very fact determine not only the nature of values but a system or scale of values.<sup>14</sup>

But this point of view, it is increasingly recognized, inevitably involves the *petitio principii* inherent in the entire psycho-biological point of view. We wish to validate these values by carrying them back to life. But in this it is already assumed that life and its continuance have value. For if these values get their significance solely from their teleological<sup>1</sup> relation to life and its enhancement, surely life must get its significance from absolute values which it embodies. Otherwise life and its relative values lose all genuine meaning. From the more ultimate philosophical point of view, then, an ultimate knowledge of value is presupposed in any concept of valuable life. From this point of view the idea of a system of values has another meaning, just as the idea of value itself has another meaning.

This line of argument—made familiar by the axiologists—inevitably brings with it the idea of philosophy as a system of absolutely valid values. In this conception of a system of values the fundamental problem is obviously the relation of these values, the true, the good and the beautiful, to each other; as well as the special question of the relation of the logical values of existence and truth to the a-logical values. The chief problem here, we may say, without going into details, is that of co-ordination or subordination. If values are unique, individual and indefinable, it seems to follow that they can not be reduced to each other and un-

<sup>14</sup> Typical of this point of view and method is an article by W. K. Wright, "The Origin of Values from Instincts," in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2. Constructions of such systems on a large scale are to be found in J. M. Baldwin's *Genetic Theory of Reality*, and S. Alexander's, *Space, Time, and Deity*.

derstood in terms of each other, and many, including Münsterberg and Croce, have drawn that inference: they are co-ordinate. On the other hand, subordination, or the principle of scale, seems to follow from the *a priori* nature of value. For it seems to lie in the very nature of values as such that, given any two values, one must be higher than the other. The principle of scale is the principle of subordination.

These statements serve merely to present the problem of the system of values. The problem itself is still unsolved. It must be admitted that as yet a completed scale of values does not lie open to our knowledge. It is true also that all attempts to reduce or subordinate one type of value to another have proved unsatisfactory. On the other hand, it seems equally certain that the principle of scale, of higher and lower, lies in the very nature of value itself, is intrinsic to the value concept, and that the principle of subordination must be ultimately determinative in any system of values. It is true that if we take the principle of totality or individuality as the clue to both reality and value, it is possible, in the manner of certain idealists, to reduce the principle of scale to the principle of logical system and make degrees of value correspond to degrees of totality or self-completeness. On this view a certain conciliation of the two principles is possible. But such a solution has seemed, to many at least, to sacrifice all other values to logical values and against this sacrifice the modern value consciousness protests. In any case no completely satisfactory principle of system has yet been found.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Contributions to the discussion of this problem are found chiefly in other than American writings. The principle of co-ordination is, however, upheld in Münsterberg's *Eternal Values*; the principle of subordination, in articles by A. P. Brogan and W. M. Urban. See the former's paper, "The Fundamental Value Universal," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVI; also W. M. Urban, "Knowledge of Value and the Value Judgment," *ibid.*, Vol. XIII. An interesting presentation of this problem and an evaluation of the contributions of Windelband and Rickert are to be found in a monograph by William Ray Dennes: "The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology," *University of California Publications*, Vol. V, No. 1.

## VII

It is at this point, perhaps, that the development of our recent thinking on aesthetics may be most intelligibly considered. In general, books on aesthetics have been mostly written by those who are desirous of applying modern psychology to the problem of art and those written by philosophers from the standpoint of a theory of the universe. But there is a third point of view making itself felt, namely, that which considers aesthetics as a fundamental and irreducible form of valuation and as having a unique place in a scheme of values.

Space will permit me to consider the problem only from this last point of view. The doctrine of the autonomy of the aesthetic values, developed in their several ways by both Croce and Münsterberg, has penetrated deeply into both the general and the specifically philosophical consciousness of the time. The nature of aesthetic value in general, and the question of its autonomy specifically, are among the most difficult questions of value theory.

The difficulties, as well as the confusions, in this field may be seen in the fact that views as to the nature of the aesthetic range all the way from a denial of its character as value at all, to the view that all value is aesthetic. Aesthetic value is in general not recognized by the pragmatist, for whom valuation is judgmental. On the whole, the aesthetic experience would appear to be essentially post-judgmental and appreciative and on the principles of the pragmatic position, as an immediate appreciation, it has no logical function and must be denied the name of value.<sup>18</sup> For Prall, on the other hand, (and for Santayana from whom this conception derives), valuation is immediate enjoyment and value an essence. "Valuation is not a logi-

<sup>18</sup> Cf. H. W. Stuart: "Valuation as a Logical Process," an essay in *Studies in Logical Theory*, by John Dewey and other writers.

cal process" and "standard value is a misnomer." All values are in a sense immediate and aesthetic.<sup>17</sup>

Such wide variation as this indicates, not only the equivocations in value, but also the uncertainty in our interpretations and evaluations of the aesthetic. So far as the last question is concerned, we can merely say that neither extreme represents the consensus of thought on this question. The ancient view that values are subsumable under the heads of goodness, beauty and truth, "a three-fold cord not lightly broken," may in general be said to be strengthened rather than weakened by modern value theory. All attempts to reduce the aesthetic either to truth or goodness leave a remainder. But it is equally certain that every attempt to break the three-fold cord results in highly unreal and sophisticated notions both of the aesthetic itself and of the other values of truth and goodness from which it has been separated. The idea that aesthetic objects constitute a world of "valuable illusion," that to enjoy them one must appreciate them without imputing reality to them, associated with the doctrine of the autonomy of the aesthetic, marks the point at which the aesthetic problem becomes crucial, not only for value theory but ultimately for metaphysics itself.

## VIII

Value thinking has not only played a determining role in those disciplines traditionally known as normative, it has not only been a fruitful motive in the contemporary reconstructions of traditional idealism and realism, but has also changed notably the perspective in which books on Ethics and "Introductions to Philosophy" have been written.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. D. W. Prall: "Metaphysics and Value," Berkeley, *University of California Publications*, Vol. 5; also "A Study in the Theory of Value," *ibid.*, No. 13.

Noteworthy efforts to utilize the results of value theory in ethics are Everett's *Moral Values* and Dresser's *Ethics in Theory and Application*. Both not only make use of the distinctive terminology of value theory, but attempt the construction of a scale or system of values. In a concluding chapter on "Ultimate Values," Dresser discusses the relation of value to reality. As regards "Introductions to Philosophy," Brightman discusses values in connection with the problem of universals.<sup>18</sup> Patrick makes the problem of values central throughout.<sup>19</sup> Conger has a section on "Philosophies of Value" which he uses as a transition from the "normative sciences" to the philosophy of religion.<sup>20</sup> Calkins in the last edition of *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, rewrites the chapter on "Contemporary Philosophy," chiefly from the point of view of changes brought about by value theory and the "axiologists." Her conclusion is that "axiology is consistent with any metaphysics except that of realistic naturalism."

In short, as has been said, "one would have to call a fairly complete roll of contemporary philosophers to exhaust the list of students of axiology." All this means that the traditional problems of philosophy have received a noteworthy revitalization and reinterpretation through the value concept and value thinking in general. It may be an exaggeration to say, with Mr. Belford Bax, that "in the last resort all problems of metaphysics reduce themselves to problems of value," but it is certainly true that none of these problems is soluble without reference to value. In any case there can be no question that there has developed in modern thought a new point of view which has reached such a point of definiteness and consolidation as to receive a new name, that of Axiology.

<sup>18</sup> *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 1925.

<sup>19</sup> *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 1924.

<sup>20</sup> *A Course in Philosophy*, New York, 1924. See also G. A. Wilson, *The Self and Its World*, New York, 1926.



It is ordinarily assumed that when a body of knowledge has attained sufficient integrity to be given a new name, it has at least a relative self-sufficiency. There are those indeed who, like Creighton, see no independent problem here. In a sense they are right. The questions we have been considering are questions that must be raised by any philosophy and in the attempt to answer them appear, as we have seen, all the differences of the schools. On the other hand, it may be said with equal truth that the almost simultaneous creation, on the part of so many, of the new term, axiology, in contrast to epistemology, was motivated by nothing less than an acute realization of the existence of problems that could not be adequately handled within the limits and with the methods of the old field.

Axiology may be merely a name for value theory in general. It may also mean a specific point of view regarding the ultimate problems of philosophy. In the latter sense the recognition of the axiological problem registers a relatively new situation. It epitomizes problems in a sense unique in the history of thought. What we have here is in fact a general and deep-seated conflict or rivalry in modern thought, between the tendency to subject values to the scientific or logical consciousness and the tendency to submit science and logic to the demands of a more general evaluational consciousness. The insistence on the axiological point of view, like the insistence on the value judgment, as opposed to the judgment of fact, represents this latter tendency and reflects this deep-seated dualism in the modern consciousness. As we look back over the development of value thinking, including the struggle over definition, the dispute over the relation of valuation to cognition, the question of the subjectivity and objectivity of values, we can see that this has been the fundamental issue.

What is the significance, the implication of this fundamental issue? Underneath the entire development may be

discerned a pressing problem of the modern consciousness. The paradoxical combination of a growing preoccupation with values with a marked revival of realistic naturalism has created a new situation. There are those who feel the need of a transfer, so to speak, of values from their traditional "idealistic" basis to what they feel to be "the more solid foundation of realism and naturalism." The question is, can this transfer be made without relegating the values in general, and religious values in particular, to a realm of æsthetic imagination or fruitful illusion? There are those, on the other hand, who dwell on the uniqueness of the values of truth, beauty and goodness, declare them to be indefinable and irreducible, in this way not only removing them from the purview of science, but also claiming for them a validity superior to that of science. The question here is whether, if we follow this line of thought, we can say anything intelligible about values at all, for only that is a fact that is expressible in logical form, and where we have logical form we have "science" in some sense. The problem of values in modern thinking has raised the whole question of the definition and evaluation of science.

This chasm in modern thought is not closed and shows no signs of closing. It is all very well for the naturalistic thinker to say that "there is no doubt of the supreme importance of values for life, but this importance does not exempt them from the attempt to understand them, to make a science of them." But every one is aware that to make a "science" of them in this sense, is to reduce them to non-value terms, and that the mere assertion of their supreme importance begs the whole question of the relation of importance to reality. It is all very well for the idealistic philosopher to say that value is the clue to reality, and that "if the objectivity of value is denied no religious view of the world is possible." But here, again, everyone knows that

this involves making the evaluational consciousness ultimate and the reduction of existence itself (and the sciences of the existent) to a form of value and validity.

This chasm, I repeat, is not closed and shows no sign of closing. It is possible to say with Sheldon that both types of reduction, of value to existence, and of existence to value are equally possible and equally valid, and that it is simply a question of choice, according to their fruitfulness, which reduction we take.<sup>21</sup> Such a dualism can not, however, be ultimately satisfactory, and we are always confronted with the incontrovertible fact that fruitfulness is itself a value concept. The primacy of value seems inescapable whatever turn or twist of thought we take. Perhaps the best we can say (alike the most and the least) is that, while not identical, value and existence are inseparable. For some, as for Windelband, this is the "sacred mystery" that will never be solved. And it is perhaps the realization of this fact that constitutes the revival of mysticism, so characteristic a feature of the last decade. In any case, this is the key question of modern thought.

For the modern man the values are *there*, not only pragmatically, so to speak, but in a new and more acute sense than ever, for theory also. It is the *sense* in which they are there which has been, and continues to be, the great problem of the world<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> W. H. Sheldon: *Strife of Systems and Productive Duality*, Cambridge, 1918, Ch. VI.

<sup>22</sup> These last paragraphs were written before the meeting of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. I can not resist the temptation to record the conviction that this chasm in modern thought does show signs of closing. The unanimity of representatives of all schools of thought, on the general position that value and fact, or existence, are inseparable, was the outstanding feature of the discussions of the Section on Value. In general, the effect of the discussion was to suggest that there is, perhaps, no field in modern philosophy in which there is so much convergence of opinion towards agreement on fundamentals, and no field in which the discussion of technical problems has more clearly and definitely led to a deeper understanding of the problems that face the philosophy of the modern world.

## LOGICAL THEORY

HAROLD R. SMART

THE purpose of the following article is to give an account of some outstanding tendencies in contemporary logical theory in the English-speaking world. One important movement, however, need not demand our attention here. For, what is somewhat inappropriately labeled, in some quarters, "instrumental" logic, is discussed in another article of this series.

Almost any elementary text book is an epitome of these various remaining tendencies. Such a book usually follows, in fundamentals, the Aristotelian tradition. That is to say, it treats of propositions and their parts, of the forms of "immediate" inference, of the syllogism, of the several types of judgment, etc., etc. Just at the present moment it is fashionable to add supplementary chapters on symbolic or mathematical logic—chapters which rather inadequately and half-heartedly explain the application of symbolism to logical problems, and define such technical conceptions as "class," "relation," and "implication." This usually concludes the analysis and description of the so-called deductive inference. In spite of its failure—if indeed it may be called such—to devote more than passing reference to the labors of the "logisticians," Mr. J. N. Keynes' *Formal Logic*<sup>1</sup> has earned its place as one of the classic works in this field.

As for induction, most logicians conventionally and uncritically assume that it is an "inverse" process, that it

<sup>1</sup> London, Macmillan Co.

somehow presupposes acceptance of the principle of the Uniformity of Nature, and that it results in the formulation of a general law covering, with a high degree of probability, *all* the "instances" of which only a certain number actually have been examined. Accordingly, there follows an exposition, more or less elaborate, of Mill's inductive methods, and of the use of analogy, statistics, and hypothesis, as aids to the inductive process. The special subject of mathematical probability often proves an embarrassing one, but tradition demands its inclusion as part of any complete introductory text book.<sup>2</sup> And other chapters may be added on the effect of evolution on logical theory, on fallacies, and—as the capstone of the entire structure—on scientific inference in general. It should be emphasized that as thus popularly conceived the problem of induction, like all inverse problems, becomes *ipso facto* indeterminate—the result of inductive inference can be only probable and not certain. The whole task of inductive logic therefore consists in the formulation of formal tests for the determination of various degrees of probability—a formulation based upon a division of induction into several different species, e. g., complete enumeration, incomplete enumeration (or "imperfect" induction), etc. Thus in the conventional sense induction always has to do with a number of instances.

Some logicians, however, look critically upon this standpoint. The late Professor Cook Wilson, for example, argues (in his *Statement and Inference*<sup>3</sup>) that the term "inverse" is not one-sided but two-sided, and that consequently there is serious danger of being misled by an uncritical use of the term when it is descriptively applied to a process of inference. Indeed, as Wilson further points out,

<sup>2</sup> Mention should be made here of Mr. J. M. Keynes' important and highly original work on this subject; namely, *A Treatise on Probability*. London, Macmillan Co., 1921.

<sup>3</sup> Published posthumously. Two volumes. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1926.

it is highly questionable whether induction is really a matter of instances at all. If we were to free ourselves from the perhaps unnecessary encumbrance of a word, and were to turn to an unbiased analysis of the process of scientific inference as our material, we might find ourselves returning in essentials to the Aristotelian view. That is to say, for Wilson induction seems on examination to be a "gradual process by which the mind comes to recognize, in the abstract and apart from all particular instances, a principle which it has been using in the particular instances."<sup>4</sup> Induction so conceived is not an inference of, or to, the validity of the universal law *from* the existence of the particular instances as such, but a process by which we are brought "to think of the universal principles in abstraction from the particulars in which we first thought the universal."

However that may be, our elementary text book actually represents a loose conjunction of two or three different tendencies in contemporary logical thought, *e. g.*, that towards a greater formalization and *a priorism*, that towards empiricism and positivism, and that towards a development of Hegel's doctrines. As a practical expedient, demanded by the conditions of brevity, one may classify most present-day writers under one or the other of these three headings. (It is understood, of course, that the reader will bear in mind the important exception accounted for at the beginning.) Among the formalists one might include, pre-eminently, such authorities on mathematical logic as H. MacColl, and Bertrand Russell, in England, and Professors C. I. Lewis and Henry Bradford Smith, in America.<sup>5</sup> Mention should also be made of the original contributions to formal logic of Dr. Christine Ladd-Franklin, and more especially of her important articles in Bald-

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 582.

<sup>5</sup> For a bibliography see Lewis, *A Survey of Symbolic Logic*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1918.

win's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. Karl Pearson, author of the famous *Grammar of Science*,<sup>6</sup> is a prominent representative of the empirical-positivistic point of view, and Mercier's *A New Logic*<sup>7</sup> should also be noted in this connection. Lastly, there are many important works by writers whose doctrines may perhaps be most aptly described in a general way as a continuation of the Aristotelian-Hegelian tradition. In this group, in spite of very significant differences, we may include Mr. Joseph's *Introduction to Logic*,<sup>8</sup> and the well-known writings of Bradley, Bosanquet, Creighton, and others.<sup>9</sup>

There remain, for separate notice, certain interesting treatises which in a special way combine the formalistic and empirical standpoints. Professor Montague's *The Ways of Knowing* and Mr. Johnson's *Logic*<sup>10</sup> are works which share in common at least the general spirit of this movement. In order to appreciate the full significance of these works, however, we must first briefly call attention to some of the characteristic features of formalism and empiricism, respectively, as they appear in contemporary thought.

First of all, it is typical of the age that ordinary syllogistic logic should come in for serious criticism. The mathematical logician, and the empiricist, as well as those who have shared in the development of "modern" logic, fully agree that the conception of inference as syllogistic is incomplete and shallow. But the agreement ends where it

<sup>6</sup> Third Edition, London, 1911

<sup>7</sup> London, Heinemann, 1912.

<sup>8</sup> Second Edition, Oxford, 1916.

<sup>9</sup> E. g., Bradley, *The Principles of Logic*, 2 vols., second edition, Oxford, 1922; Bosanquet, *Logic*, 2 vols., second edition, Oxford, 1911; Creighton, *An Introductory Logic*, fourth edition, New York, 1922. In the sequel these works will be referred to under the head of "modern" logic

<sup>10</sup> Professor Montague's work appeared in 1925 (New York, Macmillan), and we refer here especially to Part I of that work, "The Six Methods of Logic." Mr. Johnson's work is still incomplete. He has published three volumes, entitled respectively: *Logic*, Part I (1921); Part II, *Demonstrative Inference: Deductive and Inductive* (1922); and Part III, *The Logical Foundations of Science* (1924). A final volume on Probability is already in preparation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

began, for each group has its own idea of how to make good the deficiency. Observing incidentally that quantitative comparisons—equality, inequality, etc.—are not naturally expressible in syllogistic form, certain thinkers have gone on to analyze in detail the nature of mathematical inference. And while the principal stimulus for this investigation is doubtless the endeavor to establish a completely formal, abstract foundation for pure mathematics, one important side issue is the criticism of traditional syllogistic logic from this point of view. The syllogism, so the criticism proceeds, can treat adequately only of relations of whole and part, of class inclusion. But even in ordinary mathematics one encounters, as has been pointed out frequently enough, relations of quite different kinds. And, generalizing, we may conceive the main preliminary task of logic as that of discovering and classifying the various different possible types of relations by means of which experience may be ordered and organized. Then, regarding this task as accomplished, at least in principle, the mathematical logician will in the next place seek to define a set of conceptions and to formulate accurate and simple rules of operation for the guidance and control of any deductive inference whatsoever. When securely based upon such purely generalized “logical” grounds, pure mathematics would stand forth as *the* science of deductive reasoning, *par excellence*. In this sense of the word deduction means simply the rigorous application of the rules of substitution and “implication” to whatsoever subject-matter, while the correlative aim of the procedure is to guarantee the absolute certainty of its conclusions.

Generality and rigor are favorite watchwords of this school of thought. Other students of logic, however, point to the abstractness of the fundamental conceptions and the artificiality of the mechanical operations by means of inarticulate symbols, which, they maintain, is no less charac-



teristic of it. Deduction, on this other view, whether syllogistic or "mathematical," is at best only a means of verification; it can advance to nothing new, for, just by virtue of its adherence to abstract formalism, it is manifestly out of contact with any fructifying experience. The long dispute among formalists themselves as to whether thought really "creates" or merely "discovers" truth, substantiates, for the empiricist, this contention. Positively, the empirical logician holds that logic's main function is to determine the method by which new truth may be acquired. And, as we have already seen, all genuine knowledge must be founded on (sense) experience—or, what amounts here to the same thing,—on experience of particular instances or cases. The logic of induction accordingly emphasizes the experimental nature of concrete scientific inquiry, and satisfies itself with an account of how the employment of simple conceptions and rules leads the investigator to a more or less probable generalized conclusion. We reason, so we are informed, from certain cases in past experience, by application of the principle of similarity or resemblance, to other like cases in the present or future. It is implied that if we like we may discover, by an analysis of examples of inductive reasoning, the rules or "canons" which effect the operation of the principle.

We are now prepared to estimate the significance of the doctrines of Mr. Johnson and Professor Montague, regarded as a combination of these two superficially different types of logical theory. The possibility of such a combination<sup>11</sup> turns upon an independent analysis of the nature of mathematical inference. In brief, both of these thinkers question the somewhat widespread doctrine that mathematics is a pure deductive science; rather, they maintain,

<sup>11</sup> Or, to use a word suggested by Professed Montague (*op. cit.*), of such an "alliance." This authority finds that there are in all six possible "methods" in logic: *i. e.*, besides rationalism and empiricism, we have authoritarianism, mysticism, pragmatism, and scepticism.

all science employs both deductive and inductive methods. In other words, what differentiates mathematical inference from inference in the other sciences is the quality of absolute demonstrative certainty which attaches to its generalizations, as contrasted with the greater or less degree of probability which is all that can be claimed for the laws, say, of physical science. Again, both writers hold that the processes of deduction and induction are equally amenable to rule and that the principles upon which each depends can be clearly and distinctly formulated. Induction, for example, is simply a process of elimination. This is the real meaning of Mill's methods, which are rules or canons—perhaps in need of some critical revision—for the application of this process to various particular cases.<sup>12</sup> Deduction, of which, we are to remember, induction is the “inverse” process—also depends upon the determination of specific rules for combining and separating the epistemological atoms (or “particulars”) which according to this theory are the ultimate elements of the logician's universe.

Now it is at once obvious that these types of logical theory—the formalistic-deductive, the empirical-inductive, and the combination or alliance of the two—represent a considerable departure from the standpoint of Plato and Aristotle. Confining ourselves for the moment to the narrower issues, the most striking fact, doubtlessly, is the changed conception of the very function of logic. For Aristotle, in particular, logic was primarily the science which investigated the way in which the then existing bodies of knowledge had been acquired and systematized. It was an attempt to discover the presuppositions, and to analyze the structure of knowledge, as it existed, or could exist, *e. g.*, in the sciences, in the form of objective truth. And the persistence with which we still venerate the letter even where the spirit of this doctrine is notoriously absent, is a

<sup>12</sup> Joseph, Hobhouse, and others also concur, to a greater or less extent, in this view.

unique tribute to the genius which originally animated it. Nowadays, on the other hand, in the above-mentioned quarters at any rate, the function of logic is very differently construed. Instead of attempting to understand the process of reasoning or inference by studying its characteristic products, it is decidedly the fashion to demand of the logician a set (or sets) of rules constituting a technique for the guidance and control of reasoning. This involves, of course, a very definite limitation and prescription of the intellectual activity to certain predetermined forms and ends. An unkind critic would even be tempted to say that the aim of such doctrines is to construct a mechanical substitute for the manual labor of the intellect.

With regard to the wider implications of these contemporary views only a word can be said. If logic is to become a technique of reasoning naturally certain fundamental problems arise which had no place on the classical view. For example, the so-called epistemological problem of how and what we can know, or of justifying our confidence in the operation of the technique, when applied to any given subject-matter, becomes of vital importance. And, secondly, there is the "metaphysical" or cosmological problem of independently determining the nature of the subject-matter-in-itself, as it is in its own existential right, apart from our knowledge of it. This problem, indeed, some would gladly delegate to science, and this—one may suspect—is what is sometimes meant by the declaration that philosophy must become scientific, or that in our study of nature we must carefully abjure all transcendentalism and metaphysics.<sup>13</sup>

In the space remaining at our disposal we must do our best to convey some idea of the significance of what we have agreed to call "modern" logic. This movement is often described as a continuation and development of

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the writings of Dr. Whitehead for an expression of the doctrine that a philosophy of nature might better be called a "pan-physics" than a metaphysics.

Hegelian principles and doctrines. Its leaders nevertheless recognize the need of adopting a critical attitude towards that great thinker, and they also freely acknowledge indebtedness to logicians of other schools—notably to Lotze, Sigwart, Jevons, Mill, and the neo-Kantians. They heartily acknowledge and support the criticism of the conventional syllogism, so far as it claims to represent adequately all possible types of inference. But candor forces them to apply the same criticism to the doctrines of many of the opponents of this so-called traditional view. In other words, many critics of the syllogism simply point to its inadequacies as a universal technique of reasoning. But, as intimated above, the ideal of these thinkers is to substitute a more adequate technique for the rejected one. Empiricists and formalists alike persist in the search instituted by Bacon and Descartes, respectively, for a sure and easy method of reaching truth. Symbolic logic on the one hand, and the tenacious persistence of the doctrines associated with Mill's canons on the other, are two manifestations of what is at bottom one and the same tendency. In his *Implication and Linear Inference* Bosanquet demonstrates this point very clearly. But surely, so the modern logician would contend, it is necessary to question this whole notion of a mechanical technique, operating by means of rules fixed once and for all. He would argue indeed that this is to endeavor to preserve the empty formalism of the Aristotelian tradition, rather than its spirit. In other words, as the modern logician sees it, contemporary logic must effect a concrete synthesis of the formalistic and empirical doctrines. Merely to combine them, in the fashion proposed by Professor Montague or Mr. Johnson, while an open confession of the urgent need of supplementing various inadequacies in each of these one-sided developments, is in effect never to raise the most vital question of all—

may be said indeed to be a most effective way of entirely disregarding it.

This problem, namely that of analyzing the structure and articulation of our actually existing knowledge, together with its correlate, that of examining at first hand the process by which it is being developed, becomes unavoidable in the long run, for Kant and Hegel as it was for the Greeks, and now again for us as it was for Kant and Hegel. And while it is certainly true that our solution of it is bound to differ from theirs, in many essential respects, yet the spirit and the ultimate goal of the inquiry remain everlastingly the same. The goal has always been, as Plato might say, a justification of the ways of mind to man.

In the words of Bradley, who perhaps as well as any one succinctly summarizes this standpoint in logic, "logic's direct and primary purpose is . . . to set out the general essence and the main types of inference and judgment [the categories], and, with regard to each of these, to explain its nature and special merits and defects. The measure here to be applied is the idea of perfect truth in the sense . . . [of systematic coherence]. Truth is reality taken as ideal, and that must mean reality taken as an intelligible system; and every judgment and inference therefore must be understood as directed and aimed at such reality. The degree in which the various types each succeed and fail in reaching their common end, gives to each of them its respective place and rank in the whole body."<sup>14</sup>

Abandoning as an artificial and one-sided abstraction the "linear" conception of inference,<sup>15</sup> modern logic insists that both induction and deduction are actual ingredients of every concrete process of inference, and are not, as is often

<sup>14</sup> *Principles of Logic*, second edition, p. 620. Cf. also F. J. E. Woodbridge, "The Field of Logic," in *Congress of Arts and Sciences*, St. Louis, 1904, Vol. I, pp. 313-330.

<sup>15</sup> The word, of course, is Bosanquet's. Cf. his *Implication and Linear Inference*.

uncritically assumed, separate and independent methods of reasoning. It is true, of course, that in the successive stages of the development of knowledge now the one, now the other aspect of thinking may assume temporary ascendancy, and it is probably also true—as Poincaré somewhere observes—that some minds have a natural preference one way or the other. These historical and psychological considerations would at least partially explain the persistence of the conflict between formalists and empiricists, and might also serve as an added stimulus to various special investigations, from the standpoint of modern logic. Perhaps the most pressing demands in this regard are for a detailed analysis of scientific inference conducted in the light of the genesis and historical development of leading scientific conceptions,<sup>16</sup> and for such a study as that projected by the late Professor Creighton on the significance of history and the historical method.

In conclusion it may be pardonable to add one further personal observation regarding the relation of logic to metaphysics. For it is a frequently repeated objection, accompanied by a tone of reproach, that modern logic finally merges with, or is inseparable from, a metaphysics. But surely this is inevitable, in the end, on any view; just as inevitable, we may say, but no more so, than in the case of ethics, or of theory of values in general. And a frank admission of this fact claims our enthusiastic support. For, negatively, such a view solves the vexed “problem of epistemology,” so-called, by revealing its unreality; while, positively, it establishes a definite foundation, critically aware of its own presuppositions, for a rational interpretation of human experience.

<sup>16</sup> More especially, the nature and presuppositions of mathematical reasoning should be investigated. Cf. the present writer's preliminary study, *The Philosophical Presuppositions of Mathematical Logic*, New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1925.

## ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

HENRY W. WRIGHT

ETHICAL thought in English-speaking countries has been strongly affected for the past few years by two influences. One is the general concern over the application of ethical principles to problems of social and political organization which was a natural consequence of the war. The other is the recent dramatic swing of psychology away from the analysis and description of mental processes to an experimental study of behavior, in whose motivation and control ethics is profoundly interested. So powerful, indeed, have been these two influences in English-speaking countries that the ethical theory of the present period is less interested in the rational grounds of moral judgment than in the interaction of the human individual with his natural and social environment. As a consequence, the boundaries between ethics and sociology, politics and economics seem not as well defined and certainly are not as well observed as formerly; much present-day thought on these subjects proceeds on the assumption that the philosophy of practice is fundamentally one field within which ethical, social, political, and economic theory represent merely differences of interest and emphasis.

The war has not simply directed attention to pressing problems of political and economic organization; it has led, at least in the countries now under consideration, to a widespread movement away from idealism in ethics and in political and social theory. This has been due in part to the

belief prevalent in the war period that Hegelian idealism supplied a theoretical justification for the excesses of German nationalism, and in part to the spiritual exhaustion and disillusion of the post-war years. The first of these causes is responsible for Professor Hobhouse's spirited attack upon the idealism of Hegel and "his most modern and faithful exponent," Bosanquet, in his *Metaphysical Theory of the State*.<sup>1</sup> While this keen and vigorous critique is concerned primarily with political relations, it is like all its author's writings in the social field founded upon definite ethical principles. The three governing positions in the Bosanquet theory as Hobhouse finds them, (1) that we are morally free when our actions conform to our real will; (2) that our real will is the general will, and (3) that the general will is embodied in the State, he challenges, rejects as false, and denounces as socially dangerous. The human self he holds to be positively free when, hindered by no external influences, it develops the different parts of its nature harmoniously. But the will to effect such harmonious development (the *rational* will as Hobhouse prefers to call it) is not real in the average man nor completely real in the best of men. It exists only as a rational ideal in sharp opposition to our actual impulses which alone can claim really to exist. This rational will, furthermore, is in no proper sense a general or common will, nor does its expression require that the nature of the individual be shaped by, or be merged in, the common mind, but rather that all minds be given a free scope for individual development. And finally it is an equally glaring error to regard the State with all its imperfections, injustices and stupidities as the embodiment of the interests of all its members as rationally harmonized.

Absolute idealism is not left without worthy defenders in the ethical field, however. Professor Turner<sup>2</sup> has essayed

<sup>1</sup> London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918.

<sup>2</sup> *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation*, London, Macmillan Co., 1924.



a restatement of the ethical implications of this philosophy in a book notable for clarity of sustained argument in the higher altitudes of philosophic thought. A truly philosophic ethics, he maintains as his central contention, must base itself upon pure obligation, but an obligation which proves itself perfectly consistent with rationality. Individual and social development is more and more freely directed toward the attainment of objective value which consists in completeness or perfection. The ultimate standard of completeness and of objective value is the dynamic process of the universe as a whole. In his selection of values the human individual remains entirely free. Nevertheless obligation remains as the characteristic feature of morality. It is an imperative to apply the principle of *pure* reason to reason in its practical connections and entanglements. The distinctive law of pure reason is that of organization which commands the inclusion of the part within the whole. For reason declares the highest value to reside in the fullest measure of contribution to the maintenance and development of the Whole; and when we realize explicitly the true nature of the Whole then there is at once implied an inexpugnable element of absolute obligation.

Of the powerful influence of psychology upon the ethics of our day Professor McDougall's *Social Psychology* must still be regarded as the most important single source, considered both as the starting-point of the author's own further studies of political and ethical problems and as the target of criticism and attack by others. The full force of McDougall's well-known dictum that the instincts furnish the sole motive-force of human conduct is apparent when coupled with his further assertion<sup>3</sup> that all moral judgments spring originally from moral emotions. And inasmuch as there are no specific moral emotions, judgments of moral approval merely express and reflect the feelings

<sup>3</sup> In agreement with the conclusion reached by Westermarck in his *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*.

which accompany the arousal of certain primary instincts, and disapproval those which attend upon the arousal of others (perhaps more definitely grouped) like hostility and fear and aversion. Thus the first result of the impact of psychology upon ethics seemed revolutionary enough: reason was dethroned and the place of command given to impulse and emotion. But McDougall weakened the force of this blow by assigning to intelligence a crucially important function in moral and social control. In virtue of its powers of intellectual synthesis it forms conceptions which appeal to a number of instincts and enlist the support of their combined motive-force. Such is the conception of the self-as-subject-to-social-criticism which as the nucleus of the "self-regarding sentiment" is supported by instinctive fear, self-assertion, submission, and active sympathy in conventional morality. McDougall moves a step further toward idealism in his account of how through reflection and the influence of admirable example the individual forms abstract moral sentiments of honor, justice, generosity, etc., and finally attains to the master-sentiment for a perfected moral life, but always and even here as a self-playing-to-social-gallery and therefore moved by such impulses as self-display, submission, sympathy and the like.

More consistent with his starting-point and the tendencies of his thought as a whole is the explanation which McDougall offers in his *Group Mind*<sup>4</sup> of the way in which the self-regarding sentiment expands into national sentiment and becomes the psychological basis of political organization. Nationalism, or patriotism, as thus constituted, is the most powerful moralizing and socializing agency known to man, not even excepting religious humanitarianism. This is because the nation is the one group which the individual, through the efficacy of language, literature and historic tradition, can and does identify with

<sup>4</sup> Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1921.

*himself*. It therefore enlists in its support those strong egoistic instincts which respond to any thought of self-interest and reinforces them by powerful altruistic impulses. The greater instinctive appeal of nationalism over humanitarian ethics McDougall rationalizes<sup>5</sup> (shall we say?) by endeavoring to show that universalistic ethics is in many respects inferior to nationalistic and if consistently followed would be destructive of civilization.

The view that we find in the instinctive-emotional responses of the human species the ultimate source of all moral distinctions was promptly challenged by believers in the rational basis of morality. Canon Rashdall, whose death has been a grievous and irreparable loss to ethics, vigorously attacked McDougall's position<sup>6</sup> from the standpoint of that ethical idealism which he so masterfully expounds in his *Theories of Good and Evil*. As a psychological explanation of the way in which certain kinds of conduct came first to be approved and disapproved he admitted a great deal of truth in McDougall's account. But, he contended, the objective validity claimed by moral judgments which constitutes the very heart of our reflective morality is left wholly unexplained. All scientific thinking is based upon certain ultimate principles which cannot be induced from experience but which are implied in all our thinking. The ultimate principles of morality are as much implied in our thinking about conduct as are the ultimate axioms of mathematics in our thinking about quantity and number. We claim for the judgment "This is good" the same kind of truth that is claimed for mathematical or scientific or historical judgments. Furthermore, when reason judges an act to be right, reason itself furnishes the motive for performing it, and this is moral obligation. Here we touch

<sup>5</sup> In his *Ethics and Some Modern World Problems*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Is Conscience an Emotion?* Also an article in *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 19, pp. 449ff.

upon the crux of the controversy; the idealist holds that the idea of duty does indeed create an impulse to do what reason pronounces ought to be done.

The objective validity of the moral judgment is upheld by Dr. G. E. Moore whose *Principia Ethica* appeared in a second edition in 1922 and exerts a considerable influence upon contemporary ethical thought. Moore's theory is notable because it represents rationalism or intellectualism in ethics divorced from idealistic metaphysics. To be good is not identical, the author asserts, with being willed or being felt in a particular way. Frequently, we do prefer what we think good but it by no means follows that what we think when we think a thing good is that we prefer it. Good is a simple, unanalyzable, indefinable, quality, as simple and indefinable as "yellow." Judgments of intrinsic moral value which attribute this quality to objects (if true at all) are true universally. Moralists have made the mistake of trying to define goodness by identifying it with something else, e. g., pleasure, or super-sensible reality, while the proper aim of ethics is to discover what other properties belong to all things which are good. This is equivalent to asking what kinds of things are good in themselves. Moore's answer to this question is that intrinsic or unmingled goods consist in the love of beautiful things or of good persons; esthetic enjoyment and personal affection possess intrinsically the quality of goodness.

The rationalistic school finds it easier to exhibit the inadequacy of "psychologism" in ethics than to answer the questions which it raises. For the concern of ethics is with human behavior, and human behavior has its psycho-physical antecedents—such factors as hereditary action-tendencies and environmental pressures, such processes as trial and error, and habituation, leading to "substitute stimuli" and "substitute responses"—which psychology is rapidly bringing to light. Such psycho-physical antecedents deter-

mine, or at least influence, the motivation of all conduct, including that which is consciously directed toward the realization of the Good. The need for a fuller explanation of the motivation of good conduct is doubtless responsible for a pronounced tendency among thinkers otherwise inclined to do full justice to reason to admit feeling to a place of equal importance in morality. For is not feeling the dynamic of action? And not merely that, does it not also exercise a selective function among prospective modes of behavior? Thus Mr. A. K. Rogers<sup>7</sup> holds that a thing is recognized as possessing goodness when the contemplation of it affords pleasure, in which case it calls forth the judgment of approval. The pleasure of approval is a sign of the attractiveness of a desire in an intellectual or anticipatory setting, a sign that we are on the right road to a satisfaction of our needs. The peculiarity of the sense of ought this writer finds in the feeling of repugnance or dislike aroused in us against something for which we have otherwise an active craving. Against what do we experience this emotional revolt? Against what is cruel and ugly, certainly. But more profoundly, against what is mean and small and essentially trivial. Accepting essential triviality as the mark of the morally bad, we ask why such triviality is morally offensive to us. The answer is, because of its *unreality*. An unreal act is an act which has no firm footing in our rational nature: contrariwise, acts have reality when they issue from a consistent and dependable personal character.

Professor G. C. Field<sup>8</sup> is preoccupied with the same difficulty of accounting for the motivation of good conduct. Kant's theory he rejects because, after separating the good from all our actual wants, Kant is forced to assume that its mere intellectual apprehension is sufficient to move us to action, while as a matter of fact the bare knowledge of

<sup>7</sup> *The Theory of Ethics*, New York, Macmillan Co., 1922.

<sup>8</sup> *Moral Theory*, London, Methuen and Co., 1921.

anything can never move us to action. Aristotle's doctrine of the mean he also subjects to a similar criticism. If the Good consists in the harmonious development of all the different tendencies of our nature we have still to find a *desire for the good* which is not merely a sum but a harmony of these different desires and impulses. The Good must consist in some form of self-activity on the part of conscious intelligent beings (there is this much truth in the Aristotelian ideal of contemplation) but it must also make effective connection with our practical activities. The ideal situation which meets both of these requirements is the relationship of love among conscious beings which involves perfect knowledge and understanding. With reference to the conflicting claims of reason and feeling to determine the moral judgment, Field emphasizes a difference between the subject-matter of the moral judgment and that of our "scientific" judgments. In the former case, we are judging about the actions and characters of ourselves and human beings like ourselves. And such being the case, it is not unreasonable to take a certain feeling of ours toward such forms of conduct as an indication that they are so related to our nature that they would be an element in what we desired above all else if we had full knowledge and understanding.

Perhaps the most satisfactory synthesis of these two apparently discrepant factors of reason and will, on the one hand, and impulse and emotion, on the other, is attained by Professor L. T. Hobhouse,<sup>9</sup> whose wide knowledge of the facts of mental and moral development and excellent powers of philosophical correlation enable him to deal very competently with a problem like this. All behavior, human as well as animal, has, he holds, its natural roots in hereditary instinct or impulse. Feeling is a mode of consciousness whose biological function is the governance of impulse

<sup>9</sup> *The Rational Good*, London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922.

in the interest originally of survival and later of that continuity and harmony of conscious life which reason demands. When impulse is directed by an anticipatory idea attended by a feeling, desire arises. Now any element in experience (impulse, idea or action, of ourselves or others) which excites a favorable or pleasant feeling tending to intensify, prolong, or renew it, is judged to be good. Conversely, any experience which excites an unfavorable feeling which tends to arrest or annul it, is judged bad. Hence, we may say that any experience immediately pleasurable arouses an impulsive judgment of approval which expresses the accompanying feeling. But this may be corrected by a maturer judgment of rational reflection which considers the experience in its wider relations. This also rests on feeling, however, the feeling which an act or situation arouses when connected with other acts and experiences. Since reason is the principle of interconnection persistently applied, it correlates purposes in an operative system which postulates, (1) the harmony of all feelings in one system; (2) the harmony of all experience of all sentient beings with this body of feeling, and (3) the consistent and impartial application of the universal principles of practical organization to the world of sentient existence. But what of the obligation we feel to conform with the demands of rational goodness? On the view here taken, every judgment of the good involves the existence of an impulse-feeling directed toward it. Among the mass of impulses we must recognize a certain correlation which we can speak of as a specific impulse toward harmony by virtue of whose influence our various impulses tend to become an organized body, overcoming recalcitrant movements, however intensely felt, by the power of the organized mass. This organization, consistently and intelligently carried through is the practical reason. While the work of the practical reason is essentially creative it rests upon a real fact, a

certain unity pervading all mind. But the unity which it finds differs from the unity it seeks to create because of the obstacles which still exist to free and harmonious co-operation between men, such as physical barriers and opposing aims and interests.

In all these discussions of the relation of feeling and impulse to reason, one factor has been omitted: *action*, in the sense of bodily movement. Instinct and impulse while aroused by an object perceived or thought of and involving a feeling toward this object is, primarily, a conative tendency seeking expression in bodily movement. Now such motor response has distinctive features of greatest importance for ethics. It is of the nature of thought to generalize, to range over a wide field, including the past and future as well as the present, and to claim universal validity for its conclusions. And feeling, while it attaches originally to particular objects which stir impulses and awaken desires, readily spreads to the general conceptions of thought. But action always has a specific occasion; motor responses are events occurring in the physical world and, like all physical events, they have their particular time and place. Behaviorism has in recent years been forcing upon our notice this objective expression, this external embodiment, of mind in motor activities.

It is the importance of action that Professor Dewey<sup>10</sup> emphasizes. Since in his view the primary function of thought is the guidance of behavior, and action always occurs at a particular time and place, he holds that thought is peculiarly and properly concerned with specific practical problems. The doctrine of instrumentalism has of course a direct bearing upon ethics. The field of conduct is the field of action, and action is (in one aspect, at least) a motor response projected into the physical world and fol-

<sup>10</sup> *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1920; *Human Nature and Conduct*, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1922; *Experience and Nature*, Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1925.



lowed by a chain of physical events. This concentration on the part of pragmatists upon behavior has led to one result of highest significance for ethics. It has brought into the foreground one feature of action hitherto neglected but of great ethical moment, its *experimental* character.

As living individuals and social beings we have, according to Dewey, many diverse interests and desires. We seek to satisfy them through activities which social custom has made habitual. But these desires and impulses frequently come into conflict and the habitual activities employed in their service block one another. Such conflict of mutually incompatible goods defines a moral situation. The work of intelligence applying itself to the practical problem is to resolve the situation by analyzing out the component factors, tracing in imagination the consequences of alternative courses of possible behavior, and finally projecting a provisional plan of action that promises to effect such a reorganization of the activities involved in the existing situation as will enable them all to function with the maximum of freedom and harmony. But in carrying out its plan in action intelligence proceeds experimentally, i. e., subject to control by the consequences, not altogether foreseeable, which eventuate as the action proceeds, and stands ever ready to revise its plan in the light of new facts and unexpected conditions which are thus brought to light.

Thus, reason, according to Dewey, does not create or foreordain that harmony of interests and desires which constitutes the rational good. At the most it discovers this harmony in and through the active commerce which it directs between the individual and his environment; it brings to light new resources of satisfaction in the natural and social conditions of human existence. Inasmuch, moreover, as the moral end or ideal is essentially and necessarily a plan of action, its realization does not come as the far-off terminus of protracted effort; it is achieved in the course

of action which, so far as it proceeds harmoniously, brings with it an emotional appreciation of varied and mutually enhancing contacts with the natural world and with fellow-men. From these two facts a consequence follows which Dewey regards as of momentous importance to morality and, in fact, to the whole field of human practice. The deep gulf generally believed to exist between values as intrinsic and ideal on the one hand, and instrumental and utilitarian on the other, is completely bridged over. In the light of a true functional psychology morals can no longer be exalted as the sphere of purely personal relationships governed by *a priori* rational law, while industry and commerce are depreciated as the field of technical art and mechanical invention concerned with the material necessities of human existence. Rather are both morality and industry practical arts, making progress so far as human intelligence is able by the use of its own proper methods of experimental enquiry and technical invention so to control and to transform the physical and social conditions of human life as to increase and diversify and harmonize the satisfactions which accompany the daily activities of men.

The doctrine of pragmatism has had a marked influence upon the political and social philosophy of our day. This is in a measure due to the incisive writings of Professor Dewey who is keenly interested in politics and internationalism, and profoundly convinced of the value of the instrumentalist logic as applied to these problems. Professor Laski,<sup>11</sup> for instance, adopts pragmatism as a philosophic basis for his attack upon the absolutist theory of the state and of national sovereignty. "What the Absolute is to metaphysics," he says, "that is the State to political theory." Tested by the pragmatic criterion, absolutism and monism in political theory have consequences which are morally dangerous and may be tragic, as the late war so

<sup>11</sup> In his *Sovereignty*.

conclusively demonstrated. From the theoretical conception of the Oneness of the State we pass to its absolute legal right and then to its absolute moral right. In the face of such unqualified national power, individuals abdicate their right of independent moral judgment and accept the dictates of the sovereign state as right whether their own consciences pronounce them right or wrong. The pluralistic theory of the state, on the contrary, is consistently experimentalist. It denies the rightness of force; it insists that the state like every other association shall prove itself by what it achieves. Sovereignty, therefore, in the case of the state as of all other organizations, means no more than the ability to secure assent on the basis of the useful services it renders to human individuals.<sup>12</sup>

Two recent books by Mr. Walter Lippman on public opinion<sup>13</sup> may also be cited in further illustration of the effect of instrumentalism upon present-day thought in the social-political field. Mr. Lippman believes that the hope to which democracy has pinned its faith of developing among the mass of its citizens by social education an opinion upon matters of public concern sufficiently well-informed and judicious to guide the direction of national policies is an unattainable and mistaken ideal. It is, of course, not difficult for a writer of Mr. Lippman's exceptional opportunities for observation and facility at characterization to find evidence striking enough of the incompetence of public opinion in modern democracies. But he believes that scientific justification for his thesis that an intelligent public opinion is an impossibility is furnished by the pragmatist principle that intelligence works effectively only when applied to the specific situations that arise in the lives of human individuals. Thus the average citizen

<sup>12</sup> Professor Norman Wilde defends the authority of the state on the basis of an idealism that may be described as Ethical rather than Absolute. Cf. *The Ethical Basis of the State*.

<sup>13</sup> *Public Opinion*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922; *The Phantom Public*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1925.

thinks intelligently, can think intelligently, only of his own business, his own profession, his own local and family interests. Affairs of government can be competently considered only by insiders who "know the ropes." Hence, all the citizen-body can expect or hope to do is by application of certain coarse but clear criteria to keep tab on the insiders and repel the efforts of special interests to control the processes of government for their own profit.

Moving still further "to the left" we may give passing notice to writers who make more radical use of recent discoveries in psychology and physiology in their treatment of social and moral problems. Thus, Mr. Joad,<sup>14</sup> who celebrates the complete failure of traditional ethics because of its metaphysical method of *a priori* reasoning and proposes to write an empirical or "common-sense" ethics, makes large use of the psychology of instinct with which he couples many of the facts and assumptions of psycho-analysis. "Impulse" he holds is the dynamic element in human life, the principle of growth and progress. It is an urge to action springing from the depths of our nature and conditioned by no consciousness of end or result. Some impulses, to be sure, develop into conscious desires and purposes; but impulse is primary and it rather than desire is to be looked on as the source of human conduct and the social order. The importance and rightfulness of impulse are witnessed by the facts which psycho-analysis has unearthed regarding the evil effects of thwarting or repressing these vital tendencies. Morality itself springs from an impulse, the impulse to blame. Man feels this impulse, then sets his reason to work to rationalize the censure he wants to inflict. Historically morality has to a great extent signified the control of the impulses of the young by those of their elders, which has meant the control of our positive creative impulses by the negative impulses of fear

<sup>14</sup> *Common-sense Ethics*, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co.

and blame. Thus in the matter of sex relations, morality has taken the form of prudery, "the old woman's caricature of morality." Mr. Joad's doctrine of the "liberation of impulse" sounds like a recommendation to let ourselves go, and, indeed, the burden of his teaching does seem to be to give expression to the life-force in the gratification of impulses, particularly while they retain their youthful fire and vigor. But he is at pains to deny that his theory justifies any indiscriminate indulgence of impulses. There is, he holds, an impulse in human nature which may be called *will* which seeks the fullest possible satisfaction of impulse as a whole and hence the best life. Furthermore, impulses fall into two classes, possessive and creative, of which the latter bring the fuller satisfaction because they facilitate the expression of other impulses and tend to create a social order offering more opportunities for satisfaction to all.

Finally, we are interested to see what behaviorism as sheer physiology can yield in the way of ethical theory. To rebuke any possible incredulity on this point it will be sufficient to mention the ethics of Professor Givler.<sup>15</sup> The meaning of all terms, he tells us, consists in the action-patterns they arouse in us. Logical antonyms arouse antagonistic reactions. So "good" signifies an outgoing extensor reaction and "bad" a withdrawing or flexor reaction. Hence the virtuous man is the relaxed, resilient, coordinate individual and the vicious either the muscularly flabby or abnormally hypertonic organism. Virtue means the mobilizing or expending of energy to obtain a dependable good. As to what is dependably good, the author seems to regard some form of energism as the logical implicate of behaviorism. Extensor actions, he tells us, bring more of the world of action within our range and even the thwarted man imaginatively explores the environment to find substitute stimuli to release his energy upon. And only when

<sup>15</sup> *The Ethics of Hercules.*

a man's actions really enlarge his environment and provide him with increased opportunities for turning his wishes into wills is he in the highest sense ethically free.

A far cry it is indeed from goodness as the unique property of a will which is governed by pure reason to goodness as the characteristic of a motor reaction governed by extensor rather than flexor muscles. Yet such is the range and diversity of contemporary ethical theory. Despite this confusing divergence of viewpoint and conclusion (due in part to the disintegrating impact of new knowledge and world-shaking events) there are clear signs that progress is being made in solving the problems of human conduct in the moral and social field. Whatever the outcome may be of the present controversy among psychologists over instinct, the recent studies of instinct and emotion initiated by McDougall have thrown a flood of light upon the motivation of human behavior, and have given us a more adequate and concrete conception of the way in which man's practical reason obtains and extends its control over his conduct, as is witnessed by Hobhouse's synoptic and clarifying treatment. Dr. Moore has rendered ethics a signal service by showing that the objectivity of moral values can be successfully defended without appeal to any special metaphysical theory. And Professor Dewey, by demonstrating the experimental character of all intelligently directed behavior, has brought to our attention a neglected factor of incalculable importance to moral and social science.

We make no real progress, I believe, in understanding the facts of morality if we do not recognize that the organization of human conduct and social relations is achieved under the direction of rational will as the one practical capacity common to all men which can claim universal and objective validity for its conclusions and its dictates. But this does not mean that the good life can be completely understood as an *a priori* prescription of reason, or that ethi-

cal enquiry can properly limit itself to a study of the logical inter-relations of moral judgments. On the contrary, reason's plans for the reorganization of human conduct can only be worked out by courageous, sagacious experimentation whose procedure and results are as much determined by the external occasions and conditions of human action, physical, physiological and social, as by the dictates of reason. Moral progress, as we all know, means the realization of ideals formulated and approved by rational reflection through the instrumentality of activities of the human organism in interaction with the forces and factors of the physical and social environment. This means that two very different spheres, each with its own distinct characteristics, that of intellectual synthesis and intelligent interpretation on the one hand, and that of bodily movement and physical change on the other, be brought into effective working relation. And here of course is the rub, the crucial difficulty of practical philosophy revived in our day by the rise of behavioristic psychology and reappearing as that of the relation of conscious intelligence to the motor responses of the human organism.

New knowledge of the working impulse and feeling has contributed materially to the solving of the problem. But we do also, I think, get decided help from a consideration of the outstanding position occupied by three motor responses in the behavior of man as an intelligent and social being. These three responses, depending upon structures peculiar to man, are those of articulate speech, of manual contrivance and technical invention, and emotional expression and esthetic perception. These three responses owe their outstanding importance to the fact that while they are bodily movements occurring in the physical world they are nevertheless to a remarkable degree under the control of individual intelligence, and while they are developed and exercised under social guidance and confirmation they

are at the same time especially fitted to express what is unique and original in individuality. In virtue of these characteristics the responses mentioned become, as I have shown in a recent book,<sup>16</sup> media for the communication and expansion of intelligible meanings and satisfactions. Through speech, ideas, beliefs and opinions are exchanged, accumulated and correlated; through practical contrivance, industrial methods and appliances, social procedures and institutions are invented and put to social uses; through emotional expression with esthetic perception, meanings strongly felt but inarticulate are embodied in, and transmitted through, sense-imagery. These three activities are the basis of human association because through them men are able to participate in a common experience: to share in a common fund of knowledge, to co-operate in a common world-task, and to respond sympathetically to the salient features of our common human lot. Through these activities carried on in connection with the everyday activities of social life, men realize values, viz., those of true insight and mutual understanding, of fellowship in productive labor, and of imaginative sympathy, which are *objective* inasmuch as they are open to verification by all who make the specialized motor responses required for their realization. The accumulated products of these activities, scientific and historical writings, industrial art and social institutions, and creations of fine art in all its branches, constituting the sum-total of social culture, furnish the individual with a means of translating the facts of his life into terms of universal human experience and also with a set of generally accepted symbols in which to embody his own insights, inventions and appreciations, and thus to make them part of the permanent spiritual heritage of humanity.

<sup>16</sup> *The Moral Standards of Democracy*, New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1925.



## INTERPRETATIONS OF RELIGION

EDWARD L. SCHAUB

### I

THE problems and view-points today regnant in the philosophy of religion within English-speaking countries are only in part of recent origin. In their general outlines, at least, some of the more basic of them emerged as distantly as Hellenism. Others, and perhaps precisely those that somewhat specifically define our orientation as a whole, may be traced back directly to the leading ideas, more especially, of Kant, Schleiermacher and Hegel. The teaching of these philosophers was at once so revolutionary in its character and so enduring in its influence that those of our present generation who have attained to self-consciousness in their reflective interpretation of religion are very apt to recognize themselves as in the midst of a stream with eighteenth century sources.

True, there are marked changes in perspective. Waterhouse, for example, describing the *Zeitgeist* of Schleiermacher's day, refers to "the ethical rigourism of the Kantians, reducing religion to a footnote to the text of morality."<sup>1</sup> The large measure of truth in this judgment should, however, not cause us to forget that the "footnote" was of distinct significance and that the considerations which led to it and to its precise place in the text of the critical philosophy were of epoch-making import. Few, we believe, would seriously dispute Pringle-Pattison's conclusion that

<sup>1</sup> Waterhouse, Eric S.: *Modern Theories of Religion*, London, 1910, p. 25. In another passage (p. 117), however, Waterhouse acknowledges that Ritschl's "doctrine of value-judgments, like so much else in modern philosophy, has been traced back to Kant."

the Kantian "conception of intrinsic value as the clue to the ultimate nature of reality is the fundamental contention of all idealistic philosophy since Kant's time,"<sup>2</sup> and many would agree that "to Kant may be traced the most characteristic forms of the Theistic argument."<sup>3</sup> The addresses and papers evoked by commemorations, in 1924, of the bicentenary of Kant's birth very generally argue that our contemporary outlook with respect to religious problems is ascribable in no small measure to the philosophy of the great Koenigsberger.<sup>4</sup> To him, the *Alleszermalmer*, may be traced the recognition (today predominant outside the circle of the neo-scholastics) that *pure* reason is impotent in the sphere of theology, unable either to disclose the god of religious worship or to demonstrate his existence. To Kant, moreover, do we owe the realization that religion may not be interpreted through the categories of spatial and temporal existences. Kant was likewise the source of certain positive insights involved in most of the technical discussions of religion today and defining for the latter their further tasks. For he taught that religion is essentially a matter of attitudes and of life, that it consequently relates to the realm of values, and that the dogmas of religion, therefore, —more especially those of theology—are expressions, not of logical analysis or purely theoretical activity, but of the inner experiences of moral agents—they are not generaliza-

<sup>2</sup> Seth Pringle-Pattison, A.: *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1917, p. 38; cf. also pp. 46ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, two collections of such essays bearing the title *Immanuel Kant: 1724-1924*, the one edited by E. C. Wilm (Yale University Press) and the other by E. L. Schaub (The Open Court Publishing Co.); also a paper read at the University of Michigan by R. M. Wenley, later printed in the *Anglican Theol. Rev.*, Vol. VII, pp. 121-144; and, very especially, the lectures delivered by C. C. J. Webb at Oxford and published under the title, *Kant's Philosophy of Religion* (Oxford University Press, 1926). Professor Webb declares that we still have much to learn from Kant's interpretation of Christianity as primarily ethical in character. He stresses also the Kantian view that, while religion includes a non-rational element, this in no wise destroys its essential reasonableness.

tions or formulations of matters of fact but possess the deeper truth of symbols and of art.<sup>5</sup>

This conception of the symbolical nature of theology, and the doctrine that religion is not a cognitive product but a manifestation of broader, non-theoretical experience, were cardinal likewise in the teaching of Schleiermacher. But here religion wins its complete emancipation, even from morality, and establishes itself as an autonomous phase of experience. Indeed, it is declared as "the sense of absolute dependence" to reveal the depths of the human soul, and as "a sense and taste for the infinite" to furnish its own revelations of the ultimate order within which man and all that is finite have their being. Religion, it is realized, cannot be satisfactorily interpreted if it is dealt with simply from the standpoint of, or in connection with, ethics, general psychology or physical science; it will be distorted if envisaged in terms of any metaphysics that has been developed without initial heed to its own claims, practical assumptions and implications. Hence Wobbermin has described Schleiermacher as the Copernicus of theology. Schleiermacher's point of view has become so prevalent in current thought, and the results of his own direct examination of religious experience are still so pertinent, that, in elucidating modern theories of religion many would feel impelled to begin, as does Waterhouse in a recent book, with an account of Schleiermacher. It is not strange, therefore, that we are witnessing something of a Schleier-

<sup>5</sup> In his highly important and influential *Philosophy of Religion*, Hoeffding defined religion as "faith in the conservation of values" and variously he has described the final problem of philosophy as the determination of the relation between our highest values and existence as a whole. The connection of "fact and ideal in some rational and satisfactory manner" was likewise regarded by Sidgwick as philosophy's central task. Balfour's Gifford lectures (*Theism and Humanism* and *Theism and Thought*, published in 1915 and 1924 respectively by George H. Doran Company, New York) revolve about the thesis that the *causes* of our beliefs must be adequate to account for their existence and, therefore, if we are to hold to the validity of the accepted beliefs of common sense and of science we must construe the system of causes as expressions of an intelligent purpose.

macher renaissance, within English-speaking countries no less truly than in Germany itself.<sup>6</sup>

Current thought is empirical. It recognizes in religion a distinguishable feature of the life of rational selfhood and investigates it in initial independence of all else. It seeks to determine the revelations and claims of religion and to penetrate beneath ideational formulations and expressions to what is actually and psychologically primary. This empiricism, however, does not content itself merely with an examination of "subjective spirit"; it supplements this with a study of what was placed in the foreground by Hegel, namely, "objective mind." The interests and activities of social groups, the nature and power of religious communities and institutions, and the insistent features of their history—these, we today recognize, must be understood if we are serious with a philosophy of religion. Royce, indeed, as well as an important group under the intellectual leadership of Ames and King, made them the primary, if not the exclusive, determinants of their interpretations.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, to present writers it is *selbstverständlich* that religion is something quite other than philosophy or theology, and that there should be no unguarded shifting from the

<sup>6</sup> In 1913 W. B. Selbie published his *Schleiermacher, A Critical and Historical Study*; this was followed in 1926 by an English translation of the *Soliloquies* which, together with valuable introductory material, appendices and bibliography, we owe to Horace Friess. (Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co.) Referring to Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith*, Friess writes: "But the underlying principle of this work, that systems of theology are to be understood as symbolizing religious experience, has never commanded wider respect among all the various classes of men interested in the interpretation of religion than today" (pp. lviif.). In his recent book, *The God of the Liberal Christian* (New York, 1926), D. S. Robinson stresses the abiding importance of Schleiermacher and refers to similar estimates by other contemporary writers such as Leighton, Knudson and McGiffert (p. 51n.), and to Wobbermin's "motto for contemporary theology," which is: "Back to Schleiermacher, and from Schleiermacher forward through William James" (p. 50).

<sup>7</sup> See especially Royce's *The Problem of Christianity* (New York, 1913), Ames's *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (Boston and New York, 1910), and King's *The Development of Religion* (New York, 1910).

one to the other of these fields. They very generally hold that a metaphysical system must take direct cognizance of the broad area of religious facts no less than of other elements of experience and scientific knowledge. Metaphysics cannot vindicate its claim to being a philosophy of religion by the mere device of rebaptizing its terms, calling the Absolute "God," for example, or social experience "religion." Arduously it must build into its structure the contributions from the religious no less than those from noetic, moral, aesthetic, social, technical and economic experience, reckoning with values as conscientiously as with facts, and with faiths and attitudes as scrupulously as with the findings of physical and social science and the principles of mathematics. In so far—as Muirhead has recently pointed out—"idealist writers like Bradley and Bosanquet, realists like Professor Alexander and Professor Lloyd Morgan, pragmatists like Dr. Schiller, are all at one," and this common view indicates, on the part of English writers, "a wholly new appreciation of the independent and permanent significance of religious experience in human life."<sup>8</sup> So zealously have some of our scholars thrown themselves into the tasks of empirical description and interpretation, that as we shall later note, this really pre-metaphysical work has often seemed to them the Omega as well as the Alpha of legitimate inquiry.

<sup>8</sup> Editor's Preface to *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, pages 21 and 20, respectively.

## II

So far as the utilization of a strictly "scientific" and "empirical" psychology is concerned, the change just indicated came at about the beginning of the present century. Its initiating impulses and early creativeness were such as rapidly to bring results significant in both quantity and quality.<sup>9</sup> The past decade has yielded a refinement of earlier conclusions, some fresh studies, the discovery and preliminary utilization of novel methods, and more thorough appraisals of the degree of authoritativeness or finality to which psychological methods and conclusions may lay claim.

Critical surveys of important results to the dates of their publication are offered by three recent psychological works: J. B. Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness* (1920), R. H. Thouless's *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (1922), and W. B. Selbie's *The Psychology of Religion* (1923). The first and third of these books are essentially eclectic as regards psychological method and standpoint as well as in respect to sources from which the data are derived. The second is significant primarily for its judicious use of a moderately psychoanalytic psychology. In this it contrasts favorably with E. D. Martin's *The Mystery of Religion* (1924). The latter leaves quite to one side the abundant literature of religious psychology and approaches the religious experience of the individual with an initial commitment to an extreme and, in the view of the present writer, a crude psychoanalytic doctrine rather than with a determination openmindedly to permit religious experience to dictate psychological conclusions. Of the books we have mentioned that of Pratt stands out not merely for its fine

<sup>9</sup> I have sketched this development in an article contributed to the *Journal of Religion* for March, 1926 and since included in a collection of essays, *Religious Thought in the Last Quarter-Century*, edited by G. B. Smith (The University of Chicago Press, 1927). The literature of the past decade in the general field of religious psychology was reviewed by the present writer in *The Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 23, pp. 681-700.

judicious quality but also for its independent contributions to our scientific knowledge of religion. Important, for example, is its distinction between the conversion experiences which represent primarily an emotional perturbation or shift and those others in which the center of struggle concerns life's basic values and thus something quite objective and morally significant. This is in correction of Starbuck and other earlier writers who represented emotional conversions as thoroughly normal. In doing so, Pratt insists, they have taken as principles of human nature what in reality are the conventions of theology. Growing out of the same error is the systematization of the conversion process into distinct stages, and likewise the conclusion that "conviction" is normal and that "surrender" is necessary. A further fruitful discrimination of Pratt's is that between "objective worship," which "aims at making some kind of effect upon the Deity or in some way communicating with Him," and "subjective worship," which "seeks only to induce some desired mood or belief or attitude in the mind of the worshiper." Again, in five admirable chapters, Pratt describes and evaluates the milder forms of mysticism independently of the more extreme types. All in all, the volume is perhaps our best evidence that the psychological treatment of religion in general has outgrown its childhood and is now capable of making notable contributions to philosophy.

As regards special problems, perhaps the outstanding contribution is that made by J. H. Leuba in his *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism* (1925). Proceeding genetically, Leuba finds a continuity between the mystical ecstasy produced, among many peoples, by drugs and other physical means, the Yoga system of mental concentration, and the highest modes of mysticism. Proceeding comparatively, he finds striking resemblances between the outstanding aspects of the latter and various scientifically explicable

conditions, such as hysteria, neurasthenia, epileptic ecstasy, the trance (with its disturbances of time and space perception, its photisms and impressions of levitation, of increased moral energy and of ineffable revelation), and the sense of invisible presence. All of these problems are attacked with an analytic power and an expertness that have decidedly advanced the frontiers of our knowledge in a field as baffling as it is both practically and theoretically significant. By way of contrast with Leuba's essentially positivistic treatment, C. A. Bennett, in *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism* (1923), offers an interpretation in terms of what might perhaps be called a philosophical psychology. The analysis proceeds not from without but from within the experience itself. Following the view of Hocking,<sup>10</sup> Bennett urges that, while the mystic indeed thinks lightly of the values of the non-mystic or perhaps even neglects them altogether, he does so because of a conviction that this is the truest path to their ultimate conservation. The key to the life of the mystic is the principle of alternation: he turns away from the practical interests of life only to return to them with increased moral sensitivity, enthusiasm, and fruitfulness. For he has enjoyed a more comprehensive and vital contact with reality and has thus secured a broader vision and a restoration of power. In a recent paper,<sup>11</sup> Bennett similarly interprets worship as "a pause in the current of living," when the individual submits his spirit in holy awe to his God. In distinction from the worship of beauty, for example, religious worship restores

<sup>10</sup> In *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. The date of this important book, 1912, places it outside the range of our direct survey. But we would here refer to one of Hocking's later works, *Human Nature and Its Remaking* (Yale University Press, 1918). The doctrine here set forth of a central instinct, conceived as a will to power, has been provocative. (Cf., for example, B. W. Brotherston's paper on "Religion and Instinct" in *J. of Rel.*, 1924, IV, 504-521.) Hocking's accounts of pugnacity, sex love, and ambition in their relation to Christianity are among the most profound discussions we have of these subjects.

<sup>11</sup> "Worship in its Philosophical Meaning." *J. of Rel.*, 1926, VI, 486-503.



moral energy, replacing heroic resolve with creative inspiration. Equally insistent on the spiritual indispensability of mysticism, but treating it explicitly from the viewpoint of the distinction made by Roman Catholicism between nature and supernature, are the profound writings of the late Friedrich von Hügel.<sup>12</sup> An authoritative account, primarily developmental, of the main types of mysticism in India is now available in Dasgupta's *Hindu Mysticism* (The Open Court Publishing Company, 1927). The *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* (New York, 1927) includes five important papers read at the special session devoted to mysticism. The paper by Starbuck exemplified a novel approach to the subject. By the method of correlations Starbuck attempted to secure evaluations, singly and severally, of the interacting elements in combinations of relations within experience. In his investigations, for example, he found a positive correlation of .40 between the degree of mysticism and "the amount of religiosity in home training"; a positive correlation of .68 in relating mystical experience with participation in religious activities; a positive correlation of .67 between such experience and belief in a personal God.

Stratton's book, *Anger: Its Religious and Moral Significance* (1923) is a careful study based upon a psychological examination of the sacred literature of the more important religions of the world. Mention should be made of the second edition of Leuba's *The Belief in God and Immortality* (The Open Court Publishing Company, 1921). This work is a valuable psychological and anthropological investigation of the differences, as respects both origin and function, between early, primary conceptions and essentially different ideas of later appearance and different mo-

<sup>12</sup> Cf. especially the two series, published in 1921 and 1926, of *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, and the monumental study, *The Mystical Element in Religion as Studied in St. Catherine of Genoa and Her Friends*, 2 vol., 2nd ed., London, 1923.

tivation. It also represents pioneer work in the scientific application of statistical methods to the study of religious beliefs. Of late, moreover, new investigations have been made of the springs and psychological nature of religion. During the earlier years of the present century erotogenetic and psychoanalytic theories had as their rivals primarily two doctrines. The one was functional. It conceived religion as the consciousness of the dominant values of group life and traced the latter to such social actions as are necessitated by human needs and demands in the presence of specific environmental conditions.<sup>13</sup> The other construed religion in terms of man's universal tendency to transform and idealize his world through action, imagination, and scientific discovery—a tendency culminating in the idea of the Perfect and the Best.<sup>14</sup> Within the past decade or so Coe,<sup>15</sup> writing from the standpoint of a self-realizationist, has presented us with a variant of the latter doctrine. He thinks of religion in terms of a deep-lying impulse to the organization of an experience that is self-critical, self-controlling, and creative of social and spiritual values. The process is regarded as one in which objects of absorbing interest are idealized, in which "the social instincts" come to pre-eminence, and in which one "finds one's real world partly by having a share in making it real." More recently W. K. Wright<sup>16</sup> has contributed to the problem by borrowing the conception of sentiment from the psychology of Shand and

<sup>13</sup> See especially Irving King's *The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness* (1905) and *The Development of Religion* (1910); also E. S. Ames's *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (1910). For an examination of this doctrine, and a further bibliography, reference may be made to the present writer's paper, "Functional Interpretations of Religion: A Critique" in *Essays in Honor of J. E. Creighton* (1917).

<sup>14</sup> For a richly documented and illuminating portrayal of this thesis we are indebted to G. M. Stratton's *The Psychology of the Religious Life* (1911).

<sup>15</sup> *The Psychology of Religion* (1916).

<sup>16</sup> In his volume, *A Student's Philosophy of Religion* (1922), and in a later essay, "On Certain Aspects of the Religious Sentiment," *J. of Rel.*, 1924, IV, 449-463.

McDougall. The religious sentiment is construed as an organization of primary instincts and emotions (specifically: tender emotion, fear, intellectual curiosity, and gregariousness) centering about, and evoked into activity by, various objects, primary among which is "the Agency through which the conservation of socially recognized values is sought," namely, among advanced peoples, God. The organization is strengthened by imitation, suggestion and sympathy; it sweeps within its circle such complex emotions as admiration, awe, gratitude, reverence, along with other sentiments relating to the conservation of the higher values.

Thinkers whose interests center in social psychology, sociology, and social reform have naturally stressed the social import of religion. Shailer Mathews notes a distinct reaction on their part against identifying Christianity with socialism; he finds, moreover, that in general their results have of late been practical rather than theoretical—the more creative writers have tended to turn from general principles to the demands of concrete situations.<sup>17</sup> Conspicuous among these studies of religion from the "social" angle is *The Reconstruction of Religion* (1922) by the well known sociologist, Charles A. Ellwood. This book, though offering much that is useful in its chapters on the bearing of religion upon family, economic, political and social life, and though sound in its insistence that religion cannot spin practical programs from within itself but must derive them from the social sciences, suffers from fundamental confusions and ambiguities in basic principles.

More rewarding theoretically are such studies as E. E. Ericksen's *The Psychological and Ethical Aspects of Mor-*

<sup>17</sup> Cf. "The Development of Social Christianity in America" in *Religious Thought In the Last Quarter-Century*, p. 235. Reference may here be made to another paper of Mathews, "Theology from the Point of View of Social Psychology" (*J. of Rel.*, 1923, III, 337-351), in which he contends that in distinction from philosophy, which is an unofficial and an individual interpretation, theology is an expression of group belief whose meanings must be sought by reference to social origins.

*mon Group Life* (1923) and A. W. Cook's *Sacraments and Society: A Study of the Origin and the Values of Rites in Religion* (1924). Both of these essays are written from a viewpoint aspiring to be at once functional, genetic, and social. The same is true of the publications of E. S. Ames, who defines religion as "the consciousness of the highest social values," and denotes as non-religious all persons who are indifferent to, or destructive of, the social well being. But does not such a virtual identification of religion with social morality simply brush aside features that have always been distinctive of religion? At any rate we find numerous critics who insist that Ames fails to note important differences between adherents of organized religions and devoted atheistical servants of society; that he neglects the basic fact denoted by Schleiermacher's "sense of dependence" and Pratt's "attitude to the ultimate Determiner of Destiny," as well as religion's characteristic assurance that in our finest social attitudes and moral endeavors "we somehow have the very Heart and Soul of things with us and are aligning ourselves with the Eternal." Moreover, do we in our loftiest attitudes take our values as elaborations or as revelations? In answer to his critics Ames has pointed out that in our modern age religion is increasingly identified with social idealism and that, whatever the particular form given to the Deity at different levels of culture, and whatever the symbol, "the substance of the idea of God, the objective reality, is the Spirit of the group whose awesome will is enforced through the commandments of social custom." Thus Ames is led to a position very similar to that of the Durkheimians. When charged with subjectivism and idea-ism, he has countered with the query: Is Alma Mater a mere idea of fiction? Is it subjective? Has it not all the reality of buildings, faculties, donors, students, etc?<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> See his papers on "Religion in Terms of Social Consciousness" and "The Validity of the Idea of God" in *J. of Rel.*, 1921, I, 264-270 and 462-481. Ames might be grouped with the instrumentalists of the Dewey school. Their

This, however, does not satisfy Hocking. Not even for practical purposes, he contends, is the group spirit identical with God. From the group's demands upon the individual, from its powers and enforcements, there is always, factually or potentially, an appeal to another spirit of a more absolute nature. At best the spirit of one's social order is somewhat external, undiscerning, and lacking in appreciation and understanding of the spiritual needs of the individual; it is here also God's function "to do better." Again, "if there be in the universe an object upon which there can be reliance *without criticism*, a *valid* object of worship, and a source of *peace*, that object must be other than the social good." Further, "perhaps the most practical of all religious functions has been its function of assuring individual minds that they may and should aspire without limit;—if religion is to do this, it must involve the whole sweep of the objects of the mind that worships, and not any finite part of them. But the social spirit is a very finite portion of the cosmos."<sup>19</sup>

Humanism's voice, however, continues to be raised;<sup>20</sup> and the religious movements of positivism and ethical culture have vigorous champions. Critics, such as Muirhead, Bosanquet, and Webb, have assailed the standpoint of the latter on the ground that moral and religious attitudes must be sharply demarcated. In the words of Bosanquet:<sup>21</sup> "Morality lies essentially in a recognition of the "ought-to-be"

outlook is essentially positivistic. In M. C. Otto's *Things and Ideals* the anti-theistic note is clearly struck.

<sup>19</sup> Hocking, E. W.: "Is the Group Spirit Equivalent to God for All Practical Purposes?" *J. of Rel.*, 1921, I, 487. From a very different angle, and with a totally different philosophy, G. B. Smith has called attention to features of religious experience to which theism seeks to give rational form: "Is Theism Essential to Religion?" *J. of Rel.*, 1925, V, 356-377.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Humanism*, a late book by Curtis W. Reese (The Open Court Publishing Co., 1926) and a subsequent volume, under the editorship of Reese, and by the same publishers, *Humanist Sermons*.

<sup>21</sup> *Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, p. 59. The issue in question is one of the main themes of Bosanquet's *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy* (London, 1921).

which is not . . . and therefore involves an individualistic conception of perfectibility . . . in particular finite spirits throughout a temporal progression. While religion, implying as a subordinate feature all that morality can imply of duty and self-improvement, is understood to lie essentially in a union by faith and will with a real supreme perfection in which finite imperfection, though actual, is felt to be transcended and abolished." Significant it is that in a recent essay, a leader<sup>22</sup> of the movement thus criticized, accepts this distinction between religion and morality and repudiates only the contention that the movement, at least as it is represented and championed by Felix Adler, was less than religious in Bosanquet's definition of the term.

From different angles it has been argued that theology and the philosophy of religion dissolve into psychology. Such, essentially, is the view of the psychoanalysts. Such also is the outspoken belief of a functionalist to whom we have already referred, E. S. Ames. Because "reality is given in experience," he urges, "the science of that experience," meaning psychology, furnishes "the reasonable and fruitful method of dealing with reality, including the reality of religion." But this line of argument proves too much; it engulfs physics and all sciences of nature and of man, as well as all philosophy, in psychology. Much more hotly debated, therefore, has been Leuba's thesis that belief in the gods or the God of *religion* (as distinct from the God of metaphysics) rests upon inductions drawn from religious, that is, from inner experience; that this realm "belongs entirely to psychology"; that "since the gods of religion are empirical gods they belong to science" and "theology is a branch of psychological science."<sup>28</sup> In the course of

<sup>22</sup> Stanton Coit in "Ethical Mysticism", a paper (also separately printed) published in *Aspects of Ethical Religion*, essays in honor of Felix Adler on the fiftieth anniversary of the Ethical Movement.

<sup>28</sup> These passages are from "Theology and Psychology", a chapter in Leuba's *A Psychological Study of Religion*.

his writing, however, Leuba tends to say, not what a strict interpretation of the above phrases would imply (and what critics have primarily called into question), but rather that psychology, as any science, makes recourse to what Comte would call theological and metaphysical modes of explanation unwarranted. Thus, instead of a denial of an objectively real God we sometimes seem to have merely the contention that "inner experience" requires only "its god" and that the introduction of a real being, causally manifest in specific events of religious experiences, is unnecessary for psychological intelligibility and quite out of accord with the nature of science. Perhaps Leuba's critics have not always construed him generously but, if he has at times been misunderstood, as he himself believes, he is himself not entirely blameless, for to a philosopher's vision his account often appears blurred and confused. He does not seem clearly to appreciate the fundamentally abstract character, and the consequent philosophical limitations, of a positivistic or "scientific" psychology. To be sure, a superhuman spiritual order, or a God, could not as such be the object of psychological science, nor could it through the resources of the latter be demonstrated to exist. Even *if* transcendental causes or divine activity were operative in human experience, such agency could not, by the very nature of psychological science, come within its purview. Whether or no God exists is thus a question whose answer carries us far beyond any results which empirical accounts of conscious processes, taken as events, can yield.<sup>24</sup> Leuba's earnest championship of the powers of psychological science, however, is valuable in view of continuing arguments that certain features of various religious experiences, such as "genuine" conversion, for example, are "explicable" only

<sup>24</sup> The most pointed criticisms of Leuba's position are perhaps those of Pratt (*The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 454-8); of Waterhouse (*The Philosophy of Religious Experience*, pp. 98ff.; and of Hocking (in a review of Leuba, *J. of Phil., Psy., Sci. Meth.*, X, 328-333).

by reference to a higher Power. On the other hand, further work is needed in the determination of the powers and inherent limitations of a psychology of religion.<sup>25</sup> At the very least, it must live in comity with all other sciences and disciplines; it may not withhold its conclusions from assessment in the light of the results reached through other avenues of thought and experience.

S. Alexander has very properly insisted that "a philosophy which left one portion of human experience suspended without attachment to the world of truth is gravely open to suspicion; and its failure to make the religious emotion speculatively intelligible betrays a speculative weakness" (*Space, Time and Deity*, II, p. 353). It seems indeed even to be true that religious experience itself involves a demand for metaphysical justification. For, as Whitehead puts it (*Religion in the Making*, p. 85), "religion is the longing of the spirit that the facts of existence should find their justification in the nature of existence. . . . Science can leave its metaphysics implicit and retire behind our belief in the pragmatic value of its general descriptions. If religion does that, it admits that its dogmas are merely pleasing ideas for the purpose of stimulating its emotions"—an admission, of course, that religion absolutely refuses to make.

<sup>25</sup> Thoughtful essays on this subject have been published by H. C. Sheldon ("The Psychology of Religion Interrogated," *Princeton Theol. Rev.*, XX, 41-56) and W. R. Matthews ("The Psychological Standpoint and its Limitations," an essay in a co-operative volume, *Psychology and The Church* (1925), edited by O. Hardman). Leon Roth's admirable study "The Goodness of God" (*J. of Phil. Studies*, II, 507-515) brings him to the conclusion that "the novel approach to religious questions proposed by the psychological theologian" accentuates rather than solves his problem.



## III

The recent organization of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, with its quarterly organ, "The New Scholasticism" (beginning January, 1927) and the appearance (1927) of so substantial a volume as F. J. Sheen's *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy* are in themselves sufficient testimony of the vitality of a very important type of religious philosophy.

What is true of scholasticism holds also of the idealistic or speculative philosophy of such earlier writers as the brothers Caird and, later, of John Watson. Their religious doctrines received distinctive formulations, at the beginning of the second decade of our century, in the thought of W. E. Hocking, through his emphasis of worship and mysticism, and his skill in weaving the results of their analysis into a comprehensive account of concrete religious experience; of Josiah Royce, through his penetrating study of loyalty, the moral burdens of the isolated individual, and the saving power of the community; and, under the influence more notably of Hegel and Bradley, of Bernard Bosanquet. Truly remarkable for its distillation of thought is a later booklet by Bosanquet, *What Religion Is* (1920). Religion is discovered "wherever man fairly and loyally throws the seat of his value outside of his immediate self into something else which he worships, with which he identifies his will, and which he takes as an object solid and secure at least relatively to his private existence." The basic need satisfied by religion is that of salvation—salvation, be it noted however, not from pain, danger or hazardous enterprise, but from loneliness, isolation, and their attendant fears. Such salvation comes through dedicatory faith, through "giving ourselves to something which we cannot help holding supreme." Thus the substance of religion, for Bosanquet, is "justification by faith." The finite indi-

vidual, conscious of his unworthiness, inability and unreality, comes into union, through will and conviction, with a spirit which is a self-complete, perfect whole, a genuine individuality. Self-satisfaction on the part of the finite being is "the sin against the Holy Spirit." Evil is any experience conflicting with the complete service inspired by faith; sin is the persistence of that false or finite will which in genuine religion a man disowns.

Like Bradley, Bosanquet regards personality as a finite category, and hence he refuses to predicate it of the Absolute. This, and related considerations, impels him to differentiate between the God of religious experience, who is purposive and ethical, and the Absolute of philosophical contemplation, in which evil must be transformed or absorbed. So, in spite of the conviction that a man's religion offers him "the nearest approach to truth that he can make his own" and gives him "the clue to reality," Bosanquet tends to hold that in the last analysis it really discloses only "appearances," however high may be their degree of truth and reality. Herein his thought runs counter to that of C. C. J. Webb,<sup>26</sup> who, stressing the rational or common as against the exclusive features of personality, argues (as does Sir Henry Jones in *A Faith that Enquires*, 1922) that, if we are to be true to the attitudes and implications of religion, we must conceive God as both the Absolute and as personality. Webb likewise, however, recognizes the moral implications of finite selfhood, which therefore he refuses to relegate to the status of "appearance" or grant only an "adjectival" existence within the Absolute. To Galloway it seems highly doubtful whether this element of Webb's philosophy can exist in harmony with his absolutism. While agreeing that religion indeed takes God as the Ultimate Reality, Galloway construes this to mean "not that God is all that is real, but that He is the active

<sup>26</sup> In *God and Personality* (London, 1918).

Ground of the universe, the Supreme Spirit who is only limited in so far as He has limited Himself" (Mind, 1920, p. 478).

Those who think of reality in terms of individuated centers of consciousness, denying the ontological reality of everything save persons, and who describe religion in terms of personal relationships between finite spirits and God, have been not merely aggressive in their attacks upon the absolutists but also eager in the consolidation of their own positions. In contrast with the "atheistic personalism" of J. M. E. McTaggart, and the "purely ethical or teleological personalism" of Howison, their metaphysics culminates in a God conceived as ultimate in the sense of being the one, and the independent, causal ground of the world. The world is indeed given a measure of independence and of "otherness" from God, being regarded as the result of a free act of the divine creative will, but it is nevertheless said ultimately to be dependent upon Him. As grounded in a divine act, the human individual is described as more than a mere idea or mode of the divine consciousness, more than the thought which it expresses or by which it is apprehended. This outgrowth of the philosophies of Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant and Lotze has enjoyed strong championship on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>27</sup>

Highly significant, moreover, are the considerations which A. E. Taylor<sup>28</sup> has been urging against absolutism, and his closely argued defence of theism. Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (1919) is a carefully reasoned presentation of ethical theism. It "recognises the real world

<sup>27</sup> Among British writers may be mentioned James Ward, Hastings Rashdall, George Galloway, and C. A. Richardson. The most competent of recent American presentations of the doctrine is perhaps that in Albert C. Knudson's *The Philosophy of Personalism* (1927); somewhat earlier are E. S. Brightman's *Religious Values* and R. T. Flewelling's *The Reason in Faith*. Under the editorship of Flewelling, a quarterly journal, *The Personalist*, now in its eighth volume, is being published by the University of Southern California.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. the article on "Theism" in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

of persons as charged with the discovery and realisation of values, and it interprets the apparatus of life and its environment as subordinated to this supreme purpose" (p. 485); and it "issues in a view which finds the moral purpose of the world to be the purpose of a Supreme Mind and which regards finite minds as attaining unity with this Supreme Mind not by absorption of their individuality but by the perfecting of their character in co-operating with the divine purpose" (p. 473f.).

A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, though an early critic of Hegelianism's inadequate appreciation of the distinctness and value of the finite individuality, nevertheless refuses to pass to the extremes of the full fledged personalisms. His distinction between God and the Absolute is at times far from sharp. He is, however, clearly insistent that the divine is both immanent and transcendent.<sup>29</sup> God is described as creative, not in the sense of a creator *ab extra* (at this point there is criticism of Hastings Rashdall), but as a self-communicating life. The Absolute is generally conceived as "God-and-the-world," "a self-contained and internally organized whole, beyond which there is nothing." Though holding that individuals must not be regarded as mere channels through which "a single universal consciousness thinks and acts," Pringle-Pattison likewise rejects all views that deny "any self-consciousness except that which is realized in the finite individuals." When the extremes, personalism and Bradleyism, join in proclaiming that religion "is throughout a two-sided affair," Pringle-Pattison is glad to add his voice to theirs. In short, most readers of the latter's aristocratically conceived and executed book will agree with Bosanquet that, in its account of the relation of man to God, the "author is on a razor-edge balance" but that he

<sup>29</sup> We are in general referring to Pringle-Pattison's *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1917), but at this point we have in mind also his essay, "Immanence and Transcendence" in *The Spirit* (1920), a collection of papers edited by B. H. Streeter.

is "finally influenced rather by ethical and conative than by religious and aesthetic experience" in determining man's degree of otherness and independence in relation to the divine life. The very conditions of human knowledge, Pringle-Pattison states, preclude us from comprehending how we may hold, as we feel constrained to do, both to ethical freedom and to the ontological dependence of man.<sup>80</sup>

Pringle-Pattison conceives the universe not as a finished reality of which man is a mere spectator but as a developing system whose culmination is the rational being. The latter is thus rooted in and organic to nature; and it is through him that nature finally acquires a consciousness of herself and a joy in her own being. Pringle-Pattison thus emphatically recognizes the principle of continuity while yet maintaining that this does not exclude, but on the contrary demands, the emergence of real differences. Here too he strives to preserve a "razor-edge balance." In his philosophy he thus exhibits an identity-in-difference, or a continuity-in-variation, with earlier idealisms.

There are those today, however, who contend for a much more radical discontinuity. In Lloyd Morgan's Gifford Lectures,<sup>81</sup> for example, we have a novel philosophy—a union of evolutionary naturalism and theism. Reality is portrayed as an ascending hierarchy of realities, each higher stage of which is "supernatural" to the preceding. That is, the higher stages are not implicit in the lower but genuinely emergent therefrom, and this relation obtains throughout the sweep of evolution, with its various levels of the inorganic, organic, psychic, rational and self-conscious. This entire development, Morgan teaches, must be described and empirically interpreted by the methods of

<sup>80</sup> Valuable symposiums covering issues touched in the above paragraph have been published (in two supplementary volumes, 1918 and 1924, respectively) by the Aristotelian Society: "Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being" and "The Idea of a Transcendent Deity: Is the Belief in a Transcendent God Philosophically Tenable?"

<sup>81</sup> *Emergent Evolution* (1923) and *Life, Mind, and Spirit* (1925).

naturalism. But, while this holds true of each and every detail, the process as a whole is ultimately intelligible only as dependent upon Divine Purpose. "Spirit" is placed by Morgan neither within nor at the summit of the ascending hierarchy of realities. It is not conceived as an empirical quality towards which there is ever a *nisus*. Rather is it represented as that of which all the stages of the process are manifestations under the conditions of space and time. Thus the religious attitude transcends the moral attitude or any relation towards particulars or members of the evolutionary process; it is described as the acknowledgment of the Divine Purpose. In this view, the "ethical value of what the right-minded social person speaks of as 'playing the game' is not lost; the spiritual value of doing so in accordance with Divine Purpose, or "in God's sight," is gained" (*Life, Mind, and Spirit*, p.x).

Abandoning the theistic element of Morgan's philosophy, S. Alexander has presented, with magnificent sweep and with the utmost refinement of detail, a metaphysics of emergence moving from space-time to deity. God becomes the whole, infinite world "as possessing the quality of deity" or "with its *nisus* towards deity." Deity is an empirical quality, the "mind" lodged in a portion of the world, which, if we are to continue the analogy, might be conceived as the "body," "God's body"; Deity is an empirical quality hereafter to emerge, its promise and potency being some actual complexity or refinement of mind to which the fecund processes mothered by space-time have given birth. Deity is thus a quality transcending goodness, truth, and beauty, though in that particular line of development of which they are the actualized culminations. God may be termed good only by license, only if, by reference to one of the highest of the actually emerged values, we intend to suggest his perfection, the specific character of which, transcending as it

does all actualized emergents, lies beyond our ken. In another sense, God as the whole universe within which there is a soul or nisus towards deity, includes both good and evil. Yet as deity he is on the side of goodness for, on the one hand, this has a character of cosmic permanence when compared with evil ("morality is the nature of things") and, on the other, it is from the line of goodness that deity is to emerge. Thus, for Alexander (in his *Space, Time and Deity*) religion is "the sense of outgoing to the whole universe in its process towards the quality of deity; and just as Space is apprehended by intuition, sensible qualities by sensation, universals by thought, and values by appreciation, so God is apprehended cognitively through the religious emotion by the assurance we call religious faith" (II, p. 402).

Profoundly influenced by the doctrine of creative evolution as expounded by Bergson, H. Wildon Carr has described the conception of God which he finds implied therein. This conception, he writes, "is vague and formless. In the consciousness of our own finiteness, and in the perception that our knowledge is relative to our actions and that our actions are restricted in form and limited in range, there arises the idea of an encompassing existence from which we derive the spur and direction towards defined actions. Our experience seems to indicate an impelling force of external origin, a striving which is causing us to strive. We can fashion no likeness of it, not because to liken the supreme being to some earthly shape savours of sacrilege, but because man himself with all his furniture of aesthetic imagery is only one mode of this divine being. In contrast, therefore, to the God of the ontological argument whose idea includes existence, the God of creative evolution is existence which refuses to be comprehended under any idea" (*Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics*, p. 86).

In his recent publications (see especially *Religion in the Making*) Whitehead sides with Bosanquet in conceiving the basis of religion to be justification; he places the emphasis somewhat differently, however, when he specifies religion's primary virtue to be sincerity. Succinctly put, religion for him "is the force of belief cleansing the inward parts" (p. 15). Only in its first glimmerings and in its decay is it, as the functionalists have held, primarily a social phenomenon, dominated by ritual and emotion. In its prime it is, as James maintained, what the individual "does with his own solitariness." But, in further departure from functionalism, Whitehead speaks of ritual as "the primitive outcome of superfluous energy and leisure," having "no direct relevance to the preservation of the physical organisms of the actors." With Alexander he thinks of religious experience as the "direct apprehension of a character exemplified in the actual universe," but he differs sharply in teaching that the God of rationalized religion is not temporal. He is the "actual but non-temporal entity whereby the indetermination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom." He is not the totality of being, for he excludes evil: he is "a certain dominant and sustaining character or order of all being whereas evil is disorganization." Thus, God's goodness is his limitation. On the one hand, God transcends the realm of existence; indeed, apart from Him there would be no actual world. Moreover, he is "the binding element in the world"; the function "by reason of which our purposes are directed to ends which in our own consciousness are impartial as to our own interests"; "that element in life in virtue of which judgment stretches beyond facts of existence to values of existence." On the other hand, "apart from the actual world with its creativity, there would be no rational explanation of the ideal vision which constitutes God."



Two admirable volumes,<sup>82</sup> written by Henry Nelson Wieman under the influence particularly of Hocking and Dewey, define the religious attitude as the "mergence of the individual with the total movement of things," the "sense of dependence upon the whole and participation in the working of this total movement." God is by definition—and really He may be much more—that "Something of supreme value" in the universe which is "more critically, ultimately and constantly important for human welfare" than aught else. That this Something, God, exists is indisputable, as is the fact that He is good beyond compare. But further than this, knowledge, while not available in immediate experience, may be attained through the resources of science and philosophy operating with the material of specific experiences. Religion is not cut off from the truth it requires, but it requires more truth than it possesses; and the path for the acquisition of this, the most precious of all truth, leads out from worship and experimental living.

Thus Wieman belongs to the religious realists. But does he give sufficient credit to the naive, unreflective religious consciousness? Those of Rashdall's persuasion would answer: Far too much; all religious truth is mediate, the product of inference and reflection on experience. Macintosh,<sup>88</sup>

<sup>82</sup> *Religious Experience and Scientific Method* (New York, 1926) and *The Wrestle of Religion with Truth* (New York, 1927).

<sup>88</sup> *Theology as an Empirical Science* (New York, 1919) and *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (New York, 1925). In part the question at issue in the above paragraph involves that of whether religious experience itself, prior to all theologizing and philosophizing, includes more or less explicit cognitive elements. Present psychology here tends towards an affirmative reply. Collingwood makes creed, that is a view of the universe, the center and foundation of religion, and denies that theology is simply a superstructure erected on the basis of experience. (Cf. *Religion and Philosophy*, London, 1916.) According to Tennant's review in *Mind* (N. S. 31, p. 229), W. R. Matthews, in his *Studies in Christian Philosophy* (The Boyle Lectures, 1920) "holds that there is no such thing as religious experience that is prior to the fashioning of theological ideas, and that whatever is *sui generis* in religious experience is to be sought, not in the affective and conational elements which such experience contains, but in the ideas which are employed to colligate them and to assign them a causal explanation."

on the other hand, would answer the question in the negative. In his view, life need wait upon the development of explicit, critical scientific methods neither for religious nor for other knowledge. The existence and the essential features of God are both known in living experience. Theology must and may be converted from a speculative into an empirical science. As such it assumes the existence of the object it investigates. Our pre-theological assurance of God's existence is gained through an intuition which involves "perception in a complex"—a form of intuition exemplified also in the awareness of one's own existence, of the existence of other persons and of physical objects. At the very beginning of theological inquiry, moreover, one realizes that God "is great enough and good enough to enable us, when rightly related thereto, to be spiritually prepared for whatever experience we may have to meet." The affirmations of experience should wherever possible receive verification and expansion through scientific methods, but the ultimate court of appeal is nevertheless experience itself.<sup>84</sup> Yet the experience to which this appeal must be made is that of those who make what is described as the "right" and "dependably successful" religious adjustment. If we inquire wherein "right adjustment" consists we are told that for this knowledge we must go to experience. Thus, in spite of his attempted objectivism, Macintosh ultimately espouses a form of subjectivism. Moreover, as we have put it elsewhere: "The attributes of God are determined in the last analysis solely by reference to human needs and experiences, and hence are interpreted pragmatically. But precisely by what logic are certain experiences singled out as caused by God and therefore as revealing His nature, whereas others are ascribed to natural or to human agencies? Moreover, if we know, as it is argued, that the

<sup>84</sup> In his *Religion and the Mind of Today*, Leighton defends intuition as a valid form of knowing but also requires that all intuitions justify themselves "by fitting harmoniously into the interpretation of reality as a whole" (p. 192f.).

devil does not exist, so that evil choices are an expression of human volition, why should we not similarly hold that our aspirations for the good likewise grow out of experience or emanate from the human will?"

Temple's *Mens Creatrix* (London, 1917) declares that the problem of evil is the nub of the philosophy of religion, and in this A. E. Taylor agrees. For, the undeniable and insistent reality of evil, as a fact both of inner life and of outer nature, makes acute the question, Does God exist? We face not alone the problem concerning the origin of evil but, once we accept the reality of God, also that concerning its good. As to this Temple maintains, and again Taylor assents, that "the victory of good over evil is itself at least one of the greatest goods; and *this* good would be impossible in a world where there was no evil to overcome." According to Bosanquet, religion, while to some extent transcending the conflict between good and evil, nevertheless remains determined by this transcendence. Hence our consciousness of the Absolute must be a somewhat different mode of awareness than religion affords. Describing this consciousness Bosanquet writes: "We are aware of a strength and amplitude of the world. . . . The universe, we feel, though it is a rough place, and not exactly fitting into the frame of good as against evil, is great and splendid in ways that are to us inexhaustible. . . . The universe is the magnificent theatre of all the wealth of life, and good and evil are within it."<sup>85</sup> Very different, again, are White-

<sup>85</sup> Bosanquet, B., *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 311f. A somewhat kindred spirit, Josiah Royce, gave much attention in his later works to the doctrine of original sin. He interprets this as a moral burden which inevitably falls upon the finite individual in the process whereby he attains to self-consciousness. The individual comes to feel a lack of and need for a principle that will satisfy, energize and harmonize his own nature and bring him into the requisite union with his fellows. This saving principle is that of loyalty; it must be vouchsafed to man from without and from above, through a medium that expresses the spirit of a "beloved community." Then there is the sin of the traitor, of him who is wilfully disloyal to the cause he has espoused. Here salvation comes through the sacrificial devotion of some loyal

head's remarks on the topic of evil. In contrast with the good, which is positive and creative, evil, he explains, is positive and destructive. Even evil, however, in "its aspect of triumph in its enjoyment," is good; and, temporally regarded, evil is essentially unstable—herein, indeed, is evidenced the fact of a moral order in the world. Again, through destruction, degradation or elevation, evil promotes its own elimination. To illustrate: "A species whose members are always in pain will either cease to exist, or lose the delicacy of perception which results in that pain, or develop a finer and more subtle relationship among its bodily parts."<sup>88</sup>

But does an acknowledgment of evil, of a degree of independence on the part of finite individuals, of the fact that religion is "throughout a two-sided affair," of the conclusion that religion only partially transcends the active dualism between good and evil and that all categories of practice are limited—does an acknowledgment of one or another of these or other points indicate the finiteness of the divine being? A growing number has followed J. S. Mill and William James in so believing. We think, among the popular writers, of H. G. Wells (*cf.* his *God, the Invisible King*). Among technical philosophers those personalists who at all admit the reality of God are very generally committed to the thesis that He is in some respects limited, though this limitation is described as a self-limitation arising from the nature of God as creative, out-going love, as a spirit of social participation and self-communication. Other thinkers see in pantheism an all-engulfing and therefore altogether repelling doctrine, and hold, with Waterhouse, that any "philosophy in which God is not in some sense finite is pan-

member of the community whose deeds reclaim the evil doer and create a finer community. Hastings Rashdall (*Mind*, N. S. 23, p. 415), has criticized this doctrine of "objective atonement."

<sup>88</sup> Whitehead, A. N., *Religion in the Making*, p. 96.

theistic" (*Modern Theories of Religion*, p. 296). Speculative idealists like Bradley and Bosanquet distinguish between God and the Absolute and ascribe self-completeness, perfection, and full reality to the latter alone. Increasing deference to empirical considerations has led Balfour, Carr, Rashdall and others to endorse the words inscribed on the scapula which Pascal wore near his heart: "*Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob—pas le Dieu des philosophes et des savants.*" "Experimental religion," Macintosh contends, repudiates the view that God is absolutely unconditioned. He may be called infinite only hyperbolically, to indicate his freedom from all limitations that would render him inadequate as "the Object of absolute dependence and worship." Ranged over against the large company we have indicated, however, there are other leaders of thought who refuse to admit that the demands of the awakened soul or of philosophic doctrine can be satisfied by any being who is limited either as to power or goodness, who is dependent for his existence or his nature upon any other reality, or who is involved in struggle. In this refusal Webb and Pringle-Pattison are joined by Temple and A. E. Taylor, as well as by Radhakrishnan, the latter of whom has made this problem the theme of his *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* (London, 1920).

Kant once declared that without a belief in a future life religion cannot be conceived to exist. If this statement is to escape wreckage by familiar facts, we must interpret it to mean that immortality is a rational implication of religion. Since it was made, however, many religionists and philosophers have tended toward a diminished interest in and emphasis upon the doctrine of immortality.<sup>87</sup> Toward

<sup>87</sup> As regards American men of science Leuba has presented valuable statistics in his *The Belief in God and Immortality*. On p. 181 n. of this book he cites studies of other investigators who dealt with different groups. Recent Ingersoll lecturers at Harvard University differ in their estimates as to how firmly rooted in human nature the desire for personal immortality is. For

the close of his colossal work, *Space, Time and Deity*, Alexander admits (II, p. 424): "Should the extension of mind beyond the limits of bodily life be verified, so that a mind can either act without a body or may shift its place to some other body and yet retain its memory, the larger part of the present speculation will have to be seriously modified or abandoned." In his *The Idea of Immortality* (Oxford, 1922), Pringle-Pattison bases immortality on the existence of a beneficent and loving God. But, one might urge, even granting God's existence and granting further that He has an interest in the continuance of human individuals, how may we be certain of immortality when we consider that evil is real and that God's desires are therefore sometimes not fulfilled? So Sir Henry Jones (in *A Faith that Enquires*, London, 1922) makes the point that abandonment of the belief in personal immortality must carry with it that of belief in a God of limitless love and power. Galloway's monadological idealism of course gives to the finite spirit a place of distinct worth and relative independence in relation to both the realm of nature and the Supreme Mind, yet it withdraws from the contention that an exclusively metaphysical or psychological argument can prove or even establish the probability of personal immortality.<sup>88</sup> Rather does it base immortality on the demands

thoughtful discussions of various phases of the general problem of immortality the reader may turn to four of these lectures: *Living Again* by C. R. Brown; *Immortality and Theism* by W. W. Fenn; *Immortality and the Modern Mind* by Kirsopp Lake; *The Sense of Immortality* by Philip Cabot. (These four books were published, in 1920, 1922, 1922, and 1924 respectively, by the Harvard University Press.)—J. G. Frazer's Gifford lectures (1911-1912) on *The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead* are a comprehensive study of an important group of customs and beliefs among primitive peoples.

<sup>88</sup> More importance is attached to these considerations by Tsanoff who writes (*The Problem of Immortality*, New York, 1924, p. 372f.): "Worth-attainment, striving after perfection, conservation of value, moral aspiration cannot be frustrated in the universe. We reflect that they are all essentially personal in character; that, unlike material things, persons are not in any sense compounds, but individualized systems; that if value is to be conserved, the character of the universe must include personal immortality."

of immanent justice and on the moral consciousness generally, with its insistence upon coherence and harmony in a moral universe. Webb's outlook is less determined by ethical experience; what militates against the supposition that an individual "is not secure in God" is for him primarily a "consciousness of religious value in our unique individuality." . . . Spiritualistic literature has abounded, but there has been no appreciable tendency on the part of either psychologists or philosophers to hold that metapsychic phenomena prove the fact of immortality, though there are those who believe that we have well attested facts which establish at least the very high probability of a period of survival after death in the case of certain spirits.<sup>89</sup>

We are today witnessing intense activity on the part of a group who refer to themselves as fundamentalists. Despite psychological science, they insist that we possess truths that in no wise reflect human insight or personal-social experience but that have emanated directly from the mind of a transcendent God as a pure revelation to man. Despite historical science, they clutch to bodies of fact long discredited by empirical methods. Despite scientific conclusions generally, they so revere certain doctrines—some of them incomprehensible save only to students of the history of thought and culture—as to deem them essential for salvation from the fires of hell. Ritualistic practices which, to anthropologically and sociologically oriented minds, cannot have other than a symbolic significance, are regarded as essential steps in the only path to salvation and eternal bliss. In sharpest opposition to such a point of view is that of thinkers who, starting from what man has found to be true or highly probable, arduously forge ahead that they may bit by bit dispel the outer area of darkness; or, to put the

<sup>89</sup> Special attention may be called to a symposium recently held at Clark University and published under the title *The Case For and Against Psychical Research*.

matter differently, who, through intellectual strategy and heroic effort strive to transform a view that is dim, confused and patchy into progressively clearer, fuller and more substantially buttressed knowledge. Tawney and Lake have cogently pled for an attitude of experimentalism in religion,<sup>40</sup> and, indeed, most of the writers to whom we have called attention in this paper, however they may differ in their conclusions, are at one in taking their cues from science and human experience.

But whereas the conflict between fundamentalism and the various forms of liberalism, including experimentalism, rages only on the arena of life, there is today another controversy that occupies also the forum of scientific debate, namely, the issue between theism and a certain type of humanism. Theism grows out of experiences of dependence and ineptitude, and involves attitudes of faith, trust, worship and reverence towards the most real being, the "Determiner of Destiny"; the humanism in question, construing theism as a lingering survival of antiquated views, identifies religion with social idealism, and, metaphysically, with meliorism. But of this controversy some reference was made above, and an admirable discussion may be found in D. S. Robinson's recent book, *The God of the Liberal Christian*. L. P. Jacks once pointed out that when we have a low estimate of man and his world, theology tends to regard salvation as the heart of religion; whereas the stress falls upon the pursuit of moral excellence whenever there is a shift to confidence in, and esteem of, human powers. He added that the former tendency is that toward which orthodoxy inclines, while the latter is favored by liberal

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Tawney, G. A.: "Religion and Experimentation," *Int. J. of Eth.*, XXXVI, 337-356; and Lake, Kirsopp: *The Religion of Yesterday and Tomorrow*, New York, 1925.



theology. Robinson, however, is the spokesman for a very considerable company who still adhere to the contention that one may at once be a liberal and yet refuse to equate religious with social experience or to identify religion with the moral quest.

## HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

SEYMOUR GUY MARTIN

AT THE present time there is much need of a good, up to date bibliography of historical studies in philosophy. An annual publication of a complete and critical bibliography of such studies as have appeared during the year would render a real service to scholars in this field. But, let it be understood, it is with no pretension to anything even approximating a complete reporting of publications that the following few pages are written. The aim of this brief survey is merely to give some indication, necessarily incomplete, of the nature and extent of the contributions which British and American scholars are making toward our better understanding and appreciation of the philosophers of the past. Having this end in view, we deliberately and with a certain recognized arbitrariness confine our consideration to *some* of the books on the history of philosophy, written in English, that have appeared during the last ten years. In the whole of English philosophical literature, one finds very few *comprehensive* histories of philosophy—works of the *allgemeine Geschichte* variety—which may be either pointed to with pride or viewed with alarm. “English writers have as a rule been most reluctant to produce histories of philosophy. They appear to be overwhelmed by a sense of the enormous difficulty of the task and of the awful dignity of the muse who presides over this form of composition.”<sup>1</sup> But *partial* histories, dealing with some aspect or period of the whole, are more numerous; and it will be well, perhaps, to notice first a few

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Alan Dorward, in *Mind*, N. S. 32 (1923), p. 501.

of the works of this order that have been published during the last decade.

1. "*Histories*" of *Philosophy*: Mention may be made first of two rather unpretentious works dealing with the philosophy of France. (1) Mr. J. A. Gunn has surveyed the movements of French thought since the middle of the nineteenth century in his *Modern French Philosophy: A Study of the Development Since Comte*.<sup>2</sup> Three main currents of thought are therein distinguished—the positivist, the neo-critical, and the spiritualistic—and traced through their divergent treatments of the problems of the age, under the none too definite captions of Science, Freedom, Progress, Ethics, and Religion. The method of historiography here employed, which subordinates the individual thinker to the treatment of general problems, is beset with difficulties—as M. Bergson recognized in his "foreword" to the volume; few have followed with any complete success the illustrious example of Windelband here. But Mr. Gunn's exposition—he disclaims any attempt at critical evaluation—affords in the main a lucid and instructive representation of French philosophy of the period since 1850. (2) Supplementing the preceding in several ways is a more recent volume by Mr. George Boas, discussing the first half of the century under the title, *French Philosophies of the Romantic Period*.<sup>3</sup> "The importance of a philosopher," writes the author (p. 307), "is not to be measured by the number of pages which he receives in a history of philosophy" [*sic!*] . . . but "is to be measured by the intimacy which he has with the civilization in which he works; by the effect he has upon that civilization or by the clearness with which he expresses that civilization's interests." Mr. Boas is concerned simply with "making the proper correlations" between the political and aesthetic developments in the age following the Revolution and its philosophies.

<sup>2</sup> New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1922.

<sup>3</sup> Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925.

Whatever one may think of the statement that "Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus had relatively little contact with their times" (or of its implications as regards their "importance"), one may still admit that, judged by the author's standard, the French thinkers with whom he deals "take on a striking importance."

Fields hitherto little familiar to English and American students have been cultivated advantageously in two scholarly works next to be noted. In *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy*,<sup>4</sup> Mr. Isaac Husik has done an admirable pioneer work. By "Jewish philosophy" the author here designates not the entire philosophical activity of the Jews during the middle ages, but rather—excluding mysticism and Kabbala—their *rationalistic* philosophy, whose task was primarily the "reconciling of two apparently independent sources of truth": "The Bible and Talmud were the documents of revelation, Aristotle was the document of reason" (*Preface*). (Is it not, then, rather a consequence of definition than a statement of historical fact that "Jewish philosophy never passed beyond the scholastic stage. . . . There are Jews now and there are philosophers, but there are no Jewish philosophers and there is no Jewish philosophy" [p. 431]?) Through eighteen substantial chapters, whose content is systematically ordered and clearly presented, Mr. Husik traces "the rationalistic movement in mediaeval Jewry from its beginnings in the ninth and tenth centuries in Babylon among the Karaites and Rabbanites to its decline in Spain and south France in the fifteenth century" (p. 428). Only those scholars who have intelligent access to the Hebrew literature of the period can pass judgment upon the accuracy of the author's interpretations. But it may be said that the work should have a generous measure of success in its avowed aim of appealing both "to the scholar and the intelligent

<sup>4</sup> New York, Macmillan Co., 1916.

non-technical reader"; appealing to the former certainly by its copious citation of sources in the notes, well relegated to an appendix, and appealing to the latter by its simple directness of statement and logically ordered expositions.

Professor Surendranath Dasgupta has published the first volume of his *History of Indian Philosophy*,<sup>5</sup> which will be completed in two volumes. Because Sanskrit and Pali sources of Hindu thought are inaccessible to most English and American students, this work by a recognized Sanskrit scholar is of considerable interest and importance. In its plan the book differs strikingly from any history of western philosophy; the difference is—as the author explains—necessitated by the nature of the subject itself. For in the evolution of Hindu philosophy one finds not a succession of one system or type of philosophy upon another which it tends to replace, but rather a parallel development of a limited number of rival systems. "Instead of producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish," writes the author (p. 63), "India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of rival schools." "The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the *nastika* and the *astika*. The *nastika* . . . views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Carvaka. The *astika*-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Samkhya, Yoga, Vedanta, Mimamsa, Nyaya and Vaisesika, generally known as the six systems" (p. 68). Dasgupta asserts (p. 8) that "the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thought can

<sup>5</sup> Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1922.

be traced to sometime between 600 B. C. and 100 or 200 B. C. As time went on the systems began to develop side by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A. D. in an unbroken chain of teachers and pupils." Each of the successive chapters in this first volume of the *History* deals with one of these systems in its evolution throughout the whole of this long period. Of the evolution in general, Dasgupta writes (p. 64): "A system in the sutras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if we take it along with its developments down to the beginning of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is necessary that each system should be studied and interpreted in all the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole." No one but a Sanskrit scholar could possibly judge the accuracy with which these Indian systems are interpreted; but every reader can appreciate the remarkable lucidity of Professor Dasgupta's style, no less than the learning that has entered into the production of this work for which the need is unquestionable.

Mr. W. R. Sorley's one volume *History of English Philosophy*<sup>6</sup> was designed "to trace the history of philosophy in Great Britain from the time when it began to be written in the English language"—with Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* (1605)—"until the end of the Victorian era" (*Preface*). It is based upon the chapters earlier contributed by Mr. Sorley to the *Cambridge History of English Literature*; thus, in its conception at least, it really antedates Mr. James Seth's study of *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*<sup>7</sup> with which it naturally invites com-

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1920.

<sup>7</sup> London, J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1912. In the "Channels of English Literature" Series.

parison. Both authors seek to delineate the British national philosophy as its traits are exhibited in the succession of thinkers who have given it shape.<sup>8</sup> Neither of these works, however, seems essentially to modify traditional interpretations of the leading British philosophers, although Mr. Sorley has, in particular, well insisted upon keeping intact the *whole* outlook of the individual thinkers, as against the procedure which views them merely as examples of "empiricism," "realism," "materialism," or some other "ism." A special service rendered by this work—not, however, in a greater degree than by Mr. Seth's volume—is the attention it gives to the literary, as well as the doctrinal, significance of English philosophers. The estimate of Mr. Sorley's work expressed by a scholarly English reviewer seems, with its cautious restraint, eminently fair: "There is probably no other work from which the general student of good intelligence can learn so readily exactly what our philosophers have done to shape the general course of the stream of 'British thought' and to create its vehicle of expression."<sup>9</sup>

Mr. Seth commenting, in 1912, upon the "confluence of the two streams of English and American philosophy" prophesied that "in the future, the movement of philosophical thought in England and America will be a single movement."<sup>10</sup> And then, ten years later, came Mr. A. K. Rogers' interesting volume on *English and American Philosophy Since 1800: A Critical Survey*.<sup>11</sup> The nineteenth century—even though we are now well beyond it—continues to present grave difficulties to the historian of its philosophy; the more grave in proportion as he conceives the historian's task to involve a complete and orderly representation of

<sup>8</sup> T. M. Forsythe's *English Philosophy: A Study of Its Method and General Development* (1910), on account of its entirely different method, still furnishes a most valuable supplement to these works.

<sup>9</sup> Mr. A. E. Taylor, in *Mind*, N. S. 31 (1922), p. 208. Cf. Prof. Albee's review of the volume in *Philosophical Review*, 1922.

<sup>10</sup> *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*, p. 358.

<sup>11</sup> New York, Macmillan Co., 1922.

the entire philosophical output of a period, or as he is beset with the conviction that history must be written as a chronologically continuous story without gaps. Mr. Rogers disclaims any primarily historical purpose in writing this book, and disarms some possible criticism through his insistence (in his *Preface*) that the "book as a whole is frankly propaganda, and designed to recommend one particular attitude as against conflicting attitudes." But if the book be propaganda, it is not obvious what special message it definitely proclaims. Although the author's primary interest was not in "the tracing of historical affiliations and historical causes," it is nevertheless likely that his success in his endeavor "as a historian to be accurate" in the expository portion of his task will remain one of the most permanent recommendations of the work. The volume is by far the most complete picture we yet have of the whole English-American philosophical family of the nineteenth century, comprising as it does not only all of the first rate, but most, perhaps, of the second and third rate minds as well.

A good bibliography covering publications of the sort here being considered would quite certainly include several significant titles besides those of the six works that have been singled out for mention above. The compiler of such a bibliography would certainly not be so far led astray by titles as to omit the expanded and thoroughly revised second edition of Mr. Ernest Barker's *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors*.<sup>12</sup> Professor A. E. Taylor's appraisal of that work seven years ago as "by far the best work yet in existence on the social and political side of Plato's philosophy"<sup>13</sup> is likely to remain a fair one for several years to come. Nor, further, would one fail to take cognizance of the real service that Mr. E. A. Burt has done all students of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by

<sup>12</sup> London, Methuen and Co., 1918.

<sup>13</sup> See his review of this work in *Mind*, N. S. 28 (1919).



his work, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science: A Historical and Critical Essay*.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps nowhere—certainly in no single English work—can one find so illuminating a discussion of the philosophical aspects of the achievements of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Gilbert, Boyle, and Newton. The book is a distinct contribution to the history of philosophy. Finally, one would certainly not forget to include the posthumously published *Lectures on Modern Idealism*,<sup>15</sup> by Josiah Royce. For where can one find more of appreciative insight into the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, or a more trustworthy and suggestive interpretation of that post-Kantian movement, than in those pages? Royce often modestly disavowed the role of historian of philosophy. Nevertheless, he not only drew constantly and largely upon the wisdom of the past, but he often enough repaid his indebtednesses by shedding, as an interpreter, much illumination upon it.

One of the most learned historians of Greek philosophy has recently proclaimed that, "No one will ever succeed in writing a history of philosophy."<sup>16</sup> Many of us share Mr. Burnet's opinion, even when the grounds of our conviction may be not quite identical with his. Of course, such an opinion purports more than the platitudinous observation that no one can ever reasonably hope to write *definitively* the history of any, or all, periods; that one's work may be improved upon by others who come after is not in itself to miss "success." Rather one who voices such an opinion has an eye not so much to the inevitable limitations of historians of any one age as to a special difficulty in the very nature of the task itself. But what, after all, *is* the task of a historian of philosophy? One more often meets with disclaimers of the title than with any thoughtful discussion of

<sup>14</sup> New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1925.

<sup>15</sup> These ten lectures, originally delivered in 1906 at the Johns Hopkins University, were first published by the Yale University Press, New Haven, in 1919.

<sup>16</sup> John Burnet: *Greek Philosophy. Part I: Thales to Plato*, p. 1.

the task disavowed. This would not be the occasion to discuss the problem even if the present writer felt that he had any new light to shed upon it. But it does seem to him clear, and a matter of importance, that some of our prevailing discouragement and failure grows out of a confused understanding of the task. At least let us ask: Is not the history of *philosophy* an enterprize that may be—nay, ought to be—clearly distinguished, e. g., on the one hand from the history of philosophical *writings* and *writers* and on the other hand from the history of “thought,” of “culture,” of “civilization,” or of something else—if such there be—even more vaguely inclusive? Of course, philosophy scarcely “exists” apart from writings and writers, nor out of relation to civilization! Yet why must the historian of it compete creditably with the “Absolute”—or be a failure? Why should we in the field of philosophical history in particular rebel against the limitations of an inevitable abstraction? Or again (having limited ourselves to philosophy), let us ask: Must we not clearly observe the distinction between the task, e. g., of purely descriptive and interpretative exposition and the quite different task of tracing causes and influences of philosophies? And need a history of philosophy, in order to “succeed,” perform both of these tasks? Indeed, would not success often lie rather nearer by the doing of one of these tasks adequately and consistently and without whimsically passing from one to the other? But, after all, Professor Burnet’s prophecy of an eternal shortcoming rests upon rather different reflections. He wisely observes that “philosophies, like works of art, are intensely personal things; and thence passes on to the more questionable proposition that it is *only* “in so far as the historian can reproduce the Platonic contact of souls that his work will have value.” Perhaps the fact of the matter is that, to be a good historian of philosophy one must needs be so much of a philos-

opher that the ubiquitous problem of the one and the many is apt to lay rather too burdensome a hand upon him *qua* historian. At least it seems to the present writer that it is in the interpretation of the "many" individual philosophies, rather than in the exhibition of the "one" through the continuous unfolding of successive philosophies, that English and American scholarship has chiefly furthered the history of philosophy. And we may now turn to some works which will serve to illustrate this service.

2. *Studies of Individual Ancient Greek Thinkers*: The philosophical literature of the twentieth century displays marked evidences of an increased interest in Greek philosophy, and perhaps in Platonism in particular. Students of the history of Greek thought are vastly indebted to English scholars in this field, notably to Mr. John Burnet and Mr. A. E. Taylor. Such students appreciate especially the vast learning and substantial scholarship, no less than the freshness of vision, which these men have brought to bear upon the vexed questions centering around the interpretation of the Platonic *Dialogues*; even while many are not ready to accept the whole of their positive results. Perhaps, among others, the problem of the "historic" Socrates is destined to remain a perennial one; it is certainly not the less apt to do so as long as philosophical students feel satisfied in the assurance that, however historians of any generation may "solve" it, the *thought* of Plato's *Dialogues* is a secured possession forever. Yet, as Mr. Burnet simply observes, "In a way, no doubt, it does not matter whether we owe a truth to Pythagoras or Socrates or Plato but *it is natural for us to desire to know our benefactors and keep them in grateful remembrance.*"<sup>17</sup> And what historian, having any scruples of conscience about his "evidences," after encountering all that prodigious progeny of unscientific methods, the bewildering number of "real"

<sup>17</sup> *The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul*, p. 3. Italics my own.

Socrates'es, will not feel the force of Mr. Burnet's remark: "It would be better to say at once that we cannot know anything about Socrates, and that for us he must remain a mere *x*. Even so, however, the Platonic Socrates is actual enough."<sup>18</sup>

Of course, the revolutionizing labors of both Burnet and Taylor mostly antedate the period of the last ten years which is here being considered. But we should note in passing the continuation of their work. Particular attention should be called to the important address of Mr. Burnet on *The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul*<sup>19</sup> as well as to his recent edition of *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito*,<sup>20</sup> whose notes (like those of the earlier edition of the *Phaedo*) richly abound in suggestive information, accessible even to the reader of English with no Greek. And all teachers and students of philosophy who have marvelled at the excellence of Mr. A. E. Taylor's little volume on *Plato*<sup>21</sup> may now find, furnished by his recent study of *Platonism and Its Influence*,<sup>22</sup> a fresh illustration of how much a *master* of the subject can achieve with great brevity and simplicity. In this latest work the arrangement of the three chapters on the "Principles of Science," the "Rule of Life," and "Plato the Theologian" is reminiscent of the earlier volume; but this later study is occupied with the *tradition* and *influence* of Plato under these three heads. Assuredly the fulfillment of this little book is far beyond the author's modest claim (in his *Preface*) "not so much to supply information as to provoke the desire for it." The information supplied is very considerable; and the excel-

<sup>18</sup> *Greek Philosophy*, p. 128.

<sup>19</sup> The second annual "Henriette Hertz Lecture on a Master Mind," delivered Jan. 25, 1916, and published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press.

<sup>20</sup> Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924.

<sup>21</sup> London and New York, 1911. In the "Philosophies Ancient and Modern" series.

<sup>22</sup> Boston, Marshall Jones Co., 1924. In "Our Debt to Greece and Rome" series.

lently selected bibliography indicates where the best of further sources of information lie.

Students of Greek thought will find much value in three pleasingly written volumes by Mr. Paul Elmer More. *Platonism*,<sup>23</sup> the earliest of these, now stands as a sort of introduction to a series which will be complete in four volumes on *The Greek Tradition: From the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon*, of which the first two have so far appeared, viz., *The Religion of Plato*<sup>24</sup> and *Hellenistic Essays*.<sup>25</sup> Mr. More appears to accept in general—although it does not fall within the scope of his work to discuss the problems involved—the accuracy of Plato's picture of Socrates: "the biographical parts of the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo* present a faithful picture of the man Socrates"; and he adds, "It is easier to believe in the power of Nature to create such a character than in the ability of an author to imagine it."<sup>26</sup> In his interpretation of Platonism, this scholar lays much emphasis on its "dualism"; not only—what is recognized by all—the dualism revealed within the soul especially through the moral consciousness, but a supposedly ultimate *metaphysical* dualism. It was this dualism, according to Mr. More, which the later Hellenistic philosophies sought to escape, and which early orthodox Christianity alone retained, thereby becoming the true inheritor of Plato's teaching. It is Mr. More's ambition in these volumes to interpret the thought tradition which received its initial impulse from Socrates, was developed by Plato, and—despite its perversion in Stoicism and neo-Platonism—entered into Christianity. Of this tradition, "Platonic and Christian at the center," he writes: "Without it, so far as I can see, we should have remained bar-

<sup>23</sup> Princeton University Press, 1917. An elaboration of five lectures first delivered at Princeton University on the Louis Clark Vanuxem Foundation.

<sup>24</sup> Princeton University Press, 1921. Cf. the appreciative review by A. E. Taylor in *Mind*, N. S. 31 (1922), p. 518.

<sup>25</sup> Princeton University Press, 1923. Cf. the review by H. N. Gardiner in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 33 (1924), pp. 612ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Platonism*, p. 3n.

barians; and, losing it, so far as I can see, we are in peril of sinking back into barbarism."<sup>27</sup> Mr. More's aim is not "so much to produce a work of history . . . as to write what a Greek Platonist would have called a *Protrepticus*, an invitation, that is, to the practice of philosophy."<sup>28</sup> These volumes do not, perhaps, evince the breadth and depth of historical background which distinguishes other work in this field; but they do contribute, I think, toward effecting that "contact of souls" which Mr. Burnet has said is a criterion of the value of an historian's achievement.

Plotinus<sup>29</sup> is a conspicuous instance of a great figure in the history of thought who has not hitherto received, in the English literature, the studious attention that is his due. By two volumes on *The Philosophy of Plotinus*<sup>30</sup> the scholarly Dean of St. Paul's—long recognized as a master among the mystics—has made a noteworthy contribution to historical studies. Dr. Inge confesses himself "to be a disciple and not merely a student and critic of the philosopher" whom for many years he has studied "as a spiritual director, a prophet and not only a thinker." But his most enlightening exposition of Plotinian mysticism is not rendered the less accurate or impartial, it would appear, by Dr. Inge's deeply-felt conviction that Plotinus is "full of intellectual light and guidance" and that we may today well "find in him a message of calm and confidence for the troublous time through which we are passing." Four lectures on "The Third Century" and "The Forerunners of Plotinus" constitute a well done introduction to the detailed exposition of the system, which is the main achievement of the work. The present writer would not venture his own

<sup>27</sup> *The Religion of Plato*, Preface, p. viii.

<sup>28</sup> This statement in the "Preface" to *Platonism* seems to be equally applicable to the subsequent volumes.

<sup>29</sup> *The Complete Works of Plotinus* have recently been translated into English by K. S. Guthrie (Alpine, N. J., Comparative Literature Press, 1918). See also the translation of the first four *Enneads* by Stephen MacKenna (London, P. L. Warner, 1917).

<sup>30</sup> London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1918.

judgment as to the accuracy, in several details, of this interpretation of the *Enneads*.<sup>81</sup> But he must confess that the later lectures, dealing with the practical aspects of the philosophy—rather than those dealing with the metaphysics—have seemed to bring him much light in a field that has always seemed one of the most inhospitable toward his efforts at understanding.

As an acquaintance with the Greek language becomes less and less a part of the equipment of large numbers of philosophical students, the greater is the significance attaching to such notable enterprizes of translation as that sponsored by the University of Oxford in the case of Aristotle's complete works. One of the first volumes of this translation to appear was the translation of the *Metaphysics* by Mr. W. D. Ross, one of the co-editors of the work. More recently, we have the substantial volume by Mr. Ross entitled *Aristotle*,<sup>82</sup> a work of mature scholarship. Its aim is neither to trace Aristotle's ideas to their earlier origins, nor to follow out their influence, but (as stated in the *Preface*) "simply to give an account of the main features of his philosophy as it stands before us in his works." The content of the Aristotelian treatises is, in the main, lucidly summarized in chapters dealing in order with the Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Biology, Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric and Poetics. How far such a method of exposition, which tries to lift its subject out of the stream of ideas in which his thought lived, is the way to the best understanding of a thinker, we shall not discuss. But the present writer misses in this book the exhibition, which he fondly hoped to find there, of a deep conviction—such as he knows Mr. Ross must feel—of the vitality and interest for our own day of some of Aristotle's problems and solutions. This is not to suggest—what I am far from believ-

<sup>81</sup> One may see for competent criticism the review by A. E. Taylor in *Mind*, N. S. 2<sup>d</sup> (1919), pp. 238-245.

<sup>82</sup> London, Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1923.

ing—that the study of the great minds of the past need be justified by the light they may shed upon present-day problems. But as little does it appear to me that a great philosophical system of the past need be distorted by being examined in the light of present day interests. It must be difficult, I should suppose, to write chapters on, e. g., Aristotle's biology or psychology with no references to the issues in contemporary philosophy of "mechanism and vitalism," "emergent" and "creative" evolution, "functionalism," "behaviorism," etc. But doubtless there are those to whom the seeming detachment of Mr. Ross's writing from present day concerns will seem the surest evidence of that objectivity which is always to be expected in the true historian. Certainly everyone will profit by the enormous learning that has gone to the preparation of this compact volume.<sup>83</sup>

3. *Studies of Modern European Philosophers*: Neither English nor American writers have, during the last ten years, enriched our understanding of the philosophers of the seventeenth century through any works comparable, e. g., with those earlier ones of N. K. Smith on Descartes, of Sir Frederic Pollock and Joachim on Spinoza, or of Russell on Leibniz.<sup>84</sup> But they have advanced considerably our knowledge of some British philosophers. This is conspicuously true in the case of three meritorious volumes next to be mentioned, dealing severally with the three classic representatives of "English Empiricism." Each of these vol-

<sup>83</sup> Mr. A. E. Taylor's *Aristotle* (2nd ed., London and Edinburgh, 1919. In the series of "The People's Books.") is a small volume only in respect of the number of its pages, and loses not at all by comparison with the much more detailed exposition by Ross

<sup>84</sup> This is not failing in appreciation of the book by Mr. Leon Roth on *Descartes, Spinoza and Maimonides* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924), with its fresh discussion of the old problem of the relation of Spinoza's thought to its Cartesian and Jewish antecedents; or of his recent editing of the *Correspondence of Descartes and Constantyn Huygens, 1635-1647* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926). Nor do we overlook, e. g., the monograph by Mr. A. G. A. Balz on *Idea and Essence in the Philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1918) and other brief studies too numerous even to be listed here.



umes strives to correct prevailing misconceptions about the motivations of these thinkers; and all protest against the one-sidedness of view which results when these philosophers are looked upon merely as exponents of "empiricism."

The far reaching influence of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* upon subsequent philosophical history is universally recognized. But it may well be doubted whether this important document has ever received so fair or so masterly an interpretation as in Mr. James Gibson's *Locke's Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations*.<sup>85</sup> Mr. Gibson correctly observes (in his *Preface*) that the habit of regarding the movement in British philosophy which culminated in Hume "as the story of the self-refutation of certain of Locke's principles, has been largely responsible for the false perspective in which the *Essay* itself is too commonly viewed"; and he notes further (p. 182) that the fact that the *Essay* "constitutes the starting-point of the classical development of philosophy in England has led to concentration of attention upon its influence, to the comparative neglect of the sources from which it is derived." These limitations and defects in interpretation Mr. Gibson seeks to remedy. In "Part I" he sets forth "The Doctrine of the Essay" with a rare freedom from prepossessions about it. Insisting that the real motive of the work is epistemological, he observes (p. 1f.) that "any account of Locke's work which finds its main significance in an account of the genesis of our ideas fails entirely to represent either the aim or the outcome of the *Essay*, as these were conceived by its author. Great as was the importance which he attached to his theory upon this subject, it played only a subordinate part in the scheme of the *Essay* as he designed it; and any attempt to make it central alters entirely the perspective of the whole." How important it

<sup>85</sup> Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1917.

is for the interpreter of Locke to keep this point *always* in view becomes sufficiently clear in the excellent discussion of Locke's polemic against innate principles, the real point of which has often been missed. "Part II" discusses "The Historical Relations of Locke's Doctrine" most instructively. Especially helpful is the chapter treating of Locke's relations to his contemporaries—particularly his scientific contemporaries—in England. Professor Sorley in his *History* asserted (p. 104) that "John Locke may be regarded as, on the whole, the most important figure in English philosophy." Mr. Gibson, who cautiously refrains from evaluations of that sort and adheres strictly to his task of *understanding* Locke, has gone far in exhibiting the proofs for Mr. Sorley's statement.

Second among the books on British philosophy we may mention Mr. G. A. Johnston's *The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy*.<sup>38</sup> The author is not sparing of superlative estimates of his thinker: "Berkeley is naturally the keenest mind in the history of English philosophy" (p. 325), "perhaps the freshest and most original thinker in the history of British philosophy" (p. 12), and "Berkeley's literary style is the most delightful in the history of English philosophy" (p. 382). But despite such unrestraint, Mr. Johnston's work is on the whole a cautious and critical investigation of the evolution of Berkeley's theories. Especially good is the full and painstaking discussion in the chapter on the "Origins of Berkeley's Thought." As every interpreter must nowadays do, Mr. Johnston devotes much attention to the *Commonplace Book*, and gives a detailed and convincing discussion of the original order of its entries—with regard to which he differs significantly from the view of Campbell Fraser. While the author recognizes that Berkeley's "philosophical activity was not only influenced by the deist controversy, but was dominated by it,"

<sup>38</sup> London, Macmillan and Co., 1923.

he yet does not fall into the common error of supposing Berkeley's discovery of his central principle—*esse est aut percipere aut percipi*—to have been motivated by religious considerations, however much Berkeley welcomed what he later thought to be the agreement between his principle and religious orthodoxy. (It is not a little interesting to note that, instead of viewing the frequent avowals of orthodoxy in Berkeley's pages as exhibitions of the misplaced piety of an "Angelic" doctor, Johnston sees rather in them another instance of the practical sense of Berkeley whose eye was usually upon the "main chance" for ecclesiastical preferment! Cf. Chapter VII on Berkeley's "Philosophy of Religion.") Among many suggestive points, scattered throughout the book, is a fine discussion (p. 209ff.) of the way in which Berkeley's interest in the mathematician's employment of signs suggested his own metaphysical conception of signs. Two appendices to the volume discuss helpfully (1) the old question of Berkeley's relation to Collier, and (2) the philosophy of John Sergeant, who, strangely neglected by historians, it would appear "merits study by all who are interested in the philosophy of Locke and Berkeley" (p. 396).

In the third volume on British thinkers referred to above, *Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume*,<sup>87</sup> Mr. C. W. Hendel has made an extremely interesting contribution to our knowledge about one of the greatest figures in the history of modern philosophy. One could point to few, if indeed to any, studies of Hume in English literature which rival this in thoroughness and objectivity. Mr. Hendel corrects several current shallownesses of interpretation. E. g., Hume's critics have too often supposed that his declaration that observation of the mind reveals only a "mere bundle or collection of perceptions" amounts to a denial of personal identity. This, however, is to neglect Hume's no

<sup>87</sup> Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1923. Cf. the recent review by Mr. S. P. Lamprecht in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 22 (1926), pp. 411-418.

less significant words to the effect that "the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or existences. . . . In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than to a republic; . . . the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts." In his chapter on "The Self or Personal Identity," Mr. Hendel shows a very just understanding of Hume. Other examples there are a plenty in the book. But one of its most striking and novel features is its concern with the theological motivation and implications of Hume's thought. In 1915 Mr. Hendel undertook—for a doctor's dissertation—a study of Hume "in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of Hume's position with regard to religion." To Hume has commonly been attributed a hostility toward religion and only a mild personal concern, at most, as to the *truth* of religious beliefs. Mr. Hendel urges quite convincingly that Hume's interest in "human nature"—especially his epistemological enquiries—was the direct outgrowth of an interest, reaching back to his early youth, in the theological problems of the day. He supposes also that the final outcome of Hume's lifelong reflections on religion was, in effect, to substitute a newer for an older standpoint of "naturalism" in religion—finding the basis which validates the belief in God's existence not in the evidences of external nature but rather in the "natural imagination" of man. It does not fall within the scope of Mr. Hendel's book to treat, save quite incidentally, of the ethical writings of Hume.

Recent years have witnessed the publication of two very notable volumes on the philosophy of Kant: *A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"*<sup>88</sup> by Mr. Norman Kemp Smith, and *A Study of Kant*<sup>89</sup> by the late Mr. James

<sup>88</sup> London, Macmillan and Co., 1918; second ed., 1923. Cf. the excellent reviews by R. F. A. Hoernle in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 28 (1919), pp. 305-313, and G. Dawes Hicks in *Mind*, N. S. 28 (1919), pp. 217-229.

<sup>89</sup> Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1922. Cf. the same author's *Immanuel Kant*, being the "Hertz Philosophical Lecture" for the same year.

Ward. Were we bold—or foolish—enough to attempt an arrangement of the works mentioned in this survey according to the order of their merit and distinction, certainly we should have to place these two works very near indeed to the head of our list. Mr. Smith's impressive scholarship and powers of interpretation in this *Commentary* defy any brief reporting of his achievement. The work is now known to all Kant students as skillfully combining the functions of commenting with insight and order upon the detailed passages of the *Critique* and of supplying a masterly constructive interpretation of the whole work. The interpretations of Kant by English scholars have often suffered from an Hegelian bias; one of the traits of Smith's work, which was promptly upon its appearance recognized with approval, was that he did not look upon Kant's role in history as that of a John the Baptist to Hegel. The incompatible tendencies in the *Critique* are not glossed over, but receive close critical examination. In this matter the author has thoroughly availed himself of the more recently known facts about the origin and history of Kant's text—acknowledging his great indebtedness to Adickes and Vaihinger in particular. The merits of such textual analysis appear to the best advantage, naturally, in the illuminating discussion of the various "deductions" of the Kantian categories. One excellent feature of the volume is its critical examination of Kant's relations to earlier thinkers. The second edition has added an Appendix on the bearing of Kant's *Opus postumum* upon the doctrine of the *Critique*.

In Ward's *Study of Kant*, the aim is to exhibit the informing and central insights of the Kantian philosophy viewed as a whole. Kant's doctrine is held to be essentially—and to its credit—"anthropomorphic," by which is meant that it is a deliberate attempt to interpret the World in terms of the Self as this latter is known in reflection. That Dr. Ward should find Kant's essential achievement to lie

in the direction of a further development of Leibniz' doctrine, should not be surprising to those acquainted with Dr. Ward's own *Weltanschauung*. Nearly the first fifth of the *Study* is devoted to a quite unusual tracing of Kant's intellectual development. In the later pages attention, well proportioned to its great merits, is given to the *Critique of Judgment*. It is high, but I think well deserved, praise that is given this work by a competent reviewer: "The proper comparison is with Caird's treatise, and despite the startling disparity of size. . . . Ward's discussion is, we may fairly affirm, no whit inferior in philosophical importance."<sup>40</sup>

Among recent books dealing with philosophers of the nineteenth century<sup>41</sup> possibly the most noteworthy is Mr. W. M. Salter's *Nietzsche the Thinker*.<sup>42</sup> "Criticism of Nietzsche is rife, understanding rare. . . . Few appear to have thought it worth while to *study* Nietzsche," the author writes in his *Preface*. That Mr. Salter has studied his subject, the present volume leaves no room to doubt. The Nietzsche of the successive "periods" is clearly and fully presented with abundance of well chosen quotations; and, throughout the interpretation is conspicuous for its sobriety and restraint—some might say, even to its detriment. Not often has Nietzsche been treated to so large a dose of the apparatus of scholarship; but the handling has certainly produced the most adequate exposition of its subject in the English language.

This review must mention in conclusion two collections of historical studies: (1) Under the editorship of the De-

<sup>40</sup> Mr. R. F. A. Hoernle in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 33 (1924), p. 290. Cf. the review of Ward's *Study* by N. K. Smith in *Mind*, N. S. 32 (1923), p. 479.

<sup>41</sup> In a complete survey, note would be taken certainly of many other works, such as, e. g., H. A. Reyburn's *The Ethical Theory of Hegel* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921) and W. T. Stace's *The Philosophy of Hegel* (London, Macmillan and Co., 1924).

<sup>42</sup> New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1917. Cf. the review by Miss Grace Neal Dolson in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 28, p. 554.

partment of Philosophy of Columbia University have appeared two volumes of the *Studies in the History of Ideas*.<sup>43</sup> The essays are varied in theme and quite unequal in merit. To the earlier volume, Professor Woodbridge contributed an excellent discussion of "Berkeley's Realism," and Professor Dewey, an interpretation of "The Motivation of Hobbes' Political Philosophy." To the later volume, Mr. S. P. Lamprecht contributes a study on "Empiricism and Epistemology in David Hume," and Mr. A. G. A. Balz on "Dualism in Cartesian Psychology and Epistemology"—both well documented and worth while studies. The second volume has also an interesting "Supplementary Essay" by Mr. Dewey on "The Development of American Pragmatism." (2) E. A. Singer: *Modern Thinkers and Present Problems*<sup>44</sup> consists of a series of studies of great persistent problems as they have been wrestled with by the classic thinkers: Bruno, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. The essays, historical in spirit, may, the author tells us, "stand for moments of any thoughtful life and will have done all they were intended to do if they inform such a life with, and give it a sense of, attachment to the world that has gone before it and is going on 'round." These essays should do more than this; they *will* charm the reader, through their incomparably exquisite style—almost to forgetfulness of the difficulty of the problems and to overlooking the great subtlety of the writer's handling of them.

<sup>43</sup> New York, Columbia University Press, Vol. I, 1918; Vol. II, 1925.

<sup>44</sup> New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1923.





CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
FRENCH SPEAKING COUNTRIES



## GENERAL PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

D. PARODI

IT is well known how greatly general speculative philosophy has renewed its activity in France during the last years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, through the work of Henri Bergson, on the one hand, and of Octave Hamelin, on the other. But whatever boldness modern thought may display in its constructive efforts, it can no longer be solely and completely dogmatic. Whether to establish the foundations of a new synthesis, or to discuss its validity, modern thought must always start from a critical theory of knowledge. Such a theory is found in Bergsonism. This is an exceedingly attractive and strong doctrine, closely akin to pragmatism. Through rigorous analysis, perception and conception are set forth as intended less to make us grasp reality than to guide and favor action, and are subordinated to a kind of direct union with objects through intuition and sympathy. There is likewise a theory of knowledge in the great presentation of universal deduction that we owe to Hamelin. In this case the theory of knowledge is of such central importance that it is blended with the development of the doctrine itself. Thought, consubstantial with reality, appears as an absolute, and leaves nothing outside of itself that could without contradiction furnish the conditions and elements of existence. It seems that the efforts of French philosophy have been concentrated during these past eight years around this problem of knowledge and have scarcely gone beyond it. But, on the other hand, it

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Gertrude C. Bussey.

is clear that a problem of this kind includes all others: it would not be difficult to extract a metaphysics latent in the great doctrines of the time, even when the writers themselves forbear to formulate one. There is no doubt but that some of these theories tend more to idealism, others to realism; that some constitute at least virtually a monism, while others constitute rather a dualism or pluralism.

What, before the war, was called the "new philosophy," i. e., the philosophy of M. Bergson, has not produced an original work of importance since 1918, even though its influence is noticeable upon practically all the thinkers of this period. The whole philosophical public is, furthermore, awaiting the new work which the author of *l'Evolution créatrice* is preparing. But at least he has collected in one volume under the title *l'Energie spirituelle*,<sup>2</sup> some of his earlier articles, and these gain a new value simply from being brought together. On the subject of the relation of the physical and the mental, in particular, this volume contains some refinements which are essential for an understanding of the question; it includes also the famous, epoch-making article on psycho-physical parallelism, and, in addition, some more limited and more strictly psychological studies on dreams, on intellectual effort, on false recognition and even on "metapsychics." Its interest is, then, of the first order. Furthermore, the great intellectual commotion aroused everywhere by the theories of Einstein, and the overthrow of the idea of time which seems to result therefrom, could not leave indifferent one who had founded all his metaphysics on the essential reality of duration as a reality lived through. Accordingly, in his short volume on *Durée et Simultanéité*,<sup>3</sup> M. Bergson has tried, by a minute and precise analysis of the new conceptions in physics, to prove that the different times which one at-

<sup>2</sup> Alcan, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> Alcan, 1922.

tempts to conceive are only "measures of time," or "auxiliary times," intercalated by the mind of the physicist between the starting point of the calculation, which is real time, and the point of arrival, which is similarly real time; but in the latter only is there real succession, the latter alone is a duration.

Under the name of intuition, M. Bergson acknowledges a mode of knowing distinct from the abstract knowledge by categories. It permits us to grasp reality immediately. With a different and more traditional terminology, a somewhat analogous conclusion, on the whole, is finally reached by thinkers who remain attached to positive religious dogma. These thinkers, with M. Maurice Blondel, claim to delineate a form of intelligence which, superior to abstract understanding, models itself upon things by virtue of a kind of natural affinity, and penetrates them more exactly than does positive science, which always parcels out and impoverishes the real. This form of intelligence, conceived as it seems in the fashion of Emile Boutroux, corresponds to what is termed "common sense," or "soundness of mind," or "experience of life," closely akin to the Pascalian penetration or keenness of mind.<sup>4</sup>

The traditional religious doctrines, furthermore, are being set forth in our time, if not with originality, at least with an imperious confidence which they seem to have lost in preceding generations; but they more often inspire literary writers or the authors of polemics than philosophers proper. Thomism seems to be acquiring a renewal of influence, not only upon historians, like M. Gilson, but also in connection with dogmatic speculation. In violent reaction against Bergsonism, which has served in its time as a support for some modernists, there is often an appeal from this quarter to scholastic intellectualism. However, if there is a French Catholic philosophy, it has to be sought

<sup>4</sup> *Le Procès de l'intelligence*, Bloud, 1922.

in the works of those thinkers who are somewhat suspected by the scrupulously orthodox, a Le Roy, a Blondel, a Laberthonnière. In the main, the study of this movement belongs at least as much to the history of the literary and particularly of the political ideas of the time, as to the history of philosophy.

It is very interesting to observe how frequently philosophers proper turn away from the traditional problems of philosophy, such as the question of God and the soul, and in a certain sense avoid them. The questions which they prefer to raise are in some sort the preambles to these problems, and, as we have said above, the most original efforts of the time are concentrated upon the theory of knowledge and the theory of science.

Strict positivism still has its representatives, chiefly among the workers in the special sciences. However, M. Goblot in his *Système des sciences*, adheres in general to positivism and declares that there is no philosophical knowledge distinct from scientific knowledge. M. Cresson,<sup>5</sup> for his part, tries to establish once more the claim that metaphysical problems do not permit arguments nor valid proofs. They comprise, in his opinion, the realm not so much of the unknowable as of the unverifiable. It is not denied, furthermore, that these problems may legitimately be raised, but it is maintained that the choice between the different possible solutions can rest only upon the temperament of the different thinkers. M. J. de Gaultier<sup>6</sup> comes to the same conclusion. For him the universe is in its essence only disorder and blind will to live. Both art and science express only the esthetic moods of the men who have invented them and can have only a dramatic value. One should therefore abandon the attempt to derive rules of life from either.

<sup>5</sup> *l'Invérifiable*, 1920.

<sup>6</sup> *La Sensibilité Métaphysique*, 1923.

Considering rather the results of the different positive sciences, and the conceptions of the world suggested by them, M. Rosny, in an erudite volume,<sup>7</sup> has used all his powers once more to establish pluralism. He believes that from mechanics and physics through chemistry and biology, although the mind tends to unify phenomena, the latter present in themselves an irreducible variety and mobility. The laws or types which we define express only averages; the order is only approximate or apparent, and is entirely statistical in character. The intrinsic and basic disorder eludes us by virtue alone of the law of large numbers and of the scale on which we consider phenomena.

The complementary aspect of the same idea is brought to light by M. Emile Meyerson in his profound and learned book on *l'Explication dans les sciences*.<sup>8</sup> Science always aims to reach the real and explain it; but to explain is always to reduce phenomena step by step to one another, making differences and novelty disappear as if they were only apparent, with a tendency to final identification. This fact accounts for the privileged position of the mechanistic conceptions in which all diversity seems to arise from the different position in space of elements which are identical in nature and unchangeable in themselves. But nature and experience lend themselves only imperfectly to this attempt at unification; at long intervals, brute facts appear which are heterogeneous and irreducible to each other, "irrational." Such is, in particular, the principle of the degradation of energy, and philosophical analysis forces us to recognize others, if only the existence of change and of the sensible qualities. Thus there is in turn reciprocal agreement and resistance between nature and unifying reason: such is the spectacle that the universe of M. Meyerson presents to us. Further than this the author refrains from

<sup>7</sup> *Les Sciences et le Pluralisme*, Alcan, 1922.

<sup>8</sup> Payot, 1921.

deducing the metaphysical consequences of his studies in epistemology.

This conception of the struggle between the world which is the source of diversity and the mind which tends always toward unity and assimilation, recalls the conclusions of the already old thesis of M. André Lalande, *La Dissolution opposée à l'évolution*, conclusions which their author has not restated in any new work that has appeared in the period with which we are concerned, but which, sustained by the great authority of his teaching, exercise at the present time an incontestable influence on the philosophic youth of France.

Finally, M. Léon Brunschvicg, in his large and comprehensive enquiry into *La Causalité physique et l'expérience*,<sup>9</sup> as well as in an important study in *l'Orientation du rationalisme*,<sup>10</sup> has defined with deepest erudition what he believes will be the only one possible task of philosophy in the future. This particular task of philosophy is, according to M. Brunschvicg, to make the mind conscious of itself by retracing its own steps and its successive creations through the stages of its secular life, in science first, in mathematics and physics, then in the moral life, and in civilization at large. Basing his study on the most extensive knowledge of the history of the sciences, Brunschvicg derives from it a conception of the relation of experience and reason which is both precise and flexible. As far as the mind goes back into its past history, and analyzes its elementary operations, it never encounters brute data where external reality can be grasped as it is in itself; everywhere it finds itself face to face with itself, i. e., with processes through which, in its inexhaustible fecundity and its unforeseeable ingenuity, it has succeeded in making nature intelligible and in mastering it. But, on the other hand, at every moment of scientific evolution, it is only through the shock

<sup>9</sup> Alcan, 1922.

<sup>10</sup> *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, July, 1920.



of experience that mind has unfolded new resources, and has modified, adapted, reformed, or, at long intervals, upset its earlier constructions. Thus, whether we are concerned with mathematics or physics, experience and reason always make their appearance as inseparable, constituting correlative terms—the one inconceivable without the other. We never encounter anything except ideas, facts, or objects, already worked over and interpreted by the mind, and theories or laws modelled upon the lines of experience. This is a conception of science which may seem quite close to that of the critical idealism of the Kantian variety, with this essential reservation, that for M. Brunschvicg, reason can never be considered as a collection of fixed and unchangeable forms imposing themselves *a priori* upon phenomena; what are called categories, laws, or rational principles are themselves, in the long run, the results of the collaboration of experience and mind, and always remain subject to modification according to the exigencies of this indefinite adaptation, and of this assimilation of one to the other. Finally, if it were necessary to state what reason, or mind, is for M. Brunschvicg, one would define it doubtless as an activity, pure, original, and free, which is no more subordinated to the nature of a supposedly external object, than to the supposed nature of a subject; for the latter, as soon as it is conceived as given once for all, becomes by that very fact object in its turn.

Evolution, incessant and creative, in the life of the universe, according to M. Bergson; evolution in the theories of science, and in the different disciplines of moral life; evolution in reason itself,<sup>11</sup> the instrument of both: such seem to be the conclusions in which the majority of present day thinkers agree. And it might seem that they agree

<sup>11</sup> M. Meyerson who, for a long time, seemed to hold that reason is unchangeable in its principles, and in the demands by which it is manifested, has apparently been converted by Einstein to the idea of a possible transformation of reason. (*La déduction relativistic*, Payot, 1924.)

in some measure with the conclusions of scientific positivism, with the conclusions, for example, of biology, and of contemporary sociology: Indeed, one thinker who belongs to a period anterior in date, but whose inspiration and works are being revived at this time by the faithful enthusiasm of a group of disciples—the obscure and profound Jules Lagneau—seems to bring to the fore the idea of spiritual freedom. This freedom even in rational activity conquers by doubting and at each instant goes beyond its own demonstration and proof. But the distance nevertheless remains great—wide enough to provide place for the whole of true philosophy between empiricism, naive objectivism, or an uncritical positivism, and the profound conviction, which animates all of modern French philosophy, of the ever-present creative activity of mind and of its universal immanence.<sup>12</sup>

And perhaps it is permissible to believe that from this point of view there is still possible a genuinely philosophical interpretation of the world, wherein one will rediscover, over and above the necessary negations, the positive traits which would define a reason whose spontaneity and freedom would not exclude its determinateness and dialectic continuity, in accordance with the eternal conditions of the possible and of the logically necessary, and in accord-

<sup>12</sup> This is, in fact, the main inspiration of a remarkable *Introduction à la Philosophie* (Alcan, 1925), which has just revealed a young thinker, M. René Le Senne. Taking his departure from the dialectic of Hamelin, and from relation and categories as expressing the metaphysical conditions of all experience and of all thought, which are but one, he believes that he can discover in contingency and freedom the creative principle which should allow us to go beyond the domains of abstract necessity, and to construct a *concrete idealism*. Over and above metaphysics and science, reason should be able to strive, through religion, morality, and art, toward an indefinitely increasing approximation, to the purely individual act which is essentially invention, life, and thought in one.

There are also efforts toward the highest philosophy, and attempts, more or less under the influence of Hamelin, at constructive dialectic, manifested in the work of M. Lavelle, *La Dialectique du monde sensible*, and in that of M. Nabert, *L'Expérience intérieure de la liberté*. On the other hand, M. Rougier has felt obliged to denounce *Les Paralogismes du Rationalisme*; but in so doing he has given perhaps a rather narrow and arbitrary interpretation of rationalism.

ance with the demands of intelligibility: "in the beginning was the Word."

If such are the character and directions of general philosophical speculation in France, we shall not be surprised to find them not only in the universities, where ideas are worked out, but in the classes in philosophy, which are unique in our secondary education, and through which these ideas are disseminated and contribute to the formation of all cultured minds. No state doctrine is imposed upon these classes; freedom of teaching is complete. It is just for this reason that the diverse tendencies of our own times are represented there, and combine in a thousand ways, particularly the spiritualism of Bergson, the sociologism of Durkheim, and idealism of the Hamelin variety. Evidence of this may be found in text-books, those of M. Malapert, Abel Rey, Challaye, Thomas, l'Abbé Baudin—among which a special place must be given to the excellent *Psychologie* by M. D. Roustan, in which Bergson's influence is dominant.

## LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENCES<sup>1</sup>

ANDRÉ LALANDE

IT is commonly said that the French are a nation of logicians. Is that the reason why France has produced few treatises on logic, while there are many such in England, a land where citizens enjoy the reputation of carrying into daily life more intuition and feeling than inclination to reason upon their conduct? There is often a kind of compensation between theory and practice. It is not the men most gifted in business who have written the best books on economics, and the converse is no less true. However, in the last few years there has been a revival of activity in the field of logic. This is due, it seems, to the influence of two men: Louis Couturat, who died in 1914 as a result of an automobile accident incurred in the course of mobilization, and whose remarkable works are therefore anterior to the period with which we are here concerned;<sup>2</sup> and M. Edmond Goblot, Professor at the University of Lyons, whose *Traité de Logique*<sup>3</sup> is the most important and most widely read book in this field published since the war. Although this book shows a thorough knowledge and a fairly extensive use of the ideas put into circulation by Couturat, it is conceived in an entirely different spirit. M. Goblot has shaped his ideas through contact with the ex-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Gertrude C. Bussey.

<sup>2</sup> Louis Couturat was forty-seven years old when he died. It will be remembered that logistic (following the method of Bertrand Russell) and the logic of language (particularly the logic of artificial languages) were his two favorite fields of study. Both writers, furthermore, are related to Leibniz whom Couturat had first studied in his masterly book, *La Logique de Leibniz* (1901).

<sup>3</sup> Armand Colin, 1918.

perimental sciences. His recent *Logique* is in many respects the sequel and development of an already old study on *La classification des sciences*<sup>4</sup> which had begun as early as 1898 to win him recognition. He there set himself the problem of which his new book has just given a solution, debatable to be sure, but forceful: how can reasoning be at once both rigorous and fertile? If the conclusion is necessary, it is already contained in the premises, and we have tautology; if reasoning can carry thought forward, create something new, there must have been in it something unforeseeable and contingent. The solution is derived, according to M. Goblot, from the distinction between the operations which one decides to perform and the precise rules according to which one carries out each of these operations; the rules are rigorous, but the operations are acts, quite comparable to physical movements which one chooses at pleasure to make or not to make. One observes their conclusion as one observes the effect produced by a manipulation. The rules of logic guarantee their validity, but the initiative of the reasoner is what constitutes their fertility.<sup>5</sup>

Moreover, the *Traité de Logique* of M. Goblot is not limited to this ruling idea. It reviews all the traditional questions, passing rather hastily over many points, but on the other hand treating profoundly and in detail questions in which the author is particularly interested: the theory of hypothetical judgments and inferences, to which he reduces many of the forms usually regarded as categorical; teleological reasoning, by which is demonstrated the relations of finality, relations which, in his opinion, can be given a perfectly scientific and positive meaning; the logic

<sup>4</sup> Published by Alcan; the present form of other ideas expressed in this book may be found in a recent book by the same author, *Le Système des Sciences*, Armand Colin, 1922.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. also on this question. A. Roux: *La Raisonement par récurrence; la nécessité et la nouveauté en mathématiques*, in *Revue Philosophique*, January, 1925.

of judgments of value; and, finally, the relations between logic and the rationalism of which he is a vigorous and determined partisan.

This book is today in the hands of all students. But the *Logique* of M. Rabier,<sup>6</sup> which has been frequently reprinted and which was inspired by the teaching of Lachelier at the *Ecole Normale*, and the *Manuel de Logique* of Liard<sup>7</sup> in which much less space is given to general and formal logic than to methodology, are still much used. Moreover, all the manuals of philosophy (rendered numerous by the organization of French secondary teaching and of the baccalaureate) contain a section devoted to logic. It is impossible to cite them all: the manual richest in treatment of questions of logic is that of M. Rey,<sup>8</sup> professor at the Sorbonne; the latest is the book of M. Challaye,<sup>9</sup> professor at the Lycée Condorcet, which is very lucid and well adapted for its purpose; the most ingenious in its mechanical contrivances is the *Cahier d'études philosophiques* by M. Achille Ony (Boulinier, 1925; two vol.) which contains, on removable sheets of strong paper, up-to-date abstracts and very full bibliographical references.

Classical and even mediaeval logic have been represented by an important work by M. Maritain, professor in the Faculté Catholique of Paris.<sup>10</sup> In it, the author expounds, in modern form but with rigorous fidelity to the principles of St. Thomas Aquinas, the doctrine of the concept, of the proposition, and of the syllogism. He develops in an interesting way and with the aid of the most recent works, the ruling ideas of his master, but he is severely orthodox in his opposition to any position contrary

<sup>6</sup> Hachette, 1886, 8th ed., 1924.

<sup>7</sup> Masson, 1884, 10th ed., 1922.

<sup>8</sup> *Leçons de philosophie*, Vol. 2: *Logique, Morale et Philosophie générale*. Revised in accordance with the new programs of the baccalaureate. Rieder, 1925.

<sup>9</sup> *Philosophie scientifique et philosophie morale*, Nathan, 1923.

<sup>10</sup> *Petite Logique (Logica minor) ou Logique formelle*, Tequi, 1923.

to that of the latter, for example, to logistic and the logic of relations, which he considers as "destructive of a sane philosophy of reasoning."

France, furthermore, has never looked with favor upon symbolic logic. Our mathematicians, after the manner of Poincaré, attach only slight importance to it, and the philosophers are only mildly interested in this technique which they, in general, criticize as being enclosed within itself, without giving evidence of any appreciable fertility in useful applications to other sciences. However, *La structure des théories déductives*,<sup>11</sup> by M. Rougier, the *maitre de conférences* at the University of Besançon, constitutes an interesting attempt to reform classical logic through reliance upon the works of MM. Peano, Padoa, and Russell. But the work is not limited to this attempt. The formulae of a mathematical nature take only a secondary place. M. Rougier is in the main a disciple of M. Goblot to whom the book is dedicated. It is true that he disagrees with his former master on the question of which we have just now spoken, that of the novelty of the conclusion. On this point he maintains a doctrine more in harmony with intellectualistic traditions, and more favorable to an idealistic logic which transcends action. Nevertheless, in his ideas on deduction, on the unity of the different forms of reasoning, on "*l'économie des théories deductives*," there remains a direct kinship in spirit between this book and the *Traité de Logique*. In many respects it appears as the free development of the earlier work, a development which takes advantage of the logical researches of mathematicians, but which received its original orientation from elsewhere.<sup>12</sup>

Mention might also be made of the *Leçons de Logique*

<sup>11</sup> Alcan, 1921

<sup>12</sup> Cf. also, on logic and mathematics, A. Reymond: *Sur une définition des ordinaux transfinis*, in *Revue de métaphysique*, May, 1919; J. Richard: *Considérations sur la logique et les ensembles*, *ibid.*, July, 1920; Hadamard: *Les principes du calcul des probabilités*, *ibid.*, July, 1922; Bénézé: *Qu'est-ce qu'un système de référence?* *ibid.*, July, 1925.

*formelle* by M. Luquet,<sup>13</sup> a text-book of studies of the same kind, but one which exhibits even greater freedom in regard to the logistic already formulated. M. Luquet is professor at the Lycée Rollin, and is already well known through his *Essai d'une Logique systématique et simplifiée*, which had attracted the attention of specialists twelve years ago. His earlier work was based upon the classical logic, but his new book is in harmony neither with that nor with logistic; notations, principles, demonstrations, practically everything is his own. Although the work in its general aspect is predominantly algorithmic, it makes numerous appeals to intuition, and thereby sets itself in opposition to the ideal purity aimed at in the *Principia Mathematica*.

Within the field of symbolic logic—or at least within a field adjacent thereto—one may mention, finally, a remarkable little work by Jean Nicod, which shows—in contrast to the work just mentioned—an extreme care for the rigorous criticism of postulates, and for the precise distinction between ideas: *Le problème logique de l'induction*.<sup>14</sup> The author, who died in 1924 at the age of thirty-one, was an excellent logician who had supplemented his studies in France by several years of study at Cambridge, under the direction of Bertrand Russell. The vigorous work just mentioned, though debatable on many questions, is none the less one of the books which one must have read in order to speak on this problem today. It occasions a high opinion of its author, and a keen regret for his premature death.

We should also connect with logic, at least for an important part of their content, several of the numerous works on linguistics which have appeared during these last years:

<sup>13</sup> Alcan, 1925.

<sup>14</sup> Alcan, 1924. Jean Nicod also published *La Géométrie dans le monde sensible* (*Revue de métaphysique*, 1924), a very unusual and penetrating logical analysis of perception. (Preface by Mr. Bertrand Russell.) He is also the author of an interesting discussion of *La Logique*, by M. Goblot, *ibid.*, May, 1919; of a study on *Les relations de valeur et les relations de sens en logique formelle*, *ibid.*, October, 1924, and of several English articles in British reviews.



*Le langage et la pensée*<sup>15</sup> by M. H. Delacroix, and *Le langage*,<sup>16</sup> by M. Vendryès, both writers being professors at the Sorbonne, the one of psychology, and the other of the science of language; and especially, *La pensée et la langue*,<sup>17</sup> by M. Ferdinand Brunot, Dean of the Faculté des Lettres at the University of Paris. The latter work exhibits the great originality of substituting for the old analysis of language, made according to morphological or syntactical forms, a new arrangement, in which the author rather brings together under one head all the verbal forms answering to the same feeling, the same intention, or the same logical function, e.g., determination or indetermination, exclusion, addition, cause, consequence, opposition, possibility, necessity, hypothesis. Experience has already shown that even in teaching grammar to children, this method of approach, from thought to its verbal expression, has evoked a livelier interest than did the former method.

Another aspect of this logical study of language is to be seen in the voluminous work of philosophical semantics which was begun twenty-five years ago, and carried out under the supervision of *la Société française de philosophie*, the last part of which (U-Z) appeared in 1922. Each of the technical terms of philosophy is there analyzed, its diverse meanings are distinguished, its equivocations, and the sophisms which result from them, are pointed out, unusual uses or abuses of terms are discussed. All the conclusions upon which the members and correspondents of the society have been able to reach an agreement are incorporated in the main text; but numerous observations in the form of notes contain, over the signatures and upon the responsibility of their respective authors, divergent opinions that could not find place in the article, or accessory remarks that it has seemed useful to preserve apropos of

<sup>15</sup> Alcan, 1924.

<sup>16</sup> *La renaissance du livre*, 1921.

<sup>17</sup> Masson, 1922.

the meaning of the words and the discussions connected with them.<sup>18</sup>

But the field of logic wherein the French have been pre-eminently active is that of epistemology, understood in the sense which we give to the word (and which is not quite the same as that which it has in English-speaking countries) i. e., the study of the method and structure of the positive sciences. In this domain, I should not hesitate to analyze, first of all, the very remarkable book of M. Brunschvicg, *l'Expérience humaine et la causalité physique*<sup>19</sup> if it were not that it goes far beyond our field of study in two directions: on the one hand, this work is conceived on an essentially historical plan, and, on the other, it carries its conclusions to the most ultimate problems of the philosophy of mind, and of its relation to nature. A very profound analysis of this book will be found, however, in the preceding paper, devoted to general philosophy and to theories of knowledge.<sup>20</sup>

On the other hand, we are in the very center of French epistemology with the two works of M. Emile Meyerson, *l'Explication dans les sciences*,<sup>21</sup> and *La déduction relativiste*.<sup>22</sup> There are few works on science which are so much read and discussed by the younger generation of philosophers. They are the natural sequel of *Identité et Réalité*, which for a long time has assured the reputation of its author, and they develop the same ideas by commenting upon them or applying them. *L'Explication dans les sciences* is a freer and more popular exposition of the subject; to explain is to show that what appears new is reducible to something that existed before; that which seems different in appearance is for reason reducible into like

<sup>18</sup> *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*, 1902-1922, and *Supplément*, July and October, 1923. Part of these numbers are at present out of print, but a new edition, revised and enlarged in two volumes, has recently appeared. Alcan, Paris, 1926.

<sup>19</sup> Alcan, 1922.

<sup>21</sup> 2 vols., Payot, 1921.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. the above article by M. Parodi, p. 359.

<sup>22</sup> Payot, 1925.

elements. Hence the increasing use of mathematics in the sciences, for all calculation presupposes the repetition of identical units.<sup>23</sup> But this truth leads to a conclusion which M. Meyerson has himself named "the epistemological paradox." On the one hand, science is realistic, in so far as it involves prevision and the power of acting upon things; on the other hand, it tends to annihilate everything through explanation, for nothing exists but differences, and if everything were identical nothing would be. It was precisely to escape this consequence that Hegel, renouncing classical logic, wished to banish mathematics from the philosophy of nature and to explain everything by his concrete universal. Thus the name of Hegel is the one which appears most often in the work of M. Meyerson, who is at the same time both his friend and his opponent—his opponent considered as a physicist, his friend considered as a critic of the philosophical consequences which result from explanation through homogeneity. *La déduction relativiste* is an application of the same principles to the theory of Einstein. The author has not here attempted to give a popularization of the theory but to trace its psychology. He has collected the assertions or the characteristic expressions of the principal relativists: Einstein, Eddington, Langevin, Weyl, etc., and tries to show that the great motive of their work, as well as the great factor in their success, is to be found in their progress towards a complete assimilation of phenomena—a progress so considerable that some become afraid of the complete identity which they foresee, and react against the vertigo of universal dissolution.

With these ideas one may compare *Le mensonge du monde*,<sup>24</sup> by M. Paulhan, who, however, considers the subject in its psychological and metaphysical rather than in

<sup>23</sup> In *L'Explication dans les sciences*, Vol. 2, Ch. XVII, there may be found a remarkable account of the development of these ideas.

<sup>24</sup> Alcan, 1921.

its logical aspects. He also is one of those who have perceived this character (strange at first) of scientific thought. But he does not make of it the backbone of epistemology as do the authors of whom I have already spoken. The same thing may be said of another work of M. Rougier, whom we have already mentioned. It is a very interesting and well informed collection of articles on scientific philosophy, which bears the title *En marge de Curie, de Carnot, et d'Einstein*.<sup>25</sup> The principle of the degradation of energy and the principle discovered by Curie (that effects are always as symmetrical as, or more symmetrical than, the causes) are presented as two remarkable forms of the tendency of phenomena to become uniform spontaneously. Strictly speaking, these laws are not interpreted in the same way by everyone. M. Meyerson sees in these leveling principles an irrational character, because they are a blow to the principle of conservation. Others, on the contrary, have tried to show that they are in essential conformity with reason, inasmuch as they tend in the direction of identity.<sup>26</sup> But this very discussion may give a fair hint of what are at present the themes debated in the logic of the sciences.

It is too late now to return to the relativist movement of Einstein which passionately interested the French public from 1921 to 1923, but which seems today to have been cast somewhat into the shadow by other preoccupations. There remain, however, as witnesses to this movement not only numerous reviews<sup>27</sup> and a whole library of popularizations, but also some very original reflections by M. Bergson himself, in *Durée et Simultanéité*.<sup>28</sup> These last have occasioned many discussions to which the author has replied in the

<sup>25</sup> Chiron, 1921.

<sup>26</sup> *L'Épistémologie de M. Meyerson et sa portée philosophique*, in *Revue Philosophique*, March, 1922; *La déduction relativiste et l'assimilation*, in *Revue Philosophique*, March, 1926.

<sup>27</sup> Particularly, *Bulletin de la Société de philosophie*, July, 1922; *Revue philosophique*, same date.

<sup>28</sup> Alcan, 1922. 2nd ed., 1923.

addenda to the second edition. Public opinion has remained uncertain concerning the solution which he proposed, and it does not appear that the verdict will be given for a long time.

On the other hand, problems which concern the nature, method and co-ordination of the sciences are always the subject of numerous publications. Mention has already been made of *Le système des sciences* by M. Goblot. A short while before his death, M. Pierre Boutroux wrote a little masterpiece, *L'idéal scientifique des mathématiciens*,<sup>29</sup> which summarizes and completes his large work on *Les principes de l'analyse*.<sup>30</sup> In the same collection have appeared *L'espace et le temps*,<sup>31</sup> by M. Emile Borel, professor at the Sorbonne, and *l'Unité de la science*,<sup>32</sup> by M. Leclerc du Sablon, formerly dean of the Faculté des Sciences at Toulouse. M. Rey has published a new and greatly enlarged edition of his thesis: *La théorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains*.<sup>33</sup> *La méthode générale des sciences pures et appliquées*<sup>34</sup> by M. Lamouche, a naval engineer, is an important work animated by a markedly instrumentalist spirit. The author aims to maintain throughout a direct contact between the most general ideas and their technical applications, and believes that only minds capable of grasping and comprehending this double aspect of ideas, combine in themselves the necessary conditions for speaking with competence about them. The book is a little long, but substantial and instructive. Personal talent, imagination, originality are, on the other hand, the dominant traits exhibited by the book of M. Rueff, *Des sciences physiques aux sciences morales*,<sup>35</sup> in which the

<sup>29</sup> Alcan, 1920 (New scientific collection).

<sup>30</sup> 2 vols., Hermann, 1914 and 1919.

<sup>31</sup> Alcan, 1922 (New scientific collection).

<sup>32</sup> Alcan, 1919.

<sup>33</sup> Alcan, 1923.

<sup>34</sup> Gauthier Villars, 1924.

<sup>35</sup> Alcan, 1922.

author analyzes the use of mathematics in the physical sciences in order to show how its use may be extended to the moral sciences and particularly to economics. Finally, numerous articles on methodology have found a place in our principal philosophical reviews.<sup>86</sup>

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A serious disadvantage of asking a specialist to summarize the movements in the field of his science is that he is forced either to be incomplete or to speak of his own works. Entrusted for the past twenty years with the work in logic and methodology at the Sorbonne, the author of the present article has had there as students a large number of the young professors who are at present teaching in the "classes of philosophy"<sup>87</sup> at the Lycées and colleges. He believes, therefore, that it will not be out of order to indicate what have been the dominant ideas of his own teaching.

Their origin lies in a reaction against the Spencerian interpretation of the positive sciences, which was still dominant at the beginning of this century, and which despite all that has been said against Spencer, still has great weight in the minds of many scholars. However, if one reflects upon it with a critical mind, one perceives clearly the insufficiency of "differentiation" to represent even the physical order with its spontaneous tendency toward uniform distribution of energy, still more its inadequacy to the moral, aesthetic, and religious orders, where there is

<sup>86</sup> Among the articles may be cited particularly, Dorolle: *La Valeur des conclusions par l'absurde*, in *Revue philosophique*, Sept., 1918; Halbwachs: *L'expérimentation statistique et les probabilités*, *ibid.*, Nov., 1923; Déat: *La démonstration par l'absurde en psychologie et en morale*, *ibid.*, Jan., 1924; Lacombe: *L'interprétation des faits matériels dans la méthode de Durkheim*, *ibid.*, May, 1925; Winter: *Les axiomes de la physique différentielle*, in *Revue de métaphysique*, Jan., 1924; Dupréel: *Convention et raison*, *ibid.*, July, 1925. See also *La Revue de synthèse historique*, directed by M. Henri Berr, as published by La Renaissance du Livre. We mentioned above, in connection with formal logic, various other reviews concerned with mathematical method.

<sup>87</sup> In France elementary instruction in philosophy is given to all students who carry on their secondary studies, even if they do not go to the universities.

manifested throughout an "involution," a progress toward identity. It is necessary, then, to recognize two opposing currents in the world, the one vital, the other manifested both above and below the biological level, in degradation of energy on the one hand, and in the constitution of human values on the other. Between these there is a parallelism from which important consequences can be deduced.<sup>38</sup> Many of these concern only remotely the subject of this article; but, among others, may be found the incontestable proof that logic is a normative science, not in the sense that it can conclude from ascertained facts to bounden duties, but in the sense that it moves entirely in the normative realm of obligations, and that the most fundamental position of logical thought, " $p$  implies  $q$ ," means that one has not the right to deny  $q$  when one has affirmed  $p$ . It is hardly necessary to point out the agreement of this thesis with the one which regards the concept as logically posterior to the judgment of which it is an abstraction, or a result. But it is in my opinion, the only way to give a reasonable answer to the question of the principle and basis of induction set forth hitherto in such an ambiguous way.<sup>39</sup>

From this point of view, logic is plainly distinguished from psychology on the one hand and from symbolic logic on the other.<sup>40</sup> The latter must not be considered as the substance, but as the auxiliary of reasoning, with a role comparable to that which may be played, in the aesthetics of music, by the notation on the staff, or by the symbolic theory of harmony. A *purely formal logic* does not even exist. Not only must the algorithms be handled like things, furnishing no results except on this condition—in this M. Goblot seems to me to be quite right—but they do not assume a logical character unless they cease being a simple

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Le Parallélisme formel des sciences normatives*, Report of the Congress of Bologna, 1911; *Revue de métaphysique*, July, 1911.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Revue des Cours et Conférences*, Feb. 15 and 29, 1924.

<sup>40</sup> *Sur les rapports de la Logique et de la Psychologie*, in *Scientia*, 1915, Williams and Norgate.

assemblage and are interpreted as proof of the true and false. It is by catachresis that one speaks of the "formal truth" of a proposition, in order to say that it followed necessarily from certain hypotheses; what is true is the assertion that it *does* follow from these hypotheses, and this truth is no less "material" and "ascertained" than the cubical form of a salt crystal.

This, naturally, does not preclude our recognizing that symbolic logic has rendered immense service in analyzing judgment and reasoning. It has brought into relief the distinction between the existential and the non-existential; and the invalidity (or more exactly the incompleteness) of reasoning which moves from the universal to the particular. It has generalized the useful notion of a universe of discourse. It has shown the independence of principles formerly confused; the importance and extent of correct operations which are not reducible to the classic types; the real complexity of some of these; the generality of the conclusions based on the formal properties of various relations. All these results may be incorporated into formal logic, taken in its broadest sense. Formal logic should also develop the different properties included under the term intension, subjective and objective; intension, decisive, complete, implicit, eminent. It should similarly analyze in a more exact and complete fashion the extension and quantity of propositions. When all these distinctions are correctly made, many prejudices and pretended principles and equivocations seem to disappear, such as that which states that extension is in inverse relation to intension, or the futile classic discussion as to whether the true point of view of logic is that of intension or extension.

These foundations assured, there can then be demonstrated, I think, an important distinction which is too often misunderstood or improperly expressed, that between the operations of reasoning (a syllogism, a transformation of



an equation, a substitution of a constant for a variable) and the conduct or general structure of reason, which can I think, be reduced, at least tentatively, to four types: the hypothetical—deductive; the inductive or experimental; the reconstructive, of which the principal application is in history, but which is also of great judicial interest; the polemic, of which a good example may be found in the *Nouveaux Essais* by Leibniz, or the *Philosophy of Hamilton*, by J. S. Mill, and to which are related problems as characteristic as the burden of proof. I would not present this list as definitely complete, but it seems essential to set forth this general methodology and to distinguish it clearly both from the logic of operations, and from the “special methodology” (the methodology of each particular science) which forms its field of application.<sup>41</sup>

Further, if logic is really normative, it ought to eventuate in a precise conception of the true and the false, as well as of related ideas such as certainty and error. I say “eventuate in,” for the method of normative sciences seems to me to proceed by induction, like the natural sciences, with the changes implied by the difference between the experience of a sensible fact and that of the judgment of appreciation. Nothing would seem to me more inadmissible than the old pretention of dogmatism and even of certain forms of criticism that one grasps the fundamental laws of the mind by an immediate act of reflection; but it is no less true that, in this case as well as in others, in proportion as an inductive science develops, its outcome should tend to be transformed into a possible principle.

Does this method authorize us at this time to give any answer to the question, “What is truth?” It seems to me that that is true which any mind feels the obligation of rec-

<sup>41</sup> All these logical “conducts” have been treated in courses taught in the past years, but only one has been published: *Les théories logiques de l'induction et de l'expérimentation*, in *Revue des Cours et Conférences*, December, 1922, February, 1924.

ognizing in the absence of seduction or of constraint, provided only that this mind has reached the stage of cultural development necessary to understand the meaning of the proposition concerning the truth or the falsity of which the question is raised.<sup>42</sup> This gradual agreement of minds among themselves, of which the analysis of the sciences furnishes a continual illustration, is the most easily discernible aspect of a triple assimilation that gives a more complete answer to the question: viz., assimilation of minds to each other, assimilation of things to each other, assimilation of things to minds.

This triple assimilation is the great motive of what is commonly called the necessity of reason, or "rational truths." It has become impossible to admit that the *a priori* forms of space and time, the principle of causality or that of continuity have remained invariable in the historical movement of thought. Some forms of reason which earlier epochs have not recognized appear as possible and convincing. Reason as it is constituted at each moment is transformed to a certain degree. But is not this to fall into scepticism, to put feeling above reason? No, because throughout its transformation reason exhibits a vector, a definite direction which can be characterized in an unchanging fashion as supremacy of identity over difference. This constitutes the fundamental logical value (even though it may not, as yet, be wholly conscious) and appears as the essential norm of Constitutive Reason. Constitutive Reason is active, but cannot be apprehended in its pure state. Constituted Reason at each epoch may express itself in formulae, but this is because it is incorporated in a matter furnished by experience. It includes: *first*, acquired truths, categories hallowed by use, values held in common; *second*, rules of thought, i. e., of effective logical

<sup>42</sup> Cf. for a detailed exposition of this theory, H. Lelesz: *La conception de la Vérité*, published by *La vie universitaire*, 1921.

procedure, having authority in discussion; *third*, rules of conduct which it is sufficient merely to mention, since our subject is not concerned with practical reason; and, finally, even rules of aesthetic judgment, which are just beginning to be worked out.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, in what constitutes the very soul of logic, one finds (as one should if rationalism is *true*) the same spiritual function that gives birth to the other normative sciences, and that constitutes the *a priori* factor of their observable parallelism.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. the lessons entitled *Raison constituante et raison constituée*, in *Revue des Cours et conférences*, April 15 and 30, 1925 (publisher, Boivin) and *Lettre à M. Brunschvicg*, in *Bulletin de la Société de Philosophie*, July, 1921 (Publisher, Armand Colin).

## PRINCIPAL CURRENTS OF ETHICAL THOUGHT<sup>1</sup>

GEORGES GUY-GRAND

IT is impossible to speak of the flux of ethical conceptions in France during the last six years without a preliminary reference to the lessons of the war. For so great a catastrophe, if it does not strike a direct blow at speculative thought, at any rate compels a reconsideration of the problems representing the very life of society itself. The special problems revived or created by the war, however, demand a separate investigation devoted solely to them, and this task we have attempted elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> We may therefore be excused from here touching upon them. Moreover, during the last seven years life has resumed its normal course, the new problems have been brought into connection with the old, and the great currents of French thought are reappearing in ethics as well as in the other disciplines.

Three great ethical currents may be distinguished: the sociological current, properly so-called, represented by the school of Durkheim and of M. Lévy-Bruhl; the opposition thereto, which, starting from a positivism that is not of Durkheim, issues in a rationalism, that is often radical, but

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> *Quelques réflexions sur les idées morales après la guerre*, in *La Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1921. Questions discussed: 1. Legitimate defense and non-resistance. 2. Force and law. 3. Religious ethics and secular ethics. 4. Rationalism and sociology. 5. The difficult wisdom.

We also take for granted a knowledge of the main currents of French ethical thought prior to 1914. An account of them may be found in a chapter, "The Moral Problem," of a book by M. D. Parodi on *La philosophie contemporaine en France*, Alcan, 1919; a new edition has appeared, with a supplement first published in *La Revue Philosophique*, Nov.-Dec., 1925.

exclusively secular; and, finally, the current of religious ethics which is opposed to both the sociological school and the purely secular rationalism. In addition to these three great currents, there are some suggestive attempts to maintain, in ethical thought, intuitive or irrational tendencies. Moreover, legal and political doctrines are themselves throughout permeated with the same antagonistic influences.

## I. ETHICS AND SOCIOLOGY

The most important work in the field of ethics offered by the sociological school up to the last few weeks is M. Lévy-Bruhl's book, *La morale et la science des mœurs*, published in 1903. Here we find stated the creed of this school. Durkheim himself had treated these questions in only a fragmentary manner in his *Division du travail social* and in his note on *La détermination du fait moral*.<sup>3</sup> The course in ethics which he offered in the Sorbonne had until just recently remained unpublished. But it has now appeared under the title *l'Education morale*.<sup>4</sup> This is indeed a strong and admirable book, in every particular exhibiting the hand of the departed master. It creates a profound impression as much by its logical rigor as by the singularly gripping, even imperious, tone of some of its pages.

The thought of Durkheim is clear. He wishes, as he says, beginning with the very first of his lectures, to develop a secular system of morals, that is, one that is purely rationalistic. He starts with a postulate which he expresses thus: "There is nothing in the realm of the real that need be regarded as radically opposed to human reason." But it is important that we clearly understand this

<sup>3</sup> *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, sessions of Feb. 11 and Mar. 22, 1906.

<sup>4</sup> Alcan, 1925. Brought out by Paul Fauconnet, *Maitre de conférences* at the Sorbonne.

rationalism. On the one hand, it is unalterably opposed to mysticism, according to which there is at the basis of things something unintelligible, "I know not what principle of darkness, forever refractory to reason." But Durkheim is equally disinclined to a rationalism that is "too easy," and too simple, and does not take into sufficient account the complexity of things. It is between these two "abysses" that the child must be led and doubtless also the adult.

Moral education, according to Durkheim, is all the more necessary in our age because of the fact that we are passing through a period of grave crisis; "we are living in one of those revolutionary and critical epochs in which the authority of traditional discipline, always enfeebled in such periods, may easily give way to the spirit of anarchy." We recognize here an idea that goes back to Saint-Simon and Comte. We can see how it comes that Durkheim insists on the necessity of a spirit of "discipline" as the first essential of morality. The second principle, likewise to be found in the thought of the positivist, consists, for the founder of the existing sociological school of France, in "the attachment to social groups," among which, when we are dealing with the child, is the school. In the preface to his *Division du travail social*, Durkheim had already insisted upon the importance of professional groups as a means of introducing the individual to society. In treating of education, he emphasizes the similar role of the school. The family is too much dominated by sentiment; humanity is too vast and too remote; the Fatherland which "enjoys a real priority over all the others" cannot accomplish its humanizing function unless the school arouses a love for it. One can thus understand the "supreme importance of the function which falls to the school in shaping the moral life of the country."

By means of this stern discipline and of this attachment to social groups, Durkheim seeks to maintain in social life an imperative rule which has been described as a revival, in a different form, of the categorical imperative of the Kantian ethics. Instead of conscience, it is society that commands; or rather, the requirements of society and those of conscience are identical. This does not mean that Durkheim demands absolute conformity to laws and customs. The third element in morality, according to him, is the "autonomy of the will," and here again the author of *l'Education morale* is in accord with the author of the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Rationalism, far from being contradictory to individualism, presupposes it. Society includes not only forces of tradition but also forces of regeneration and progress, and it is for this reason that the educator cannot be content merely to expound "the traditional morality of our fathers." "It does not suffice to conserve the past; it is necessary to pave the way for the future."

Such are the ruling ideas of this work *l'Education morale*. One need not look beyond it to gain a knowledge of the ethical theories of the French sociological school. For this edifice Durkheim expected to furnish a rigorously empirical foundation. For him, as for M. Lévy-Bruhl, the type of ethics just described is truly scientific—indeed, it alone is scientific. The posthumous work of the master of the Sorbonne brings dire destruction upon theoretical and abstract systems of ethics; these, to him, seemed antiquated. A system of ethics must be concrete and this concrete authority, though transcending the individual, is the authority of society: "what is necessary is to place the child in contact with things, with concrete and living realities in respect to which abstract terms express only the most general characteristics. Thus we show what the thing really is. And thus moral education acquires a real hold."

Taking their inspiration from the master and placing special emphasis on certain aspects of his doctrine, his followers have attempted to revive several of the most important questions of traditional ethics. Thus, M. Paul Fauconnet has reattacked the problem of responsibility<sup>5</sup> which M. Lévy-Bruhl had previously treated in a classic manner. At the present time the idea of responsibility is commonly associated with those of liberty and of individual merit or guilt. But the latter, says M. Fauconnet, are entirely modern conceptions, representing a departure from and an abandonment of primitive responsibility. In primitive cultures, responsibility is collective and does not, as in modern times, relate exclusively to individuals. The function of pain is not so much to punish the guilty as to restore order in the social group shaken by the misdeed. It follows that sociological ethics, in the minds of its exponents, undermines neither the idea of responsibility nor that of duty, though it justifies these conceptions in its own way. And the same holds of the idea of contract, even if one believes with M. Georges Davy, that its origin is to be found in the institution of "potlatch."<sup>6</sup>

The necessity is already being felt of supplementing these particular studies with a general science of moral facts—a science for which another disciple of Durkheim, M. Albert Bayet, has suggested the name "ethology."<sup>7</sup> M. Bayet, however, more radical than his master, advocates the elimination of every normative tendency as distinctly contrary, in his view, to the spirit of scientific research. He seeks to limit himself exclusively to the study of facts, whatever their complexity and difficulty of comprehension. "When ethology shall have come into existence, the practical applications will doubtless appear of themselves." The moral fact concerns the distinction of good and evil in the

<sup>5</sup> *La responsabilité*, a sociological study by Paul Fauconnet, Alcan, 1920.

<sup>6</sup> G. Davy: *La foi jurée*, Alcan, 1922.

<sup>7</sup> Albert Bayet: *La science des faits moraux*, Alcan, 1925.



field of social phenomena, requirements, languages, laws, customs and literatures. To establish facts through a search for laws which, as in every science, is free from any but an exclusively scientific interest—such is the task which M. Bayet assigns to the sociologist. He has himself exemplified what he requires in a comprehensive study on suicide.<sup>8</sup>

Sociologists, even those of the school of Durkheim, are not equally convinced that moral ends may be determined by exclusively scientific methods. M. Bouglé is unquestionably persuaded that the scientific study of ends considered as facts is the prime necessity; “but,” he queries, “to arrive at a knowledge of these ends, can and ought one henceforth limit one’s procedure to that of scientific investigation? That is another question.” And, like Durkheim, M. Bouglé asserts that the reasoning of the moralist who forms and co-ordinates value judgments “is something more peculiarly rich and flexible than the reasoning employed by the scholar when he is engaged in demonstration and verification, and occupies himself with the intentionally delimited field of positive science.”<sup>9</sup>

## II. POSITIVE ETHICS, MORAL RATIONALISM, ETHICS AND BERGSONISM

The recent works of the sociological school, then, leave standing those criticisms which had been directed, from a strictly ethical and normative point of view, against the very principles maintained in these works. It is, indeed, necessary to examine moral facts objectively and empirically, but from such an examination one must not deduce rules of conduct. Durkheim’s *l’Education morale* does

<sup>8</sup> *Le suicide et la morale*, Alcan, 1922.

<sup>9</sup> *Leçons de sociologie sur l’évolution des valeurs*, pp. 239 and 242, Colin, 1922.

not enable us any more than does the *La morale et la science des moeurs* to understand why we ought to acquire the spirit of discipline and of attachment to social groups upon which the author lays so much stress. No more can one derive from facts an obligation to realize the "normal" type. We indeed understand very well, in reading M. Fauconnet, how the idea of responsibility is transformed in the process of becoming individualized. But ought we to regard this development to individual responsibility with favor, or ought we, on the contrary, to resist it, striving to revive the collective responsibility of primitive society? Is "simple morality" which condemns suicide preferable to the "differentiated morality" which sometimes condones it? Such are questions for which purely sociological studies have no answer.

Nor has there been any weakening in the current of resistance to the methods of the school of Durkheim. Some moralists, while carrying on their investigations in a strictly empirical spirit, warn against confusing positive and positivistic no less than social and sociological. M. Gustave Belot, in re-editing his *Etudes de morale positive*,<sup>10</sup> has pointed out that we must take into consideration not merely the actual society that impinges upon man but also the will of society that urges man on to the realization of a type of society ever more conformable to the moral ideal represented by the most developed consciences of the time. In other words, just as there is, superior to the purely physiological ego, the ego which tends to realize the idea that it has formed of the moral person, so "superior to the society which makes man and to which Comte and his epigones have been fond of ascribing the genesis of man's superior qualities, there is the society which man makes according to a certain slowly elaborated conception of the human ideal." Thus the idea of the end, and of the volun-

<sup>10</sup> New edition in two volumes, with a second preface and two new studies: *Règle et motif* and *La valeur morale de la science*, Alcan.

tary end, deliberately chosen as that which most conforms to man's moral nature, reappears in ethics. It is this that M. Belot has in mind when he asserts that we are concerned not with the discovery of an already existing will but with the creation of a will, being assured from the outset that the rule imposed by the reflective conscience rediscovers and justifies the social instinct as the supreme moral motive. This distinction between the rule and the motive, according to M. Belot, satisfactorily removes numerous theoretical difficulties.

But why does the reflective conscience confirm the social interest? Why does man desire the existence of moral ends? To this question there is as yet no very clear reply. Hence M. Parodi still finds an "element of arbitrariness and of ultimate irrationalism" in the teaching of M. Belot.<sup>11</sup> M. Parodi, as well as M. Paul Lapie, seeks the reply in a "moral rationalism" integrated within rationalism as a whole. There are not two forms of reason, one theoretical and another practical, which might be conceived as diverse; there is but a single reason which builds up both science and ethics, employing the same methods in both fields. Moral ends are established by reason and are obligatory as scientific truths, inasmuch as "all recognized truth contains an obligation." One can no more logically escape from the obligation of conforming his conduct to a rule recognized as rational than one can escape the necessity of drawing conclusions from a rational demonstration. In brief, the determination of the good has its ultimate basis in reason, "the same reason which constructs mathematical and theoretical knowledge."<sup>12</sup> "Reason," writes M. Lapie in the same vein, "is practical as well as theoretical. It is

<sup>11</sup> *La philosophie contemporaine en France*, p. 361, Alcan, 1919.

<sup>12</sup> *Le rationalisme moral*, pp. 475-480. Address at the *Congrès International de philosophie* held in Paris in 1921. M. Parodi has also published a new edition of his work, *Le problème moral et la pensée contemporaine*, Alcan, 1921.

alike a spring of action and a torch of intellect."<sup>13</sup>

With respect to these matters there is no essential difference between M. Parodi and M. Belot, except that the latter supplements the rational conception just described with a sociological content defining concrete duties. But this moral rationalism, in turn, has encountered adversaries. M. Felix Pécaut has pronounced it very "narrow."<sup>14</sup> Formal universality seems to this anti-Kantian "a thing extremely empty, empty to the point of nothingness," "complete ennui." He demands moral realities that have more body, such as sympathy or sociability. To this M. Parodi has replied that moral rationalism can no more dispense with affective states than can intellectual rationalism with experience, but that reason must order the former as well as the latter; in any case, rational ethics is "in the same position as science."<sup>15</sup> We here notice a well marked contrast between two "spiritual families."

This antithesis becomes still more apparent when we pass from these more or less rigorous rationalists to those who, like M. Alfred Loisy, do not expect to find in reason the justification of moral facts. The difference relates not to the content but to the justification of duty. In entire agreement with M. Parodi, M. Belot and Durkheim, M. Loisy believes that moral life is possible only within society, so that it is the latter which is the source of duty. In a spirit very similar to Durkheim, M. Loisy goes even so far as to say that the moralist cannot create morality; he can only discover it. Solidarity is a duty because it is first of all a fact. But after having thus disengaged morality from all metaphysical connections, Loisy directs all of his

<sup>13</sup> *Revue pédagogique*, Oct., 1925, p. 250. M. Paul Lapie was Rector of the *Académie de Paris*.

<sup>14</sup> M. Parodi, M. Belot and M. Pécaut are inspectors general of public instruction.

<sup>15</sup> Discussion that followed M. Parodi's address at the *Congrès International de philosophie*. Cf. also, *Morale et Science* (lectures delivered at the Sorbonne), Paris, Nathan, 1923.

energy against the rationalists.<sup>16</sup> Morality, for the Professor of the History of Religions at the *Collège de France*, is not rational, but is "mystical." It is "human" but it is also "religious." Let it be realized that morality is not a science; "morality is a spirit, the social instinct developed into the spirit of justice and of devotion." Let it be realized that it has nothing to do with any positive religion but with an always living faith which communicates itself not by demonstration but by a sort of "spiritual contagion" and which enables us to labor "for the realization of a single, holy, universal and abiding humanity, a veritable church of the spirit."

One can perhaps understand that such a doctrine is capable of arousing an ardor that is truly contagious, but one can also understand the criticisms of the rationalists. It is all very well, reply the latter, to exalt faith, but who will guarantee for us its authority if it will not submit itself to reason. "No," writes M. Lapie, "neither the intuition of the ideal nor the anticipation of its realization is foreign to reason; neither is an item of knowledge superior to intellectual knowledge. Let us reclaim for reason the entire domain of which M. Loisy has wished to dispossess it."<sup>17</sup> What remains true is that one must not think of rationalism in too narrow and circumscribed a way. And one comes to the distinction made by Durkheim.

What follows when one rejects every rational criterion is clearly shown by the example of those who are consistently irrationalistic. For M. Jules de Gaultier, who is a representative of this tendency, rationalism is absurd; it is but an "official philosophy" which sets itself in opposition to true philosophy. For him, reality is at the bottom blind and aimless. Every doctrine, when closely regarded, is but

<sup>16</sup> *La morale humaine*, Nourry, 1923. M. Loisy is Professor in the *Collège de France*.

<sup>17</sup> *Revue pédagogique*, Oct., 1925. See also an article by Mme. J. Jacob, *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1924, No. 3.

"an impassioned expression of an emotion," and these emotions eternally clash. No recourse remains therefore but that of observing this scene without attempting to change it; the emotion should become an object of observation.<sup>18</sup> The abandonment of ethics in favor of aesthetics—of an aesthetics which may lay no more claim upon truth than may ethics—this, indeed, is the inevitable outcome of irrationalism.

The adversaries of irrationalism, however, are not all in agreement with one another. Between pure rationalists represented, among others, by M. Parodi and M. Lapie, and the pure irrationalists who are led to deny the existence of moral rules, as does M. Jules de Gaultier, there is an intermediary group that allies itself with pragmatism. One would call it Bergsonian if M. Bergson had himself directly treated moral problems. But the work upon which we know that the author of *l'Evolution créatrice* is engaged has not yet seen the light of day. Meanwhile there are disciples, who, inspired by his doctrine, have supplied the omission of their master. M. Pradines denounces the "moral error" of rationalism; in the latter he sees only "an allurements of nothingness." Then he attempts to establish a morality of action designed as an essential part of his "philosophy of action." Reason appears only as "a method whose fruits are the moral precepts."<sup>19</sup> M. Joseph Wilbois, on the other hand, has made an extremely original and suggestive attempt at a Bergsonian ethics that seeks likewise to preserve the results that may henceforth be acquired by the sociological school. For M. Wilbois duty is based neither on rational principles nor on empirical data. It is a primary reality which is at once impossible and useless to prove. But it can be identified. It is characterized by two features, endeavor and generosity, as one can see in the

<sup>18</sup> J. de Gaultier : *La sensibilité métaphysique*, edition of *le Siècle*, 1923.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *l'Erreur morale* and *Principes de toute philosophie de l'action*, Alcan. M. Pradines is Professor in the University of Strasbourg.

case of the individual as well as of humanity. Creative evolution becomes creative progress, and this progress, although free and unpredictable, realizes itself through sociological determinism. Moral effort, the human equivalent of the *élan vital*, creates institutions and then leaves them behind in a perpetual striving for moral invention. "A morality that grows without ceasing is basically involved in an ultimate definition of man."

The rationalists have not failed to reproach this ethics, along with all purely pragmatic doctrines, with "subjectivism." Pragmatists, as we know, throw back the criticism and accuse rationalism of itself being subjective. When the issue is thus formulated, the debate is fruitless. But that which, in the eyes of most of the pragmatists, saves them from the accusation of arbitrariness, is the fact that, beyond the individual and the purely human reason, they conceive another truth, a transcendent truth, which is the absolutely religious truth. We are thus carried to another plane and the debate acquires a new breadth.

### III. ETHICS AND RELIGION

M. Bouglé discussed the theories of M. Wilbois before the *Société française de philosophie*. In characterizing them, he contended that M. Wilbois supports on two columns of such different styles as intuitionistic pragmatism and sociological determinism, a "Catholic capital." The author of *Devoir et durée* did not defend himself. "The hand of the transcendent," he writes, "forms and upholds us, cradles us, chastises us, and pierces us in order to free us. . . . When a virtue grows it becomes religious; development transforms an ordinary duty into a supernatural

duty; God appears in the midst of our moral upheavals."<sup>20</sup>

Thus there reappears at the heart of moral problems the question as to the relation of morality and religion. Here French thought assumes a unique position. While not in general separating the one from the other, and while still accustomed to find in religions the justification or culmination of moral precepts, most of the thinkers of whom we have just spoken as positivists or rationalists undertake to sever morality from religion as completely, or even more so, than from metaphysics. They profess what Ferdinand Buisson calls "the secular faith." Even the thinkers who recognize the great social importance of religions and are distrustful of abstract rationalism, as, for example, M. Alfred Loisy, wish to institute a purely human morality.

At the same time this is not the only tendency. There are, as we are coming to see, a number of philosophers who wish to maintain close bonds between morality and religion. But these philosophers, in turn, do not all put the problem in the same way. We may distinguish two fairly demarcated tendencies. On the one hand, there are those who, maintaining an alliance with pragmatism or Bergsonism, conceive transcendence as necessary for immanence. They hold that religious or supernatural truth conditions or envelops human nature which therein alone finds its culmination. It has often been noticed that some of the most eminent disciples of M. Bergson, such as M. Edouard LeRoy and M. J. Wilbois, give the doctrine of *l'Evolution créatrice* a religious crown, and that the master, without appropriating the latter, nevertheless does not disavow it. Another thinker of similar tendencies, a philosopher of "action," M. Maurice Blondel, also comes to conclusions that are distinctly Catholic in character. This is not the

<sup>20</sup> M. J. Wilbois: *Devoir et durée*, Alcan, 1912. Cf. a discussion of this book before the *Société française de philosophie*, in the *Bulletin* of this society, 1914, No. 1. M. Wilbois has founded an *Ecole d'humanité contemporaines*, designed to train leaders for the direction of affairs.



place to study the specifically philosophical and metaphysical aspects of his view. In the field of ethics, this tendency toward Catholic thought has produced a vigorous moralist who died prematurely, namely, Paul Bureau. His book on *La crise morale des temps nouveaux* published twenty years ago was followed by a great work on *l'Indiscipline des mœurs*.<sup>21</sup> Bureau holds himself more closely to LePlay than to Comte. In common with the rationalists, he criticizes purely sociological theories of morality; but, in distinction from the rationalists, he affirms that there can be no basis for morality apart from a belief in a personal God, the only being "qualified to . . . induce the obedience of an intelligent and free being who would have no reason to submit himself to a force devoid of personality." Paul Bureau was particularly inclined to plumb to the depths of the question of sexual morality which seemed to him of prime importance for the future of society. In this he resembled another thinker whose tendencies are otherwise very different, being thoroughly permeated by the spirit of Bergson, Georges Sorel, the philosopher of syndicalism, who died in 1922. "I am persuaded," writes the author of *Réflexions sur la violence*, "that the world will become more just only in the measure that it becomes more chaste."

Besides these Bergsonian or mystical Catholics, there are others who accuse the former of compromising Catholic dogmas through interpretations that are singularly divergent from doctrinal truth. Modernism has been condemned by Pious X and a number of works by Bergsonian Catholics have been put on the Index. In reaction against this tendency, there are thinkers who advocate a return to the scholastic philosophy. Best known among them is M. Jacques Maritain. As characteristic of this neo-scholasticism in the field of ethics, we would mention at least two

<sup>21</sup> Bloud et Gay, 1923. With reference to Paul Bureau see the first of the *Cahiers de la nouvelle journée*, organ of this tendency of Catholic thought, Bloud et Gay, 1924.

works: a new edition of Mgr. Deploige's book, *Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie*<sup>22</sup> and a more recent work by M. R. P. Gillet entitled *La morale et les morales*, which is a collection of lectures first given in Buenos-Aires in a course on Catholic culture.<sup>23</sup> These two works furnish a particularly spirited criticism of biological, psychological and sociological ethics. They seek to show that there can be no true ethics without a theological basis. After discussing in particular the distinction made by M. Belot between the rule and the motive, M. R. P. Gillet endeavors to demonstrate that the supreme rule of human conduct is the divine reason. He argues that the supreme motive of moral action is the divine reality, the final goal toward which we tend, alike in our spontaneous activity and in our free volitions, so that in heaven "the motive meets the demands of the rule." This theology, thus, is rational and objective without thereby neglecting the spontaneous impulse of human nature which propels man towards God.

Obviously we here reach a limit where all controversy becomes impossible. For we have to do with an act of faith in the supernatural and with revelation, the keystone of religious faith which the secular thinkers are unwilling to acknowledge. This is not to say, however, that these thinkers are completely satisfied with secular rationalism in the form in which it at first sight seems opposed to religious thought. They attempt to perfect it. M. Jean Devolvé accuses it of being too abstract and of failing to touch the heart. The conditions under which a secular morality may be efficacious, he thinks, involve a utilization of a religious sentiment, but of one that is very broad; precisely because

<sup>22</sup> Third edition, 1923, *Nouvelle librairie nationale*. Mgr. Deploige is President of the *Institut supérieur de philosophie* at the Catholic University of Louvain.

<sup>23</sup> Edition of *La revue des jeunes*, 1925. M. R. P. Gillet, as well as M. Maritain, is Professor in the *Institut catholique de Paris*. Paul Bureau belonged to the same institution.

it is too vague it meets with reproach at the hands of rigorous spirits.<sup>24</sup>

The debate has not remained an affair of philosophers. It is carried on beyond the circle of thinkers; it has entered the turbulent domain of politics where the religious question, because of the role which the Roman church has always played in France, continues in the forefront of attention. The Catholic politicians wage a vigorous campaign against the secular school and against educational neutrality, in which they see only deception. The secular publicists reply not only with dogmatic justifications but also with references to the fruits of the secular school—it furnished the great majority of the heroes of the war.<sup>25</sup> We can here but mention these polemics which are sometimes very sharp; but it is necessary to know of them in order to judge of the commotion which such doctrinal controversies can arouse when they affect vital interests.<sup>26</sup>

We would add, furthermore, that, except in these political struggles, the minds of all the religious faiths and of all the philosophical schools are very happily united in the common pursuit of moral tasks and of theoretical enlightenment. *La ligue française d'éducation morale, l'Union de libres penseurs et de libres croyants pour la culture morale*, and *l'Union pour la vérité* (formerly *Union pour l'action morale*) bring together Catholics, Protestants, Jews, rationalists, and thinkers without any religious belief in a spirit of co-operation, confidence and mutual esteem. Within these organizations we find an equal respect for all sincere beliefs; even profound metaphysical differences are

<sup>24</sup> *Rationalisme et tradition*, Alcan, 1911. M. Delvolvé, Professor in the University of Toulouse, has applied his ideas in a small book on ethics designed for children: *La morale à Nelly*, Paris, Nathan.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Albert Bayet: *La morale laïque*, Rieder, 1925; also Georges Weill: *Histoire de l'idée laïque en France au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Alcan, 1925.

<sup>26</sup> One may find an account of the religious question in France from the Catholic point of view by M. Georges Goyau and from the secular point of view by the present author in *L'Europäische revue*, Sept., 1925. Cf. also our work, presenting in collaboration a debate, *Sur la paix religieuse*, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1923.

not repressed. Only the Catholic irreconcilables have a tendency to hold aloof from these philosophical and ethical societies, restricting their efforts to specifically Catholic activities. This irreconcilability varies with the times; at the present moment it is ordered, if not by the sovereign pontiff, at least by the high dignitaries of the church.

#### IV. ETHICS, LAW AND POLITICS

Our survey of the main thought currents would be inadequate if it restricted itself to individual morality. The same tendencies, sometimes contradictory, reappear when we turn to the relations of the individual to society, as these are manifest in law and politics.

Here likewise the sociological and the individualistic or rationalistic schools are ranged against each other. But the conflict in this case exhibits unique characteristics. Why ought we to obey the juridical law, the social counterpart of the moral law? To this question M. Duguit, appealing to the authority of August Comte, replies by rejecting every metaphysical element of a subjective sort and falling back solely upon the rule of objective law, the expression of social solidarity.<sup>27</sup> But though invoking sociology, the dean of Bordeaux rejects the hypothesis of a collective consciousness. Along with Tarde, he finds reality only in individuals, governing and governed. If legal relations are to be obeyed, this, according to him, is because they impose themselves as facts without whose acceptance society is impossible. But we clearly see the problem which continually arises from the juridical as well as from the moral point of view—the problem of judgments of value. Why ought we to submit to a fact? Why

<sup>27</sup> The works of M. Duguit are well known to jurists and to sociologists. The master of Bordeaux is giving definite form to his doctrine in a monumental work, *Traité de droit constitutionnel*, which began to appear in 1921.

should we obey the "regulation of law" of Duguit any more than the "collective consciousness" of Durkheim? This is a question to which no reply is possible without a kind of idealism which goes beyond a pure sociological and juridical realism.

This is the criticism of M. Duguit raised by the partisans of individual rights who rejuvenate the ancient theory of natural rights by adapting it to the modern outlook. M. Hauriou, the most eminent representative, after Sal-elles, of this school, does not deny that there are social rights that are objective and prior to the rights of individuals. His theory of the institution is in this respect one of the masterpieces of present-day juridical sociology. But for M. Hauriou social rights are limited by the imprescriptible rights of the individual moral person; for the moral and religious destiny of the latter transcends society. Objectivity, according to M. Hauriou, is transcendent. The Dean of Toulouse in this respect espouses a sort of Platonic and religious idealism,<sup>28</sup> and we are always carried back to the profound and ultimate roots of doctrines, which are metaphysical beliefs.

With reference to these two extreme theses of realism and idealism in the field of law, paralleling a similar situation in the field of ethics, the orthodox sociological school has believed itself able to effect a synthesis and a reconciliation. In a substantial little book on *le Droit, l'idéalisme et l'expérience*,<sup>29</sup> M. Georges Davy, a disciple of Durkheim, seeks to maintain that sociology alone can resolve the contradictions into which the antithetical doctrines fall.<sup>30</sup> He

<sup>28</sup> "Intelligence has been forced to develop by adapting itself to the intelligible realities of the external world, to the *idées-forces*, the messengers of God. . . . In these ideas and in God who is their center, the moral order and the principles of natural law have an objective existence." Summary of *Droit constitutionnel*, 1923, p. 46.

<sup>29</sup> Alcan, 1922. The same author has since published a *Sociologie Politique*, Delagrave, 1924. M. Davy is Dean of the Faculty of Letters in Dijon.

<sup>30</sup> *Revue philosophique*, Nov.-Dec., 1925. With reference to the relations of law and sociology see also an excellent study by M. G. Aillet in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, July and Sept., 1923.

holds that assertions of an objective import and the prescriptions of juridical idealism have a common center in the requirements of the collective consciousness. But there always remains, as M. Parodi has retorted, the necessity of explaining "how collective representations can be formed and can acquire a constraining authority . . . ; and furthermore, once critical reflection has arisen and an individual can no longer content himself with establishing the existence of collective representations, how and on what rational basis one may justify the latter." Thus, there reappear the questions already put to sociological ethics. We move in a circle.

The reflections of the jurists relate not alone to general theories of law. They attack also the more concrete questions of private and of public law. This is best exemplified by the very animated critique of the idea of national sovereignty and of the very notion of law, the traditional bases of the democratic regime in France. M. Duguit, in particular, has sharply attacked the Roman conception of sovereignty developed by royalty and likewise adopted by the Revolution which transferred it from the king to the people.<sup>81</sup> M. Hauriou, without definitely rejecting it, as has M. Duguit, has shown that it ought to be limited by the individualistic principle in accordance with the viewpoint which we have just described. Along with the idea of sovereignty, that of law is no less energetically proclaimed to be "decadent." On the part of a number of jurists, parliament is no longer considered to be the sole source of legislation. Just as the League of Nations tends to develop an international law superior to the laws of nations, so the powers of parliament tend to be curtailed to a certain extent from within, by economic and social groups which develop "professional laws" and by judicial administration

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Duguit: *Les transformations du droit public*, Colin, 1923, and *Le droit social, le droit individuel et la transformation de l'état*, Alcan, 3rd ed., 1922.

which tends in "its juridical constructions" more and more to emancipate itself from the letter of the law. "We no longer have to choose between the rigorist and the liberalist interpretations of the written law; it is in the great book of life that we must read."<sup>82</sup>

We thus come to the threshold of grave political questions which have been throwing the European democracies into confusion, particularly since the war. The crisis of parliamentarianism, the crisis of authority, the crisis of law and the crisis of contract are but varieties of one and the same phenomenon to which we may give the generic name "the crisis of democracy." We cannot here enter upon it but one can at least realize its moral character. Without doubt institutions cannot be eternal. Our parliamentary regime, the outcome of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, ought to be brought into harmony with the new economic, political and moral needs which could not be foreseen by the contemporaries of Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau, or even by the theorists of the nineteenth century. But if one evokes "life" and its changes uncritically, one succumbs, in political as in moral philosophy, to "mobilism" and to an arbitrariness no less dangerous than an abstract and immutable dogmatism. To diminish the powers of parliament for the aggrandizement of particular groups or of the judiciary will involve national life in serious difficulties and will destroy the very foundations of a democratic regime. M. Gaston Morin is well aware of the danger inasmuch as he demands a reform of the intellectual training of the judge—in his belief the most important of reforms. Though not unmindful of this necessity, let us realize that there is something of even greater importance, namely, the reformation of the intellectual and moral outlook of the legislator and of the citizen. For in

<sup>82</sup> Cf. G. Morin: *La décadence de l'autorité de la loi*, in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, April-June, 1925; also the discussion of this contention before the *Société française de philosophie* in its session of Dec. 27, 1924.

spite of the diversities which exist and of which the magistrate ought to take cognizance, there is need, in the last analysis, of a social bond which is expressed in the law. It is indeed the law which should express whatever there may be that is constant and rational in the consciousness of an epoch.

Thus we have throughout found in ethics, law and politics, the same preoccupations, the same problems, the same tendencies, the same antagonistic solutions. It is at bottom the eternal problem of the one and the many in which one must hold both ends of the chain. The types of minds range themselves according to their leanings, the rationalists favoring the universal rule whereas minds in love with the concrete place the emphasis upon diversity, multiplicity and relativity. We can dispense with neither of the two tendencies, but they are more or less fitting according to the epoch. We live in an age of crisis where particular events are in the focus of attention.<sup>83</sup> It is clear, however, that a normal order will not be re-established if, transcending these diversities, there is not recovered the sentiment for general law which, however, should not have the rigidity characteristic of it in the past. Laborious search for scientific information as complete as possible—pursued, without any other aim than that of truth, by the special paths of all the various disciplines—and the judgment of the upright man, the citizen, the legislator, the judge, on the one hand illumined by this work yet on the other exercising upon it his critical reflection: this, it would seem, is the best means of bringing together the rigor of the scientific spirit and the need of an ideal for conscience. Such is the path that must be taken if one would form or strengthen a common and developing idea of what is rational and just by the collaboration of all who are com-

<sup>83</sup> We have undertaken to develop this in a chapter of our book, *La démocratie et l'après guerre*, Paris, Rivière, 1923, and in a more recent study, *La crise actuelle de l'autorité* in *Grande revue*, Aug., 1925.



petent in matters of ethics. These, it would seem, are the conclusions in which ethical speculation in France today eventuates.

## AESTHETICS

### MARYSE CHOISY

AESTHETICS being a comparatively new science among philosophers, it is not unnatural to find it tinged with other forms of knowledge already explored. Each country, each school of thinkers, marks it with its own particular stamp. Therefore, while Benedetto Croce in Italy and the earlier German aestheticians turn to its metaphysical side, while in Great Britain we find with Ruskin mainly ethical cares, in France there is a tendency to emphasize the psychological factors in aesthetics. We are chiefly concerned with the representation of the universe as seen through our own individual minds; the latter being, when all is said and done, the only representation which we can be quite sure of, after all.

Among French philosophers we can only trace M. Jules de Gaultier who condescended to clothe aesthetics in the dignified garb of metaphysics.<sup>1</sup>

Unlike, however, Benedetto Croce, who assigns to the aesthetic activity the first momentum historically in human thinking and the lowest among disinterested activities in the scale of metaphysical values, Jules de Gaultier considers that the aesthetic activity is, on the contrary, the most developed in the evolution of the mind which ascends from the primitive Messianic point of view to the spectacular point of view. The "*sensibilité messianique*" is the one which contemplates the universe with the aim of changing

<sup>1</sup> Jules de Gaultier: *La sensibilité métaphysique*, Editions du Siècle, Paris, 1925.

it. All tendency to progress whether it take the form of religious or moral perfection or the Bergsonian "*élan vital*," all search for an external or future end, belong to the hope of a Messiah. The "*sensibilité spectaculaire*" contemplates the universe for the sole pleasure of contemplating it.

This theory which was first obscurely expressed in a different way by Nietzsche was not followed out to its conclusion by the German philosopher. Nietzsche forgets the world as representation in his enthusiasm for the world as action, and he falls back into the "Messianic fallacy" by expecting (in precisely the same way as do the moral thinkers whom he criticizes) some immoral Messiah who will perfect the world in beauty.

M. Jules de Gaultier, who is more Nietzschean than Nietzsche (I mean the earlier Nietzsche of the "Origins of Greek Tragedy") and who is logical, works out his thesis in the following manner: The first symptoms of a "*sensibilité spectaculaire*" manifest themselves in biology with the change of sensation into perception. This "*sensibilité spectaculaire*" plays an important, though often unconscious part in human life in the form of curiosity, and attains its perfection in aesthetic activity. Science is far from being disinterested. Quoting Hobbes': "Knowledge is power" and Comte's: "Every science aims at foresight," Jules de Gaultier concludes that the desire to know is a form of the will to power. Science belongs therefore, at first, to the "*sensibilité messianique*," searching, as it does, the final end outside itself; i. e., an end where, owing to some universal convergence, all phenomena would merge into an identity, whether this identity be the Eleatic One, the Platonic τὸ ἀγαθόν, or the Hegelian Absolute. Science has failed in this enterprise, because of the resistance of the Real. It appears, then, that modifying its primitive conception of identity, according to which science consid-

ered itself as a means of reducing the diverse to unity, it has later used this conception as a means of uniting between themselves the different forms of diversity and of creating out of these forms perceptible objects. After an infinite development, these objects have become no longer degrees towards the attainment of an end, i. e., Bradleyan degrees of reality, but objects the contemplation of which constitutes an end in itself.

Existence, according to M. de Gaultier, is conditioned by knowledge, but knowledge itself is conditioned by relation. Relation must needs exclude all finalism, in which it would be abolished. This argument brings Jules de Gaultier to the position, somewhat paradoxical at first sight, that in the sphere of relation, which is also that of the whole of reality, there is no place for truth. For nothing is true, except when considered from an objective and sole end. Truth presupposes Messianism and belongs to the sphere of philosophical folk-lore. It must therefore in the sphere of relation give its place to Beauty. Knowledge which is the condition of existence is also its sole justification. It appears, finally, that in the evolution of the different forms of the "*sensibilité messianique*" towards the forms of the "*sensibilité spectaculaire*," existence frees itself from dependence upon truth and becomes subservient to the hegemony of the beautiful, which alone mirrors the real.

M. Jules de Gaultier is the first philosopher since Kant and after Croce to give to aesthetics its metaphysical import, but unlike the two former thinkers, he allots to this science the chief place, and his conclusion reduces practically the whole of the theory of knowledge to an aesthetic activity.

Among those—and they are very few in France—who have approached aesthetics from a moral point of view, we

must mention M. Lalo.<sup>2</sup> After a very exhaustive and critical survey of the different solutions of the problem, and an impartial statement of its historical side, M. Lalo points out the impossibility of adopting an absolute scale of values. He admits, however, a differentiation between the "normal value" (i. e., the moral principles of the man-in-the-street) and the "ideal value," or the morality which it is not always desirable to realize. In all questions of value, it is the "normal value" which remains fundamental and is the only one capable of being objectified. The ideal value is its hypothetical transposition and can be more or less verified by time, space and humanity. M. Lalo argues further that that which is morally bad in itself may be morally good on the whole, and he enforces his attitude by Aristotle's cathartic theory of art. An immoral work of art may be finally moral by the very fact of its immorality, i. e., of the purgation of undesirable passions; which, of course, lands the whole problem in a kind of universal relativism.

It is difficult, says M. Lalo, to conciliate the beautiful and the good in one indivisible unity; this would be too simple and too abstract for life. It is also difficult to maintain them in a badly regulated duality, which is anarchical. Their harmony must be solidarity and organization. He therefore seeks the answer to the problem in the double notion of synthesis and relativity. Wherever there is synthesis, the whole acquires a value which its elements do not possess. If the whole reacts on its parts or vice versa—as would a cell in an organism—these two values clash, though the one cannot exist without the other, and though they form a whole. The only sin in spirit, in M. Lalo's eyes, is that of being incomplete.

Though M. Lalo insists too much, so it seems to us, on the social side of art,<sup>3</sup> he remains well in the vein of

<sup>2</sup> Lalo: *l'Art et la morale*, Alcan, Paris, 1922.

<sup>3</sup> Lalo: *l'Art et la vie sociale*, Doin, Paris, 1921.

French thought. Even in *l'Art et la Morale*, and especially more so in his other works on aesthetics,<sup>4</sup> he approaches aesthetic questions chiefly from a psychologist's point of view. He discerns five main classes among the functions of art in life:

Firstly, an escape from practical reality (Type Flaubert).

Secondly, a cathartic activity of immunization—by liberation—against the tension of external and tyrannical aspiration (Type Goethe).

Thirdly, a purely technical activity which leads to the theory of "art for art's sake" (Type Goncourt, Théophile Gautier, Oscar Wilde).

Fourthly, an activity of embellishment of a vulgar reality and of the author's own vulgarity (Type Jean-Jacques Rousseau).

Fifthly, a more humble activity of reinforcement of simple reality (Type Stendhal, Van Dyck, Mozart).

This classification, though very ingenious, appears to us, nevertheless, somewhat arbitrary and often overlapping. For instance, there is much more in Oscar Wilde than a purely technical activity, and Van Dyck seems to have been far more refined in his art than in his private mode of living.

M. Lalo's two treatises on aesthetics, already mentioned, contain an exhaustive and impartial survey of the different problems for a beginner. Of the same type but of a more ambitious character is the history of French aesthetics set forth in a very satisfactory way by M. Mustoxidi.<sup>5</sup> Though it imparts nothing entirely new, we find therein a systematized review of technical theories of art.

Another interesting treatise on general aesthetics is M.

<sup>4</sup> *Notions d'esthétique*, Alcan, Paris, 1925; *Esthétique*, Vuibert, Paris, 1925.

<sup>5</sup> *Histoire de l'esthétique française (1700-1900)*, Champion, 1920.

Alain's *Système des Beaux-Arts*.<sup>6</sup> We have here a most original theory of art considered as a discipline over human passions. Taking the Cartesian doctrine of the faculty of imagination resulting from the mechanism of bodily functions, M. Alain proceeds to demonstrate the social control exercised by art over the individual emotions.

No dreamery, no fantasy is a work of art. It is a waste of time for an artist to look for the beautiful in the mere possibilities which present themselves to his imagination. No mere possible is beautiful. Only the real is so. An artist must be both perceiving and active. He is more attentive to the object which he contemplates than to his own passions. He has no patience for idle dreams. One can only create while working, holds M. Alain. If the power of execution did not go much further than the power of thinking or of imagining, there would be no artists.

But, what, then, is the difference between the artist and the artisan, the mere workman? It lies in the fact that a mechanical work can be reproduced an unlimited number of times, while a work of art obeys one particular rule specially framed for it. The genius knows himself in his creation. The rule of the beautiful appears in the work of art and remains in it, so that this particular rule can never again serve for another work of art. But rule there is, though it is only discovered during the execution. For M. Alain considers that the very definition of art is rule and he includes not only those which are actually regarded as arts (such as dancing, music, painting, literature and so forth), but also such achievements as politeness, courtesy, ceremonies, manners and the like. This is not without piquancy. The social element theory is thus logically defended.

The psychological field is far from being exhausted. Among the most interesting publications is, no doubt, the chapter by M. H. Delacroix on *Le Sentiment Esthétique*.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Nouvelle revue française*, 1920. Reprinted in 1926.

<sup>7</sup> In Georges Dumas's, *Traité de Psychologie*, Alcan, Paris, 1924.

He examines the doctrine that play is the origin of all art. Though he does not deny the analogy between these two activities, he argues that the new factor which the aesthetic activity adds to the faculty of play, it might as well add to a more serious faculty. He defines the work of art as a profound psychological moment in life. At the beginning of every aesthetic sentiment there is a sensorial element, but the task of intellectualizing the imagination and the dream is none the less important. Not unlike the former thinkers whose theories we have stated, M. Delacroix holds that the aesthetic activity is that faculty which discovers new relations between us and the sensations and among the different sensations, as independent of the particular quality of the sensations themselves. There is therefore at the basis of all the arts an intellectual activity which is the same as that which leads to the constitution of language.

In his more recent book,<sup>7a</sup> he examines how the work of art arises in the mind of the artist. It is, according to him, part of the artist who conceives it, and could not be conceived by any other artist. The reasoning by which Edgar Poe explains the genesis of *The Raven* resembles, says M. Delacroix, ratiocinations well-known in psychiatry. They do not explain the delirium. They are, on the contrary, consequences of the delirium itself. There are slow reparations, immediate realisations, brutal intuitions. But, in reality, the preliminary work has prepared the elements and made a choice beforehand.

An important part of this book is devoted to the different expressions of art. Nevertheless, the aesthetic sentiments, though individual, bear, according to M. Delacroix, a character of universality. In the pure emotions the artist detects the structure and the plan of evolution. These sentiments are the most delicate and the most profound reaction of the soul towards the universe. He claims,

<sup>7a</sup> *Psychologie de l'Art*, Alcan, Paris, 1927.



therefore, that all human interests are represented in art. But he thinks that the same aim is achieved by the contemplation of nature as by a work of art.

Such is also the opinion of M. A. Dauzat.<sup>8</sup> After having analyzed the impressions which the contemplation of nature produces in certain individuals, he proceeds to examine the influence of surroundings on works of art. He concludes, however, with M. Paulhan,<sup>9</sup> that it is mostly when love of nature has been denied its free outlet that it reveals itself, as it is always a repressed tendency which creates the artistic attitude.

This brings us to a very modern part of the literature on the subject. It is not surprising to find that the Freudian doctrine has influenced in many ways contemporary aesthetic theories in France as much as—or perhaps a little less than—in other countries. Even M. Lalo seems to tend in this direction in his more recent books. We have not found, however, in this Freudian aspect of the aesthetic activity anything new which was not already stated in the old Aristotelian theory of the purgation of passions.

Doctor Hesnard<sup>10</sup> argues that a work arises in the mind of the artist through an unconscious process which can be compared with that of the dream. The artist puts in his work many tendencies of which he finds an ideal realization or liberation. He searches for the sublime means of expressing all his aspirations. Psychoanalysis will discover in his work all the intimate sentiments of the author with the whole of his affective history and the whole of his personal life, including his reminiscences of childhood and youth.

Charles Baudouin<sup>11</sup> gives us many examples to illustrate the Freudian doctrine of art. Every state which engrosses

<sup>8</sup> *Le sentiment de la nature et son expression esthétique*, Alcan, Paris, 1914.

<sup>9</sup> *l'Esthétique du paysage*, Paris, 1912.

<sup>10</sup> *l'Inconscient*.

<sup>11</sup> *Suggestion et Auto-Suggestion*, 1919.

the mind tends in one way or another to secure external expression, for it is a concentrated energy which wishes to diffuse itself. He goes on, showing how, for Victor Hugo, for instance, hallucination by compromise, which in his case is the source of symbolical poetry, is the normal method of discharge; and how Goethe by writing Werther freed himself from a suicidal impulse.

On the pathological side of the subject we must mention Doctor Vinchon's *l'Art et la folie* (Stock, Paris, 1924), and an earlier book by Marcel Réja, *l'Art chez les fous* (Mercure de France, 1914). Though the examples they give of art (literature, painting, music) as created by inmates of an asylum are interesting in themselves, they throw but little light on the main problems. Marcel Réja, basing himself on the examples in his book, concludes that art seems to be the manifestation of the obscure consciousness of the individual. It expresses, with the satisfaction which every activity finds in its own expression, the actual state of mental acquisition. The work of art is a kind of concrete scheme in which the individual takes pleasure in synthesizing acquired notions without having recourse to the logical and rational process of abstraction.

If anything, the poems and pictures created by lunatics and systematically collected by Marcel Réja would go to prove the theory of the French aestheticians, as against Benedetto Croce, that a real work of art is constituted of intellectual elements as well as sensual.

Among other psychological contributions we must briefly mention the special number of the *Journal de Psychologie*<sup>11a</sup> devoted to aesthetics. We find therein an interesting discussion by Vernon Lee on "Problems and Methods in Empirical Aesthetics;" a very exhaustive article on the conscious and the unconscious in inspiration by Charles Lalo; a subtle analysis of judgment and taste by A. Thibaudet; a

<sup>11a</sup> *Journal de Psychologie*, XXIII (1926), Nos. 1-3.

few notes on the evaluation of tragedy by Gabriel Marcel; an excellent study on art and scholastic by P. Masson-Oursel; and very illuminating opinions on the specialised branches of art by the leading French authorities in each subject.

Our review would be incomplete if we did not say a few words of the artists who have written about their own activities. Their theories may not be philosophical, but as a confession they throw some light on the subject. They are important in a country like France, where new literary schools are created every year, new manifestos written, new poetical programmes proclaimed, and where artistic life is bubbling over with new fashions.

Among the earlier writers, a curious theory of "eurythmic harmonization" of the individual with conflicting causes, has been put forward by Rémy de Gourmont.<sup>12</sup> Though it remains in the tradition of the Aristotelian καθαρσις and the Freudian "libido," Rémy de Gourmont's theory is more subtle, as it is based on a hedonic search for "attunement" with the surroundings and the universe and the desire for immortality, which is reminiscent of the Platonic doctrine in the Banquet. This theory has been followed to its logical conclusion by the author's brother, Jean de Gourmont, who tells us a very illuminating anecdote on the subject: "I once suggested to Rémy," he writes, "the possibility of a fire in his library. He answered that he would rather die than see his notes and manuscripts disappear. Transposition of the instinct of generation, perhaps. But in this there is especially the human conception of the idea of eternity. This realization of oneself in a work of art which will last longer than one's life, is, in fact, the negation of religious faith and its transposition into an individual eternity."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *Le problème du style*, *Mercure de France*; *Esthétique de la langue française*, *Mercure de France*, Paris, 1909.

<sup>13</sup> *Jean de Gourmont: Souvenirs sur Rémy*, *Champion*, Paris, 1924.

The desire for immortality as a factor in creative work is also emphasized in M. Paul Valéry's *Eupalinos*, an imitation of a Platonic dialogue, which takes place in the underworld between the ghost of Socrates and that of Phaedrus.<sup>14</sup> "Nothing beautiful," says M. Paul Valéry through Socrates' mouth, "can be separate from life, and life is that which dies." It is most ironical and somewhat pathetic to hear two immaterial ghosts discussing the necessity for material bodies and forms as these alone can radiate and perceive beauty. For there exist no details in the execution of a work. The reality of a discourse, according to Paul Valéry, lies more in that which appears accidental to the profane, i. e., in the coloring and in the tone of a voice, in the way things are expressed rather than in the things expressed. Here again we see that the sphere of relations is of paramount importance for aesthetic perceptions.

The crux, however, of M. Valéry's theory is in its aesthetic formulation, too often overlooked by those who approach the question as metaphysicians and psychologists. Paul Valéry insists that art is mainly choice—a fact often forgotten—and that as such it is tyrannical. Real beauty, he says, is as rare as is, among men, the man capable of making an effort against himself, i. e., to choose a definite self and to impose it upon all his other selves. It is urgent that *that which shall be* should satisfy, with all the force of its novelty, the reasonable requirements of *that which was*.

After a somewhat arbitrary distinction between natural and artificial objects—arbitrary, because M. Valéry, basing it as he does on two different kinds of order, forgets that order is altogether an anthropomorphic conception—Paul Valéry's theory of choice (among the infinite subject-matters for aesthetic creation) culminates in the following argument:

<sup>14</sup> Paul Valéry: *Eupalinos ou l'Architecte*, Nouvelle Revue Française, Paris, 1923.

If the universe is the effect of an act, and the act itself the effect of a Being and of a need, of a thought, of a science and of a power of that Being, it is by an act alone that one can join again the great aim and propose to oneself the imitation of him who has made all things. This is the most natural way of putting oneself in the very place of God. And out of all acts the most complete is that of constructing. A work demands love, meditation, obedience to one's most beautiful thought, invention of laws by one's soul. It arises from the most intimate part of one's life, and yet it is not identical with oneself. One would be to that work—if it could but think—a God. Just as God created out of chaos, the artist creates out of the chaotic elements which surround him, and he starts where God has stopped.

Thus, by putting aesthetics at the highest summit of spiritual evolution, Paul Valéry comes, though by different means, in a totally different manner, and on an altogether different plan, to a conclusion which has several points of analogy with that of Jules de Gaultier.

Among the ultra-modern manifestoes on art, we must quote Marinetti's<sup>14a</sup> cry of battle: "An automobile in full speed is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace or the Venus de Milo." Exaggerated as it may seem, it nevertheless marks a new aesthetic interest. Until now, all civilizations have centered around two main ideas: the infinite, in the East, based perhaps on the contemplation of the desert, which brought forth mystical ecstasy, monotheistic religions, pantheistic thinking and a general disorder in creative work, where, as can be seen in Hindu temples, the mass, reminiscent of infinity, is overadorned and overdressed with rich details; the finite, in the West, based on the contemplation of trees which suggest individuality, human gods and beautiful forms. But whether oriental

<sup>14a</sup> *Manifeste du Futurisme*, Paris, 1909.

or occidental, the aesthetic ideal has always been an ideal of repose, of immobility.

"Est-elle en marbre ou non, la Vénus de Milo?  
Je hais le mouvement qui déplace les lignes."

Such was the credo of beauty of a former French poet. Now the futurists have introduced for the first time the idea of movement as a subject-matter for aesthetic contemplation, and this opens up new vistas of possibilities.

Following closely in the steps of the futurists are the surrealists,<sup>14b</sup> chiefly represented by Philippe Soupault, F. Arago, André Breton and Robert Desnos. Their ideals also are speed and shortness, with special stress laid upon impulsive expression and the inspiration of the unconscious. They make a practical application of the Freudian theories to the technical side of art.

No masterpiece, nothing of great artistic value has so far been created in any of these modern schools.<sup>15</sup> This, of course, is not a fair criticism, for (as is witnessed in the history of art) hardly any masterpiece has ever been achieved by the same minds that have invented a new aesthetic language. The sonata form was known a century before Beethoven and Mozart brought this musical language to perfection. It seems as if the whole creative power is exhausted by the invention.

However, for better or for worse, the futurists and the surrealists are children of that century of speed where

<sup>14b</sup> Cf. André Breton, *Manifeste du Surréalisme*, Kra, Paris, 1924.

<sup>15</sup> We must except the works of M. Marinetti and M. Joseph Delteil. M. Marinetti's better writings, however, like *Le Roi Bombance*, *Poupées électriques*, etc., have not been written according to futurist canons. As to M. Delteil, who was for one year a futurist, then for a year a surrealist, and is now content with being himself, we must add that his works (especially his *Jeanne d'Arc*), though influenced by both these schools, nevertheless remain strictly individual, as are the works of all creative geniuses, no matter to which school they belong.

conditions of life leave little time for contemplation. The value of their aesthetic ideal can be determined alone by time.

## PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION<sup>1</sup>

EMMANUEL LEROUX

THE title of this article must not be allowed to mislead the foreign reader. The very expression "philosophy of religion" is undoubtedly employed less in France than it is in Germany or in the English-speaking countries. In any case it does not among us designate a definite and unique discipline. In using it here we are attempting simply to envisage together the recent studies which lead either to an interpretation of religious phenomena as a whole or of one of their essential forms, or to a reasoned solution of the problem which they contain. Thus our field will include, for example, the psychology of religion as well as rational theology.

### I.

Let us recall first of all the status of these studies in France before 1914. The dialectic method no doubt continued to have its adherents as much among the scholastic thinkers as among the idealists more or less devoted to the Hegelian tradition. For a long time, however, it had not led to any work of the first rank. The most remarkable philosophical effort aroused by the religious problem during the quarter-century preceding the war seems to be that which, in the mind of a frankly Catholic thinker, took the form of a *philosophy of action*. We cannot review in brief lines the profound and elaborate system which M. Maurice Blondel has set forth under this name in his celebrated

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Edward L. Schaub.



essay of 1893 and in several succeeding articles. Let us simply say that it appears to us as an original reconstruction of the thought which dominates the apologetics of Pascal. All the philosophical problems are marshalled about a central consideration: that of the essential aspirations of our will. Tracing the active manifestations of these aspirations, and pointing out how they survive inevitable disappointments, the author seeks to establish that our will transcends the phenomenal order, that it manifests the immanence in us of a transcendent deity; if, moreover, it is to remain at the crest of its original impulse, it must keep itself open to the action of this deity.

An entirely analogous conception has been presented by Father Laberthonnière in a form much less technical, very personal, and very penetrating; this Oratorien has, moreover, connected his standpoint, under the designation of *moral dogmatism*, with the Augustinian tradition, and strongly opposed it to the scholastic theology, to which he has objected as being a theocratic deviation from the Christian spirit. Finally, in connection with one aspect of this tendency, one might cite the brilliant and courageous efforts of M. Edouard Le Roy to put into new terms the problems of dogma, of miracle, and of God. For here also it is from a deeper experience of the spiritual life, interpreted in a sense antithetical to intellectualism, that religious philosophy borrows its light, though it should be added that the thought of M. Bergson, whose influence is predominant in the case of M. Le Roy, perhaps presents not less of difference from than of similarity to the doctrine of M. Blondel.

As for the effort to treat religious phenomena in their ensemble as a strictly *positive* investigation, it took form in our country only within relatively recent times. It suffices to read the chapter devoted by Ribot, in his *Psychologie des Sentiments* (1896), to the religious sentiment,

to see how little advanced the analysis of this state of consciousness was at that time. Since then the psychology of religious phenomena has made great progress. In particular, let us refer here, next to the small work by Murisier, to the works of M. Henri Delacroix. In his remarkable *Etudes d'Histoire et de Psychologie du Mysticisme* (1908), this writer, through a minute study of three great historic personalities, presented a peculiarly profound analysis of Christian mysticism, whose complex and progressive development he brought into clear relief.

Finally, sociology, in its turn, has attempted to annex to itself the study of religious facts. It will be sufficient here to call attention to the works of M. M. Hubert and Mauss, and especially to the authoritative treatise of Durkheim on *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912). On the basis of a study of a particular set of facts, namely Australian totemism, Durkheim presents religion in its totality as a product of the collective life, as transposing into a form that is imaginative but not wholly unreal the most fundamental features of this life. If this bold thesis is far from having been demonstrated by Durkheim's work, it has at least never before been set forth in a manner at once so precise, so broad and so vigorous.

Such, in the period preceding the war, were the most notable productions of French thought in its grapple with the religious problem. What new efforts have been made subsequently to 1914 to penetrate further into this domain? It is this which we here endeavor to set forth.

## II

The dialectical method has not yet been abandoned by all. Under the traditional form of Thomism, it is represented by Father Garrigou-Lagrange, though, to be sure, he has not, during the period under present consideration, given us any new philosophical works but only new edi-

tions of former publications. In the most important of these<sup>2</sup> he makes a strenuous effort to demonstrate the existence of God by the principle of causality, which of itself carries back to the principle of identity in such a way that we are compelled to choose between the affirmation of God and the acceptance of an absurdity. This type of argument appears feeble to most contemporary thinkers. Nevertheless it is necessary to point out that in certain quarters Thomism is again in vogue and that it counts enthusiastic followers, of whom the most ardent and salient is M. Jacques Maritain.<sup>3</sup>

As concerns the dialectic of idealism, one may find a particularly significant example in the lectures by Jules Lagneau, *De l'existence de Dieu*,<sup>4</sup> recently published through the devotion of one of his followers. Nowhere may we find the reflective method utilized with greater sincerity or depth. The fundamental concern of the author, strictly speaking, is not to prove the existence of God, for existence is exclusively a character of sensible things, but to penetrate to the reality of God as a principle immanent in the exercise of our own thought. Lagneau seeks to establish that the principle of all reality, transcending sense existence and even intelligible necessity, really resides in an "absolute act" of freedom, an act by which God eternally posits himself and *ipso facto* posits the essential identity of the ideal and the real. We need not follow the author in the windings of the ingenious dialectic by which he con-

<sup>2</sup> *Dieu, son existence et sa nature. Solution thomiste des antinomies agnostiques.* Paris, Beauchesne, 3rd ed., 1920. Cf. by the same author, *Le sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques.* Paris, Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 3rd ed., 1922. (The first edition appeared in 1909.)

<sup>3</sup> See in particular the *Réflexions sur l'Intelligence*, Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1924.

<sup>4</sup> Paris, Alcan, 1925. The neo-Scholastic movement has produced the book of Baron Decamps, *Le génie des Religions, les origines*, Brussels, A. Dewitt, and Paris, Alcan, 1923. But this comprehensive synthesis which takes cognizance of everything from epistemology to prehistoric facts touches everything very superficially.

nects with this central principle the fundamental aspects of being. Let us simply note that according to him it is especially in the moral act that the fundamental character of reality reveals itself. For inasmuch as the thinking being in this act sacrifices the individual to the universal, he attains in it the most complete certainty of the reality of God. This line of argument, which at the outset seems to carry abstraction to its culmination, itself terminates in the conclusion that the true solution of the metaphysical problem lies in action. Lagneau invokes as his masters especially Plato and Spinoza. Yet in sum, we have here a version, very pure, very personal and especially closely-knit, of that absolute idealism of an ethical cast which sprang from Kant and from Fichte, and which a Royce, for example, developed in a richer and more concrete form in America. We would not forget, moreover, that Lagneau was almost a contemporary of Royce; the book *De l'Existence de Dieu* reproduced lectures delivered in 1892-1893. In fact, it seems to bear the stamp of that date. For even though the taste for dialectics has of late reappeared among certain authors,<sup>4a</sup> it is doubtful whether this way of treating the religious problem is such as can today satisfy many minds. Yet the ideas put forth by Lagneau are far from being dead. On the one hand, his insistence on the metaphysical import of action has its equivalent in the thought of M. Blondel, though, to be sure, with very wide differences in method as well as in application. And, furthermore, the idealistic conception of a deity completely immanent in mind still seems to be more or less implicitly adopted by a number of our contemporaries. It is to be found, for example, in the thought of a Brunschvicg<sup>5</sup> whose impersonal spiritualism is so resolutely hostile to all at-

<sup>4a</sup> Cf. the above article by M. Parodi, p. 366 n. 12.

<sup>5</sup> See in particular the last study contained in the small collection entitled *Nature et Liberté*, Paris, E. Flammarion, 1921.

tempts at an individualization of God. Nor is the conception foreign to the mind of a former student and ardent admirer of Lagneau, divergent as are the two in style: the pithy essayist who signs himself Alain and whose name is Chartier.

The last-named writer has attempted a concrete interpretation of religious facts in his "*pièces mal cousues*," brought together under the title *Propos sur le Christianisme*.<sup>6</sup> Nothing could be more impossible to summarize than this small book. Its every bit, indeed every sentence, stimulates thought with a new goad. We can only point out some of its leading tendencies. Alain places religion, and particularly Christianity, in the nexus of the history of the human spirit and he explains the latter by the continuous action of two really different factors: the play of the emotions and the effort of thought. On the one hand, he insists on the naturalistic, so to speak the corporeal, origin of religions. Seasonal festivals, dances, ceremonies, and also idols, temples, monuments—these are bodily manifestations that give rise to cult prior to legend. But to these manifestations reflection soon applies itself. Hence the pagan myths already express the idea of a universal order. In these ancient theologies, one may discern the first operation of reason. Catholicism marked a still more decisive advance in its idea of a single spiritual deity, in its teaching of human brotherhood, and in the importance which it attached to faith. Alain is concerned to show what elements of truth may be found at the basis of these dogmas, including that of the Trinity. But in so doing, he boldly transposes them. For him, as for Hegel, to comprehend a thing is already to have passed beyond it. The idea of universal spirit, advanced by the Church, now exists outside of the Church. On the one hand, it is corroborated by science, which realizes the accord of all and alone permits us

<sup>6</sup> Paris, F. Rieder, 1924.

to discover that which is; on the other hand, it always requires faith, but a faith freed from beliefs, reduced to its true nature, relating to "that which will come through volition"—a faith, moreover, exclusively human. Alain praises Epicurus for having denied the existence of any will hidden at the heart of the universe; and he does not sever himself from the materialists on this point. He writes frankly: "We may adore naught but man."

In brief, the successors of Lagneau have accentuated, if not narrowed down, the somewhat vague thoughts of their master in the direction of intellectualism and of an exclusive *humanism*. Would we now have an example of a book comparable to that of Alain in that, though truly philosophical in thought, it is addressed to the wider public, —a book, however, that is animated by an entirely different spirit and leads to opposite conclusions? In such event, we could doubtless not do better than to select *l'Inquiétude Humaine*<sup>7</sup> in which Father Pierre Sanson, priest of the Oratory, has published lectures which he gave in Notre Dame in Paris before immense audiences. His theme is the same that Pascal dealt with. He treats it after the spirit of M. Blondel or, still more, of Father Laberthonnière, not without the moving sincerity and the apostolic ardor that characterize this new great orator. He insists on the fact of universal human restlessness. He finds the cause of this in the contrast that exists between our radical frailty and our longing for the infinite, between our fundamental dependence and our need of entire freedom, between that which we are and that which we wish to be. He thus sets forth in its fullness the problem of our destiny and then strives to establish first of all that we cannot avoid it by refusing to face it, as is the case with all manner of skeptics. He finds also that no satisfactory solution is possible out-

<sup>7</sup> Paris, "Editions Spes," 1925. This book is the first of a set, the second volume of which will come out shortly.

side religious belief. He seeks to show the inadequacy at this point of all terrestrial social organizations, of science and even of philosophy. This latter analysis is particularly significant. Taking the monism of Spinoza and the pluralism of Renouvier as representing the two fundamental philosophical attitudes, Father Sanson criticizes them, each in turn, for their inability to bring us genuine liberation. According to him, we can gain the infinite to which we aspire only by preparing ourselves to receive it, only by performing an inner act of religious faith which he describes in terms brief but penetrating.

There being a dearth of French defenders of radical pluralism, we may say that, with the exception of the Thomistic renaissance described above, this supernaturalism, which is based on deep searchings into human restlessness, and the monistic idealism based on the requirements of thought and defended in very different ways by a Brunschvicg and a Chartier, represent the most vital forms of religious philosophy in French-speaking countries. It is still especially Pascal and Spinoza who are brought face to face in the most modern thought—the one in a form exhibiting the influence of romantic lyricism and of the experience of spiritual leaders; the other more or less transposed into the language of Kantian idealism and of the religion of humanity. Let us now leave these regions of almost pure philosophy to see what other contemporary thinkers have derived from an empirical study of religious facts.

### III

Religious sociology, strictly speaking, seems to have given birth in this recent period to only a very few works, at any rate to such as are synthetic in character. We may mention the work of M. Czarnowski.<sup>8</sup> Studying the legend

<sup>8</sup> *Le Culte des Héros et ses Conditions sociales. Saint Patrick, héros national de l'Irlande*, Alcan, 1919.

of St. Patrick, this writer has presented it as a product of the Christian churches of Ireland, creating through this epic a finer picture of their social life. Then, by means of this example, M. Czarnowski has tried to establish a connection between the cult of heroes and certain types of social structure. We may also mention the preface, in which M. Hubert has refined the solution offered by the author of this monograph, whose bent is sociological. Much more important, doubtless, would have been the study undertaken by Robert Hertz on *le Pêché et l'Expiation dans les Sociétés primitives*. But this richly endowed young sociologist was killed in the war before having finished the work in which he sought to elucidate these fundamental notions of the religious life by studying them especially as they occur in Polynesian groups. Only the remarkable introduction has been published.<sup>9</sup> Hertz here vigorously brought out the obscurity of the Christian notions of sin and of expiation and the necessity of turning to ethnology for a clarification of their genesis. But M. Mauss has been able to utilize the abundant and methodical notes which Hertz left and has himself prepared, conformably to the thought of his friend, a book whose early publication he has announced.<sup>10</sup> Finally, let us add that the interpreters of religious facts must henceforth take into account the already classic work of M. Lévy-Bruhl on *La Mentalité Primitive*.<sup>11</sup> The author has extensively set forth the "essentially mystic" character of primitive thought, showing that it conceives all sense phenomena as manifestations of occult forces with which they continue, for primitive thought, to be inextricably interwoven.

With the strictly sociological works we may connect those of certain historians. In his ingenious little work

<sup>9</sup> *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, July-Oct., 1922, pp. 5-54.

<sup>10</sup> *Année Sociologique*, Nouvelle Série, Vol. I, No. 1, 1925, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Paris, Alcan, 1922. We know that this work constitutes a sequel to the book on *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, Alcan, 1910.



*Le mystère de Jésus*<sup>12</sup> M. P. L. Couchoud, seizing with a rare talent upon the thesis of the mythologists, contends that Jesus ought not to be regarded as an historic personage but as a product of the collective mind, as a being gradually evolved by the Christian consciousness, as the result of a "collective mystic experience." Again, in his excellent work on *Les rois thaumaturges*,<sup>13</sup> M. Marc Bloch, bringing a more accurate method to bear on a less important but less elusive subject, studies the belief according to which the English and French kings enjoyed miraculous healing powers. Among the causes that have produced and maintained this belief he makes room for both collective representations and the action of certain individual will-forces, thus purposely combining the sociological explanation with what may be termed the Voltairian interpretation. We should mention above all the works of M. Alfred Loisy, especially a work such as *l'Essai historique sur le Sacrifice*<sup>14</sup> which subordinates a wealth of information to a vigorous synthesis and exhibits a strong sociological interest. But since it is impossible here to devote to this work the consideration which it merits, we would do well to dwell on the book in which this illustrious exegete has set forth the ensemble of his ideas on religion.<sup>15</sup>

In this work, at once very simple, very personal and devoid of all references, M. Loisy aims to disengage the "human aspect" of religion observable alike in religion and in contemporary society. However profound may be his sentiment of universal evolution and of the transiency of all dogmas, he nevertheless believes that religion has a kind

<sup>12</sup> Paris, Rieder, 1924.

<sup>13</sup> *Publications de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Strasbourg*, No. 19, Strasbourg and Paris, Istra, 1924.

<sup>14</sup> Paris, Emile Nourry, 1920.

<sup>15</sup> *La Religion*, Paris, Emile Nourry, 1917; 2nd ed. with preface considerably revised and enlarged, 1924. We may find other small works on related subjects mentioned on the cover of this book. See also the six short essays recently collected under the following title: *Religion et Humanité* (Nourry, 1926).

of permanent essence. What one finds as the principle of all religions is, according to him, the sense of human solidarity, the sentiment of our duty toward humanity. Such a sentiment was confusedly present even in primitive religion but it was here fused with the belief in doubles; in the course of history it became progressively clarified, and in our day it is emancipated from all metaphysical theory. But M. Loisy insists no less on the "mystic" character which this sentiment preserves and will ever preserve; by this term, deviated from its specific meaning, he designates a disposition of our being irreducible to reason. Faith has always been the primordial factor of religious evolution; and at bottom it is a sentiment of confidence in the future of the group. At present, Christian beliefs are being dissolved through a fatal crisis arising from the whole of social evolution. What should succeed them is not the reign of reason but a new faith, faith in humanity extolled by M. Loisy in moving terms as "the eternally true Christ, ever suffering, ever dying, ever resurrected" (2nd. ed. p. 367).

It is clear that M. Loisy stands rather apart, as he is equally hostile to supernaturalism and to rationalism. In certain respects his position obviously approaches that of Durkheim. Both scholars agree in regarding human society as at once the origin and the true object of religion; both alike endeavor, while eliminating every trace of the transcendent, to extract from the religions of the past a degree of permanent truth. But differences appear through these agreements. M. Loisy is at once more idealistic and more anti-intellectualistic than Durkheim. He avoids, as it would seem, the equivocation inherent in the purely sociological theory of religion; the legitimate object of our worship is for him not the actual society but ideal humanity (p. 371). He has too pure and too profound a sentiment for the moral life to reduce it to the simple pressure of

the collective consciousness. Perhaps one might even characterize his theory of religion as the most radical *moralism* which has ever existed. The sentiment of duty which he makes the common essence of morality and religion is conceived by him with no less austerity than it was by Kant. But he isolates it from all considerations both of metaphysics and of rationality. For him it has the nature of a spiritual instinct which impels the individual to devote himself to the service of humanity without hope of personal reward. The nobility of this conception is incontestable, as is also its accord with certain tendencies of modern thought. But is the interpretation faithful to the facts of religion? It must be admitted that M. Loisy exhibits far less concern than Durkheim to advance proofs. His book, *La Religion*, represents a spirited profession of faith, incorporating apt historical syntheses. But perhaps it fails to establish that the faith of the author is identical with the essence of positive religions or even that it may properly be called religion.

A fact which seems curiously to justify this doubt is that another historian has recently advanced a conception of life very similar to that of M. Loisy but has presented it as *opposed* to the religious conception. In his book, *La Religion et la Vie de l'Esprit*,<sup>16</sup> M. Paul Oltramare of Geneva, the erudite student of Indian civilization, explicitly puts this capital question: Is religion an indispensable aspect of spiritual life? When all is said and done, his answer is frankly in the negative. What he also defends is a purely human ethics; at the same time he pays a stricter regard than M. Loisy to the unique character of religion. He defines the latter as "the totality of beliefs and practices by which man expresses sentiments of reverence, of desire or of fear towards objects or beings which, though going beyond his sensible experience, he has invested with a capacity of beneficent or malevolent action" (p. 196-7). For

<sup>16</sup> Paris, Alcan, 1925.

him religion always implies belief in the reality of the transcendent. He seeks, moreover, to establish his thesis by an argument that is rather complex. He considers in turn the social and the individual aspects of religion, emphasizing the importance of the latter. He dwells alternately on the services which religion is capable of rendering to the spiritual life and on the injuries which it can cause. He insists on its exclusively human origin and holds that "religious experiences" reveal no other reality than the soul of the believer. He endeavors to show that, though religion has often been beneficent, it is sometimes also harmful and is never indispensable; it brings to man no good which he cannot obtain by other means, often to better advantage. It was the first moulding influence of the spiritual life, but we may now leave it behind and seek our ideal in the present life. . . . One sees how clear is this thesis of M. Oltramare and how diametrically opposed to that of Father Sanson. But perhaps he has set forth in a somewhat cursive manner the chief arguments on which one may lean rather than established any of them by an analysis sufficiently profound to carry conviction.

#### IV

It remains for us to consider the works of religious psychology. Such have not been lacking during recent years.

The most significant of the comprehensive works that have appeared in this domain during this period is doubtless *La Religion et la Foi*<sup>17</sup> by M. Henri Delacroix. We have here a methodical and detailed inventory of the principal forms of faith and connected experiences, considered in both their structure and their evolution. The work is remarkable especially for the abundance of the assembled facts, for the analyses of mental states, and for the inter-

<sup>17</sup> Alcan, 1922.

pretations proposed in passing. History and psychology are often brought into reinforcement, mutually enriching each other in a very happy manner. The author exhibits a live consciousness of the complexity of the phenomena which he studies, an obvious repugnance towards one-sided explanations, a constant concern for objectivity. His work, moreover, no less truly manifests a genuine singleness of spirit. At the very outset he distinguishes three principal types of faith: implicit or authoritative faith, trusting faith, and reasoning faith. This distinction corresponds to three factors which are consistently held throughout the entire volume to be at work in the religious life, the intent being not to sacrifice any of them: institution, sentiment and reason. Delacroix opposes with particular vigor explanations in terms purely of sentiment. No less truly at the basis of religion, he contends, is human desire, which creates belief in the realization of its object, and subconscious emotion, individual or collective, which confers upon this object an appearance of transcendence. To these affective states, however, one who strives for completeness must add an act of thought, belief in a certain objective order of forces or of causes. Moreover, desires and beliefs immediately give rise to a system of ritual; here lies the mainspring of cult, which preserves a degree of importance even in the most profound forms of faith. From the rite itself there is more and more completely disengaged, in the course of history, the myth, and then the dogma. Here again there intervenes an act of thought which, from the primitive notion of an impersonal and diffused religious force, presses forward to deities ever more individualized and finally re-absorbs them into the anonymity of divine infinitude. Similarly, if upon living faith there supervene dogmatic formulae, it is in consequence of the need that this faith experiences to know its own character and be founded on

truth. There then comes a complex speculative development in which dogma presents itself as explanation before becoming mystery, and in which the authority of the Church finally intervenes to consecrate a protective synthesis.

We thus have a glimpse of the complex interrelations in which M. Delacroix envisages the diverse elements of faith. At the conclusion of all these analyses, so rich and so delicately demarcated, some minds cannot but put to themselves this question: What do they teach us with respect to the value of religious faith? M. Delacroix does not explicitly touch upon this problem. Obviously, however, he seeks to present religion in its totality as a product purely of "creative faith," explicable by the general laws of the human mind and doubtless incorporating much of illusion. Moreover, however much he insists on the intellectual labor that religious faith often includes, he tends to make an absolute distinction between this faith and reason. "The faith which reason has in itself," he writes, "is not faith but reason" (p. xii). Here is an assertion singularly trenchant but in its brevity somewhat enigmatic. But this is just the kind of thesis that the author is least concerned to justify. He seeks deliberately to hold himself as closely as possible to the psychological point of view in his present work. But would not his psychology itself really have received a greater precision and confirmation if he had clearly put the epistemological problem and the metaphysical problem to which it inevitably leads, even if he did not solve them?

The same type of question will arise even more forcibly if we turn to that field of religious psychology which has been cultivated more intensively than any other in recent years: the study of mystic experience. Let us consider, first of all, the authors who, like M. Delacroix, believe themselves able to hold to an exclusively psychological point of view. *La psychologie des Mystiques catholiques ortho-*

*doxes*<sup>18</sup> by M. Maxime de Montmorand at once comes to mind. In this interesting and richly documented work, the distinctive traits of a particular group of mystics, their ascetic method, their mystic "phenomena" and "states" are described and classified in a manner both precise and clear. But the interpretation of the facts remains somewhat too brief. M. de Montmorand undertakes to discuss especially the explanations advanced by other psychologists, and to exhibit the inadequacy of purely pathological theories. He himself connects mystic "phenomena" with the psychological state of *inspiration* without much explanation of the denotation of this latter term. As for mystical ecstasy, he insists that it affords something original but admits that it tends toward unconsciousness, and refuses, from the psychological point of view, to find in it a higher form of knowledge. In brief, M. de Montmorand has presented a convenient survey opening up the study of mysticism rather than a profound analysis of the experience.

A few attempts have been made, not in France but in Switzerland, to interpret mysticism in the light of psycho-analysis, following the example of Silberer. Flournoy has advanced an interpretation of this sort in the case of a curious "modern mystic" whom he has studied minutely with the aid of her own personal confessions.<sup>19</sup> But the theory remains a mere outline and its application limited to the interpretation of a single case—and one altogether remarkable—whose patient and penetrating analysis constitutes the entire interest of this study. A much more systematic and comprehensive extension of the concepts dear to psycho-analysts to the interpretation of mysticism

<sup>18</sup> Alcan, 1920. Let us mention also the second edition of the book of M. J. Segond on *La Prière* (Alcan, 1925), an edition which differs from the essay of 1911 only in a new arrangement of certain chapters and in numerous omissions.

<sup>19</sup> *Une mystique moderne (Documents pour la psychologie religieuse)*, in the *Archives de Psychologie*, Vol. XV (1915), pp. 1-224. See also *ibid.*, pp. 338-353. We find here some interesting remarks by M. Delacroix concerning this case which he compares to those of the great mystics of history.

has been presented by M. Ferdinand Morel in his *Essai sur l'Introversion mystique*.<sup>20</sup> Taking as his point of departure a study of the writings of pseudo-Denys the Areopagite, he believes himself able to demonstrate that the central phenomenon among the great mystics is the attitude that Jung has called *introversion*; that is, the condition in which consciousness is detached from external reality and turned back upon its own functioning. This full introversion, to be found among the Indian, Alexandrian and "speculative" mystics, itself results from a fundamental *narcissism*. Among female mystics, on the other hand, auto-eroticism predominates. Finally, the mystics called "orthodox" represent an intermediate type. At the basis of the two extreme types one may find a common element, namely, a sexual mal-adaptation resulting in a shift of attention toward the unconscious pole of the mental life. We have here, it is obvious, a curious conception of the mystic experience. But one must confess that the interpretation seems both somewhat arbitrary and superficial. To us it appears probable that psycho-analysis can throw some light on this obscure region, but only on condition that it operate with the aid of less rudimentary concepts. In their excessive brevity the interpretations of Flournoy embodied the promise of an explanation more richly shaded.

Of the theories advanced from a purely psychological point of view, the most complete apparently continues to be that of M. Delacroix. In his *Etudes* of 1908, he described the stages of mystic development as subject to laws representing internal determinism, in part subconscious, tending, moreover, to a progressive enrichment of the personality. It is by this hypothesis of the subconscious, borrowed from William James, that he explained in particular the feeling of passivity common to mystics. At the same time, however, he insisted on the control exercised by intelligence

<sup>20</sup> Thesis presented to the University of Geneva, Kündig, 1918.



over their experience. In his more recent publications<sup>21</sup> he has presented a new analysis of the mystic ecstasy in its totality. He represents it as consisting fundamentally of "a confused exaltation illumined by a spiritual interpretation." At its basis there is thought to be a sort of indeterminate effusion of love closely kin to that which gives birth to lyrics or to music, but in the case of the mystic there is also a metaphysical schema resulting from speculations on the infinite and ineffable deity. Thus the mystic experience appears to the eyes of a psychologist not as a simple intuition but as a very complex synthesis of intellectual and affective motifs governed by an effort on the part of the individual to identify himself with the principle of the universe. Psychology thus shows "the profoundly human character" of the mystic experience without, however, being able to decide on its ontological value.

Recently another investigator has sought, with the aid of a peculiarly privileged subject, to clarify not only the psychological nature but, as he calls it, the "noetic value" of the mystic experience. M. Jean Baruzi has consecrated to this purpose a voluminous, learned and penetrating study of St. Jean de la Croix.<sup>22</sup> One may not praise too highly the wealth of his information and the pithiness of his analyses. As to the conclusion which he endeavors to derive, this does not always stand out with perfect clarity. But the following is what seems to us to be essential in it. Through the depth of his mystic experience, St. Jean de la Croix, realizing in himself the universal and permanent conditions of union with the divine, was led to a true intuition of a metaphysical import, namely that of the absorp-

<sup>21</sup> See *La Religion et la Foi*, Bk. II, chap. 1; the article mentioned in the *Archives de Psychologie*; and finally, the remarks concerning the thesis of M. Baruzi, *Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie*, May-June, 1925, pp. 33-42.

<sup>22</sup> *St. Jean de la Croix et le problème de l'expérience mystique*, Alcan, 1924. Also the communication of M. Baruzi to the Société française de Philosophie, *St. Jean de la Croix et le problème de la valeur noétique de l'expérience mystique* (*Bulletin* cited in the preceding note).

tion of the soul into a deity without modes. Thus he implicitly went beyond not only the scholastic psychology which he had received from tradition without changing it, but even beyond Christianity; he was led without realizing it into a form of "intellectualistic idealism" in the manner of M. Brunschvicg. . . . We here have, as may be seen, one of the most engaging efforts to free the intuition of a mystical genius from the inadequate interpretation which it had given of itself under the dominance of the traditional categories,<sup>28</sup> and the thesis, though based on the analysis of a single case, nevertheless contains a thought of universal bearing. M. Baruzi holds that the mystic experience possesses an irreducible originality, that it yields real "insights" independent of the religious form to which it may be bound solely by an accident of history, that it reveals a new relation between the spirit and things. We have here a thesis strikingly original but which still awaits—M. Baruzi himself recognizes this—its complete demonstration. What seems a bit disappointing in the work already accomplished is the fact that from the experience of St. Jean, described at such length, one retains a noetic residue so slight and so little different from that which others have obtained by means of a completely abstract dialectic.

There are other authors who have expressly shown that if one would penetrate to the bottom of the mystic experience, one must examine it in connection with the general

<sup>28</sup> It goes without saying that this interpretation of St. Jean de la Croix has been challenged. See in particular the profound discussion of Father Laberthonnière (*Bulletin* cited above, pp. 43-75). According to him the spiritual life of St. Jean de la Croix surpasses and sometimes contradicts his scholastic language, but not true Christian tradition; he conceives the mystic ecstasy not as an absorption of the soul into a universal substance, but as the union of two beings based upon the reciprocal giving of self prepared for by the practice of generosity. See also for a closely related article that of M. Joannès Wehrlé, *La vie et la doctrine de St. Jean de la Croix* (*Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée*, No. 3, *Qu'est-ce que le Mystique?* Paris, Bloud et Gay, 1925, pp. 124-169). M. Wehrlé sees in the doctrine of St. Jean both a development of evangelical thought and a sketch of the philosophy of action. For an article in the more traditional sense, see the critique of M. Baruzi's book by the monk of Solesmes, Ph. Chevallier, *La Vie Spirituelle*, 1925, XII, pp. 188-212.

conditions of human knowledge. This demonstration has been undertaken in two rather different ways by Father Joseph Maréchal and by M. Maurice Blondel. The former, in his very interesting *Etudes sur la Psychologie des Mystiques*,<sup>24</sup> sets forth with much accuracy the complex conditions that come into play in the interpretation of mystic states. He disengages the principal types of explanatory hypotheses, recognizing that the strictly empirical theory carries a "presumption of authority" based on the methodological principle of the economy of thought, but he himself inclines to the doctrine according to which mystical ecstasy affords a true intuition of being, due to the action of God wherein he reveals himself to certain souls. To the support of this thesis he adduces the testimony of the mystics themselves, the conclusions which he believes to be established by metaphysics, but especially the general psychology of human intelligence. That which, according to him, characterizes this intelligence in all its activities is the need of affirming being and of achieving unity. In the realm of natural knowledge, namely that of sense perception and of multiplicity, this need cannot be completely satisfied. Our spirit can realize its deep aspiration only if, thanks to the intervention of an external power, it attains to an intellectual intuition of being. Such precisely is mystical ecstasy; though surpassing the powers of mere intelligence, it is merely a projection of the essential movement characteristic of the latter.

This conception of mental dynamism represents a loan from the Thomistic psychology, in which one discerns an echo of Plotinus and even of Plato. In the present case, however, such echo is weakened by the idea that human knowledge is naturally imprisoned within the circle of the sensible. M. Blondel has based a rather similar glorification

<sup>24</sup> Vol. I, Bruges, Ch. Beyaert, and Paris, Alcan, 1924. This volume contains articles published in 1908-9 and 1912.

of mystic union on a theory of knowledge much more complex and original. In his remarkable contribution of the volume, *Le Procès de l'Intelligence*,<sup>25</sup> he has advanced the important thesis that our intelligence, over the above *notional knowledge*, is able to form and to develop what he calls *real knowledge* or *knowledge by connaturality*. This latter form of concrete thought which tends to the possession of being in its character of a totality comprising particularity and wholeness, rests on a natural *affinity* which causes us to vibrate in unison with others, and is developed by a spiritual culture which progressively frees us from egoism and actively harmonizes us with other beings. This knowledge, requiring for its exercise the co-operation of all our powers of action and feeling, and likewise possessing a rational and objective character, represents, according to M. Blondel, the point where mysticism inserts itself into human life. This is the doctrine defended in a very complicated but substantial study, *Le problème de la Mystique*.<sup>26</sup> Real knowledge puts us into communion with integral reality, but in a manner always imperfect. It tends to unite us to the principle of being, but by itself alone cannot consummate this union, for God is not an object who may thus be laid hold upon. Mysticism yields the only truly satisfactory reply to the question that reason puts but cannot answer. Human knowledge in all its forms ultimately leaves a void; the contemplative union enjoyed by the mystic alone yields true satisfaction. Though irreducible, and different from the ordinary experiences of life, this state is nevertheless in continuity with the latter, "being a direct

<sup>25</sup> *Le Procès de l'Intelligence*, by P. Archambault, M. Brillant, P. Gemahling, L. Ruy and M. Blondel, Paris, Bloud et Gay, 1922. These studies had previously appeared in articles in the *Nouvelle Journée*. M. Blondel here names St. Augustine, Pascal and Newman as the principal upholders of the conception which he develops. In another work he points out also a more precisely worked out expression of this in the work of his master Ollé-Laprune: See *Ollé-Laprune, l'achèvement et l'avenir de son oeuvre*, Bloud et Gay, 1923.

<sup>26</sup> In the *Cahier* already cited: *Qu'est-ce que la Mystique?* pp. 1-63.

prolongation of the line pursued by our knowledge and our action" (p. 44). It involves a divine grace that is incommensurable with human achievements and that may nevertheless, even in its most exalted forms, to a certain extent be apprehended by reason. It is the complete realization of the human ideal, and even, in a strict sense, of the philosophical ideal. It is "the perfection of the spirit" (p. 62). This is an important contention, of whose justification, however, M. Blondel has up to the present attempted only a sketch.

Thus the psychology of religious phenomena in their profounder phases leads to conclusions no less divergent than those of the purely philosophical study of religion. Nevertheless the former offers at least the advantage of turning our thought towards facts, doubtless difficult to grasp, yet rich in substance. Another aspect of the subject—and one too long neglected—has been explored in an interesting way by two Protestant authors. I refer to the religious sentiments of childhood. M. Henri Clavier, utilizing numerous and exact observations, has written, on *l'Idée de Dieu chez l'Enfant*.<sup>27</sup> M. Pierre Bovet, in his little work *le sentiment religieux et la Psychologie de l'enfant*<sup>28</sup> has presented a completely individual analysis of the same subject. He seeks to show that the "adoration" manifested by the small child toward his parents is "the prototype of religious sentiments" (p. 46). And he describes in a very curious manner the process by which this filial love is transferred from the parents to God, a process observable in its spontaneous form in the case of deaf and dumb children. M. Bovet

<sup>27</sup> Thesis defended before the *Faculté libre de théologie protestante* of Montauan, 1913, 2nd ed. enriched by note and appendices, Paris, Fischbacher, 1926. The same author has published *l'Expérience de la Vie Eternelle*, Fischbacher, 1923. In this book he pretends to establish the reality of a beautiful experience reached by "personalistic mysticism" which is supposed to have attained its perfect form in Jesus. Unfortunately this important thesis is defended by a very superficial argument.

<sup>28</sup> Neuchatel and Paris, Ed. Delachaux et Niestlé, 1925.

likewise shows that, in spite of frequently bizarre ideas of God, children are capable of religious experiences that are "at times singularly lofty and profound" (p. 93), whether in respect to the mystical or the moral aspects of religion.

Finally, a completely new field of religious psychology has been opened up by M. Raoul Allier in his work *la Psychologie de la Conversion chez les Peuples non civilisés*,<sup>29</sup> a study long in preparation, based on the narratives of Protestant missionaries and indeed full of interest but too recent to permit of analysis here.

## V

During this brief period, unusually broken into and impoverished by the war, we find that religious problems and phenomena have nevertheless given rise, in France, in Switzerland and in Belgium, to not unimportant works, especially in the psychological domain. And we could still further notably prolongate our list if we would mention the more specialized studies from which the philosophy and the psychology of religion can derive profit. Let us at least here mention two works no less different in the spirit of their authors than in their dimensions: the documented and shrewd biography presented by the late Albert Houtin of an abbess of Solesmes<sup>30</sup> and the comprehensive *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France depuis la fin des guerres de religion jusqu'à nos jours* organized by M. Henrie Bremond with as much of talent as of erudition.<sup>31</sup> May I direct attention also to the voluminous work devoted by Father Pinard de la Boullaye to *l'Etude comparée des*

<sup>29</sup> Two volumes, Payot, 1925.

<sup>30</sup> *Une grande mystique. Madame Bruyère, abbesse de Solesmes (1845-1909)*, Alcan, 1925. This volume contains a long memoir in which Dom. Sanson denounces "the folly of pride and of mystic delirium" which the abbess had communicated to the monks of Solesmes.

<sup>31</sup> Six volumes, Bloud et Gay, 1916-1922. One might regard as similar the book of P. Pourrat on *la Spiritualité Chrétienne*, 3 vols., Paris, Gabalda, 1918, 1921 and 1925.

*religions*,<sup>82</sup> a book so rich in objective and well classified information that it has been highly praised by a critic as little liable to partiality towards a Jesuit as the aforesaid Houtin?<sup>83</sup> During this same period there have been established at least four new reviews devoted to the religious sciences, two of which specialize in the problems of asceticism and mysticism.<sup>84</sup> No less significant, along its own line, is the success of such series as *Christianisme*,<sup>85</sup> *judaïsme*,<sup>86</sup> and *Maîtres de la Pensée Antichrétienne*.<sup>87</sup> Perhaps the very wealth of the materials amassed in the field of religious phenomena has begun to make their synthetic utilization singularly difficult. It must be acknowledged that, as regards religious philosophy, this last decade is far from having given birth to as many good original works as the preceding quarter-century. The strictly philosophical productions which we have mentioned are all of the nature of popularizations or of brief sketches. Most of them present in a new form ideas that had already been advanced. The only exceptions are the publications of M. Loisy and of M. Baruzi: for, even though the one writer approximates the sociological thesis and the other the idealistic view, both exhibit a peculiarity, rare in France, namely, that of ascribing an irreducible value to both religious and mystical experience without adhering to any kind of orthodoxy.

<sup>82</sup> 2 Vols.: I. *Son histoire dans le monde occidental*; II. *Ses méthodes*, Beauchesne, 1922 and 1925.

<sup>83</sup> *Revue d'Histoire des Religions*, 1923, p. 282, and 1925, p. 119.

<sup>84</sup> These latter two are the *Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique*, founded in 1920, and *La Vie Spirituelle Ascétique et Mystique*, founded in 1919. The former, more speculative in character than the latter, contains carefully worked out articles and accounts. The two other reviews come from the University of Strasbourg: the *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuse*, founded in 1920 by the faculty of Protestant theology, and the *Revue des Sciences religieuses*, founded in 1921 by the professors of the faculty of Catholic theology. Both are very important. Let us mention also *la Nouvelle Journée*, the valiant organ of the Catholics who favor the philosophy of action, founded in 1919 and discontinued in 1924 in order to give place to the *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée*.

<sup>85</sup> Published by Rieder.

<sup>86</sup> Published by Rieder.

<sup>87</sup> In the *Editions du Siècle*.

But, truth to say, the period which we have studied appears to us more valuable for what it paves the way to than for what it itself contains. Not only does it afford many signs of its own interest in the study of religious facts but there are reasons for believing that important synthetic works are about to see the light. We have already mentioned the promise of M. Mauss and we expect that his collaborators will soon give a new lease of life to religious sociology. Will not M. Lévy-Bruhl one day complete his account of primitive mentality by a work seeking to trace its genesis? As to religious psychology, it is in too vigorous a swing to stop now. We await with impatience the conclusion of the studies of Father Maréchal, the book in which M. Baruzi will develop his conception of a mystic experience, and the treatise which M. Pierre Janet is preparing and to which he has already given the title: *De l'angoisse à l'extase*.<sup>88</sup> Finally, with strict reference to philosophy, the most vigorous thinkers are far from having spoken their last words. M. Blondel is announcing the early publication of several volumes: *La Pensée*, *l'Etre* and *l'Esprit Chrétien*. M. Le Roy, who has during recent years attacked the whole of the religious problem in some remarkable lectures, is working at a more complete exposition of his own philosophy. We hope that circumstances will soon permit Father Laberthonnière to publish the works composed during thirteen years of silence. Finally, M. Brunschvicg ought to give us a thorough and independent treatment of the problems which he has only touched upon in passing or by way of conclusion from other studies.

Most certainly we find ourselves in the presence of irreconcilable differences. In this field more than in all others it seems impossible to eliminate the personal factor. Among the readers of this very article will not more than one regret that we have judged too favorably this or that work

<sup>88</sup> Since the writing of this article the book has appeared (Alcan, 1926).



whose tendency displeases him? What is now important is that the various thinkers submit their personal convictions to the double proof of observable facts and of opposing doctrines. This is a work already largely begun, and not without gain, but which it is necessary to push even further. Indeed, although a certain division of intellectual labor is here as everywhere imperative, nothing would be more pernicious than to confine the different theories in separate enclosures or to establish a barrier between the empirical study of religious facts and the philosophy of religion. Perhaps some of the authors whom we have mentioned have never elsewhere than in these pages been brought together and yet they all discuss one and the same subject. Never will a psychological or social interpretation of religious facts dig at all deeply without striking the metaphysical problem; and never will a solution of this problem have force if it has not drawn heavily upon experience. In the last analysis one must always confront the given facts of history and of psychology with the total requirements of the spiritual life, a task which does not exclude the most daring of personal interpretations, provided one is conscious of their character and is concerned to distinguish the different stages intermediate between opinion and certainty.

# HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

PAUL MASSON-OURSSEL

## I. METHODS

THE generation of professors who held the highest positions in French universities in 1914 had succeeded in bringing about the long-expected conciliation between the historical mind and the philosophical mind. Already such men as Renouvier and Boutroux had proved that an aptitude for original thinking, instead of excluding, rather evoked, an interest in what other philosophers had thought. Bergson entered with complete sympathy into the philosophical attitudes of Plotinus and Berkeley. Hamelin combined a most robust originality with an exceptionally keen understanding of Aristotle, as well as of the great classical systems; Durkheim, different as was his mind, agreed with him in the belief that a thinker must speculate not apart from, or against, but in the trend of those who came before. Both of these thinkers, like A. Comte, were of the opinion that "one can destroy only to replace." L. Lévy-Bruhl had given an example of the *analytical* intelligence through which a system is taken to pieces in such a way as to show the origin of its various elements (*La philosophie d'A. Comte*). V. Delbos had offered well-known examples of a *synthetical* effort, following the development of a system step by step, in the case both of a single, powerful thinker (*La philosophie pratique de Kant*) and of a succession of thinkers (*Le problème moral dans la philosophie*

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Germaine and Louis Landré.

*de Spinoza et dans l'histoire du Spinozisme*). Lévy-Bruhl and Delbos remain the unchallenged masters in the teaching of the history of philosophy in France.

The war brought heavy losses within the ranks of the younger generation. It delayed the publication of many studies. Through a decision of the Minister of Public Instruction, war veterans were allowed to present one thesis instead of two for the Doctor's degree; hence a decrease in production. But it seems impossible to say that contemporary events have had any influence on the methods followed in the history of philosophy; on the other hand, we shall find that they have left their mark upon philosophical inquiry.

The adepts of analytical formulae, such for instance as that of R. Berthelot, are many; none, however, has been able to handle this method with the dexterity and the lucidity of Lévy-Bruhl. The synthetic formula has inspired several studies of very great value. Those of L. Brunschvicg on Spinoza and Pascal, that of L. Robin on *La pensée grecque* (Renaissance du Livre, 1923), that of X. Léon on Fichte (*Fichte et son temps*, vol. 2, 1924, Colin), the notes added by P. Tisserand to the works of Maine de Biran (Alcan) will mark an epoch. The rich monographs of R. Lenoir belong to the same group of studies (*Condillac*, Alcan, 1924; in *Revue Philosophique*: Cl. Bernard, Jan., 1919; *M. de Biran*, Nov., 1924; *Saint-Simon*, Sept., 1925; *Les historiens de l'esprit humain: Fontenelle, Marivaux, Lord Bolingbroke, Vauvenargues, La Mettrie*, Alcan, Paris, 1926).

Neo-criticism is still progressing. The Hellenism of L. Robin follows and completes that of Hamelin. The analyst of the *Sciences Sociales dans l'Encyclopédie* (Alcan), R. Hubert, believes that he can justify, by the exigencies of reason in its evolution, the description of the phases of reason set forth by sociological empiricism (*Le sens du réel*,

Alcan, 1925). A similar point of view throughout pervades the *Évolution de l'humanité* of Henri Berr, who, as the editor of the *Revue de Synthèse Historique*, has proved to be the most philosophical of historians. This collection of a hundred volumes is not merely a series of studies of all the civilizations of the world; it aims to follow step by step the formation of mind.

E. Durkheim (died in 1917) with his friends and disciples—was he not the only French contemporary thinker who founded a school?—inaugurated new methods even in the history of philosophy. He himself had produced commentaries on Aristotle, on Hobbes, on Comte; he had studied Montesquieu, Rousseau, Condorcet; after beginning a *Histoire du socialisme*, he traced the history of the family and the history of pedagogy. All of his far-reaching works are too little known outside of France. The sociological method, in its desire to build on an historical basis the science of social facts, has given stimulus to numerous works on the history of philosophy; it suggested that the progressive formation of our categories should be sought in the evolution of the various societies. Lévy-Bruhl at once applied this method to an analysis of the primitive mind, mystic and pre-logical, incommensurable with the positive mind (*Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, 1910; *La mentalité primitive*, Alcan, 1922; *l'Ame primitive*, Alcan, 1927.) The science of man, about which the eighteenth century dreamed prematurely, henceforth requires a comparative knowledge of mentalities. More strictly faithful to Durkheim's inspiration, M. Mauss upholds the principles of *l'Année sociologique*, which reappeared in 1925 (Paris, Alcan).

Studies of a very diverse character have been published under the influence of the sociological school. The leader of the school has studied penal evolution, suicide, etc. G. Davy starts on the history of law (*La foi jurée; Le droit*,

*l'idéalisme et l'expérience*, Alcan, 1922; *Des clans aux empires*, in collaboration with A. Moret, Renaissance du Livre). M. David, killed in action in 1914, had introduced this research by investigating Greek thought as a whole and not merely that of philosophers; he is followed by L. Gernet, who gives the archaic value of such words as ὄβρις and τιμή. M. Granet analyzes in a similar way the rural institutions of primitive China, then the feudal period of pre-imperial China (*Fêtes et chansons anciennes de la Chine*, Leroux, 1919; *La polygamie sororale*, *ibid.*, 1920; *Danses et légendes de la Chine ancienne*, Alcan, 1926.) R. Lenoir, whose monographs on French thinkers we have mentioned, analyzes the potlatch (*Revue Philosophique*, March, 1924). He devotes to the history of technique the same attention given to it by Espinas and Sorel.

Perhaps we may be permitted to supplement this list of references with a mention of our own work. We are concerned with the philosophical vocabulary of both the Chinese and the Sanskrit languages. We apply to the comparative history of ideas in the three synchronic and parallel civilizations—Occident, India, China—the method that has proved so fruitful in sociology. A positive science of the mind, in our opinion, is possible only through the comparison of the various human mentalities. For if problems and solutions have meaning only for the society that conceived them, the parallels between convictions or, if one prefers, prejudices inherent in each intellectual tradition, is the main field of philosophical concern. (P. Masson-Oursel, *La philosophie comparée*, Alcan, 1923; *Comparative Philosophy*, London, Kegan Paul, 1926).

## II. THE SUBJECTS

Recent political events have, unfortunately, not strengthened in France the desire to understand the German soul. Most of the works published by students of German civilization after 1914, were begun or may have been begun before the war. Such is the case with *Hebbel*, by L. Brun; *La fortune intellectuelle de Herder en France*, by H. Tronchon; and *Fr. Th. Vischer*, by O. Hesnard. Ch. Andler has continued his studies on Nietzsche. The penetrating studies of H. Delacroix on mysticism have aroused, so far as the tendency in Germany is concerned, only the work of Ed. Vansteenberghe on *Nicolas y Cusa* (Lille, Lefebvre-Ducrocq, 1920) and *Autour de la Docte ignorance* (Münster, Aschendorff, 1920). More useful than ever as an intellectual link is the zeal shown by such men as Benrubi and Groethuysen to reveal modern German thought to France, and, conversely, the thought of France to Germany. German philosophy has been reviewed by E. Bréhier in a short *Histoire* which is valuable for its succinctness and precision (Payot, 1921). The University of Strasbourg henceforth has a task of considerable importance, that of supplying information on Central Europe to the French mind. Its School of Protestant Theology has had the merit of publishing H. Strohl's book on *l'Évolution religieuse de Luther jusqu'en 1515*, then *jusqu'en 1520*; and the *Cahiers* of the *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses* will be useful in reminding the French public of the solidarity between dogmas or cults and philosophical notions.

Research is attracted more than before 1919 by the Slavonic mentality. The works of Léger have been fruitful. The Parisian Institute of Slavonic Studies, as well as French foundations established in Czecho-Slovakia and Poland are at once the outcome and the consecration of in-

teresting intellectual relations. On the other hand, the Revolution has isolated Russia. During this time Tolstoi's prestige decreased in France, where literary people felt a growing admiration for Dostoievsky. The powerful criticism of Chestov has produced a deep impression among us: we have been unable to forget his masterful portrayal of the personality of our Pascal (*La nuit de Gethsemani*, Grasset, 1923). Suarès has been leading us toward a better understanding of Chestov. May the latter infuse in us his supreme sense of the vitality which abstract problems seem to acquire in ardent personalities!

Before the war, the history of Anglo-Saxon philosophy subsequent to Mill and Spencer was unknown, not only to the general public, but also to the philosophers. Boutroux met some eminent Englishmen at congresses; and Bergson was fully conscious of his affinities with W. James, as was the latter of his debt to Renouvier. But the knowledge of English and American thought remained elementary. Three "agrégés" have modified this state of affairs. G. Marcel revealed Josiah Royce to the public (*Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1918). J. Wahl analyzed the *Philosophies pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique* (Alcan, 1920) with a penetration of mind that was all the keener since he started from a very solid knowledge of the whole history of philosophy, especially of German thought. Em. Leroux examined the *Pragmatisme américain et anglais* (*Ibid.*, 1923), with the aim of reaching speculative conclusions. In him the historian has not killed the philosopher, and his understanding of systems has not suffered, but has considerably gained, from his attitude. (Note his *Le développement de la pensée philosophique aux Etats-Unis*, *Rev. de synth. historique*, 1919; *La nature de l'expérience d'après James Ward*, *Rev. philos.*, 1926.) Beside these essential works, we should mention the *Mystiques et réalistes anglo-saxons* (Colin, 1918) and *Autour d'Emer-*

son (Bossard, 1924) by R. Michaud. The collaboration of Legouis and Cazamian gave us a masterful *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* in which the history of thought is not neglected. We cannot omit two interesting theses by D. Saurat: *La pensée de Milton* and *Blake et Milton* (Bordeaux, Université, 1920).

The field of the philosophical systems explored by modern investigation has widened considerably. The Middle Ages have ceased to be ignored by the State schools. Thanks to the fruitful activity of Et. Gilson, M. de Wulf is no longer the only French-speaking philosopher to whom scholastic argumentations are not unknown; the understanding of Saint Thomas Aquinas is no more the exclusive privilege of the Catholic institutes. France cannot yet compare her series of monographs, collections of texts or critical studies with the productions of the school of Baeumker. Yet a general plan is being formulated both for exploring the Middle Ages and for studying what has survived to the present day of the thought of those times (Gilson: *Le Thomisme*, Strasbourg, 1920; *Etudes de philosophie médiévale*, ibid., 1921; *Saint Bonaventure*, 1922; *La philosophie au Moyen Age*, Payot, 1922. In 1926 M. Gilson and Father G. Théry founded the *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen-Age*, Paris, 6 Place de la Sorbonne.) The works of Durantel on Saint Thomas (Alcan, 1918) and of Landry on Duns Scotus (Alcan), and the theses of Carton on Roger Bacon (*La synthèse doctrinale de Roger Bacon; l'Expérience mystique et l'expérience physique de Roger Bacon*, Vrin, 1924) bear the stamp of a new discipline. A criticism of scholastic rationalism, resting on a considerable number of documents, has been attempted along very independent lines by L. Rougier (*La scolastique et le Thomisme*, Gauthier-Villars 1925). The philosophical interest of theological problems becomes obvious at last, even to lay thought: the influence of Dela-



croix is felt. *La doctrine de la grâce chez Arnauld* and the *Saint-Cyran* by J. Laporte (Presses Universitaires de France, 1922; from the same author we have *Le coeur selon Pascal*, Rev. Philos., 1927) have been received with favor; as to the *Saint Jean de la Croix* by J. Baruzi (Alcan, 1924), it is a worthy step in the study of mystical experience.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, patristic thought has become a part of the history of philosophy. While de Faye continues his work on Origen, G. Bardy studies the *De Principiis* of this author (Lille, Desclée, 1923) and examines *Paul de Samosate* (Bruges, Ste. Catherine, 1923). The outskirts of Christian dogmatism are explored: Em. Bréhier undertakes a translation of the *Ennéades* (Belles-Lettres, 1924) and R. Arnou gathers material on the *Désir de Dieu chez Plotin* (Alcan, 1921). L. François gives us the real personality of *Dion Chrysostome, Cynique et Stoicien* (Dela-grave, 1921); F. Préchac devotes himself to the study of the *De Clementia* (Belles-Lettres, 1921); B. Latzarus treats the *Idées religieuses de Plutarque* (Leroux, 1920). L. Rougier has studied *Celse*, or *Le conflit de la civilisation antique et du christianisme primitif* (Siècle, 1925). C. Toussaint determines the relations between *l'Hellénisme et l'apôtre Paul* (H. Jouve, 1921). Works of even greater originality appear: *Yahya ben Adi*, an Arabic Christian philosopher of the tenth century, by A. Périer (Gabalda et Geuthner, 1920); the *de Deo* by Eznik de Kolb (Imprimerie Nationale, 1921), translated from the Armenian, and the *Commentaire de Diodore de Tarse sur les Psaumes* (Firmin-Didot, 1924) by L. Mariès. A masterful work, in its line, has been produced: the double story of P. Alfarric, treating both Manicheism and Saint Augustine, its

<sup>2</sup> A collection of Greek and Latin philosophers of the Middle Ages, as well as a Latin collection of the Middle Ages and Renaissance are planned by the *Association Guillaume Budé*, under the auspices of which there have just been published translations of Plotinus, by Em. Bréhier, and of Lucretius, by Ernout and Robin, (Société Les Belles Lettres).

enemy. For the first time a thorough study in the field of Orientalism gives a new interpretation of one of the main thinkers of the Occident; for the first time a religious movement which upset the ancient world from Spain to China is considered with perfect objectivity through an analysis of its sources (*l'Evolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin* (Nourry, 1918); *Les écritures manichéennes* (Ibid., 1918).<sup>8</sup>

Finally, Oriental thought is definitely brought within the scope of our history of philosophy. Even before the war, one felt, and now no one can doubt, that our civilization is Eurasiatic and not strictly Mediterranean. Orient and Occident are two terms of a very relative value, according to the periods to which they refer; both can be understood only within the same total order, which, through centers distinct but not unconnected, has been spreading for three hundred years from the extreme Orient to the extreme Occident. The Semitic population, whether in a group as in Babylon, or scattered as after the Dispersion of Israel, or victorious as in Islam, has always been a connecting link between the various parts of this continent. In this respect, the text-books published by R. Kreglinger (Lamertin, Brussels) on the history of the various religions, Ed. Montet's pamphlet on the *Histoire de la Bible* (Payot, 1924), the *Koran* of Dr. J. C. Mardrus (Fasquelle, 1925) and the *Penseurs de l'Islam* by Carra de Vaux (Geuthner) are contributions to the history of philosophy. The *Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie musul-*

<sup>8</sup> The Renaissance, which is a thoroughly European fact, has inspired some research work. Let us mention: *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie, 1494-1517* (Champion, 1916) by A. Renadel; *La pensée italienne au XVI. siècle et le courant libérin* (Champion, 1917) and a small thesis on Bruno (*ibid.*) by Charbonnel; *Un humaniste italianisant, Papire Masson, 1564-1611* (*ibid.*, 1924) by P. Rouzy; *Jean Bodin*, by R. Chauviré (*ibid.* and La Fleche, 1914); *Erasmus* by J. B. Pineau (Presses Universitaires de France, 1923); *La Renaissance du stoïcisme au XVI. siècle* (Champion, 1914) by Léontine Zanta. P. Villey has pursued his researches on Montaigne (*Revue Philosophique*, May, 1926). Campanella has found a worthy historian in L. Blanchet (Alcan, 1920), and G. Bruno, in the young Egyptian philosopher, Namer.

*ulmane* (Leroux, 1923) by L. Gauthier may be of some use, but how much more the works of Massignon! His *Passion d'al Halladj*, and even more his *Lexique technique de la mystique musulmane* (Geuthner, 1922) are master works.

Had it only its "hundred philosophies" to offer us, China would be a mine of original and varied speculations. But it possesses even more than that. This is attested by the works of Father L. Wieger. These are lacking in critical sense, but not in material (*Histoire des croyances religieuses et des opinions philosophiques en Chine*, Hien-hien, 1917 and Challamel, Paris; *Les pères du système taoïste; Le canon taoïste*, *ibid.*) The brief but very original *Religion des Chinois*, by M. Granet (Gauthier-Villars, 1922) shows on what basis this thought was established. We should not forget that the originator of contemporary Sinology, Ed. Chavannes, had received a philosophical training and that, allured by the ideas of China, he devoted himself to the study of it. He inspired his successors with an ardent curiosity. As to India, it offers to the historian of philosophy a more abundant and richer field than any other civilization. The very few fruitful researches of Sylvain Lévi and of his collaborators and disciples, after those of Burnouf, Bergaigne and that other historian of philosophy, Auguste Barth, have considerably advanced the true history of philosophy, the comparative study of human thought. Students of Sanskrit or Tibetan, Sinologues, discoverers of languages spoken or written in Central Asia centuries ago, are little by little revealing this Buddhist canon in which so much philosophy is embodied. The *Journal Asiatique*, the *Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient*, the *T'oung pao*, contain about as much history of philosophy as the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. The Buddhist studies of the Belgian, Louis de la Vallée-Poussin almost all deal with the history of thought. The

*Histoire des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, by P. Oltramare, of Geneva (Musée Guimet, Paris) is the work of a philosopher. The *Sutra des causes et des effets* (Geuthner), translated by P. Pelliot, is of no less interest to critical reflection than David Hume's *Treatise*. The study by the French Swiss, P. Demiéville, of the Chinese versions of the *Milindapanha* (*Bulletin* mentioned above, Jan., 1924) adds to the history of logic as well as to that of dogmas. Supplementing the monographs or partial histories is the synthetic effort of P. Masson-Oursel in his *Esquisse d'une histoire de la philosophie indienne* (Geuthner, 1923).

Credit for this enrichment of the history of philosophy should be given mostly to our master, Professor Lévy-Bruhl, who encouraged the co-operation between philosophical criticism and such disciplines as linguistics (as represented by Meillet and Vendryès) and ethnography (as represented by Rivet and Mauss). The *Revue Philosophique*, since passing from the direction of Ribot to that of Lévy-Bruhl, reflects this broadening of philosophical curiosity.

### III. THE RESULTS

The new spirit discernible in philosophical historiography in France may be summed up as follows: an indefinite extension of the field of study and, as a consequence, a renewing of the subjects.

Europeocentrism and "europeomorphism" no longer have meaning; we may not *a fortiori* limit ourselves to about ten systems, Greek, English, French, German, as the amplitude of human thought. It would be a mistake to suppose that our notions have simply been increased. A knowledge of the intermediary phases hitherto neglected—end of Antiquity, Middle Ages, Renaissance, Contemporary Period—and a better documentation on the peoples interposed between the principal civilizations will serve

not only to decrease our ignorance but also to throw a new light on the very doctrines which we have believed we knew best. Thus Aristotle's logic seems transformed when we compare it with that of Dharmakirti, which does not deal with concepts. Our judgment on Scholasticism is modified when we learn that it is not only a European fact but an event of greater generality. The discoveries of Miguel Asin Palacios, a student of Arabic, oblige us to modify our exegesis of the Divine Comedy and our interpretation of Pascal's wager. In no field can a part be understood, that is, assigned its exact place in history, except by reference to its relations to a greater whole. It is impossible to offer a satisfactory interpretation of any system except in connection with the comparative history of human thought.

In so far as these leading ideas are prevalent, synthetic views are useful, provided one realizes their provisional character. The general *History of Philosophy* in the course of publication by Em. Bréhier (Alcan) will meet a need.<sup>8a</sup> Important discoveries are to be expected, if research ceases to be left to the chaotic initiatives of individuals. A general organization of intellectual work that may be of great value to the history of philosophy is being prepared at the *Centre de Synthèse*, organized in the latter part of 1925 by Henri Berr, 2 rue Montpensier, Palais Royal, Paris. The recent commemorations of Pascal, Biran, Kant, Saint-Simon and Renan have not been fruitless, since they have brought out the different ways in which successive generations have understood systems too often considered as soaring in eternity. Every human thought has been lived; it becomes accessible to those alone who can again give it life. If such men as Gustave Cohen, Gilson, Koyré and

<sup>8a</sup> We are indebted to M. Emile Bréhier for establishing, in January, 1927, the *Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie*, published quarterly by J. Gamber, 7 rue Danton, Paris.

Blanchet modify our understanding of Cartesianism,<sup>4</sup> it is by replacing it in its environment, in connection with its antecedents. And it is not otherwise that Dupréel tries to formulate a new interpretation of the Socratic philosophy (*La légende socratique et les sources de Platon*, Sand, Brussels, 1922), and that J. Wahl has produced an extremely rich study *Sur le Parménide de Platon* (Rieder, Paris, 1926). It is also in life, but in life as it is revealed by clinical experimentation and psychiatric practice, that F. Morel, inspired by Freudianism, illuminatingly places the obscure and subtle dogmatism of pseudo-Denys by psycho-analytical methods (*l'Introversion mystique*, Geneva, 1918). To derive from philosophical systems all the teaching they contain it is not enough to revive them; one must be able to live them, to use them for judging other types. Thus pursued, the history of philosophy achieves its purpose, which is to advance the criticism of thought.

<sup>4</sup>G. Cohen: *Les écrivains français en Hollande dans la première moitié du XVII. siècle*, Champion, 1920; Et. Gilson: *La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie*; *Index scolastico-cartésien*, Alcan, 1913; A. Koyré: *Essai sur l'idée de Dieu et les preuves de son existence chez Descartes*, Leroux, 1922; L. Blanchet: *Les antécédents historique du "Je pense, donc je suis,"* Alcan, 1920. The *Histoire de la philosophie*, by R. Lote, following upon the *Histoire des sciences biologiques*, by M. Caullery, in the *Histoire des sciences en France*, allows the public at large to place the principal French thinkers in the field of general history. (*Histoire de la nation française*, by G. Hanotaux, vol. 15, Plon-Nourrit, 1924.) An important contribution to the history of biology is offered in H. Daudin's work: I. *De Linné à Jussieu; les méthodes de la classification et l'idée de série en botanique et en zoologie (1740-1790)*; II. *Cuvier et Lamarck; les classes zoologiques et l'idée de série animale (1790-1830)*. The series *Philosophes et savants français du XXe siècle*, by J. Baruzi, Alcan, 1926 gives extracts from and accounts of contemporary thinkers.

## PSYCHOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

JEAN PIAGET

**I**N the following pages, we intend not so much to make a complete review of the results achieved by psychology in French-speaking countries since 1914, as to indicate the principal currents of psychological thought which characterize the works published during that period.

As we are not concerned here with questions connected with pedagogy (child psychology or vocational guidance) nor with religious or esthetic psychology, we may group our remarks under four principal heads: general psychology, abnormal psychology, physiological and animal psychology, and problems closely connected with psychology.

### GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

Just as we can reach biology through anatomy, physiology or embryology, so we can also distinguish three main currents, at present, in general psychology: the *structural*, the *functional* and the *genetic* tendencies. If it is interesting to make such distinctions it is because one definitely feels that the psychologists who adopt one or the other of these orientations have very different views as to what constitutes explanation in psychology. It is certain that the psychology written in French during these last years has remained faithful to the general ideal of contemporary psychology, i. e., the ideal of being a positive, autonomous

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Marthe Sturm.

science, distinct especially from general philosophy. In this respect Th. Ribot's influence remains a living one. But it seems that the meaning of this rally-cry has notably changed during these last years and that psychological methods have become more flexible. For Ribot, probably, the independence of psychology from metaphysics meant the progressive reduction of psychological to physiological phenomena. At least, the well-known principle of psycho-physical parallelism would not have aroused so many discussions if it had not been considered as a weapon in the hands of physiologists. During the last few years, on the other hand, there has been a stronger and stronger tendency towards the complete autonomy of psychology, and the theory of parallelism now seems to be interpreted by every one in the manner some time ago set forth by Flournoy, whose work on this subject has just been republished.<sup>2</sup> Flournoy declared psycho-physical parallelism an easy way to avoid discussion about mind and body and to permit the collaboration of physiologists and psychologists without confusion of their respective fields. Indeed, the principle of parallelism offers to both groups of scientists guarantees and freedom of action: if it establishes a parallelism, it also denies any identification or causal connexion as regards the two series, psychical and physiological. But even though the contemporary psychologists writing in French agree in considering psychology a positive science, they, however, by no means accept the same underlying metaphysics. In spite of their implicit systems of philosophy, which are further divergent than ever, they agree to use, as the only possible method of psychology, observation and experimentation, to the exclusion of any kind of ontology. From this point of view Dumas' conclusion, in his *Traité*

<sup>2</sup> Th. Flournoy, *Métaphysique et Psychologie*, 2nd edition, preface by H. Hoeffding, Geneva and Paris, 1919.



*de Psychologie*,<sup>8</sup> is most interesting. He shows how different are the philosophical tendencies of his contributors and insists on the consequently greater value of their agreement on purely psychological problems. Such being the case it is easy to understand why some of the authors tend preferably towards structural analysis, others towards functional analysis and a third group towards genetic investigation. It is because of their underlying philosophies. Some do not expect any interpretation except in terms of the human mind itself, while others count on some more or less distant physiological explanation.

During the last ten years the leader in structural psychology has been H. Delacroix. M. Delacroix plays a very interesting part in the psychology of French-speaking countries. He has attempted to maintain the integrity of the realm of psychology against the encroachments of physiology on the one hand and of sociology on the other. That is the reason why his method is one of structural analysis. It is the favorite method of rationalism: to explain the human mind by reference to itself and to distrust any kind of "mental chemistry" that would seek the origin of mind in something other than itself. Therefore M. Delacroix remains wisely on his guard against all genetic formulations. These ordinarily tend either to explain psychological facts in infra-psychical, i. e., physiological, terms, or to trace them back to supra-individual, i. e., to sociological, phenomena.

We are here not concerned with religious psychology. But *La religion et la foi*<sup>4</sup> is a highly significant book from the viewpoint of method. Against genetic methods M. Delacroix raises three kinds of objections. In the first place, the concept of evolution is obscure. Secondly, the

<sup>8</sup> *Traité de Psychologie*, 2 vol., Alcan, 1924. G. Dumas, with the collaboration of Barat, G. Belot, Ch. Blondel, Bourdon, Chaslin, Claparede, Dagnan, Davy, Delacroix, Dugas, P. Janet, Lalonde, Langlois, Lapique, Mayer, I. Meyerson, Pieron, Poyer, Rabaud, Revault d'Allonnes, Rey, Tournay, Wallon.

<sup>4</sup> H. Delacroix, *La religion et la foi*, Alcan, 1922.

primitive stages, even if we could reach them, do not afford more information than the more evolved stages for they exhibit a reality already made and not a genesis. Thirdly, the permanent conditions of the possibility of a phenomenon give us better information concerning it than any genetic hypothesis, for this latter is pseudo-explanation. Against the sociological theories, Delacroix asserts the existence of a human mind anterior and superior to society, or at least of an individual infra-structure that makes possible the blossoming of social phenomena.

These principles have since been applied by M. Delacroix to the problem of the relation between language and thought.<sup>5</sup> The result represents a masterly analysis of this difficult question. Against the almost purely sociological tendency of French-speaking linguists (they are influenced by the school of de Saussure) Delacroix shows the indispensable relation between linguistics and psychology. Language is indeed a social product, but its functional conditions, its affective roots, and above all its rationality can only be understood through psychology. This rationality is especially emphasized by M. Delacroix, but without exaggeration, for, he says, "language oscillates between chaos and a cosmos."

Thus Delacroix gives us a new viewpoint regarding language. Psychologists have for a long time considered language as a pure nomenclature, as if things were simply designated by words, and as if, psychologically, words were nothing but auditory or motor images, or the like, in consciousness. Nothing is more superficial than this conception. Language is thought. Every thought process consists in the handling of symbols; and language is a necessary stage in the elaboration of these symbols. A word is not simply a label. It is a sound, bearer of a meaning and susceptible of grammatical treatment. This means

<sup>5</sup> H. Delacroix, *Le langage et la pensée*, Alcan, 1924.

also that a word is very difficult to isolate. It is not a unit. It constitutes the limit of an intellectual process of separation and identification. As to the sentence, it is not a simple sum; it is a whole made of reciprocal relations. Language, therefore, presupposes thought. Just as religion is the rational organization of affective data so is language the rationalization of chaotic phonal matter.

M. Delacroix verifies his assertions by studying the acquisition of language by children and the loss of this function in aphasia. But his genetic analysis remains descriptive. Against the physiologists, he strongly argues that the verbal sign is not a conditioned reflex. Indeed, at first, signs adhere to objects. In order that they may really become "signs," the mind must sever them from the objects, must place them in a network of symbols, in that system of relations between symbols which constitutes the very stuff of reason.

In Dumas' *Traité*, Delacroix gives a complete analysis of intellectual functions, the wealth and subtlety of which are such as to forbid our summarizing it in so short a paper as this, but the general content of which fits entirely into the main lines of the sketch we have just drawn.

Another leader in psychological analysis is Paulhan. With the exception of a book which we shall review later, he has published since 1918 only three studies, *Le psychisme inconscient*, *La sensibilité, l'intelligence, et la volonté dans tous les faits psychologiques*,<sup>7</sup> and *Le présentisme*.<sup>8</sup> In his study of the unconscious, Paulhan continues his researches in the systematization of tendencies. Tendencies and our coming to consciousness of them are essential parts of psychic life, according to Paulhan. Consciousness, it is true, exercises an influence as a cognitive element. But psychic processes maintain the same nature and func-

<sup>6</sup> *Journal de Psychologie*, XVIII.

<sup>7</sup> *Revue Philosophique*, 1920.

<sup>8</sup> *Journal de Psychologie*.

tioning whether or not they are conscious. The theory of "presentism" set forth in the third mentioned paper, points out the exaggerated predominance in the mind of the present state, whatever it may be—sensation, emotion, or new idea. This preponderance is due to the insufficient or delayed control of former tendencies. Hence certain "presentist" characters, such as impulsivity, etc.

This idea of Paulhan's leads us to mention, in the field of the analysis of characters, the work of F. Mentré, particularly his book, *Espèces et variétés d'intelligence: Éléments de noologie*.<sup>9</sup> By the term "noölogy" the author means the science of individual types. Binet, Paulhan and others had already raised the problem, but Mentré suggests new classifications; these have already been criticized just as Mentré criticized his predecessors. A. Delmas and M. Boll have also discussed the subject in their book on "Human Personality."<sup>10</sup>

If we now pass from the field of structural to that of functional psychology, we shall find an entirely different source of inspiration. The most remarkable works in this second field are undoubtedly the studies of Claparède on *l'Intelligence*,<sup>11</sup> and on *la Volonté*,<sup>12</sup> and those of Larguier des Bancels on *l'Emotion et l'Instinct*. Claparède is a pure empiricist. Few psychologists are so completely free from philosophical concerns, whether these are rationalistic or "empiristic" in the epistemological sense of the word. Sometimes he is anti-intellectualistic, when facts seem to lead him in that direction; at other times he is anti-mechanistic to the extent of seeming to tend towards finalism. The truth is that he grasps phenomena not as a theorist but as a physician. He sees phenomena as moving things, interwoven in their vital context and functioning; wherever a

<sup>9</sup> Bonard, Paris, 1920.

<sup>10</sup> *La personnalité Humaine*, Flammarion.

<sup>11</sup> *Scientia*, 1917.

<sup>12</sup> *Congrès philosophique de Naples*.

<sup>13</sup> *Introduction à la psychologie, L'émotion et l'instinct*, Payot, 1921.

structural analysis seems to him impossible or simply difficult, he begins to give a purely functional description of psychological data. Furthermore, he is convinced that applications, if not the leaven of any science, are at least the criterion of a conception's fruitfulness. That is why his analyses are always written in a language most apt to describe the process in terms of action and of movement.

His paper on intelligence is from this last viewpoint a perfect model of a short sketch. In it he repeatedly emphasizes the vagueness of our present structural knowledge and thus he raises a great number of problems that are most of the time unconsciously veiled. He supplants structural knowledge with a functional synthesis as simple as it is charming.

Intelligence, says Claparède, responds to a need. "The particular need that arouses intelligence is the need of adaptation which arises whenever the individual is not adapted to environmental circumstances." There are two kinds of behavior that ordinarily adapt the individual to his environment: i. e., *instinct*, or the system of hereditary mechanisms, and *habit*, the system of acquired associations. But when instincts fail and habits do not work, there is but one other recourse, trial and error. The method of trial and error, observable in the lowest forms of animal life (Jennings) can itself be divided into two stages which together constitute intelligence. Trial and error is either purely empirical, i. e., the steps taken are determined by a pseudo-choice made according to external circumstances; or it is systematic, i. e., the choice is determined by the consciousness of relations. Hence we have empirical intelligence and intelligence proper. But how does the readjustment which constitutes intelligence pass from purely empirical trials to systematized attempts? Here Claparède's analysis becomes most fruitful because of the problem it suggests. Three periods can be noticed in any intellec-

tual act.<sup>14</sup> First there is a *question*, i. e., the maladjustment becomes conscious; then an *hypothesis*, or the imagination of a solution; thirdly, *control* or verification. These three operations are easy enough to describe in functional terms, but what is their mechanism? By what kind of mechanism does the particular state of consciousness which constitutes the question start and direct the search for a solution? How do hypotheses arise and follow one another? What is the nature of that process of rejection and acceptance which constitutes the control? Without ignoring the value of the fine German works on *Denkpsychologie*, Claparède emphasizes the fact that in these matters we know nothing; we possess static and structural analysis but we do not understand the dynamism of the functioning.

In an article on the will, as yet unpublished, Claparède makes similar statements. He distinguishes will from intentional act as he previously distinguished intelligence from instinct. Just as intelligence arises when instincts do not work so will makes its appearance when two intentions conflict.

These contentions have been criticized. Spearman accuses Claparède of defining intelligence "by reference to experimentation," the way in which it appears in children between six and nine years of age. But it is a strength to be able to consider things with enough freshness of mind to forget classical descriptions and to find a language which shows the gaps in our knowledge. It is to this method of procedure that Claparède owes the production of a few very searching pages on *la loi de prise de conscience*.<sup>15</sup> Observing that children are more quickly aware of differences than of similarities (though they generalize automatically all the time), he shows how it is maladaptation that creates consciousness, and from this observation

<sup>14</sup> Pillsbury expressed similar ideas in 1910.

<sup>15</sup> *La conscience de la ressemblance et de la différence chez l'enfant*, Arch. de Psychol., XVII, 1919.

he draws a criticism of habitual ways of speaking, ways that are static and not functional.

The recent works of J. Languier des Bancelles, and particularly his fine *Introduction to Psychology*, have a similar orientation. Languier considers functional description better for an introductory study, but he thinks that there should be a constant alternation between structural and functional psychology. Such a rhythm, he believes, cannot be anything but useful to the improvement of science.

For James, and particularly for McDougall, emotion is but a concomitant, or an affective aspect, of instinct. Languier, through a very precise and fine analysis, arrives at the opinion that emotion, while necessarily and closely linked with instinct, is not its affective counterpart but its failure. In other words, it is when instinct fails that emotion appears; when instinct tends toward useful reaction, emotion is only harmful. Anger is not an adaptive reaction, a counterpart of the fighting instinct; it is a "brief madness" arising from the failure of that instinct. Instincts are, indeed, adaptive, but only in a general way, without anticipation of all possible cases. It is therefore not strange that they often fail. But, says Languier, there remains the problem of determining why, in the case of certain individuals called "emotional," instincts miscarry more than in the case of others. There is also the problem of understanding the mechanism of emotion. Why does the failure of a given instinct take a certain form rather than some other? To such questions Languier awaits the answer from psychology.

There is but a step between functional and genetic psychology, and most psychologists cannot be univocally classified. This is particularly true in the case of Pierre Janet whose recent works indicate an extremely interesting combination of functional psychology and genetic construction.

A synthesis of these new conceptions of Janet may be found in Dumas' *Traité*<sup>16</sup> and in three lectures delivered in London.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the *Médications psychologique* (of which we shall speak again when we come to abnormal psychology) are full of allusions to the new ideas of Janet on the hierarchy of tendencies, or the different stages of development. These ideas, if we are well informed, will soon lead to some general study of the question. The works of Janet prior to 1914 are too well known to need mention here. Let us simply indicate the most recent orientation of this versatile and fruitful scholar.

The present method of Janet is that of the behavioristic psychology, but of a behaviorism which integrates all the phenomena of consciousness under the head of particular acts. Let us, for example, take the case of memory. Memory, says Janet, is an *account*, i. e., a certain mode of speech relating to an event; it represents the event more or less correctly and was constructed at the time when the other actions called forth by the event were performed.<sup>18</sup>

From the point of view of the old school of psychology, this is an unbearable paradox, since in order to narrate one should recall. But one nevertheless sees how interesting Janet's theory is. By making memory a mode of behavior and not a faculty, such a definition emphasizes precisely all that which, in a recollection, is arbitrarily constructed and not given; such a theory explains also why the classification and ordering of memories are so slow in the case of children, and depend so much on action, particularly on social behavior. This single instance at once shows Janet's present mode of analysis. Janet agrees with Baldwin on the point that most psychological operations

<sup>16</sup> *La tension psychologique et ses oscillations, Traité de psychologie*, Vol. I, p. 919-952.

<sup>17</sup> Brit. Journ. of Psych. (Medic. Sect.), Vol. I, Part 1, 3 and 4, and Vol. II, Part 1 (1920, 1921, 1924).

<sup>18</sup> Pierre Janet, *Les Souvenirs irréels*, Archives de Psychologie, XIX, 1924, p. 14.



are internalized social actions: "We repeat with respect to ourselves modes of behavior which have first been constructed with reference to others."<sup>19</sup> Memory, belief, reflection, logical principles are but accounts, promises of action, discussions, ethical rules, etc., internalized, through repetition within and for ourselves. From this viewpoint language seems to Janet to constitute the fundamental phenomenon of human psychology: man is a talking animal who talks his actions and acts his words. And, if in truth memory is an internalized narration, reflection, an internalized discussion, and belief, a promise, etc., one can see how the genesis of these fundamental operations would not have been possible without speech.

But these new views of Janet do not remain isolated and fragmentary. They have enabled him to construct, particularly in his courses at the Collège de France,<sup>20</sup> a doctrine that relates to the hierarchy of tendencies and constitutes a general genetic theory of the stages of mental development. The guiding idea is an attempt to classify psychological operations by their degree of difficulty, taking as a criterion their order of appearance. In brief, the important stages are the following: reflex stage; social stage characterized by the appearance of imitation; the elementary intellectual stage, marked by the emergence of the perception of relations, and therefore of language, and, along with language, of primitive memory conceived as a narration; the assertive period or stage of belief; the period of reflection (which is an inner discussion leading to the summation or synthesis of beliefs); the ergatic stage, marked by the appearance of the possibility of work (i. e., work assigned by oneself); the rational stage, and finally the experimental one.

Now—and it is here that the new ideas of Janet recur to his former conceptions, with reference to the dynamism

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>20</sup> See the summaries in *l'Annuaire des Cours du Collège de France*.

of mind—the establishing of these stages is guided by an extremely interesting principle which marks the point of union between pathological and genetic psychology. Each of the stages corresponds to one of the successive strata of mental structure, or, stated more exactly, to one of the successive degrees of psychological tension. This tension may vary. The variations of level are linked with states of depression and excitation, fatigue, age, emotions, etc. But it must be particularly noted that every mental disease is marked by a regression in the hierarchy of tendencies and is thus characterized by a certain level beyond which the mind seems unable to pass. Yet these oscillations of level are not sufficient to characterize a psychological tension: it is necessary to add what Janet calls the variation of the activation degree of the tendency. A tendency may be in a latent stage. It may bring forth a desire, an effort, or a complete action, or give birth to the “derivation” called emotion. Moreover, between a latent state and complete action, the tendency may lead to an interior thought process, a kind of reaction of the subject himself to his own actions, happily compared by Janet to the proprioceptive reflexes of Sherrington. It is the interference of the oscillations of the degree of activation with the oscillations of the mental level that produces the general oscillations of psychological tension.

Among other genetic attempts mention must be made of Ph. Chaslin’s works concerning the genesis of mathematical concepts. Everybody knows that the Italian psychologist Rignano has followed Mach in an interesting conception of reasoning considered as a “mental experience.” This work was of great interest to the psychiatrist Chaslin whose very rich clinical experience led him to study the pathology and psychology of reasoning. He left a posthumous study on mathematical reasoning, a few abstracts of which have been published in different reviews.

To be mentioned also is a little book by M. Cresson on *Les réactions intellectuelles élémentaires*.<sup>21</sup> The author attempts to trace the diverse forms of reasoning to a sort of unconscious analogical reasoning that is constantly manifest in perception, recollection, etc.

Works on educational psychology, which are to be discussed elsewhere, naturally contain also several new ideas in the field of genetic psychology.

But the great innovation in genetic studies is the appeal made to sociology in explanations of the higher psychological functions. In this regard Baldwin is a forerunner. He has not had as great an influence as he should have had, except on the psychology of Janet. The most important influence came from sociologists themselves, principally from M. Lévy-Bruhl. Durkheim, as is well known, considered religion, ethical feelings, personality, logical reasoning, etc., as products of social life conceived as independent of individual consciousness, as external and superior to it. It is also known how M. Lévy-Bruhl attempted to verify these doctrines in the field of logic, through the study of the judgments and categories peculiar to primitive mentality. These works have deeply impressed the psychologists writing in French and have directed towards sociological explanations at least two of them: Ch. Blondel and G. Dumas.

Ch. Blondel, as he has himself said in an article in the *Journal de Psychologie*, has been influenced by both Lévy-Bruhl and Bergson. The former led him to distrust individualistic explanations; the latter taught him the part played by language and therefore by social life in the very structure of intelligence. Thus, since 1914 (as appears by reference to a book to which we shall later refer, *La Conscience morbide*), Blondel has distinguished two elements within the human mind, the purely psychological

<sup>21</sup> Alcan, 1922.

and the social. The former comprises all that the mind is unable to integrate either into collective sentiments or into the verbal and conceptual forms due to society. It is, then, the inexpressible: on one hand, the unconscious motor activity and, on the other, the mass of elusive feelings, somatic sensations, etc., which in normal life are completely suppressed or, as Blondel says, *décantés* in favor of whatever can be socialized or conceptualized. The genesis of the higher psychic functions brings us back, says Blondel, to the history of the socialization of the mind.

It is in Dumas' *Traité* that the most categorical pages of Blondel on this subject are to be found.<sup>22</sup> In a study of the will Blondel begins with a sharp and witty criticism, often exaggerated but always suggestive, of the introspected experiences in the realm of the will. He praises James for having most clearly seen the *sui generis* character of the will, but he insists even more strongly than this author upon the mysterious and unexplainable element in the "fiat" if one remains on a purely individualistic plane. Hence his conclusion: the "fiat" is less a decision than a manifestation of obedience—obedience of the individual to the group imperatives.

An analysis of personality leads Blondel to similar conclusions. Without society, personality would be reduced to the consciousness of body, to coenesthesia. But, strange to say, this very intimate ego, which is our most individual possession, is also the least personal thing we know. The continual introspection of an Amiel leads only to the realization of the strange and the disquieting. "The personality that loses itself in the depth of the ego finds itself again only at its surface." It is in plunging into the society of men that we rediscover ourselves. The social ego which at first appears to be most external is thus our real self. Personality is social in character. This paradox is reflected

<sup>22</sup> Chapters on *Les volitions* and *La personnalité*, *Traité*, Vol. II.

also in theories: the psychological theories that have limited themselves to the individual alone have always ended by considering the ego an inexplicable datum. Sociology alone permits us to get a glimpse of its genesis.

From a different point of view G. Dumas himself comes to similar ideas. With A. Comte he considers mind as a compound of physiological and social elements. It is true that Dumas places himself on ground that is in this respect privileged. He is concerned with the expression of emotions. The fine works of Dumas on this subject are well known. They go back beyond 1914. But in his *Traité* Dumas has renewed the exposition and has been able to show how empty are certain psychological theories that appeal to fanciful constructions where physiology and social psychology are sufficient for an exhaustive analysis of the facts.

These genetic attempts inspired by sociology have from one side or another aroused a rather strong opposition. We have already spoken of the position of Delacroix. In the field of ethical and religious feelings, G. Belot has, in Dumas' *Traité*, defended a similar conception, maintaining the psychological and individual nature of these feelings. But it is especially in the realm of thinking that the debate becomes more heated. Not to speak of philosophers who see in "sociologism" a sort of neo-pragmatism that weakens the value of rational principles, psychologists themselves have some difficulty in admitting that all of logic may be the work of society. Touching this subject, I. Meyerson published, in *L'année psychologique*, a very interesting critical study of the "Primitive Mentality" by Lévy-Bruhl.

According to I. Meyerson, it is not necessary to invoke a kind of non-rational causality in explanation of the phenomena collected by M. Lévy-Bruhl under the name of "mystical causality." We need merely recognize that prim-

itive man, as is only natural, has not yet come to believe in the regularity of the laws of nature, and that he looks upon nature as a vast system where everything is related to everything and kept in an unstable balance. Such being the case a rational principle of conservation is sufficient to explain the fact that primitive man clings to traditions and customs which we judge, and which he also sometimes judges, queer and incomprehensible. It is simply that primitive man scrupulously maintains the existing modes of action, for fear the world might collapse, i. e., for fear the slightest change might bring forth some kind of unexpected and dangerous result. The apparently non-rational element would thus be explained by a very rational principle of conservation. Here let us mention also that M. Paulhan, whose talent as an analyst is well known, has written a book on social transformation of feelings, a book which provides a balance between sociology and psychology.<sup>23</sup> Without disregarding the individual nature of feelings, Paulhan studies their socialization and the spiritualization which follows from it. The analysis of sexual feelings is particularly well done.

In the field of social psychology, to which many contemporary scholars have been led through their genetic interests, mention must be made of studies on language, the place of which is to be found half way between psychology and sociology. M. Bally has continued his fine studies on stylistic. These inspired G. Vaucher to write a thesis on affective language and judgments of value.<sup>24</sup> The *Journal de Psychologie* has devoted to the psychology of language an important brochure with contributions from Meillet, Bally, Vendryès, Bloch, Sechehaye, and others.

<sup>23</sup> *Les transformations sociales des sentiments*, Flammarion, 1920.

<sup>24</sup> *Le langage affectif et les jugements de valeur*, Alcan, 1925.

## ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

Particularly in France, because of the masterly works of Th. Ribot, it would not have been possible before the war to separate abnormal psychology from general psychology. Even now quite a few general systems of psychology lead to abnormal psychology and vice versa. This is particularly true in the case of the work of P. Janet and Ch. Blondel. Nevertheless on the whole one may say that abnormal psychology, because of the difficulty of the questions raised and the relations of their solutions to medical and physiological problems, has become in some measure an autonomous science. At any rate the time is past when one could, as Ribot did, devote a lifetime to the study of pathological methods without oneself meeting a single patient. But this does not mean, of course, that Ribot's work as an initiator has not been necessary and most fruitful.

The present status of abnormal psychology in French-speaking countries has been very clearly set forth by Dumas in two of the longest chapters of the *Traité*. These papers sanction in particular the official victory of the ideas of Babinski—ideas already old—insofar as hysteria is conceived as simple suggestion. It is true that not all the authors have accepted these ideas with equal conviction. In French Switzerland, Claparède and H. Flournoy, while not maintaining the classical conception in its entirety and while acknowledging with Babinski that the explanation of hysteria is to be found more in psychology than in physiology, nevertheless assert the authenticity of some disputed facts. Pierre Janet also refuses to define hysteria in terms of suggestion alone and continues in his last works to defend an original conception of it. In his earlier doctrines, this conception represents an explanation of hyste-

ria by reference to automatism. According to his later conception (behaviorism), automatism is itself quasi-action, or action of low tension; in such action the whole personality does not collaborate and the result is that impulse is stronger than reflection. As regards the hierarchy of tendencies or the stages of mental development, hysterical behavior is to be located at the stage of belief and may not be placed on the level of reflection, or the compensatory synthesis of beliefs.

Janet's latest works on abnormal psychology are *Les Médications psychologiques*<sup>25</sup> and *Médecine psychologique*.<sup>26</sup> In these books Janet presents a very complete history and a critique of the different systems of psycho-therapy and gives a full and extremely rich account of the procedures based on the idea of psychological force and its economy, and on the fundamental idea of tension oscillations. He is thus led in each case to establish a kind of "budget for the mind."

One of the most striking novelties in abnormal psychology is the notion of morbid consciousness due to M. Blondel. Such is the title of a book published in 1914. As already noted, the idea has been the starting point of a movement in general psychology inspired by sociology. Since Claude Bernard, most psychiatrists and even most pathologists in every field have started with the idea that the pathological and the normal are identical in nature and that a simple difference of degree distinguishes disease from normal oscillations. In contrast hereto Blondel states that the morbid consciousness is a psychic reality *sui generis*, irreducible to normal ways of feeling or thinking—a reality that must be studied in itself and for itself. Here is an attitude similar to the one taken by M. Lévy-Bruhl with regard to primitive mentality. Morbid consciousness is, in fact, characterized by certain paradoxes: motor, affec-

<sup>25</sup> 3 vol., Alcan, 1919.

<sup>26</sup> Flammarion, 1923.



tive, logic paradoxes. The last mentioned of these is particularly interesting; the patient's thought swarms with contradictions, irrepressible and inexpressible concepts queerly linked with a word taken from the current language but given an entirely different meaning.

Such a consciousness, says Blondel, is not a normal consciousness distorted. It is a unique consciousness different from ours and therefore incapable of conceptualization and of socialization. It is due, according to Blondel, more particularly to the patient's richness in somatic sensations and feelings. With the normal being, these sensations, being inexpressible, are "decanted" through the socialization of thought, for thought maintains and expresses only what is common to all. With the patient, the elements being more abundant and different from ours, cannot be "decanted." Hence his non-socialized and consequently strange consciousness is an inexpressible consciousness, ill adapted to ordinary speech. Hence the contradictions. For to the patient words have a different meaning. He feels differently and experiences a resistance due to common language and common consciousness.

This conception of the purely psychological, placed in opposition to the social, offers some analogy with certain conceptions of psychoanalysis. "Decanted" realities are not without similarity to suppressed realities. The split between the psychological and the social reminds one of the opposition which Bleuler thinks characteristic of the schizophrenic between autistic and socialized thinking. Nevertheless, exemplifying a not uncommon paradox in the history of ideas, Blondel is a merciless enemy of psychoanalysis. His book on the subject is a biting and harsh criticism of Freudian theories.<sup>27</sup> Here a few words would be in place concerning the influence of psychoanalysis on

<sup>27</sup> *La psychanalyse*, Alcan, 1924.

the development of abnormal psychology in French-speaking countries since 1914.

The novel tendency during that period has been an increasing interest in psychoanalysis on the part of French-speaking psychologists. If religious psychology were to have a place within the limits of this paper, it would be necessary to mention first of all Th. Flournoy, the genial and fruitful psychologist of Geneva, whose works previous to 1914 were an anticipation of the useful results of psychoanalysis. In a paper on *Une mystique moderne*, published in 1915, he made a remarkable and very searching application of the Freudian methods.<sup>28</sup> Flournoy's influence has been and remains great in French Switzerland, and all French Swiss psychoanalysts are his disciples.

To state things briefly and without reference to the historical evolution of the doctrine, it might be said that among French-speaking psychologists we may distinguish three attitudes toward psychoanalysis.

Some are openly hostile. Without referring to the authors, unfortunately still numerous, who criticize it without being well informed, we may say that the most intelligent criticisms have been made by Blondel (*loc. cit.*), Chaslin<sup>29</sup> and Ombredanne.<sup>30</sup> Others, without of course accepting all of the Freudian ideas, are strong advocates of the psychoanalytic methods. Several among this number have made valuable contributions to the subject. We would mention in France, the works of Hesnard, Laforgue, d'Allendy, Borel, Robin, Minkowski; in Switzerland, works by H. Flournoy, R. de Saussure (among whose publications there is an excellent book on the general doctrine of psychoanalysis<sup>31</sup>), Odier, Christin, Baudouin; in Belgium, the contributions of Varendonck. These writers have in-

<sup>28</sup> *Arch. de Psychol.*, XV.

<sup>29</sup> *Journ. de Psychol.*, 1923.

<sup>30</sup> *Rev. Philos.*, 1922.

<sup>31</sup> *La méthode psychanalytique*, Payot, 1922.

augurated a yearbook of psychoanalysis, an interesting volume of which has already been published. It contains a complete bibliography of psychoanalytical works written in French during the last few years.<sup>32</sup> Finally, a third group assumes an attitude of sympathy and critical reserve, and tries to point out what of the material presented by psychoanalysts is fruitful and what must be ascribed to the spirit of systematization. In Switzerland, Claparède, Bovet and Larguier des Bancelles have published several studies replete with suggestions. In France, Dumas has devoted some very interesting pages of his *Traité* to Freudianism, and has put in a particularly clear light the psychiatric usefulness of the concept of suppression. In a similar spirit, H. Claude, with his students at Sainte Anne, is making a number of different investigations of schizophrenia.

A propos of psychoanalysis we would mention an interesting book by Varendonck, *Evolution des facultés conscientes*.<sup>33</sup> This represents a psychology of intelligence studied from a dynamic and affective point of view inspired by Freudianism.

But with such a rapid review of the work of Janet, of Blondel and of those inspired by psychoanalysis we have not exhausted the studies of French-speaking authors in the field of abnormal psychology. To be mentioned also are the books of Logre and Devaux on *Les anxieux*<sup>34</sup> and of Dupré on *La pathologie de l'émotivité et de l'imagination*,<sup>35</sup> an already mentioned book by Delmas and Boll, and the work of M. de Fleury on *Les états depressifs et la neurasthénie*,<sup>36</sup> the studies of Hartenberg on *Les psychonévroses anxieuses*; works by Laignel-Lavastine, Reevault d'Allonnes, Mourgue, etc., etc.

<sup>32</sup> *L'évolution psychiatrique*, Payot, 1925.

<sup>33</sup> Alcan, 1921.

<sup>34</sup> Masson, 1917.

<sup>35</sup> Payot, 1925.

<sup>36</sup> Alcan, 1924.

## PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Long ago we should have mentioned the names of H. Piéron and E. Rabaud. But even though Piéron's works may at any time delve into general or abnormal psychology, they nevertheless stand by themselves, because the strictly physiological and experimental methods of their author have obliged him to cling to special problems.

We mention first a general work by Piéron on *Le cerveau et la pensée*.<sup>37</sup> It is a well-informed, clear, and up-to-date review of psycho-physiological problems, particularly of questions of cerebral localization which have been so deeply changed by observations on wounded soldiers during the war. This book contains also a complete study of the physiological problem of aphasia and several new features such as an interesting physiological schema similar to that of Claparède. Piéron has also published in the *Année psychologique* (which he directs since Binet's death), in the *Journal de Psychologie*, and in various French biological Bulletins a great number of papers and notes on psycho-physiological questions. Three of these studies must be mentioned. First, an *Essai d'analyse expérimentale du temps de latence sensorielle*. In this study Piéron takes as a working hypothesis the idea that "the decrease in the time of releasing peripherally a sensorial nervous influx through a physical stimulus of increasing intensity must, since it is capable of determining to a great extent the general aspect of the phenomenon, result in decreasing the reaction time considered in relation to the increasing intensity of excitation." Then in a paper published in 1922<sup>38</sup> on new researches in the analysis of the time of sensorial latency, Piéron succeeds in confirming this

<sup>37</sup> Alcan, 1923.

<sup>38</sup> *Journ. de Psychol.*, 1920.

<sup>39</sup> *Année Psychol.*, Vol. XX.

hypothesis and discovers a general law relating to the decrease of reaction time. Turning to the second of the studies above referred to we would call attention to a short but important note: *Du rôle des réflexes localisateurs dans les perception spatiales*,<sup>40</sup> in which Piéron supports the interesting idea of nativism in respect to reflexes. Nativist theories, according to Piéron, must be rejected as regards the associative level of knowledge, since the associative reactions of spatial perception, for instance, are acquired only by an empirical process of trial and error. But certain congenital reactions of localization show that localization is also made through a "*prise de connaissance*" of spatial reflexes, and this allows the partial reintroduction of nativistic theories under a new form. The third of Piéron's studies alluded to above is presented in an important paper entitled *Les problèmes psychologiques de la perception du temps*.<sup>41</sup> Here Piéron expresses a great number of useful suggestions concerning the difficult question at issue. Attention should be called also to another research by Piéron on the memory of digits and forms,<sup>42</sup> and to works by Madame Piéron on various tests of aptitude, on sensorial transfer, etc.

In this same field M. Foucault and B. Bourdon have made valuable contributions, the former on sensations and perceptions, the latter on exercise, fatigue, rest, persistency of acquired habits, etc. The question of psychological heredity has been excellently treated by Poyer.<sup>43</sup>

M. Wallon has contributed an interesting study on motor reactions in emotions.<sup>44</sup> His two chapters in Dumas' *Traité* on the biological conditions of consciousness and on the subconscious life are full of useful ideas. His book on *L'Enfant turbulent* contains also much in the nature of

<sup>40</sup> *Journ. de Psychol.*, 1921.

<sup>41</sup> *Année psychol.*, XXIV.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, XXII.

<sup>43</sup> Alcan, 1921.

<sup>44</sup> *Année psychol.*, XXII.

physiological psychology. Lastly, mention must be made of a forceful study by Wintrebert in *Le mouvement sans nerfs*.<sup>45</sup>

To physiological psychology belongs animal psychology. Pieron, who himself made a great number of researches in this field (particularly on memory curves of mollusks) has given a good summary of it in Dumas' *Traité*. Moreover, E. Rabaud has made several interesting contributions to this subject as well as to pure biology. Rabaud's orientation is towards integral mechanism. No one more than he attacks anthropomorphism, finalism, vitalism under any form. No one is a more enthusiastic believer in the continuity between the purely physiological and the intellectual, through the steps of reflex and instinct. His work on instinct tends to show that instinct is far from being infallible and immutable, as too many seem to think. Instinct is but a collection of reflexes that work mechanically, right or wrong according to circumstances.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, the reflex or instinctive mechanism is not merely dependent on external stimuli but is influenced by other factors such as internal secretions. From this point of view Rabaud studied the maternal affection of mice. Giard had explained this instinct through the advantage and well being which the mother derives from it. Rabaud, after criticizing this theory in detail, shows that a female is attracted by the young of another female when she reaches the middle period of her pregnancy. This attraction according to Rabaud depends on internal secretions of the ovary itself.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> *Journ. de psychol.*, 1921.

<sup>46</sup> *Journ. de psychol.*, 1921. See also *Bull. Biol.*, 1918 and 1919, where Rabaud shows that a certain caterpillar lives underground simply because it flees from light. The so-called simulation of death belongs to the category of immobilization reflexes, the mechanism of which has been studied by Rabaud.

<sup>47</sup> In the field of animal psychology mention must be made of the fine researches of Ferton on the life of bees and wasps. These correct many a hasty judgment due to Fabre. We refer also to A. Forel's work, *Le monde social des fourmis* (1921), a very important summary of a life-long observation of the customs of ants.

We thus come to the most striking novelty in the field of physiological psychology during these last years: endocrinology. The researches of Gley, Mayer, Laignel, Lavastine, Claude, and Athias have indicated the great number of relations between internal secretions and reflexes, instinct, character, emotions, etc. Dumas gives a good general account of the question in the second volume of his *Traité*.

### PROBLEMS RELATED TO PSYCHOLOGY

It would be difficult to close this rapid review of psychological works written in French without indicating the implicit or explicit psychology found in the works of important authors on logic and epistemology.

In the field of logic we must speak of the *Traité de Logique* by Goblot.<sup>48</sup> It contains a theory of reasoning that is of interest to the psychologist. The syllogism, according to Goblot, represents only a part of deductive reasoning. Deduction consists essentially of a mental construction, similar to what Mach and Rignano call a "mental experiment." Thus, mathematical reasoning consists of spatial or numerical constructions, the rules of which are not rules of logic but the propositions previously accepted. The part played by the syllogism is only to permit the application of these rules to new constructions which are therefore the essence of reasoning. This theory is psychologically very interesting and converges with the teachings of the German *Denkpsychologie*.

In epistemology, the names of Brunschvicg and Meyerson must be mentioned. In *L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique*,<sup>49</sup> by the former, is to be found a genetic psychology of the notions of cause and of object. As we have elsewhere endeavored to show,<sup>50</sup> it may be compared

<sup>48</sup> Colin, 1918.

<sup>49</sup> Alcan, 1922.

<sup>50</sup> *Journ. de psychol.*, XXI.

with Baldwin's system of genetic logic. Although M. Brunschvicg is a pure epistemologist, the reading of his pages is indispensable to anyone who would again take up Ribot's researches on the evolution of general ideas. It is much the same with M. E. Meyerson's works, *De l'explication dans les sciences* and *La deduction relativiste*. Meyerson's central idea is that the notion of cause belongs with that of logical identification and may thus be contrasted with the notion of law. Such a theory presupposes a psychology of perception, as indeed is explicitly stated by Meyerson himself: to perceive is to identify. But while Brunschvicg believes in the plasticity of reason, in genetic transformations of the categories, theories which open the door for a genetic psychology,<sup>51</sup> M. Meyerson is a "fixist" and thinks that always and everywhere, with animal or primitive man, with children or civilized people, perception is a rational process and reason is invariable, both being essentially an identification of diverse elements.

Bergson has published only two new books since 1914, *L'énergie spirituelle*, a collection of previously published studies, and *Durée et simultanéité* in which he is led by Einstein's physical theories to reconsider his conception of time.

Among other epistemological works touching psychology we would call attention to a fine book by J. Paliard, *Intuition et réflexion*, which presents some highly interesting ideas on the relations of life and consciousness. Worthy of mention is, finally, the attempt of P. Masson-Oursel (*La philosophie comparée*) to find some parallelism between European philosophy and Chinese and Hindu thought. A chapter devoted to a comparison of psychologies gives valuable information on the history of psychology.

<sup>51</sup> Brunschvicg in this respect agrees with A. Lalande, whose fine methodological preface to Dumas' *Traité* must be mentioned.



## SOCIOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

GEORGES DAVY

IN ORDER to form a precise and accurate idea of the contemporary sociological movement in France, it is necessary to know its source, or, more exactly, its sources. One school undoubtedly demands attention as much for the rigor of its scientific method as for the abundance of its production and for its incontestable influence in and out of the sociological domain: it is the school of Durkheim. But in believing, as one might be tempted to do, that this school alone represents all of French sociology, or all that counts in French sociology, one would not only commit an injustice but one would also place himself in an unsatisfactory viewpoint in regard to understanding the true nature of the Durkheimian sociology, which at once denies and continues. There is indeed some diversity in our contemporary sociological movement, because there was some diversity yesterday, and because the movement constantly scatters in the different directions—often, moreover, as we shall see, less and less different—which the nineteenth century has marked out for it. The nineteenth century we say. In fact one may well mention, and it is right to mention, the names of some great precursors, from Aristotle, formulating his famous definition of man as a political animal, to Montesquieu, deducing his concept of social law, and Condorcet, that of change and of progress. It is none the less true that sociology is a thing of the nineteenth cen-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Frances Noble.

tury—the century of history and of experience, of evolution and of relativity—and that it is, also, essentially a thing of France. Tracing, in 1900 in the *Revue Bleue*, the course of sociology in France in the nineteenth century, Durkheim could justly write: “To determine the part which belongs to France in the progress that sociology has made during the nineteenth century, is to give, in large measure, the history of this science, for it is among us and during the course of this century that sociology was born, and it has remained a science essentially French.”

It is, then, the nineteenth century, and especially the nineteenth century in France, that has defined and opened all the directions which we today still find in the science which concerns us. If we would retain only that which is essential and that which throws light on present conditions, we would say that these directions are four in number. Around them, and with a varying importance, all the other movements center; among them, moreover, there is more than one common trait and more than one instance of borrowing, as well as a number of mutual reactions which are often profitable. The first two directions were very different and were more independent of each other than doubtless was wise. On the one hand, we find that which dominates the entire movement and proceeds from Saint-Simon and from Auguste Comte to Durkheim; on the other hand, that which, under the names of social reform and, still more, of social science, goes from LePlay to Paul Bureau, passing by way of Henri de Tourville and Demolins. There are two other directions: one, starting from the Englishman Spencer, then defined, rendered precise, and enlarged by Espinas, contributed notably to the formation of the Durkheimian sociology, even while subsequently existing side by side with it and distinct from it in the form of a modified organicism; the other, brilliantly represented by Gabriel Tarde, provides, according to Tarde,

not so much a new, positive route across the sociological field as a concentration point and guiding idea for the attack which individualism, whether metaphysical or psychological, ceaselessly directs against sociology. The latter will be accused—almost always excessively, but not always without reason or usefulness—of considering of no importance the initiative and rights of individual conscience and reason. From this viewpoint, which is, so to speak, negative, the sociology of Tarde, which has remained, in one sense, without offspring, because there is no sociological school which bears his name, ceaselessly regains life and actuality. It is truly around the individual, whom Tarde would make at once the author of all progress and the single real sociological factor, that there is today being ceaselessly waged the great battle between partisans and opponents of sociology. And that is natural enough. In spite of its queer etymology, has not sociology among us truly taken for its object, not so much the strictly historical and limited knowledge of societies, as the larger, more philosophical and more human knowledge of the individual in his environment and his social order, and the determination of what he, as an individual, does or does not owe to that environment?

But in order that such knowledge may be possible and may have an effective newness, it is necessary that a definite reality be assigned to the environment whose influence on the individual one wishes to maintain. It is exactly because such knowledge will be founded on this reality—which is, moreover, quite concrete and not at all metaphysical—and because it will proceed from this reality to the individual—we say will proceed to the individual, not will proceed systematically to deny him—for these reasons the knowledge will be sociological. Three of the schools named by us, despite all their differences of opinion and methods, agree in thus understanding it. The fourth does

not believe in the existence of sociology proper. LePlay and Paul Bureau proceed to the individual only from what they believe to be his essential social environment, the working-class family.<sup>2</sup> Very similar is the view of Espinas. In contradiction to Spencer, he affirms the reality of the collective consciousness, giving as the essential and natural type thereof the family and the nation. These are, for him, simply individualities that are more extensive than individuals in the ordinary sense, whereas the latter, in turn, are only societies that are more restricted than the groups commonly so designated. Of a kindred view and much more forceful is Durkheim, whose struggle in favor of the concrete and specific reality of society and of the collective consciousness is a matter of common knowledge.

The agreement between the different schools, and the persistence from the founders down to the very present of that capital notion of a specific social reality, on which sociologists continue to count, is one of the most characteristic traits of their science. They today like to pay homage to a precursor who is too much and unjustly forgotten, and to whom several important works and essential preoccupations of the present hour have just given a lively actuality: Saint-Simon. In his previously quoted article in the *Revue Bleue*, Durkheim did not fail to assign to Saint-Simon a fine, prominent place or to pay him the homage that had been denied him by Auguste Comte. Later, in 1915, in a chapter on sociology written for a volume devoted to French science and presented at the International Exposition in San Francisco, he repeated the same homage. "Saint-Simon," he wrote, "was the first to declare that human societies are realities, certainly of a unique sort, different from those that one finds in the rest

<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that despite their anathemas against the Durkheimian notion of a collective consciousness, sometimes deliberately misrepresented, it is indeed in the study of groupings and not in the study of the individual that this school begins.

of nature, but subject to the same determinism."<sup>3</sup> Finally, in a course on Saint-Simon, a course of which the *Revue Philosophique* has just published several sections (May-June, 1925), he brought to the public eye the following significant passage by Saint-Simon: "Society is far from being a simple agglomeration of living beings whose actions have no other cause than the decisions of individual wills, no other result than brief and unimportant accidents; society is, on the contrary, a highly organized machine, all the parts of which contribute in independent ways to the functioning of the whole. The grouping of men constitutes an actual unit."<sup>4</sup> And M. Maxime Leroy, who, along with Messieurs Bouglé and Halévy, is one of those who are today doing the most to rehabilitate Saint-Simon, also emphasizes his original and significant conception of the social being which one must not, as he wisely remarks, lower to the vulgar level of a simple organism.<sup>5</sup>

Speaking of the sociological and politico-social attempts of Saint-Simon and of Auguste Comte, Durkheim has written of these two men, who have also been described as Messiahs: "It is in reason alone, that is to say in science, that the means of bringing about the moral reorganization of the country were sought. It is from this intellectual effervescence that there resulted simultaneously Saint-Simonism, Fourierism, Comteanism, and sociology."<sup>6</sup> Thus we find Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, with their idea of a distinct social reality, the object of a distinct social science, as objective as the other sciences, at the beginning of a positive and rationalistic sociology which, after an eclipse of a good quarter-century, rose again with Espinas and came into flower with Durkheim and his school.

<sup>3</sup> *La Science Française*, 1915, Vol. I, p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> *Revue Philosophique*, 1925, p. 331.

<sup>5</sup> Max. Leroy, *Henri de Saint-Simon*, 1924, p. 319. See also Bouglé, *L'Oeuvre d'Henri de Saint-Simon—Textes Choisis*, 1925, and the new edition of *La Doctrine de Saint-Simon*, by Bouglé and Halévy, 1924.

<sup>6</sup> *Revue Bleue*, 1900, p. 612.

But even during this eclipse of the tradition of Saint-Simon and Comte, preoccupations with social science and social reorganization analogous to theirs in point of departure, although very different in results and in the doctrines to which they led, arose in the work of one who was also a thinker, an ingenious man, an enthusiast, and who was also destined to found a school: Frederic LePlay. His name and method, even if not his doctrine, must be mentioned if one would today understand Paul Bureau, just as Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte must be considered if one would understand the work of Durkheim. There is in LePlay—and, unfortunately, it is doubtless this that is best known about him—a moral and religious doctrine of individual reform and of paternalism which is far from having had the success and influence that its author expected. But it should be recognized that he also inaugurated, and that he even began by practicing objectively and independent of all doctrine, a distinctive method which can be dissociated from his specific teachings. In fact, it has been so dissociated by his dissenting disciples, founders of the *Science Sociale*. This is an instrument of method, as opposed to the *Réforme Sociale*, which is an organ of doctrine. It happens that LePlay's method has two eminently sociological peculiarities. It declares social facts worthy of scientific observation just the same as natural facts, and it focuses this observation at the outset on a reality that is collective and not individual; namely, on the working-class family. It is for the purpose of dissociating the method from the doctrine, of making it precise, of ridding it of the inadequate mathematical considerations of family budgets, of extending it, according to LePlay's own indications, from the particularistic monography of the family to the comprehensive study of society with its physical and social conditions of existence, that Henry de Tourville and Demolins have worked. And this transformation of LePlay's

method, wrought by these founders of social science, terminates today, as in its last, most precise and scientific conclusion, in the sociology of Paul Bureau.<sup>7</sup> This stands face to face with Durkheim's sociology. It makes pretensions of also being an objective science, but of being wise enough likewise to make a place for liberty. The recently deceased author codified this in a book called *Introduction à la méthode sociologique*. This work appeared in 1923 as the manifesto of the new school of social science.

A bit earlier, J. Wilbois, a rather liberal member of the same school, began the publication of an introduction to sociology in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* for 1920 (pp. 471-494). But the work of P. Bureau remains much the most important and most characteristic work of this tendency. We have said that he built upon an expansion of the method of LePlay. As long ago as 1855, the latter had perceived the inadequacy of the method of family monography when the family was studied simply through its budget. "A number of details," said he, "escape this financial analysis of human life." It was in order to meet this inadequacy that he had added to his first monographic framework two rather indeterminate rubrics. One of these came at the beginning and was entitled "Preliminary Observations." This was designed to contain a description of the place where the family lives, of the organization of the work in which it is engaged, of its mode of existence, of its traditions, etc. The other rubric, entitled "Diverse Elements of the Social Constitution," also served to enlarge the analysis. There remained the step of definitely leaving the family in order to comprehend social life. LePlay felt the necessity of so doing and made the attempt in dealing with England. But it was Henri de Tourville who undertook methodically to co-ordinate in a

<sup>7</sup> Cf. on this movement Pierre Meline, *LePlay: l'oeuvre de science*, Paris, Bloud, 1912; *Le travail sociologique*, *ibid.*, 1909. Also *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée*, I. Paul Bureau le sociologue, Paris, Bloud, 1924, p. 65-127.

*general nomenclature* the different orders of social facts and also to define the setting of the study of societies in the narrow sense of the word, and of all the "social repercussions" of laws observed there.

This retrospect was necessary for an understanding of the exact sociological method of P. Bureau. The latter, indeed, absorbed this tradition and then passed beyond it. First he absorbed it. "I will," declared he, "borrow considerably from the nomenclature of social facts elaborated almost forty years ago by Henri de Tourville in dealing with the works of LePlay, though I will make important simplifications and changes such as have been shown necessary by experience. Just as it stands, this brief questionnaire is, according to me, a valuable instrument of analysis, and doubtless this will soon be realized if students will consent to follow LePlay's recommendation to study the working-class family. I am aware that this method seems to some discredited and antiquated. Nevertheless the analysis of wisely chosen samples remains the favorite and most certain method in all empirical sciences. . . . As has long been said, the working-class family, that is to say the family which draws its means of subsistence largely from the manual labor of its head or of its members, furnishes an excellent introduction to the general study of society as a whole. Since the organization of private life occupies such an important place in the general economy of society, no better avenue could be found to the interior of society itself; and the choice of a working-class family is likewise justified by the fact that, alike because of its work and because of its means of subsistence, this family, more than any other, is under the influence of determining elements of the group under observation. By virtue of their intellectual culture or material resources, families in moderate or good circumstances can raise themselves above the action of these elements. The working-class family is



more the prisoner of circumstance, and by reference to it one can best perceive the action of the environment. Moreover, to recommend the monographic method is not to say that the completion of a single monograph is sufficient. On the contrary, it is advantageous to renew observation on a different family and to check by a new test the results of the first study. All that can be said is that the scrupulous analysis of a well-chosen sample, better than any other procedure, permits the penetration of those mysterious fastnesses of psychological life where the social life of a people is developed and organized.”<sup>8</sup>

Thus, as one sees, knowledge of the family retains its privilege as the key to the knowledge of society; and this two-fold knowledge can be obtained through the use of a nomenclature which is no other than that of Henri de Tourville—a nomenclature which Bureau describes and on which he comments in a long and interesting chapter.

But let us note how he goes beyond his masters and what seemed to him their geographical materialism, in order that, without renouncing science, he might establish a “sociology of liberty,” as he has himself baptized it. It was the study, classic in the circles of science, of the fjords of Norway and of the social type which their material configuration is thought necessarily to produce, that led him to abandon the determinism of his school. “As my study progressed,” says he, “I felt a triple affirmation arising in me with irresistible force. If, said I to myself, a powerful fairy gave me the ability to change these granite mountains into beds of oil or of copper, or into good arable land, it is certain that the social structure of all Norway would be profoundly modified. But if, on the other hand, without changing anything in the geographical configuration, a chemist should tomorrow discover the means of using this granite in combinations capable of engendering force

<sup>8</sup> P. Bureau, *Introduction à la Science sociale*, p. 185.

and heat, what would not be the extent of social transformations arising from the modification of economic technique? In some decades Norway would be covered with workshops and factories, and would become one of the principal manufacturing regions of Europe. Finally, if, without modifying either the geographic structure or the technique of work, a lay mission composed of the masters of French rationalism, came to flood with conferences, pamphlets, tracts and propaganda this peasant population so firmly entrenched in the somber Lutheran dogma of sin and salvation, if this mission succeeded in convincing these pious peasants—that all their beliefs are only mirage and illusion—is it not certain also that the social structure of Norway in the fjord region would be profoundly modified? The austere life led by these peasants, in the inexpressible isolation of their “gaard,” would appear to them intolerable the day their religious doctrines were abandoned.”<sup>9</sup> The first two of these affirmations fit very naturally, as one sees, into the deterministic frame of social science, but the third demands the insertion of the possibilities and exigencies of liberty. “Under the impulsion of new evidence,” proclaims our author, “I acquire the power to abandon my first positions.” Under the name of sociological materialism, he rejects alike the liberal economy, the scientific socialism of Marx, the sociologism of Durkheim, and social science itself. The material circumstances of place, of work, and of system of property, which constituted for his masters the three determining factors, appear to him only situations that arouse or conditions that permit the phenomena, not causes that necessarily produce and suffice to explain them. But what then becomes of social science? That is the question which arose and which he asked himself but which he did not succeed in answering in clear and satisfactory fashion: “According as I held it necessary

<sup>9</sup> *Introd. à la méth. Soc.*, p. 16f.

to assume liberty, was it not necessary to give up the idea of constituting a science of social phenomena?" He decided that this was not the case, saying especially that one must hold fast the two ends of the chain of determinism-liberty, even though unable to perceive the intermediate links.<sup>10</sup> In any case he claimed for representations, especially those of morality and religion, a causal efficacy analogous to that of scientific factors proper.

We may now note a significant fact which shows that we are nearing the crucial problem. Through the claim just mentioned Bureau rejoins that Durkheimian sociology in which he wishes to see only a materialistic determinism. Even before the appearance of Durkheim's book on religion, which certainly marks this author's evolution toward idealism, I pointed out how the ideal factors (beliefs and representations) join in his thought with the material factors (morphology and institutions) to constitute the notion of collective reality and to explain human progress. And with a Bouglé, for example, sociological orientation tends to take this specific form. It is not by chance that in the Durkheimian heritage, he selects especially the notion of value—a conception that indeed acquires increasing importance—and that he devotes to the evolution of this notion a clear and brilliant little book which represents a balance-sheet of contemporary sociology.<sup>11</sup> Though appearing to us as objective and impersonal precisely because they are collective, judgments of value nevertheless express only preferences, that is, to speak brusquely, sentiments. And if a common bent imposes on us values that it has created or has generally accepted, this is not by the tyranny of a law of servitude, but by the charm inherent in a superior ideal: "Its authority," writes Bouglé, "is far from being something exterior to spiritual life, which could only command offensively; it springs from the heart of the peo-

<sup>10</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 149.

<sup>11</sup> *Leçons de sociologie sur l'évolution des valeurs*, 1922.

ple. From which it follows that to invite man to respect society, is not to ask him to bow before a sort of huge animal, but before a great flame which mounts toward heaven and which is kept ever burning by souls united in common interest."<sup>12</sup>

The analysis of economic value, moreover, seems to show us, despite classic prejudices, that it is itself a function of desire and of idea: "To measure [economic] values it is not sufficient to compute the work embodied in them. Neither does it suffice to represent them as the result of a relation between two almost mechanical forces: supply and demand. In its functioning, the law of supply and demand itself assumes a certain condition which marks the limits imposed by the moral ideal on economic appetites. There are, moreover, other needs than material needs, other interests than individual interests; by diverse systems of attractions and influences, and in directions unexpected by the economist, collectivity orientates the desires of individuals. In so far one may contend that economic values are themselves matters of opinion, it being well understood that the opinion of which one speaks is not at all anything that can be avoided or an arbitrary fantasy. It is the sum total of ideas and feelings which in a given country and time impress themselves upon collective customs, and give rise to judgments of imperative values, representing ideals that are themselves in harmony with the structure of society. Values thus conceived are the essential objects of sociology."<sup>13</sup>

The same viewpoint is emphasized still more by Bouglé in a course of lectures on, or rather against, materialism in sociology.<sup>14</sup> Durkheim's sociology, he shows, contains more psychology than is generally supposed. Despite interpretations which try to reveal other tendencies, the true

<sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>13</sup> Bouglé, *loc. cit.*, p. 110f.

<sup>14</sup> *Science, morale et éducation*, Paris, 1925, 3e série, p. 141f.

social reality is for Durkheim mental and sentimental. He does not make the collective consciousness dependent upon social morphology alone; and he admits a logic of development of beliefs. And Bouglé adds on his own account: "In order that societies may continue to exist, judgments of value must be imposed on the consciences of individuals to the end that their efforts may be made to converge. Societies would doubtless crumble into dust if there were nothing but material interests to unite men. But forces of sentiment are always at work. It is they that constitute the veritable substance of society. . . . If it be true that such is the tendency of our sociological teaching, I believe that we can all say that we are far from racial determinism, from geographical determinism, and from economic determinism. We maintain that an ideal is a necessary force. We maintain that this force itself is subject to the influence of social transformations. But especially do we point out that it is necessary to the maintenance of the life of societies." The same sort of idealism pervades the sociological conception of law which I have myself more than once sketched when criticizing the principal theoretical conceptions of contemporary jurists.<sup>15</sup>

Certain sociologists have attached an extraordinary importance to an exclusively psychological analysis of collective mentality with its unique characteristics and laws. They indeed do not cease to claim an absolute specificity of this analysis in relation to that of pure individual psychology, yet they consider it necessary to present the collective mentality in its entirety, and disengaged from correspondences of detail among its various traits and the particular or local causes of its formation in definite social organizations. This is the plan of two universally known books in which Lévy-Bruhl achieves the veritable resurrection of the collective mentality of primitive man, full of life

<sup>15</sup> G. Davy, *Le Droit, l'Idealisme, et l'Expérience*, Paris, Alcan, 1922; *Éléments de sociologie politique*, Paris, Delagrave, 1923.

and local color.<sup>16</sup> It is the more recent of the books of which we would here speak. It carries as its title a phrase, *la mentalité primitive*, suggesting the psychic identity found among regional and racial diversities. That primitive mentality is governed by a law of participation rather than of contradiction, and thus confuses classes and beings as it confounds actions and causes; that it is mystic, impenetrable to experience, indifferent to apparent causes that it believes ineffective, confident only in invisible causes, magico-mystic in character; in a word, that it is pre-logical and pre-scientific—this is all matter that it is scarcely necessary to repeat, so well known is Lévy-Bruhl's book, and so often re-edited and translated. Its contents, moreover, have recently been popularized by a pamphlet from the pen of a psychologist who is himself interested in sociology, M. Blondel.<sup>16a</sup>

M. Fauconnet's essay on responsibility is much more orthodox in its Durkheimianism.<sup>17</sup> It presents responsibility as an objective institution. It indeed contends that responsibility cannot be deduced, as is ordinarily believed, either from the requirements of a metaphysics which exhibits the free individual, or from those of morality which present him as a being full of failings before the bar of his conscience. Nevertheless it shows that responsibility expresses an imperious and entirely ideal need of the collective consciousness. All offenses against the values which the collective consciousness holds dear must be immediately effaced and compensated by a reaction *sui generis*. This at first strikes blindly and vaguely whomever, whatever, and wherever it can, just to be striking; finally it corrects its aim, directing itself to a given point where there is at last discovered an individual declared to be the responsible

<sup>16</sup> *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, Paris, Alcan; *La mentalité primitive*, Paris, Alcan, 1923.

<sup>16a</sup> *La mentalité primitive*, with a preface by Lévy-Bruhl, Paris, Stock, 1923.

<sup>17</sup> *La responsabilité*, Paris, Alcan, 1921.

cause of the evil. While it lends itself to interpretation and comprehension at first only in its objective aspects, and outside of the domain that metaphysicians and psychologists explore, the need that there be responsibility, an effacement of crime, nevertheless remains a trait of primitive mentality, a phenomenon of the collective mind.

Should one not, in a sense, say the same of another need felt in common by so many archaic civilizations—the need to translate all their activity and solidarity, as well as their group antagonisms, into the form of a ritualistic exchange of loans and gifts? With our custom of free gifts this has nothing in common except the name. For according to the ancient custom it is as obligatory to receive as to give; and an act of return must be with ceremony and with the desire to outdo and to overwhelm. This curious juristic-economic-ritualistic custom, comprising almost the whole group of traits found in the social life of societies at the totemic stage of evolution, where the potlatch is one of the most characteristic manifestations, has during these last years opened an entirely new and a fertile field of sociological investigation.<sup>18</sup> The conclusion of M. Mauss' study, referred to in the footnote, brings out the significance and the multiple importance of such investigations. They elucidate many matters far removed from the origins of law on which they cast immediate light. In these institutions, still entirely objective, it is indeed the psychology of the human living group in its concrete fullness that is presented to us. Let us turn to M. Mauss' own words. Though doubtless a little long, the citation is too important and too characteristic of this new point of view either to omit or to abridge. "We have, then, more than themes, more than the elements of institutions, more than complex

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Mauss, *Année Sociologique*, Vols. XI and XIIff; and, in the first number, which has just appeared (1925), of the new series of *l'Année sociologique*, an important study on the gift, an archaic form of exchange. See also Georges Davy, *La Foi Jurée*, Paris, Alcan, 1922; and Lenoir, *Sur le Potlatch*, *Revue Philosophique*, 1924.

institutions, more even than systems of institutions, differentiated, for example, into religion, law, economics, etc. . . . we have entireties, whole social systems whose functionings we have tried to describe. We have seen societies in the dynamic state of physiology. We have not studied them as if they were fixed in a static state or as if they were dead, and even less have we decomposed and dissected them into rules of law, into myths, into values, and into prices. It is in considering the thing as a whole that we have been able to perceive that which is essential, the movement of the whole, the living aspect, the fugitive moment when society or men acquire an affective consciousness of themselves and of their situation face to face with one another. This concrete observation of social life affords means of finding new facts which we are now only beginning to see faintly. Nothing, in our opinion, is more urgent or more fruitful than this study of social facts as a whole. It has a double advantage. There is first an advantage of generality: the facts of general functioning have the possibility of being more universal than the diverse institutions or various phases of these institutions, for the latter are always more or less accidentally tinged with local color. But above all there is the advantage of reality. One thus comes to see the social phenomena themselves, in the concrete, as they are. In societies one grasps more than ideas or rules, one grasps men, groups, and their actions. . . . Historians feel and rightly decry that sociologists are too abstract and that they are too prone to sunder the diverse elements of societies from one another. We must do as the former do, and observe what is given. But what is given is Rouen, Athens, the average Frenchman, the Melanesian of such and such an island, and not prayer or law in itself. After having been a little too divisive and abstract, sociologists must force themselves to reconstruct the whole. Thus they will find fertile fields of



study. They will also find means of satisfying the psychologists. These latter are keenly conscious of their privilege, and the psychopathologists especially have the certainty of studying the concrete. All study, or should study, the actions of beings as a whole and not divided into faculties. We must imitate them. The study of the concrete as a whole is possible, and is even more captivating and significant in sociology. We observe the complete and complex reactions of numerically defined quantities of men, of complete and complex human beings. We also describe the nature of their organisms and of their minds, while likewise portraying the actions of the mass and the psychoses which correspond thereto: feelings, ideas, volitions of the crowd or of organized societies and their sub-groups. We also watch bodies and the reactions of bodies, of which ideas and feelings are ordinarily the interpretations and more rarely the motives. The principle and the end of sociology is to view the group as a whole and its behavior as a totality."<sup>19</sup>

If it is thus among the complexities of collective life, among practices, usages and obligations included within it, that there first clearly appears the action of the individual in relation to himself and to others, and the feeling of value which he attributes to himself or which he makes others attribute to him, it is not surprising that sociology is more and more introducing its point of view and explanatory method into the domains of psychology and of law. Will it dissipate all the difficulties in these fields? Will it lead to an integral, scientific explanation by the radical elimination of that which is individual and contingent? Less and less would we dare to affirm it. And, in a chapter written more than ten years ago (in 1914; the book itself appeared much later) for Dumas' *Traité de psychologie*, a chapter for which I, not at all to my surprise, have

<sup>19</sup> *Année sociologique*, new series, I, p. 181f.

been charged with intransigence,<sup>19a</sup> I already concluded with this declaration, full, one will agree, of reserve: "Sociology shows psychology how the soul of society is reflected in that of the individual, how it there inscribes the rules of thought as well as of action, how it instills the sentiment of ideal values which make human life differ, by virtue of intellectuality and morality, from simple animal life where knowledge is based on experience. And now what original form does this feeling take in each individual consciousness, and in what unique manner does each individual exercise the superior faculties which social influences develop in him? This is a question which psychology must raise. Sociology gives it over to psychology, without denying in any way that there is such a question, but asking only that it be settled for the benefit of individual originality only after sociological explanation shall have been exhausted, and with the condition that sociological explanation be always permitted to function in reducing the part assigned to the individual."<sup>20</sup> Some attempts at sociological explanation in psychology may be found in several chapters of Dumas' *Traité*, chapters devoted to will and personality and written by the alert and colorful pen of M. Blondel; also in a recent book on memory, more than one thesis of which will awaken resistance, but which is full of substance.<sup>21</sup>

To set forth the position and the ambitions of the sociologist in the domain of law would require a special chapter. Let us note simply this question: May not the fundamental categories of private or of public law, of contract and sovereignty, for example, or the very notion of law in general, far from representing either the changeless principles of natural law, or artificial constructions as in the contractualism of J. J. Rousseau or the neo-contractualism of Léon

<sup>19a</sup> D. Parodi, *La philosophie contemporaine en France*, 3rd ed.

<sup>20</sup> G. Dumas, *Traité de Psychologie*, II, p. 808f.

<sup>21</sup> M. Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris, Alcan, 1921.

Bourgeois, or organic products as in the evolutionism and organicism of Spencer, really represent progressive acquisitions of civilization, superior products and at the same time expressions of collective life and of society's work upon itself, work in which, moreover, one cannot see why the individual should not lend his collaboration, as when the reasoned art of codification comes to graft itself onto the spontaneity of custom? It is a fact that one obtains singular clarity concerning the origins and nature of juridical notions when one gives up the attempt to explain them as the image of reason or of human instinct in general, and considers them as objectively existing institutions that are formed, unformed, and transformed in the course of the history of societies and under the action of assignable causes. One can then seek to illumine by the light of history and of experience problems which have continued to remain after and in spite of much dialectical debate. This is what we have ourselves sought to do for the notion of contract and of obligation, and for that of sovereignty, as well as for that of the mutual relationship between national sovereignty and individual liberty on the one hand, and national sovereignty and international solidarity on the other.<sup>22</sup>

This brief review is not at all exhaustive. It has had as its especial purpose the characterization of several essential tendencies. To give an idea of contemporary sociological activity in France, some facts remain to be mentioned. We would refer, in the first place, to the reappearance of the *Année sociologique* in its two-fold form of a periodical with original studies and reviews and of a collection of works. The first number has just appeared with the important essay, already noted, by M. Mauss. The second number will follow shortly. In the collection of

<sup>22</sup> Cf. G. Davy, *La foi jurée, étude sociologique du problème du contrat*, Paris, Alcan; *Elements de sociologie: sociologie politique*, Paris, Delagrave; also A. Moret and G. Davy, *Des clans aux Empires*, Paris, Renaissance du livre.

works there is announced an account by M. Granet, a Sinologist interested in sociology, of the dances and legends of ancient China. The works, above mentioned, by M. Lévy-Bruhl, by M. Halbwachs, and by myself form a part of the same collection. We must likewise refer to the assembling in book form of scattered articles by Durkheim and the publication of his unedited courses, of which we have no desire to present the work which is no longer recent but wish to exhibit the living spirit and the influence.<sup>23</sup> There must also be noted the publication of certain more or less unfinished works affording an impression of some promising sociologists lost during the war. In the foremost rank here is the very fine study by Robert Hertz on expiation and sin,<sup>24</sup> published, as were the unedited works of Durkheim, by the faithful efforts of M. Mauss. The *in memoriam* placed at the head of the first number of the new series of the *Année sociologique* will give an idea of all the unfinished work which was tragically interrupted and of which only a small part can be published. Besides the Durkheimian movement in the strict sense of the term, the important collection which, under the general head *L'évolution de l'humanité*, and under the supervision of M. Berr, director of the *Revue de synthèse historique*, presents a history and an interpretation of the progress of civilization, and the collection of the Institute of Comparative Law of Lyons, an important body of publications directed by Professor Lambert, give evidence of a sociological spirit in the large sense. The *Revue internationale de sociologie* continues to appear, as in the past, with a very open mind;

<sup>23</sup> Durkheim: *Sociologie et psychologie*, with a preface by C. Bouglé, Paris, Alcan, 1924. *Education et sociologie*, with an introduction by P. Fauconnet, Paris, Alcan, 1922. *L'Éducation morale*, with a note by P. Fauconnet, Paris, Alcan, 1925. Finally one will find in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* and in the *Revue philosophique* some of Durkheim's lectures extracted after his death from his courses on morality, on the family, and on the history of doctrines (socialism and Saint-Simonism).

<sup>24</sup> Robert Hertz, *Le péché et l'expiation dans les sociétés primitives*; taken in part from the *Revue de l'histoire des religions*. Paris, Leroux, 1922.

its Spencerian enthusiasm for organization is continually waning, as is evident in the last book published by its director, René Worms, who has just died.<sup>25</sup> We would call attention also to an important series of very suggestive articles published in recent years by M. R. Lenoir in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* and the *Revue de Synthèse Historique*; they relate to the history of positive ideas and to current sociological questions. Let us note in closing that sociology has won a place for itself not only among the public, even among non-specialists, but also in programs of instruction.<sup>26</sup> It has become obligatory in the programs of study for the *Licence* and the programs of primary normal schools, and even facultative matter for the Baccalauréat.

<sup>25</sup> René Worms, *La sociologie, sa nature, son contenu, ses attaches*. Paris, Giard, 1926.

<sup>26</sup> Whence the appearance of manuals of sociology: Hesse and Gleyze (Paris, Alcan); Déat (Paris, Alcan); René Hubert (Paris, Delalain); Souriau (Paris, Nathan); G. Davy (Paris, Delagrave).

## PEDAGOGICAL TENDENCIES<sup>1</sup>

ED. CLAPARÈDE

IT is difficult to characterize in general terms the pedagogical tendencies current among French-speaking peoples within recent years, for this movement is notably different in France from what it is in French Switzerland and in Belgium.

France, in truth, appears to be much more conservative and traditionalistic than her small neighbors. She fears innovations in the domain of pedagogy. Her entire school system, strongly centralized, lends itself but poorly to experimentation, and her educational problem appears to be dominated by considerations of politics. It is in their political bearings, unfortunately, that she still envisages most of the pedagogical questions, such, for example, as the question of the "école unique" (single type school), with reference to which Switzerland has long since reached an affirmative decision.

In France, ecclesiastical considerations likewise factor in obscuring and complicating a number of the pedagogical issues. Whereas, in Switzerland, the principle of the lay school is admitted by all and no one would venture to question it, in France, lay teaching is still an object of lively attack from the side of the parties of the right.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, the war has aroused in France a renewed interest in pedagogy. The moment the war closed there appeared a work written by a number of combatants who assumed the name, "Les Compagnons."<sup>3</sup> They demand

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> Bouglé: *l'Éducateur laïque*, Paris, 1921.

<sup>3</sup> *Les Compagnons: l'Université nouvelle*, Paris, 1918.

that educational institutions shall create a new spirit. They hope that France may witness a reversal in the order of values, as a result of which politics will pass to the second place and education to the first. "It is the individual Frenchman who must be reformed. It is his inner being, his course of life and morals, that must be changed. One must penetrate to the depths of his heart. . . . For this reason we turn to childhood. It is in the child that we place our faith." The authors from whom we have just quoted develop a complete program for all the stages of education; they seek a genuine systematization of the teaching personnel.

As early as 1916 M. Herriot proclaimed the necessity of rejuvenating the educational system, "of modifying it along lines at once more democratic and more conformable to the needs of France."

A considerable body of writers and of works have struck the same note. M. Ferd. Buisson and Mme. Kergomard, the deans of French pedagogy, insist on the "new duties" which actual events impose on the educator. More especially, they insist, one must show the children the benefits of the League of Nations. C. Bouglé shows that democracy requires of citizens the development of their reason to the end that they may be able to control the acts of those whom they elect to office. Melle. M. Dugard (*La culture et la vie, problèmes de demain*, 1918) holds that "what is most lacking in the contemporary world is men capable of improving the social structure"; "in its eagerness for the mastery of things mankind neglects certain essential values." It is necessary above all, she contends, that "studies shall be made to serve the ends of culture"; egoism must be uprooted, love of justice implanted.

Most of these proposals, however, are not novel. But one hears them proclaimed with more force than ever. Yet up to the present they have all remained mere words; they

have not yet passed to the sphere of action. *Agir!* Such is the title of a work by M. Herriot.<sup>4</sup>

In Belgium, on the other hand, under the influence of the movement inaugurated by Dr. Decroly, and in French Switzerland, thanks to the influence exercised by the *Institut J. J. Rousseau* (a school of educational science founded in 1912), the pedagogical spirit may almost be said to have been made over, and many improvements have come in educational practice.

But we cannot here enter upon the details of school questions. It is our task to indicate some of the more important publications of recent years in the fields of pedagogy and of child psychology.

#### GENERAL PEDAGOGY

A new and important pedagogical outlook is developed in the posthumous works of Durkheim. This writer connected pedagogy with his social theory. For him education is primarily a social matter. Indeed, the ideal to which it is subordinate and the end to which it should set itself vary with each society and depend upon the social structure. "Education is a socialization of the young generation." Morality and language are essentially social in character. Education must develop the will in such wise that the individual will subordinate himself to the exigencies of the group. According to Durkheim, therefore, if one would impart to the child the rudiments of morality, one must inculcate in him "the spirit of discipline" and arouse in him "an attachment to social groups." The objective of school discipline is to develop morality within the

<sup>4</sup> We would cite also the work of J. Wilbois, *La nouvelle éducation française* (Paris, 1922), which suggests a complete reformation of methods and programs. This reformation, Wilbois believes, should be founded upon the science of the child; that is, upon pedagogical experimentation.



class. Its function is "to serve as a stepping-stone from the emotional morality of the family to the more severe morality of civil life." Thus, discipline is not merely a simple process designed to maintain order in the classroom. Furthermore, obedience is truly moral only if it expresses an inner sentiment of respect for the rule imposed. And this rule, in turn, is truly a rule only if it appears to the child as impersonal, as not dependent upon the good pleasure of the teacher. Respect for discipline, then, ought not to be aroused through fear of the teacher himself; the latter must develop in the mind of the child respect for the rule which he himself reverences.

It is the role of the school to awaken that social loyalty for which there is so dire a need, especially among the French who are inclined to rebel against the group spirit. The milieu of the school, as well as certain studies, notably history, are particularly adapted to engender in children interest in a social group at once wider and more impersonal than that to which they have previously been accustomed.

As thus appears, the pedagogy of Durkheim is derived from his sociological conceptions. Once these are admitted, one must recognize that the pedagogical edifice which he has erected is not lacking in magnificence. Nevertheless one cannot fail to see that many of his theories are quite artificial. In his entire work rhetoric too often assumes the place which ought to be occupied by observation and experience. The facts regarding the social and moral development of the child are still very obscure; Durkheim writes as if they were all definitely known.

Without doubt the social environment exercises a considerable influence on the development of the child, as well as on the formation of the moral ideas which serve as social norms. But does it follow that in educating a child one must subordinate him to the ends set by the group? Not

at all, for to act morally is very often to act *against* the opinion of the group. And thus it is with entire justice that G. Belot says: "Between society and the self of reflective thought, the accord is neither immediate nor constant. Though the human animal is inferior to the social man, society is often less advanced than the rational man. So far is society from being by its nature creative of reason and of the ideal, that it constantly ranges tradition against the will for progress and against the intellectual conquests of the individual; it ranges intolerance against the free play of thought."<sup>5</sup>

J. Delvolvé, Professor at Montpellier, has also devoted some attention to moral education.<sup>6</sup> He has circulated a questionnaire relating to the moral character of school children. Up to the present, however, the results of this investigation have not been published. M. Delvolvé emphasizes the social factors of moral education in the schools. He develops a number of ideas on "educational technique" that are original but not always very clear. The technique to which he refers is of a rational character and must not be confused with educational practice. It has for its aim the justification and the interpretation of the latter. It is concerned with "the development of the child under the influences of education."

For a considerable period of years and with untiring patience, Adolphe Ferrière, of Geneva, Director of the International Bureau of New Schools, has kept adding to his publications in behalf of a reformation in our school systems under the inspiration of the methods practiced in the "new schools."<sup>7</sup> "Among the deep-lying causes of the

<sup>5</sup> From G. Belot's contribution to a co-operative volume, *Les problèmes pratiques de la pédagogie morale positive*, Paris.

<sup>6</sup> *La technique éducative*, Paris, 1922.

<sup>7</sup> Ad. Ferrière: *l'Ecole nouvelle et le bureau international des écoles nouvelles*, Lausanne, 1919; *l'Education dans la famille*, Neuchâtel, 1921; *Transformons l'école*, Basel, 1920; *l'Autonomie des écoliers*, Neuchâtel, 1921; *l'Ecole active*, Geneva, 1922.

war and of the prevailing marasmus," he says, "there is one that has perhaps hitherto not been sufficiently noticed. In all the countries of Europe, the school strives to train the child to passive obedience. It has done nothing to develop the critical spirit. It has never sought to promote co-operation. It is easy to see where this patient and long-continued training is bound to lead peoples." Ferrière therefore pleads for a school that shall teach the children initiative, self-mastery, and that shall develop the social sense. All of this is to be found in the "active school." The active school is a school based on needs, on interests. "To make the pupil act one must put him into such situations that he will experience a need for doing the thing that is expected of him."<sup>8</sup> Ferrière often insists on the bio-genetic law, and, along with Stanley Hall, he holds that educators ought to take it more into account.

M. Roger Cousinet, a school inspector in France, himself a notable advocate of the principles of the new education and of self-government, seeks to eliminate all constraint in matters of discipline and of instruction. The teacher, he believes, must efface himself as much as possible and thus allow the child to act freely. "He should give children the utmost liberty," says M. Cousinet, "no longer subjecting them to constraint of any sort or imposing upon them any manner of action, any specific mode of learning, or any definitely assigned things to learn. He should observe them. Placing the child in the environment of reality where he is altogether free to move under the surveillance of our attentive eyes, let us observe how he conducts himself, how he attacks this reality in order to make it his."<sup>9</sup>

In a work on *Pédagogie française* (1920), M. Paul Lapie, at the present time Rector of the University of Paris,<sup>9a</sup> maintains that an essential feature of this pedagogy

<sup>8</sup> Ed. Claparède: *Psychologie de l'école active, Interméd. des Educateurs*, Dec., 1923.

<sup>9</sup> *La pédagogie moderne*, l'Education, 1921.

<sup>9a</sup> Deceased since the publication of this paper in *The Monist* for July, 1926.

is liberalism, that is to say, a tendency against authority and pressure. M. Ch. Chabot, Professor of Pedagogy in Lyons (recently deceased), seeks in a small book to vindicate "the right of the child" (Paris, 1922). For him it is the family which is and which ought to remain the natural environment of the child.

Ed. Claparède advocates "a school made to measure," that is to say, a school which takes account of individual differences. Ought one not to have for the diverse forms of mentality a respect at least equal to that one has for the different shapes of feet, when one gives to them shoes "made to measure?"<sup>10</sup>

In an amusing and spirited brochure, *Le pédagogue n'aime pas les enfants* (Lausanne, 1917), H. Roorda, Professor in Lausanne, ridicules "the absurdities of our methods of teaching." A Belgian, Jean Haesaert, vigorously criticizes the school as unadapted to present conditions.<sup>11</sup>

Melle. Hamaide has given an interesting exposition of the system of Dr. Decroly in Brussels;<sup>12</sup> and Em. Duvilleard, of Geneva, has sketched the prevailing tendencies in primary education.<sup>13</sup>

One of the real tasks of moral education is to develop the international spirit and the spirit of solidarity. The Third International Congress of Moral Education held in Geneva in 1922 gave especial attention to these problems.<sup>14</sup> Much attention is at the present time being devoted also to the modification of the manuals of history and of reading books with a view to eliminating everything that might needlessly arouse hatred between nations.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Ed. Claparède: *l'Ecole sur mesure*, Lausanne, 1920.

<sup>11</sup> *Didactique mineure*, Brussels, 1924.

<sup>12</sup> *La méthode Decroly*, Neuchatel and Paris, 1922.

<sup>13</sup> *Les tendances actuelles de l'enseignement primaire*, Neuchatel and Paris, 1921.

<sup>14</sup> Investigations presented to this congress: *Education et Solidarité*, and *l'Esprit international et l'enseignement de l'histoire*, 2 vols., Neuchatel and Paris, 1923.

<sup>15</sup> Carnegie Foundation for Peace, *Enquête sur les livres scolaires d'après guerre*, Paris, 1923.

## CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL PEDAGOGY

It is a singular fact that these disciplines are less cultivated in France, the country of Alfred Binet, the gifted originator of intelligence tests, than in Belgium and in French Switzerland. As a matter of fact, it is in Geneva that there was founded, in 1912, the *Institut J. J. Rousseau* which is especially devoted to researches in this field and endeavors to orient future educators in psychological and pedagogical methods. The director of this institute, Professor Pierre Bovet, published, in 1917, an authoritative study of the fighting instinct. This study was based in part on an investigation which indicated that among most children from nine to twelve years of age fighting is a form of play, and that this play involves an instinct. But this fighting instinct is repressed by social life. It canalizes itself, or it assumes complications or deviations; it becomes sublimated, and Bovet has shown the role of education in the sublimation whereby moral virtues acquire the victory and the instinct is thus rendered harmless.

P. Bovet has also written a very striking essay on the nature and the genesis of the religious sentiment of the child. For Bovet it is neither sexual nor conjugal love, but filial love that is the prototype of divine love. This hypothesis rests on a mass of observations cited by the author.<sup>16</sup>

Ed. Claparède published, in 1916, a new edition of his *Psychologie de l'enfant*. Along with an exposition of psychological methods this book furnishes a glimpse of the mental development of the child. The author puts into prominence the phenomenon of play, modifying the theory of K. Groos so as to take into account the facts of compen-

<sup>16</sup> P. Bovet: *L'Instinct combatif*, 1921 (also translated into English); *Le sentiment religieux chez l'enfant*, Neuchatel, 1925.

sation and of origin, which, no less truly than the considerations advanced by Groos, come to expression in play. He defines the function of play in the following manner: "It is in satisfying present needs that play equips for the future." He maintains that the educator can find in play a valuable ally, for play is a liberator of energy; it is in play that the child gives himself in his entirety.

The *Institut Rousseau* has pursued various lines of investigation. A part of its activity has been devoted to the study of mental tests. We would cite here the works of Melle. Descoeudres, notably her book on *Développement de l'enfant de deux à sept ans* (Neuchatel, 1921). This development the author has traced through the use of various tests. Melle. Descoeudres had, in 1916, published an admirable work on *l'Education des enfants anormaux*. M. Claparède has brought out a small volume presenting an introduction to the technique of tests, *Comment diagnostiquer les aptitudes chez les écoliers* (1924).

Among the most remarkable works coming from the *Institut Rousseau* belong the researches of Jean Piaget on the development of the intelligence of the child. Piaget has shown that the mind of the child differs from that of the adult not simply quantitatively but more especially qualitatively. The thought of the child is not like that of the adult. It resembles the incoherent thought of the dream. And Piaget contends that the thought of a child is intermediary between the "autism" and the logic of the adult. His works include also a mass of observations that should be read in the original.<sup>17</sup>

The *Institut Rousseau* created, in 1917, a bureau of vocational guidance, one of the first in Europe. One of its founders, J. Fontgène, published a work covering the whole of this field and showing its importance for educa-

<sup>17</sup> J. Piaget: *Le langage et le pensée de l'enfant*, and *Le jugement et le raisonnement chez l'enfant*, 2 vols., Neuchatel, 1923-24; *La pensée symbolique et la pensée de l'enfant*, in *Archiv de psychologie*, XVIII, 1923.

tion. The most recent creation of this institute (1926) is the International Bureau of Education, which is to serve as a general clearing-house for all educational and psychological information and enquiries.

In Paris, the experimental tradition of Binet is carried on by an independent society for the study of the child. Subsequently to 1917 the organization has called itself *Société Alfred Binet*. Its animating spirits are Doctor Simon, the collaborator of Binet, and M. Vaney, the director of the primary school where Binet pursued his investigations. Simon has just inaugurated a series of books on experimental pedagogy by a work devoted to studies of writing, reading and spelling. Experimental pedagogy represents progress in pedagogical practice; but it ought not to be separated from such practice.

Another collection, *Bibliothèque du Psychologie de l'enfant et de Pédagogie*, has just been launched by the publisher Alcan. Its first two volumes are devoted, the one to *l'Imitation chez l'enfant* (by P. Guillaume, 1925) and the other to *Enfants turbulents* (by H. Wallon, 1925).

In Montpellier, Marcel Foucault has edited a manual entitled *Observations et expériences de Psychologie scolaire* (1923) and, in Brussels, T. Jonckheere has published a small book on *La pédagogie expérimentale au jardin d'enfant* (1924). These works are designed to encourage teachers to observe and to take note of the acts and the behavior of their pupils.

Let us add that the use of tests, hitherto much neglected in France, is in that country now beginning to have its experts. Among these we would mention M. Duthil of Nancy, and M. and Mme. Piéron of Paris. Publications by them may be found in *l'Année psychologique* for 1924.

## METAPSYCHICS AND PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

EUGENE OSTY

THERE has been considerable discussion concerning the term *metapsychics* on account of its prefix *meta* which suggests that it means “*after* the psychical” and that, too, in the derogatory sense of something beyond psychology, outside the pale of science. When Charles Richet invented this term—guided by analogy with the term “metaphysics”—his only intention was to give a name to the new science of the unknown forces of intelligence. It was to avoid premature judgment as to the nature of these forces that he chose a term which leaves to the future the task of replacing “meta” (beyond) with exact knowledge. In fruitless discussion of a term, we must not lose sight of the reality which the term designates. Let us understand by *metapsychics* the study of phenomena of human origin whose attributes go beyond those powers which the officially taught science of today ascribes to the human being. Let us understand that it is also the study of all such other supernormal phenomena, if such there be, as would be caused by forces of intelligence acting from another plane of life upon our own. This definition makes it clear that metapsychics sets itself the task of studying phenomena which are not as yet universally accepted as subject matter of science and, thereby, of bringing them within the field of science.

The special atmosphere in which this branch of science came to birth still keeps it in the anomalous position of

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Nina Winans.



having the very actuality of the phenomena it studies contested. If one were to inquire today of the greater number of scientists whether there is such a thing as a science of metapsychics, there is no doubt in my mind but that the reply would be in the negative. In the fields of chemistry, of physics, of biology, one would, ordinarily, carefully refrain from uttering an opinion about the existence of any phenomenon produced by the mere exercise of the mind. As regards the metapsychical, one abandons reasonable logic with scarcely any hesitation; one is ready to believe in his right to judge without taking the trouble to observe the facts of nature—it is a sentiment which decides. A question of fact is transformed into a matter of belief.

This unusual situation in metapsychics is due to two causes which I point out without dwelling upon them: first, *its subject-matter*, which runs the gamut of the unusual and almost miraculous aspects of the human psycho-dynamism in paranormal operation; secondly, *the intellectual attitude of most of its investigators* who introduce elements of the mystical and fantastic into the study of phenomena, thereby removing them from the field of strict observation and of methodically carried-out experiment.

It would be unprofitable to undertake here to convince the reader of the actuality of the contested phenomena. I shall content myself with the assertion that during the short era of the *scientific* cultivation of metapsychics, all savants who have been willing to base their judgment of them upon personal experience have become as certain of the actuality of metapsychical facts as of the phenomena within their own special fields of science. During the sixteen years of my strictly experimental study of man's power of supernormal knowledge, I have put certain scientific persons in a position to verify this power through their own personal observation; up to the present time there has not been a single one of them who did not finally conclude

by asking: "How can it be that phenomena which so frequently occur, which are so readily verifiable, and which are of so great scientific import, have not long since been investigated in the psychological laboratories with a view to their explanation?" The science of metapsychics, like any other science, should be estimated by observation of the facts. To remain in the midst of the conflict of beliefs—scientific, philosophical, religious, etc.—in the face of the special manifestations of the human psycho-dynamism, which are producible and verifiable at will, is not to make a proper use of one's reason.

What are the phenomena which constitute the subject-matter of metapsychics? There is a tendency to distinguish two types of phenomena: the *subjective* and the *objective*, according to some students, or the *psychological* and the *physical*, according to others. Inasmuch as all metapsychical phenomena are at once subjective, objective, psychological and physical, this distinction is without adequate foundation. It is more reasonable to distinguish two groups of phenomena: those having to do with *the capacity of supernormal knowledge*, and others having to do with *the human being's paranormal control over matter* (telekinesis, teleplasty). It should be understood that the supernormal is not to be—as it sometimes is—confused with the supernatural, but that it is qualitatively superior to the normal: the exceptional ranking in value above the usual.

To speak of a *scientific* study of these phenomena is to have in mind the setting up of experiments which, so far as possible, vary their conditions, psychological, physiological and physical. Scientific study requires that the phenomena under investigation be such as can be produced and repeated again and again. This requirement is met by the fact that there are persons, more or less numerous, who permanently possess the power to produce the several

classes of phenomena. Very rare are those who exhibit the paranormal control over matter. Very common, however, are the mythomanes or the impostors who imitate them. In France, it has been the case, by a sort of fatality, that whenever at the instigation of metapsychists scientific persons have met to confirm the facts of supernormal human actions, they have been shown this class of phenomena—phenomena which are rare, but imitable and often fraudulent, and difficult to attest because of the conditions which surround their production. The balance of results pointing in this direction appears, in the opinion prevailing in the scientific world, to suggest that these phenomena are to be regarded as more probably feats of conjuring than of psycho-physiology. Hence, among the scientific elect, the lack of interest in a science whose field, and the importance of whose sound portion, they ignore.

While those who exhibit paranormal control over matter are rare, the subjects who are endowed with the powers of supernormal knowledge are numerous—numerous and very dissimilar as to the sorts of reality they are capable of perceiving. In general they display the power to apprehend distant realities under conditions where the best intelligence equipped with the best of senses would have known nothing, time and space not restricting their perception. In practice, however, the range of supernormal perception varies with different subjects, and this variation divides them into groups according to their special sensitivities—none of them detects all sorts of realities, but each is capable of perceiving only the one or the other, or perhaps several, from among the manifold sorts.

A very large number of them are limited to the detection of expanses of water or subterranean streams of water; only some of them are equally sensitive to veins of coal, of metals, of petroleum, subterranean caves, etc. Others, such as Bert Reese, Ossoviecki, Ludwig Kahn, dis-

close what is contained in a sealed box, what is written in a sealed envelope or what was written on paper that has been burned, etc. Others, touching an object, can reconstruct in thought its surroundings, the beings and things which at various times have formed the environment of the object. Others show a special faculty in the way of supernormal understanding of man, i. e., his individual traits—emotional, intellectual, bodily—and the general trend and episodes of his life.

I mention these specializations and there are many others. They are not the product of the subject's volition nor of his surroundings; they are determined by the cryptaesthetic range of each subject.

All the special forms of supernormal knowledge have a bearing upon the study of a human being's capacity for knowledge transcending the known senses. But there is one form whose importance I cannot too much emphasize, viz., that in which the special object of supernormal knowledge is *man*. By his psychic organism, indeed, man is a being who intensely and widely influences the cryptaesthetic organism which is in harmony with his radiations. This is a field of research in which the psychologist can enter upon an experimental study of the intercommunication of minds and of the physical mechanism which underlies the amazing complexity of its manifestations.

How far has the science of metapsychics progressed? It has been in existence for about a century. But the real workers in the field are very few; and they have devoted to it not the principal part of their labors, but their leisure. All branches of science, in respect of their progress, are mutually dependent; the growth of the one furthers the development of the others. The metapsychists have not found in the classical psychology, and still less in the physiology and physics of their time, concepts which could serve for the explanation, even a superficial explanation, of the

observed phenomena. They have been, they still are, constrained, before advancing in the study of conditions which determine their phenomena, to make new contributions to psychology. Today they must bring about further progress in physics and physiology if they wish to end the era of a fruitless accumulation of facts continually recurring under the same conditions.

The small amount of time devoted to research and the difficulty of an unaided investigation, in an entirely new field, explain why the past century, as regards progress, has the appearance of a laborious beginning.

The accomplishment of the metapsychists has been twofold: they have classified their phenomena and they have begun, experimentally, an explanatory investigation into certain of these phenomena.

What, at the present time, is accomplished in the way of explaining the metapsychical? To give a fair idea of this within the limits of a few pages is a task from which I recoil. This young science already offers a wealth of newly acquired knowledge. A partial account would put it in a false light. Since, after all, I have been requested to present in this article the point of view of French metapsychics, I prefer simply to tell the reader who seeks an introduction to the subject, that useful sources of information may be found in three books, recently published, which represent—so far as France is concerned—the scope of the cleared ground. I cite these books in the order of their publication, apologizing for the inclusion of one of my own works: *Traité de Métapsychique*,<sup>2</sup> by Charles Richet: a survey of the historical development of metapsychical science down to 1921; a presentation and classification of the phenomena. *La connaissance supranormale*,<sup>3</sup> by Dr. E.

<sup>2</sup> Paris, Alcan, 1922; Eng. trans.: *Thirty Years of Psychical Research*, New York, The Macmillan Co.

<sup>3</sup> Paris, Alcan, 1923; Eng. trans.: *Supernormal Faculties in Man*, London, Methuen & Co., New York, E. P. Dutton & Co.

Osty: an experimental study of the power of supernormal knowledge in cases where the object of this knowledge is man. *Ectoplasmie et clairvoyance*,<sup>4</sup> by Dr. G. Geley: an account of experiments upon man's supernormal control over matter, and of experiments on supernormal knowledge.

Inasmuch as my words are intended for philosophical readers, I make haste to indicate how philosophy will be affected by metapsychics when this science shall have attained to the universal recognition which cannot be long delayed. The best way of doing this briefly will be, I think, to show how far certain metapsychical phenomena, selected from among those readily verifiable, *extend* the human being beyond the confines to which he is limited by the classical psychology, i. e., by the psychology that is taught officially. With this end in view, I shall consider that aspect of the rich phenomenology of supernormal knowledge which is most enlightening: viz., that in which the object of supernormal apprehension is man. And to simplify matters, I shall select three types of phenomena, endeavoring through them to convey some notion of what philosophers may expect from this new branch of science.

One of these phenomena is fundamental in the "supernormal knowledge ("metagnomie") of a human object":<sup>5</sup> *the transference of thought from mind to mind*. Theoretically, it is this phenomenon whose possibility is most easily admitted since the discovery of electro-magnetic rays and of radium. One readily compares the unknown dynamic power of thought with this known radiation; and one admits an analogy between the influence of one brain upon another brain and the influence of a source of radiation upon a receiving apparatus. Nevertheless, if one's curios-

<sup>4</sup> Paris, Alcan, 1924. Eng. trans. in preparation.

<sup>5</sup> "Metagnomie" (from *μετα*, *beyond*, and *γνώμη*, *knowledge*) is a term originated by E. Boirac to denote the power of cognizing a reality which lies beyond the range of cognition under so-called normal conditions.

ity impels him to investigate the extent of experimental knowledge of the subject, he will discover that the most reputable treatises on psychology regard this phenomenon as non-existent inasmuch as they say nothing of it, and that the periodicals of psychology and of related sciences mention it very rarely and then as an exceptional, and even an uncertain, phenomenon.

Now the transmission of thought from one psychic organism to another can be brought about very easily and in a remarkable number of cases when one works with subjects who are gifted with the power of revealing personal characteristics, presenting to them in succession different personalities selected at random. Two psychic organisms are then joined functionally, so to speak, through their subconscious minds without the participation of the so-called conscious levels of thought. When the psychic couple has been established in a sufficiently close harmony, as frequently happens, the co-operation of mind with mind is brought to its full realization and the result shows itself in "metagnomic" (supernormal) information about the personality "given objectively."

When, knowing how to produce at will this direct communication of thought between two psychic organisms, one would push one's inquiry further and investigate the process involved in this subconscious co-operation between minds and the range of its possibilities, one soon recognizes that one is dealing here not with a "reading of thought" on the part of the percipient and a "mental suggestion" on the part of the perceived, but with an *active* co-operation in which each of the two psychic organisms plays a part, with the result that there is transferred into the conscious mental representation of the metagnomic subject the knowledge which exists potentially, actually, or in memory, in the person who is the object of this supernormal knowledge ("metagnomic").

If by well-devised experiments one carries one's investigation further into the conditions under which such functional union between psychic organisms occurs, one finds that this intermental co-operation, so readily called forth when detector and detected are in the presence of each other, also occurs, though with less effect, regardless of the distance by which they are separated. It is to experimentation along this line that one may look for the explanation of the cases of spontaneous telepathy so frequently reported.

There is sufficient experimental evidence to establish the fact that this intermental co-operation between two psychic organisms, in contact with or at a distance from one another, can extend itself to a larger number of psychic organisms. In subconscious collaboration, a group of persons is capable of elaborating knowledge and ideas which are not the product of any single one of the group but of all. What happens is as if a sort of collective psychic organism with a momentary purpose suddenly precipitated itself. Ignorance of this psychological possibility has led practitioners of spiritism to believe that they were in communication with a more than human intellect when, through automatic writing, ouija, table-rapping, etc., there is obtained information not traceable to any single individual present.

So far has experimentation investigated the *spatial* extension of the human psychic organism in intermental relations. When it essays the investigation of the *temporal* extension, it brings the investigator into the presence of a dizzy spectacle. For here is what it shows.

The collaboration of minds at a distance from each other is most frequently obtained by putting into the hands of a "metagnomic" subject an object owned or touched by a distant person. If, however, instead of giving the subject an object belonging to a person distant in space, one gives him



an object which belonged to a person distant in time—i. e., a person who has been dead for a longer or shorter time—one elicits in the “metagnomic” subject knowledge of the life, or of episodes in the life, of that departed individual.

Obviously I am speaking only of well authenticated cases in which no living psychic organism, however remote in space, could through any possible intermental communication, be the source of the subject’s information. I am speaking only of the case where no living person knows or can know the nature of the subject’s “metagnomic” revelations.

Thus, facts which can be indefinitely multiplied, by pure experimentation, yield the certainty that *man leaves behind him after his death in some place, other than in the mind of the living, the story of his life.*

Does, then, the “metagnomic” subject derive information from the dead, through an intermental co-operation, in the same way that he might obtain it from the living? Does he, by a momentary participation in a universal inclusive psychic organism discover the story of a life? Or does he obtain the information elsewhere, and where? And in any case, how? Thus there is presented to experimental research, with every hope that it will eventuate in substantial explanations, in certainties, the problem of man’s fundamental nature and destiny which humanity, ever since it has been capable of so much thinking, has vainly sought to solve by purely subjective reflections.

And now let us consider that other phenomenon, the culminating manifestation of human thought, the actuality of which my sixteen years of practical investigations enable me to assert without fear that I shall ever be found in error: *The foreknowledge of the future of the human individual.* Conclusions regarding this subject may be summed up as follows: the metagnomic subject’s power of supernormal knowledge of a living human personality is

not confined to the already actualized portion of his life; it knows *his future*.

This is effected through collaboration between the mind of a subject and the mind of the person in question.

What results is as if each of us possessed a latent level of thought which knows his own future, whence the metagnostic subjects derive their information through a co-operation, active on both sides, of mind with mind.

This bimental functioning is not possible to all psychic couples. The production of pure premonition seems, to all appearances, to depend upon the subject's sensitiveness being in accord with the special constitution of the psychic plane which furnishes the transcendental knowledge.

I shall not dwell upon the transformation of human knowledge which may result from future work which shall make known the factors that underlie so remarkable a phenomenon. I merely ask philosophers to contemplate the revolution in our conceptions of man, of life, of the universe, which will ensue when official science simply accepts "foreknowledge of the future of the human individual."

To give a clear, indisputable, conclusive proof of the actuality of this phenomenon will make it certain that *knowledge precedes in time the reality known*, and therefore that there is good reason to abandon the belief that matter is the creator of thought.

To prove that it is *through the co-operation of mind with mind that the metagnostic subject is informed of our individual futures*, is at the same time to show that the transcendence of consciousness which that phenomenon everywhere discloses is not, in each of us, the product of the brain alone, an organ whose mechanism could not react to future vibrations of things not yet actual.

Philosophy is primarily the persistent effort, progressing step by step with science, to explain life, and particularly that most reflective form of individual life: man.

About human nature are centered all the great problems called metaphysical and held to be insoluble experimentally: determinism, free will, materialism, spiritualism, deism, etc., with all of their corollaries.

To the extent to which science has pushed into the unknown, to that extent is metaphysics, which not long since was almost the whole of philosophy, reduced. Under the experimental constraint of metapsychics we shall see metaphysics shrink, perhaps disappear. A new world of the mind will be revealed to a humanity which today is incredulous, which tomorrow will be astonished and perplexed.

M. Bergson has turned to instinct for the secret of the relation between universal consciousness and the successive forms of matter. From this standpoint his genius has derived all that the position could yield: splendid speculations reared on slender and uncertain foundations.

If some day man succeeds in solving his own riddle and in assuring himself that there exists the infinite intelligence which we suppose is through its will directing all that is, it will be—I am certain—only by methodical study, progressive experimental investigation of the supreme manifestations of thought: those manifestations in which the human individual is observed extending himself in space and time to other thinking individuals, and, perhaps, becoming one with them in a universal psychic organism.



CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
GERMAN SPEAKING COUNTRIES



# CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICS<sup>1</sup>

ARTHUR LIEBERT

## I. THE TURN TO METAPHYSICS

I. As regards the attitude and endeavors of contemporary German philosophy, nothing is more characteristic or illuminating than its turn to metaphysics. This metaphysical interest is very pronounced and full of promise. There is a very wide-spread demand that the richly-adorned temple of the sciences be again given its holy of holies, if we may borrow the figure by which Hegel referred to metaphysics in the preface to his *Logic* of 1912.

Only a few decades ago this turn to metaphysics represented little more than blind groping and sporadic efforts characterized by uncertainty and indecisiveness. Not infrequently, indeed, writers on metaphysics entertained certain apprehensions and sought to justify themselves as though they feared to be treading forbidden paths. At the present time, however, the invasion of metaphysics is complete. Not as though we in Germany were as yet in possession of a new and original system of metaphysics, fully elaborated and widely accepted, or capable of affording complete satisfaction to the metaphysical needs and demands and to the requirements set by recent science. What one may affirm, however, is that the various metaphysical efforts which are current converge upon a clearly discernible point, and that they concentrate upon a comprehensive metaphysical achievement. For this reason neither the possibility nor the justification of metaphysics

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

is any longer seriously questioned. Even the neo-Kantian schools are engaging in the effort to develop a metaphysics. In part, this is due to a recognition of the fact that epistemology by itself does not exhaust the tasks of philosophy—that systematic completeness makes unavoidable the step to metaphysics. In part, it springs from the insight that a critical epistemology presupposes a critical metaphysics and ontology. Particularly instructive as regards this point is the development of a former student and follower of the Marburg neo-Kantianism, Nicolai Hartmann. In his widely noticed work, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, he has traversed the way from epistemology to ontology. And the present writer also, in his book *Wie ist kritische Philosophie überhaupt möglich?* has sought to exhibit the close relation between critical epistemology and speculative metaphysics within philosophy as a whole. Closely connected herewith are various tendencies to describe Kant himself as a metaphysician, as one of the greatest and keenest, one of the most constructive and fruitful metaphysicians of all time. We might refer, for example, to the *Kant-Festheft* published by the *Kant-Studien* during the commemoration year of 1924. Among its essays are one by Heinz Heimsoeth on *Metaphysische Motive in der Ausbildung des kritischen Idealismus* and another by Nicolai Hartmann on *Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus*. We might further mention the work of Max Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker*. The earlier tendency of neo-Kantianism to regard Immanuel Kant as primarily or exclusively a critical epistemologist is everywhere on the decline. To exhibit the metaphysical foundations of Kantianism and to bring to light the metaphysics immanent within the critical philosophy is clearly justified on the basis of systematic as well as present historical interests. Even more than this may be claimed: Failure to participate in the prevailing movement towards metaphysics tends even today to be



judged as an indication of philosophical backwardness and of an antiquated point of view. If definite coöperation is not extended, one at least expects explicit approval.

It was in 1904 that Wilhelm Windelband, in association with a number of leading philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt, Rickert, Troeltsch, Bauch and others, published an admirable *Festschrift* on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of Kuno Fischer. It presented a general survey entitled *Die Philosophie im Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Included within it were comprehensive portrayals, in large outlines, of the contemporary psychology, ethics, logic, æsthetics, philosophy of law and philosophy of history. But it omitted metaphysics. This is not surprising if one realizes that this fundamental philosophical discipline was as yet still somewhat under the cloud of disrespect and of academic distrust. Moreover, would not the established conclusions of metaphysics at that time have been very meager—indeed, altogether paltry? Apart from the last echoes of the philosophy of the epigones, as Windelband has referred to the systems of Fechner, Lotze and Eduard von Hartmann, one could at most have pointed to that form of metaphysical idealism which, at the turn of the century, had already been given wide currency through the efforts of Rudolf Eucken; or also to some of the followers of the classic exponents of constructive idealism—to Adolf Lasson and Paul Deussen. The teaching and studies of these scholars were metaphysical in character. Yet these thinkers were entirely dependent upon either Hegel or Schopenhauer and developed no systems of their own. In the wider circles of the uncritical public, a certain homage was paid to a number of shallow naturalistic writers who found their departure in Ernst Haeckel and Wilhelm Ostwald. That these naturalistic world-views, unsecurely grounded as they were, and without any appreciation of the great complexity of the problems under discus-

sion, should very soon be overtaken by fate and succumb to an early death is not at all strange. In connection with their breakdown one must always bear in mind how completely helpless they were, and had to be, in the matter of interpreting historical life and social phenomena.

2. What were the underlying causes of this turn to metaphysics? Why did it enjoy a revival after long decades of quiescence? As early as September, 1919, I was able to speak of a "duty to metaphysics" in an essay published in *Der Spiegel*. Earlier still indeed, in a paper appearing in the *Kant-Studien* of 1916, I had discussed the psychological presuppositions of metaphysics. In 1915 I wrote a work entitled *Geltungswert der Metaphysik*. (Cf. also Peter Wust, *Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik*, 1920). For the change thus indicated three distinct lines of determining influences should be distinguished and considered.

In the first place, we would point to the development of the concrete sciences, the natural and the social sciences alike. The tree of the sciences had developed a tremendous wealth of branches. But the wider its expanse the more urgent became the question concerning its presuppositions and roots, and concerning the viewpoints and the principles involved in its magnificent growth. This presented a philosophical question, the problem of the Kantian epistemology. The theoretical and critical spirit that was so successful in the individual sciences inevitably turned to reflect on the bases and conditions of its achievements. But this epistemological orientation did not of itself suffice. For the results of the individual sciences were so extensive that they created a need for philosophical synthesis. It became necessary to exhibit the interconnection of the objects of knowledge by synthesizing the results of the individual sciences into an harmonious system. This gigantic task was undertaken more particularly by Wilhelm Wundt,

in his *System der Philosophie*. That the result was not much more than an encyclopedia lies in the very nature of the case. The metaphysical task should not and cannot be deferred until the sciences have produced their fruits. Otherwise when could it be undertaken? And what philosophical mind is sufficiently vast and informed really to encompass the results of the individual sciences? Nevertheless, the luxuriant development of the positive sciences led to the two tasks just indicated, namely, those of laying the epistemological foundations and of effecting the systematic unification of knowledge. It is clear that this cleared the way for a renaissance of metaphysics. The central task, as we shall presently see, was set not so much by metaphysics and the natural sciences—for in this field Kantianism had already achieved exhaustive and decisive results—as by the social sciences. A very large part of the metaphysical endeavor of today is concerned with the methodology of historical knowledge. And this indeed presents an extraordinary number of the most urgent and fruitful problems. It is necessary, for example, to establish a genuinely critical conception of the nature of the social sciences and to delimit them from the natural sciences. Moreover, one must seek an understanding of the methods by which one may attain to a scientific knowledge of mental phenomena and must ascertain the fundamental categories of such knowledge. Still again one must determine the method by which a theory of knowledge may establish the bases of the social sciences. For it is still a matter of dispute whether one should follow the critical method of Kantianism or adopt a psychological procedure. And there are numerous other problems of a related nature.

We pass to a second line of influences, those arising from the development of philosophy and its inevitable *nisus* toward systematic completion. If we disregard the sys-

tems of the above-mentioned epigones, we may say that in the period of scientific positivism, that is, from about 1850 to the end of the century, philosophical endeavor had likewise split up into a number of special investigations. These related to logic, ethics, æsthetics, and psychology, but especially to the history of philosophy. It was these decades that likewise marked the birth and the early development of so-called neo-Kantianism. Hence it is altogether natural that the early interest of this movement was exclusively epistemological. After the horrible abortion called philosophical materialism had come to the light of day, in about the middle of the past century, and had for a time indulged in its excesses, there was need for a scientific philosophy that would forcefully terminate the nefarious career of the pseudo-philosophy. And thus the construction of philosophy was begun anew from the very foundations. Investigation again turned to the bases of all philosophy that might lay claim to being scientific, and to the validity and the possible scope of such philosophy. The result was an extraordinarily widespread epistemological movement. Representative of it are a succession of brilliant men of whom we would mention Otto Liebmann and Alois Riehl.

But it was, of course, impossible to stop simply with epistemology. Once the latter had laid the foundations of philosophy and disclosed its immanent presuppositions (as was done so brilliantly by one who fell a sacrifice to the war, the highly gifted Emil Lask, in his *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre*), thought was bound to turn to the construction and elaboration of a philosophical system. Otherwise epistemology would have achieved a task that was but partial and to a certain extent superfluous. Conditions were precisely as they were in the time of Kant. The founder of the critical philosophy was similarly impelled beyond his epistemology (supplied in his

*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) to a system of critical philosophy, created in his later works. But it was not he alone who felt this urge. Every one of his successors saw in the achievement of Kant only a beginning, that is, the basis from which one must proceed to develop a system of philosophy. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel—each regarded himself, with more or less justification, as the one who continued and carried to completion the task of Kant. Windelband has declared that to understand Kant one must go beyond him. This well-known saying is true also in the sense that every preoccupation with Kant impels one beyond the *Kritik der Vernunft* to the *System der Vernunft*. Confirmation hereof is furnished by the history of neo-Kantianism. This exhibits the irrepressible fruitfulness of the Kantian doctrine and presents a close similarity to the original development from Kant to Fichte and thence to Schelling and Hegel. Epistemological investigation extended its sweep so as to include not merely the natural sciences but also the historical disciplines, and it thus became embarked upon the task of systematization. In view of the enormous wealth of presuppositions and motives involved in the critical philosophy of Kant, it is not unnatural that the development just indicated assumed a variety of forms and adopted divergent paths. Yet while there are, to be sure, very marked differences between the Marburger and the Southwest German schools of neo-Kantianism, both schools aspired to a system—the former in the case of Cohen and Natorp, and the latter in the case particularly of Rickert.

Thus we were indeed justified in contending that the development of philosophy itself tended toward the elaboration of systems. The decisive influences were, on the one hand, the splitting up of philosophy into a number of very fruitful special investigations whose conclusions required synthesis, and, on the other hand, the fact that

the particular interest of neo-Kantianism in its early stages was epistemological and led to results that likewise made necessary the advance to a system. The revival of metaphysical systematization was indeed due in part to movements within philosophy itself.

*Thirdly*, we would stress influences connected with the demand for a philosophy of life and with religious experience. For these two forces made irresistibly for the discovery of a metaphysical orientation and a system of thought capable of affording satisfaction more especially to the human spirit. In this connection, one thinks first of all, among the technical philosophers, of Rudolf Eucken; for this was the task to which he devoted himself. Among his numerous widely known and favorably received works are: *Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt*, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung*, *Mensch und Welt*, *Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, *Zur Sammlung der Geister*. Graf Hermann Keyserling, though scarcely to be counted in the ranks of technical philosophers, should be mentioned as an energetic and successful exponent of a metaphysics growing out of the need for a world-view. Among his more important works are: *Unsterblichkeit*, *Philosophie als Kunst*, *Das Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen*, *Schöpferische Erkenntnis*—the last mentioned of which also indicates the purpose of the *Schule der Weisheit*. Keyserling does not seek to create a scientific and logically established philosophy, capable of formulation in terms of concepts. He aims at the development of a fundamental attitude toward life and reality, or, as he is fond of saying, toward the realization of values. In none of his numerous publications and addresses is he really concerned with intellectual goals or the enrichment of knowledge; he does not attempt to express the nature of things in conceptual formulæ. His primary concern is rather that the excessively busy and intellectual European

again acquire wisdom. This also explains his commendations of the Orient. For in the Orient one may find precisely that "wisdom," that poise and repose, that inner self-control and simplicity which we Europeans have lost because of the disintegrating influence of an extreme intellectualism. Philosophy, in his judgment, should therefore not be an academic discipline concerned with concepts and the attainment of scientific knowledge, but a matter of practical import yielding a world-view. And thus philosophy is for Keyserling an art. It is a form of the art of life, and can be exemplified by him alone who, through self-cultivation, has become a complete, a "wise," man.

The philosophies resulting from these influences throughout have the character of a practical ethics or of a certain religious orientation. The need in Germany today parallels that of other epochs of serious spiritual and moral cataclysms and religious crises. What is required of a new metaphysics is not so much strictly theoretical enlightenment concerning the nature of the world as, much rather, religious edification and inner peace, an indubitable basis for the faith that, despite all horrible disillusionings, the world nevertheless has a rational meaning and a rational goal. Out of the depths of need there has arisen among us the demand and the search for a teleology and a theodicy of history and of human life. And not infrequently academic and scientific philosophy is reproached for its inadequate recognition of this need and for its too exclusive preoccupation with epistemological or other specialized theoretical investigations. For among the general public, the justification and the value of philosophy are very commonly found in its contribution to the amelioration of the worries and troubles of existence. One demands that it shall give to life a clearly discernible value. It enjoys greater confidence than the preachments representing a confession or a church, for the reason that it is sup-

posed to express more than mere faith. Because of its relation to science and of its own scientific character, it is respected even among those who, for some inner or external causes or reasons, feel themselves alienated from the official church and religious life, and who place no confidence in doctrines based on faith. And it is because they satisfy these wide-spread yearnings for a world-view that the writings of Eucken and Keyserling, for example, meet with respect and approbation.

3. The particular characteristics of the three lines of influence above described are reflected in the specific metaphysical syntheses to which they give rise. They thus afford a basis for an illuminating classification of the most important and noteworthy attempts on the part of contemporary German scholars to develop a metaphysics.

*First*—From the side of the natural sciences, particularly biology, has come the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch.<sup>2</sup>

*Second*—Psychology has led to the personalism of William Stern.<sup>3</sup>

*Third*—The social sciences, particularly theology and history, have furnished the basis of the so-called *Lebensphilosophie*. It counts many followers. Its real founder and trail-blazer in contemporary life may be said to be Friedrich Nietzsche, if we disregard certain predecessors. The fact that Nietzsche's fame has risen and is now acknowledged even in the strictly scientific world is due fundamentally to the fact that he was one of the founders and promoters of this *Lebensphilosophie*, which is at the present time enjoying an increasing esteem also in scientific circles. In scientific and academic philosophy, the chief representative of this general movement is Wilhelm Dilthey, with his book *Die geistige Welt* and his two-vol-

<sup>2</sup> *Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und Lehre; Philosophie des Organischen; Ordnungslehre; Wirklichkeitslehre.*

<sup>3</sup> *Person und Sache*, three volumes; *Die Psychologie und der Personalismus; Grundgedanken der personalistischen Philosophie.*



ume work, *Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens*. These writings give an historical and psychological portrayal of the philosophy of life which is no less ingenuous than it is penetrating. Among the philosophers influenced by Dilthey and particularly versed with the details of historical and social life are Georg Simmel,<sup>4</sup> Ernst Troeltsch<sup>5</sup> and Eduard Spranger.<sup>6</sup>

*Fourth*—Out of the immanent development of philosophy from epistemology to philosophical systematization have emerged the Kantian-Hegelian constructions of the Marburger School. Here we would cite Hermann Cohen's *System der Philosophie*, comprising several volumes. Cohen's renowned exposition of the Kantian system of philosophy itself exhibits a systematic and a systematizing spirit, and to this its great philosophical value is undoubtedly due. Under the present head belongs also the value-metaphysics of the school of Southwest Germany. Heinrich Rickert, its outstanding spokesman, is at present preparing a systematic formulation of his doctrines in his *System der Philosophie*, the first volume of which has appeared under the title, *Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie*. In this connection should be mentioned also Hugo Münsterberg's *Philosophie der Werte, Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung*.

*Fifth*—The problems and needs connected with the demand for a general world-view have given rise to the metaphysically oriented works of Rudolf Eucken and Graf Hermann Keyserling, as already mentioned.

*Sixth*—In addition to these metaphysical tendencies one finds in Germany also neo-Thomism. It draws sustenance from several sources. To be sure it lacks genuine

<sup>4</sup> *Philosophische Kultur; Hauptprobleme der Philosophie*. Penetrating essays relating to the metaphysics of life are to be found in his last work, *Lebensanschauung; vier metaphysische Kapitel*.

<sup>5</sup> *Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik; Der Historismus und seine Probleme; Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung*.

<sup>6</sup> *Lebensformen; Psychologie des Jugendalters*.

originality and is only a revival, with the fewest possible changes, of mediæval dogmatism. Nevertheless, it is a characteristic feature of the present metaphysical situation. It is bound up with the fact that there is an unmistakable strengthening of the Roman Catholic spirit, whose intellectual aspect, as it were, it represents. This philosophy is the creation of a period scientifically remote from ours; yet, whatever our attitude towards it, its revival is logically intelligible. For the entire history of the human spirit probably presents not another system of thought that develops such a closed world-view and establishes with such radical one-sidedness and energy an imposing unity of the mental life. It asserts an inviolable harmony between the needs of the spirit and the results of knowledge and of science. It denies that cleavage between knowledge and faith from which modern mankind suffers. Through its alleged removal of this conflict neo-Thomism believes that it offers our age spiritual health and frees it in large measure from its afflictions. It is this fiction, primarily, that accounts for the growing influence of this dogmatic world-view. It is a philosophy that rejects the validity and the value of that differentiation between faith and knowledge which had become inevitable as a fateful characteristic of modern Europe. Thereby it at bottom disallows the autonomy of science, though yielding the attractive and welcome illusion of a harmony between that which we can know and that which we can believe and await with hope. The presupposition of this harmony is the basis upon which the metaphysics of neo-Thomism rests. The system is one of harmonization and, as every harmony, it also is pleasing to all who prefer rest and the feeling of security to movement and the restless but fruitful play of dialectic. But because dialectic is lacking to neo-Thomism, the latter stands somewhat aside from that vital and dynamic metaphysics to whose development German phil-

osophers are zealously devoting themselves. Neo-Thomism does not exemplify the fundamental traits characteristic of the metaphysics of Germany.

## II. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF GERMAN METAPHYSICS

We shall not enter upon a detailed consideration of the metaphysical movements thus briefly indicated. Rather would we point out that the turn to metaphysics, taken as a whole, is a development as necessary as it is obvious. Underlying it are factors of a thoroughly objective character. It cannot be ascribed entirely or primarily to subjective needs. To be sure, as we have already pointed out, subjective and emotional influences are in play. It is true that without such needs no metaphysical systems ever arise. But these needs are nevertheless only, as it were, the personal and private presuppositions of metaphysics. Ultimately they neither account for nor explain its origin or its specific character. Really to understand the creation of a metaphysical system one must always turn to the objective presuppositions and developmental forces involved, and not consider merely psychical and subjective longings. What we mean by this will shortly appear.

By disclosing the universal factors that underlie metaphysics, we shall understand not merely the inevitability of the present turn to it but also the general character and the essential nature of the metaphysics which is in process of development. For, numerous and diverse as are the contemporary metaphysical tendencies and constructive attempts, they nevertheless have one trait in common. And this common trait is at once obvious. Negatively, each of them is characterized by the rejection of the mechanistic standpoint and mode of interpretation. None of them attempts to define the structure and the meaning of reality in terms of the concepts of the natural sciences. None

of them conceives the real after the pattern of mathematical physics; none of them regards it as mathematically calculable or formulable; none of them thinks that phenomena are exhausted by mathematical concepts or dominated by mathematical-physical laws.

Hence none of the metaphysical constructions now under discussion may be regarded as strictly rationalistic, if we take this term in its customary, that is, in its mathematical, connotation. Of the older metaphysical systems none shows slighter evidences of revival than that of Descartes. The fundamental reason for this will soon appear. What we today find is a revival of those older systems that reject the viewpoint of a mechanistic rationalism and set themselves in opposition to it. The survival or the renewal—as the case may be—of the Kantian philosophy is often objected to because of the misunderstanding that Kant's mode of thought is mechanistic and rationalistic—a misconception that appears even in Oswald Spengler's widely known work, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*. This mode of thought is now regarded as antiquated and as inadequate for the acquisition of a comprehensive world-view.

The universal rejection of the mathematical-mechanistic point of view within metaphysics is associated with a departure from those interpretations which place the entire emphasis, in the case of metaphysical knowledge, upon formal, fixed, limited, logically unequivocal and determinate features. Our thought is turning away from the static toward the dynamic. This anti-mechanistic and dynamic trait of contemporary metaphysics, as it seems to me, mirrors, intellectually and theoretically, a general feature characteristic of our spiritual culture and of its leading representatives. Life itself has discarded the traits of fixity and changelessness and has again assumed its original nature as dynamic. This dynamic character, and the knowledge of it, receives its glorification from no less a

thinker than Friedrich Nietzsche. In his dynamic philosophy of life, it acquires its most powerful expression. At the present time we are unquestionably in an era marked by the unlimbering or at least by a certain depreciation and neglect of that which is formal. This holds true no matter whether we have reference to established political constitutions, the maintenance of tradition, feelings of piety and faith in authority, modes of intercourse, social convention and rule, the economic order, theological and ecclesiastical dogma, artistic style, absolute scientific knowledge, philosophical systematization, or any other avenues along which form may manifest itself. The salvation for which we long is today no longer found in the acquisition and preservation of a strictly formalistic attitude of mind and mode of knowledge.

This now brings us face to face with the positive trait common to all the numerous world-views of our day. These are much less shut off from life than was mathematical, formalistic rationalism. They are all touched and influenced by the agitation and by the dialectic of life. In so far they are all dialectical. This does not mean merely that the richly developed philosophy of life which we now possess has a theoretical interest in life, seeking to master its problematic and irrational details; it means also, and conversely, that life with all its problematic and irrational details impinges upon the rationality of knowledge and thus contributes to the gradual development of a strictly dialectical metaphysics. We now pay more faithful and receptive attention to the intricate complications of reality; we are more mindful of the alluring multiplicity of its forms than was the constructive rationalism and idealism of former times. Our metaphysical interest is directed not to the creation of new connections and forms but to fathoming and illuminating new depths and movements, new structural relations and strata of life. We seek new revel-

ations of content, enrichments of content. Our concern is not with laws but with that which first receives its form by and in law. We are eager to immerse ourselves in the *life* of problems and are not primarily interested in discovering either conceptual forms or logically justifying categories. Not as though we were in general indifferent to all form or depreciated it. On the contrary, the most serious effort of our metaphysics, as it appears to me, is engaged in gaining and developing a conception of form which, in distinction from the earlier and different notion, makes some provision in its structure for the problematical and dialectical features of life—a conception which, without entirely sacrificing relatively formal determinateness, nevertheless appropriately incorporates the irrepressible dialectic and the luxuriantly problematic features typical of life.

Hence the emerging metaphysics does not neglect expressly and emphatically to set forth its relation to traditional rationalism. We have said that the former is anti-mechanistic. This does not mean, however, that it is thorough-goingly anti-rationalistic. No philosophy, no metaphysics, can dispense with rationalism. The modern philosophy of life may not place itself in complete antithesis to rationalism if it is not entirely to renounce the hope of knowledge. What it seeks is simply such a notion of philosophical knowledge as can give adequate expression to the dialectic of life without destroying the guarantees and forms of conception.

The turn to metaphysics and the entire development of metaphysical investigation are therefore without doubt to be regarded as a redirection and a development of rationalism. What is required is an energetic attempt to develop or reconstruct formal and constructive rationalism into a dialectic rationalism. One must advance far beyond even the dialectical interpretation of the concept and the thor-

oughly dialectic mode of procedure espoused by Hegel. The Hegelian philosophy is enjoying a renaissance not simply because Hegel was the greatest thinker concerned with the philosophy and metaphysics of history, but because he disclosed the dialectic of the concept, because he was the most nearly modern representative of a logic of dialectic and of the dialectic of logic. Nevertheless, the Hegelian dialectic and doctrine of dialectic as yet represented a logic that is altogether too formal and one-sided. In consequence, concepts, in this philosophy, could not take adequate cognizance of the problematic character of reality. Hegel came to his view of dialectic from the side of logic. To be sure, it was a magnificent and a dynamic logic. Nevertheless the approach was too exclusively from logic. Hegel failed to import into his logic, from the beginning and as a matter of principle, the dialectic of history and of historical flux. In his dialectic, this powerful philosopher of history thought in logical, constructive terms. This was indeed an advance, for it disclosed a new aspect of the concept not known to the old formal logic. And yet Hegel had not separated himself widely enough from the latter. If one would adequately understand and do justice to the nature of dialectic, must he not think of it itself in dialectical terms and apply it in a thoroughly dialectical manner? Hegel extracted too little from the endless fertility of the idea of dialectic. As a very natural result of his logistic point of view, he was too impatient an opponent of the Kantian idea of an eternal antinomies, and of the splendid and praiseworthy revival and championship by Kant of the notion of antinomies. However great may have been its dynamic tendency, Hegel's dialectic was nevertheless too static. To show why this was the case does not fall within our present plan. But it seemed fitting, in our general survey of contemporary metaphysics in Germany, to refer to the renaissance of Hegel and briefly to

indicate both its justification and likewise its limits. It is evident that the revival of metaphysics in general derives not a little strength from this renaissance of Hegel.

Now, however, we confront the important question as to what gave rise to and maintained the anti-mechanistic and dialectical character of the German metaphysics of today. For the turn to metaphysics is a very general feature of present-day philosophy, and this turn has as its clearly defined and specific trait the character just mentioned.

### III. THE TURN TO THE METAPHYSICS OF HISTORY

The anti-mechanistic and dialectical character of contemporary metaphysics results of necessity from the object of its primary concern. The latter relates, in the main, not to inorganic physical nature but to organic nature and life—primarily, indeed, to that form of life which we call history. The central tendency of our metaphysics is not in the direction of a mechanistic philosophy of inorganic nature. It aims rather to develop a philosophy of the organic, whether this be biological in character (neo-vitalism), personal (personalism), or historical (metaphysics of history).

It is chiefly attracted, however, by life in the sense of history. If we would not simply lump together diverse tendencies with an excessive disregard of their differences, we must distinguish clearly between two types of the philosophy of life, represented, on the one hand, by vitalism and neo-vitalism, and, on the other, by the metaphysics of history. Though both movements are metaphysical, they are radically distinct in character. Vitalism centers about the biological life, whereas the metaphysics of history concerns itself with historical life.

Now it is the latter that unquestionably enjoys the ascendancy as regards both the interest manifested and its



achievements. This is due to circumstances which we will now briefly describe. The rapid development, during the nineteenth century, of the so-called social sciences has made it increasingly clear that man is not alone a living being in the sense of the natural sciences, inclusive of biology, but likewise a member of an historical order, and that the laws of history are no less truly the laws of his being and development than are the laws of so-called nature. This insight, which originated in the social sciences, served in turn constantly to increase both the attention devoted to the latter and the esteem which they acquired. In consequence, there developed an extraordinarily fruitful relation between the social sciences and philosophy. The situation was analogous to that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the outstanding position of mathematics and of the mathematical sciences led to a philosophy that was based on mathematics and the natural sciences and that was oriented accordingly. The results of the social sciences during the nineteenth century, as regards both form and content, could impossibly be disregarded by philosophy once the latter again became conscious of its metaphysical task and sought to gain a comprehensive interpretation of the world. Scientific philosophy and metaphysics have always maintained a close relation with the concrete sciences. Indeed, it is more especially by virtue of this relation that they may be distinguished as scientific and thus be demarcated from all mere dilettantism in the way of metaphysics and the formulation of world-views. So long as mathematics and the natural sciences were in the ascendancy as regards both their stage of development and the respect they enjoyed, it was only natural and imperative that metaphysics should primarily base itself upon them and take them into account. But since the first third of the past century the social sciences have enjoyed an increasingly flourishing growth, and this

has made it necessary for philosophy to give the most careful consideration to their formal structure and to their conclusions.

The formal structure of the social sciences raises problems that fall to epistemology and the methodology of the social sciences. To them German scholars have been devoting themselves most assiduously during the last decades. In so far our philosophy is a theory and methodology of history. This is a field of investigation cultivated by a large number of thinkers. As a matter of fact, it is at present the central concern of scientific philosophy, and to it almost the majority of our best minds have turned. The interpretation of the conclusions of the social sciences is the task of the metaphysics of life and of history. The latter aims at a metaphysical interpretation and systematization of the empirical facts which the social sciences have disclosed concerning the play of historical life and the genesis and the fall of political, legal, economic, ethical, artistic, and religious institutions. Thus our philosophy maintains intimate connections with the social sciences. Whether as epistemology and methodology, on the one hand, or as metaphysics, on the other, it is distinctly a philosophy of history.

It is both obvious and incontestable that in this field philosophy still faces important tasks. If, taking our cue from speculative philosophy, we designate the unitary principle at the basis of historical reality as *reason*, the main task of the philosophy of history becomes what Wilhelm Dilthey called a "critique of historical reason." This would be the continuation and perhaps the completion of the critical philosophy of Kant. For it would supplement Kant's investigations of the foundations of mathematics, the mathematical sciences and biology, with similar investigations relating to the sciences of the historical order. Upon these epistemological and critical foundations would arise the

system of the social sciences. As the continuation of the critical investigations, the latter leads to knowledge of the historical and social world, and may thus be called a developed metaphysics of history. To be sure, neither the critical bases nor the systematic superstructure as yet appear in their finished form in the philosophy of history of any German writer. Considered as a whole, however, the various endeavors and tendencies of our present day philosophy of history appear to center upon the two tasks just described, namely, laying the epistemological foundations of the historical sciences and supplying a metaphysical and systematic interpretation of historical life through an appeal to and a utilization of the facts established by the historical sciences.

Just as there is unity in respect to the tasks of philosophy, so likewise may we discern a high degree of unity in respect to the points of view and methods utilized in their accomplishment. By thus bringing together and unifying the object and the form of all of these activities we shall obtain a clear view of what the metaphysics in Germany aims at and what it has already in part achieved.

#### IV. THE NEW DIALECTIC

Contemporary German metaphysics, as has already been indicated, tends to adopt an anti-mechanical and dialectical procedure. Closely connected as this is with the entire spirit and culture of our times, it prevails very especially in the metaphysics of history. The reason is easy to understand. For in the case of the metaphysics of history, the viewpoint and method of dialectic—thinking in terms of and with antinomies—is unavoidable and indispensable. A real philosophy of life that would be faithful to the object and the meaning of its task could have no other character.

Not that there is the slightest intention or tendency to

condone any form of skepticism or relativism. Practically all of the metaphysical efforts are at one in expressly steering clear of every skeptical and relativistic mode of interpretation as one that eventually always leads to an untenable historicism. Precisely because of its relativistic tendencies, historicism is condemned. It is regarded as unsatisfactory from the standpoint of knowledge and is recognized as a psychological peril—a force undermining that moral spirit which is so indispensable for strict philosophical inquiry. It would be an extremely tempting task to investigate the characteristic ethos of our metaphysics, for it exhibits very clearly the change of temper that has come over our philosophical thinking.

Relativism and historicism are regarded as manifestations of a mental disease, a spiritual crisis. From it one seeks to become free. This I have set forth in some detail in my book, *Die geistige Krisis der Gegenwart*, where the overcoming of relativism is presented as a theoretical and as a moral and practical requirement.

The nineteenth century had acquired a most extraordinarily keen consciousness of the irrationalities and antinomies of existence. The more deeply one penetrated into historical and social life—that is, the greater the advances made by the social sciences—the more clearly one realized the impossibility of formulating in the inflexible forms of abstract conceptions, the many different contradictions of historical life, or the diversity and multiplicity of its mental, moral, artistic, religious, economic and political, of its impulsive and erotic, relations and objectivizations. And yet this metaphysics of history could not permanently and deliberately rely solely upon irrational intuitions and direct experiences of life. For thus the doors would be opened to an uncontrollable mysticism involving the destruction of all serious and scientific philosophy. However hospitable the metaphysics of history may be to the irrationalities

of life, it must nevertheless exhibit their connection with the world of concepts, forms, and categories, for it claims to be knowledge and seeks to be recognized and valued as such. No mere experiencing of life, however deep or overpowering, and no intuitive or impressionistic grasp of historical culture, however rich, can suffice as a foundation for metaphysics. Hence irrationalism itself requires a rationalism that shall provide the form for the vision and give to experience a clear and universally valid methodical structure. Only thus may one acquire conceptually organized knowledge. No metaphysics of history can possibly be constructed without the express employment of critically validated categories and sharply defined concepts.

That such a rationalism differs from the older form whose character was determined by mathematics and natural science has already been indicated. The indisputably dialectical character of all knowledge relating to historical and social life exhibits itself in the fact that rational elements are combined with others that are thoroughly irrational, intuitive, and neither reducible to nor expressible in conceptual terms. The manner of this combination is fundamentally antinomical and paradoxical. Thus the metaphysics of history recognizes and utilizes that particular form of rationalism which may be designated dialectical. It was brilliantly exemplified by Georg Simmel in his book, *Lebensanschauung*. It was employed likewise by Theodor Litt in establishing the metaphysical foundations of pedagogy, as he has presented them in his work, *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart und ihr Einfluss auf das Bildungsideal*. That it offers the most suitable and the most promising method for a systematic metaphysics of history is perhaps beyond all question. It recognizes the reciprocal relations between life and knowledge. It realizes that constructions proceeding solely from life become unscientific and degenerate into romantic mysticism, whereas, on the

other hand, all constructions operating exclusively with formal and logical principles remain suspended in the sphere of high and dry rationalism, abstract and remote from life. It knows well that rationalizing and systematizing processes cannot yield a thoroughly satisfactory or ultimate comprehension or mastery of any phenomenon of life.

The rationalism we are describing at every point admits the possibility of further question; it leaves the way open for a continuation and a deepening of the discussion. Thoroughly alive to the problematical character of life, it does not deaden but it rather strengthens the consciousness that all knowledge is problematical. It thinks of knowledge as endless, not merely in respect to its range—this was recognized even by formal rationalism—but likewise in respect to its depth. At every point it discloses a new profundity, a new intellectual challenge; and thus it generates the necessity for constant reinterpretation.

The task confronting this dialectical rationalism is that of elaborating a doctrine of the categories of historical reason. The unique character of these categories must consist in the fact that they establish the significant yet antinomical interrelation between rationality as the form and the irrationality of life as the content of the metaphysics of history. This means that the principles for a comprehensive and systematic interpretation of the phenomena of historical life must be dialectical and antinomical. Thus an extensive, temptingly beautiful, and extraordinarily fertile field of investigation lies within the horizon of the German metaphysician of history.

## LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

PAUL F. LINKE

WERE one to characterize in a brief phrase the present status, in Germany, of logic and, along with it, also of epistemology, one would be forced to say that the almost unlimited dominance which Kantianism at one time enjoyed has come to an end. The interest and the affiliations of leading investigators are more and more turning to movements that are in express opposition to Kantianism. Before we here enter upon details, however, a number of preliminary remarks are necessary.

It was with intention that we just used the expression, "of logic, and, along with it, also of epistemology." For the two disciplines are very closely related. The latter affords the scientific foundations of the former. Logic, however, as Bolzano was the first to declare, is a discipline relating to scientific knowledge (*Wissenschaftslehre*). To achieve a thoroughly clear distinction between it and epistemology we will do well to fall back upon a relatively external but nevertheless a precisely delimited conception of *Wissenschaftslehre*.

If we compare the various sciences in the form in which they actually exist and are accepted by us, and if we abstract their common features, we will find that they have an identical structure. It is because of their structure that we call them sciences; it is to this that we refer when we use the terms "scientific" or "logical." In every-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

day life we frequently speak of certain connections as logical. What we mean is precisely the same as when we say that they are such as might find place in a nexus of scientific assertions, or more precisely, of assertions such as are characteristic of science.

A science is a body of assertions (concerning some field of reality) so organized as to induce the conviction that the assertions are true. That is to say, the nature and organization of the assertions must be such as to yield assurances and guarantees of their truth. This is the case when they are related to one another as are conclusions to that which establishes them, and when the truth of that which is simply basic to other assertions and not in itself further confirmable is validated in some distinctive way, perhaps by reference to observable facts. The laws underlying these guarantees of truth are the laws of a scientific or logical structure. We call them logical laws in the widest sense of the term. Any procedure governed by them may be called scientific or logical. Thus considered, every proposition established scientifically is likewise logical.

It follows from what has been said that there must be two very different types of logical laws and therefore also of logical procedure. On the one hand, there are laws of logical confirmation, that is, laws through whose employment propositions may be carried back to others or, differently expressed, may be derived from them. So far as *these* laws are concerned, the truth of the propositions is obviously immaterial—it need only be presupposed hypothetically. What is here significant is simply the correctness of the derivation or deduction. The laws in question are those of formal logic. In this context the word “*logical*” acquires the more restricted meaning of “being properly derived.” The science of that which necessarily belongs in a validly organized body of propositions is formal logic. On the other hand, and in distinction herefrom, we



may characterize as logical those laws through whose employment we may be assured of the truth of those assertions which lie at the basis of others but may not themselves in turn be similarly established. The totality of these laws and the science which elaborates them may be called material logic.

Both divisions of logic are concerned with the actually existing sciences. The fact of their existence and likewise their validity are taken as self-evident. The truth of their pronouncements and the validity of the formal structure within which they have their place are not questioned. But what if these presuppositions are untenable? What if the sciences as they now actually appear are after all not radically different from the "sciences of alchemy and astrology?" What if their truth and the validity of their conclusions are only apparent? It is obvious that the mere presupposition of the validity and the unconditioned reliability of the positive sciences cannot satisfy the final demands of thought. The philosopher insists on knowing whether the conclusions reached by the sciences through their specific procedure may be unconditionally regarded as "objective" truths, at least in the most favorable cases, or whether the things advanced as true by the sciences must, perhaps just because of the procedure of the latter, be thought of as tainted with an unavoidable constant error. Thus the problem arises as to whether the organizing principles of the sciences, as these are exhibited in formal and in material logic, may not in some manner be demonstrated to be unconditionally valid and trustworthy in themselves, that is, independently of any reference to the sciences. In other words, are there guarantees or confirmations with respect to the scientific structures themselves and are these guarantees thoroughly reliable? This is the problem that falls to epistemology.

Inasmuch as it is concerned with the unconditioned, epistemology, far more than logic, is really a philosophic discipline. As a rule, however, the logician has philosophical interests and he therefore tends to develop his subject from the outset from an epistemological point of view. Indeed, this is really always the case, even though frequently to so limited a degree that no one is at first clearly conscious of the fact. Nevertheless, as our preceding discussion has indicated, it must be possible pretty thoroughly to free logic from epistemological accretions. This is particularly true in the case of formal logic, as is clear when we consider mathematical logic or logistic. For, as is well known, we have come to realize that logical relations may be so formulated that it is possible to express them in the language of mathematical formulae and symbols. Thereby the boundaries of mathematics have become extended beyond the field of a mere science of magnitude. But as a result, logic has likewise been expanded. It has ceased to be exclusively such as we have above defined it, namely, the doctrine of scientific knowledge, or—what according to our conception is the same—the doctrine of the laws of inference, and thus, in particular, of the laws regulating the formation of concepts, judgments and syllogisms. For a useful mathematical reconstruction of the logical propositions can be achieved only if logic is applied to those purely objective relations which, on the one hand, lie at the basis of the propositions in question and, on the other, make possible the reconstruction. Inasmuch, however, as these relations must likewise be considered when one is concerned with the foundations of mathematics, mathematics and that type of logic which is carried on from a mathematical point of view may fuse into a single, great, comprehensive science. The basis of the latter is the expanded logic. To be sure, we must here note a fact which is very often overlooked, namely, that, within this compre-

hensive science, the older logic, so far as it in general may adapt itself to mathematical forms, is conserved as the doctrine of the inferences that are exhibited in propositions. And thus this latter type of logic maintains a particular place within the wider field. Might it not have been in closer accord with tradition and linguistic usage to reserve the old name of logic (and likewise the newer one of logistics) exclusively for this more particular field of study? For the total field, perhaps a different name, such as the mathematical theory of objectivity (*mathematische Gegenstandstheorie*), would have been more suitable and less subject to misunderstanding.

Mathematical logic, which has never been very intensively cultivated in Germany, has often been strongly attacked by the philosophers of our country, first of all doubtless by Lotze. These attacks must be regarded as unwarranted insofar as they were directed upon various inadequacies that were of but secondary importance. For these limitations were only natural in a science still so young; they were capable of removal and have indeed already in part been overcome. On the other hand, the attacks were justified insofar as the upholders of mathematical logic identified the latter with logic in general and finally even believed that it could supersede the epistemological interpretation of logic.

Nevertheless, the great reformation in logic which originated in Germany at the beginning of the present century and which, as is at once obvious from what has already been said, likewise had an epistemological aspect, was very closely connected, at least at the outset, with mathematical logic. For at bottom it was but a continuation of ideas first expressed by the Jena mathematician, Gottlob Frege. This prominent investigator has been acclaimed by Bertrand Russell to be the first thinker who correctly understood the nature of numbers. And thus Frege played

an important role in the philosophy of mathematics as well as in that of mathematical logic, among whose founders he must be counted. His philosophic mind developed the epistemological consequences of the fundamental thought of mathematical logic, namely, the identical nature of mathematical and logical laws. Thus he arrived at nothing less than the fundamental epistemological problem of logic, particularly of formal logic: What is the nature of logical laws? Where are they to be classified? With what other laws are they most closely related?

At the turn of the century, the answer almost universally given in Germany was that, inasmuch as logical laws are laws of thought, they are laws of thinking and therefore of consciousness. Thus, in the last analysis, they are psychological laws, even though of a unique sort, not to be thought of, for example, on a parallel with the so-called laws of association. This view prevailed, in the main, even in the older neo-Kantianism. Indeed, the chief founder of this movement, F. A. Lange, even championed it in its most extreme form. He, as also Helmholtz, thought of the logical order as conditioned by the psychological organization of man. In several passages of his works, Otto Liebmann approaches close to this view. The realistic Kantianism of Alois Riehl, though otherwise oriented, was yet unable to supply the weapons necessary to destroy the psychologistic conception of logic. It was the leaders of the Marburg school, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, who first of all brought about the change. They clearly recognized the close kinship between the logical and mathematical orders and they regarded the former as in no wise related to the psychological but as independent and unique. Nevertheless, even they could not directly free logic from the psychological prejudices adhering to it. For such an achievement they were too closely attached to the traditional modes of thought. Indeed—curiously enough,

though intelligible in the light of the tradition of Kantianism—some of their expressions were such as to seem to an uninitiated person like the theses of an outright psychologism. An example of this is Cohen's noted assertion—the basis of his transcendental-logical idealism—that thinking creates things. As one proceeds, one of course comes to learn that thinking here denotes not what is universally understood by the term, but something specifically logical. But why, then, the misleading expression? And why was it necessary to make the attack upon psychologism with anti-realistic propositions?

Nothing of this is to be found in Frege.<sup>2</sup> He exhibits the impossibility of psychological logic by developing the absurd consequences of a favorite supposition of its representatives. The supposition is that there might be beings who think in accordance with logical laws different from ours. In such an event, Frege shows, these beings would obviously be compelled to regard entirely different things to be true than do we. He then continues: "The person who, on the other hand, means by logical laws such laws as prescribe how one ought to think, that is, laws of what *is* true and not the natural laws underlying ideas as to what is true, will ask, 'Who is in the right? Whose laws with reference to what is held to be true are in accord with the laws of what is true?' The psychological logician can not ask this question; otherwise he would acknowledge that there are laws with regard to what is true which are not psychological in character."

But even Frege did not win a complete triumph. He himself had no such expectation. And who would have looked for it at that time (1893) in so secluded a place as the preface of a work on the fundamental principles of arithmetic? Success was achieved first of all by Edmund Husserl, who took up and developed the thought of Frege

<sup>2</sup> Frege, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet*. 2 Bde., 1893, 1903.

in the first volume of his *Logische Untersuchungen*.<sup>3</sup> Husserl's success was unparalleled. The book just mentioned has very rightly been called the most influential philosophical work of the present century. But Husserl's doctrines are not so completely novel as is commonly assumed. The fundamental purpose common to the two volumes of the *Logische Untersuchungen* is to establish a particular order whose significance is not merely logical. This order is conceived by Husserl as consisting of ideal entities which may not be identified with the psychological acts of representation, judgment, etc., and need not necessarily consist of the actual objects to which these acts relate. This conception was expressed also by Frege. He speaks of an order that is objective, but not actual. Lotze advances a similar notion in his critical revival of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. More emphatically still the thought was brought out by Bolzano<sup>4</sup> in his doctrine of truths—as well as of propositions, that is, of the real status of things and of representations—in themselves. Bolzano is a neglected thinker of the first half of the nineteenth century. Originally a Catholic priest, he later became a professor in Prague. He was also a mathematician of importance; indeed his greatness in this field was recognized very much earlier than in that of philosophy. He played a part in extending the bounds of mathematics beyond the confines of a pure science of magnitude. He prepared the way for the theory of classes and championed the doctrine of the non-intuitional nature of geometry, in so far anticipating thoroughly modern ideas. As a philosopher, his position was expressly opposed to that of Kant and of the German idealism of his day, more particularly to that of Hegel.

<sup>3</sup> Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*. 2 Bde., Halle, 1900, 1901. 2. Aufl., 1913, 1921.

<sup>4</sup> Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*. 4 Bde., Sulzbach, 1837. Neudruck von Bd. 1 u. 2, Leipzig, 1914, 1915.

Against the latter this otherwise very mild man expresses very sharp words of criticism.

The credit of being the first among contemporary writers again to call attention to Bolzano may be claimed by the distinguished Polish investigator K. Twardowski. But Bolzano really became known only through Husserl. And then after a delay of more than half a century he began to exercise, upon philosophy as well as upon mathematics, an influence whose magnitude may best be measured by the newly-arising and ever-increasing literature relating to him. But this alone does not tell the story. His strongest influence was exercised upon Husserl—though, in so saying, we in no wise mean to detract from the originality of this outstanding investigator. Husserl's originality is especially pronounced in the second volume of the work to which we have referred. What here aroused the attention of scholars was especially the thorough rejection of the psychological theories of abstraction that had previously been dominant. This involved nothing less than a resumption of the old controversy regarding universals, and its decision in favor of the doctrine which the majority regarded as having long ago been decisively refuted, namely, realism. Prior to this time, German philosophers, linking themselves with British empiricism, were accustomed to deny the existence of universals. According to their view, a universal is in reality something individual that possesses a representative function. It resembles several other things which it represents in idea and which, precisely because of this resemblance and representation, are combined only subjectively and psychologically into a so-called universal, a species or genus. The decisive point is here obviously that of resemblance. Two things, for example, a ball and a die, are precisely alike as regards their color. For example, they may both be a certain shade of red. Both have this color quality in common; qualitatively there

is but a single color for the two objects. But how is this possible? For only individual things are recognized. The color quality inheres in the ball; it comes into being and disappears with the latter. And the same is true of the die. And yet we speak of common possession! Inasmuch as an individual quality can not be a common one, Husserl believes that he is justified in concluding that a non-individual, that is a universal, an ideal, quality is presupposed from the beginning. Thus the theory contains a circular movement of thought: resemblance is not to be taken as final, but, as in the main Bolzano had already realized, it points to an identical ideal element. Thus "there are" universals, "there are" ideas,—indeed, everyone whose eyes are not blurred by false theories may directly intuit them. The assertion that there *are* only things, only individuals, discloses itself as an error arising from an interpretation that is one-sidedly psychological and, to use the language of Frege, that is unwilling to acknowledge entities that are not existential—for, of course, universals may not be said to exist.

Husserl's doctrines, as is, of course, only natural, exercised a fruitful influence upon the other opponents of psychologism. This is particularly true in the case of the Marburg school which stood close to him. Husserl himself had received stimulating suggestions from Natorp and was later appreciatively criticized by the latter. The youngest among the chief representatives of the Marburg school, Ernst Cassirer, who is known primarily through his thoughtful history of the problem of knowledge in modern times,<sup>5</sup> was doubtless led to a new functional theory of the concept primarily by Husserl's critique of theories of abstraction and by Frege's doctrine of the concept. Entirely in accord with the tradition of his school, which is in many respects reminiscent of Hegel, Cassirer, in his doctrine of

<sup>5</sup> Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*. Berlin, 1910.



the formation of concepts, seeks to do away with a static in favor of a developmental point of view. He acknowledges nothing as "given" but contends that everything is resolved in the unending process of knowledge. Clearly noticeable relations to Husserl and perhaps even more so to Bolzano are discernible also in the case of the second of the two great Kantian schools, that is, the so-called Southwest German school. This was founded only a few years after the Marburg school by Wilhelm Windelband, and was developed by his student Heinrich Rickert. For this school the main problem of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, namely, the problem of objective truth and its laws, was from the beginning far more central than it was for the Marburg philosophers.

The latter may be reproached with the fact that they failed to carry their epistemology beyond the position of mere logic. For, in the last analysis, they contented themselves with disclosing the presuppositions of the sciences as they actually lie at hand—"in printed books," as Cohen says. The Southwest German philosophers go further. They assign to philosophy as a whole, and so also to epistemology, an independent field represented by the universally valid values. For them, philosophy must penetrate with its interpretations not merely the sciences but likewise the totality of culture; and, among the sciences, they are concerned to exhibit the methods of those which had been most neglected by the earlier Kantians, as well as by the Marburg thinkers, namely, the historical sciences. That the structure and basic concepts of the latter are fundamentally different from those of the natural sciences, Windelband attempted to show in his studies of nomothetic and ideographic sciences, or the sciences of law and of occurrence.<sup>6</sup> In this work he was a pioneer. Rickert followed with investigations that were comprehensive and aroused

<sup>6</sup> Windelband, *Präludien*. Freiburg, 7.-8. Aufl., 1921.

wide attention.<sup>7</sup> Inasmuch as the historical sciences satisfy the requirements of what others had called sciences of law, the work of Windelband and of Rickert is noteworthy. For these thinkers sought to differentiate the two realms, and to define the unique character of each in terms purely of methodology. The goal of natural science, even where this is not as yet at every turn clearly apparent (as, for example, in the case of geography) is that which is universal, the law; history, on the other hand, is concerned with that which occurs but a single time, with events. Not every event, however, may be characterized as historical, but only such as are important or significant, and this, not for the historian, but in the nexus of other events. This sort of importance, however, ultimately always points to a realm of absolute values which, being on the "yonder side of subject and object," represents the true and central concern of philosophy. Windelband and Rickert sharply distinguish the realm of absolute values from the existential world, as well as from a "third realm," that of meaning, which, in acts of valuation, forms a bond joining the other two orders. With respect to absolute values Lotze himself had already declared that we may predicate not existence but validity. In the last analysis these values are supposed to furnish the measure for everything that may be called valuable, even for life. Thus, in the view of Rickert, life in no wise possesses an independent value. Science is thought of as embodying the absolute values of truth; and these had already been coördinated by Windelband with the absolute values of the good and the beautiful. We may not assert that thoughts *should* be or *ought* to be thought because they are true. The converse obtains. They are true because, on the ground of their value, they *ought* to be thought. At all times, even in cases of error, our thinking proceeds in accordance with psychological laws.

<sup>7</sup> Rickert, *Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*. 4.-5. verb. Aufl., 1921; *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*. 3.-4. verb. Aufl., 1922.

But it may likewise exhibit logical laws, though it does so only when its contents are true. Man, as even Windelband had believed himself to have established, is subject alike to natural and to normative laws. Otherwise expressed, there is manifest in the totality of psychical processes an over-individual consciousness of norms, called by Rickert the transcendental consciousness. To think logically means to think in accordance with this consciousness. And the situation is analogous in the fields of ethics and of aesthetics.

It is thus clear that the entire system of Windelband and Rickert stands and falls with the doctrine of normative laws and of the over-individual values basic to them. Unceasingly, and along constantly fresh lines, these thinkers stress the unique character of normative laws and the unbridgeable chasm which divides them from natural laws. And yet this doctrine is completely erroneous. Indeed, it had already been refuted in advance by Frege. He was the first clearly to point out that the word "law" has a two-fold meaning. Of this duplicity Windelband is scarcely aware; and insofar as it comes to his notice, he at once misinterprets it. "In the one sense," Frege says, "the word law denotes that which *is*, whereas in the other it prescribes that which *ought* to be. . . . Every law which declares what *is* may be regarded as prescriptive—one should think in accord with it, and thus it is a law for thought. This holds true of the geometrical and physical, no less than of the logical, laws. The latter more properly deserve the name "laws of thought" only because they are the most general laws and prescribe how one ought to think on every occasion whatsoever that one thinks."

Thus, according to Frege, all those laws, i. e., the natural laws, which Windelband and Rickert seek to place in sharpest contrast with the logical laws, are on precisely the same plane as the latter. Normative and natural laws

do not represent opposed forms of laws, but only contrasting attitudes toward laws. If I say simply, "Between two points (A and B) a straight line is the shortest," I express the matter in the form of a natural law. If, on the other hand, I say that, "inasmuch as I desire to reach B from A by the shortest path, a straight line is prescribed for me," then I have formulated the same content as above in the form of a normative law. Moreover, it is self-evident that precisely the same holds true of logical laws; they become norms for everyone who seeks the truth. The bold hypothesis of a transcendental consciousness is not at all necessary. And this is all the more gratifying because the hypothesis—in spite of the suspiciously violent attacks which its upholders frequently launch against psychologism—is without any doubt a psychological hypothesis. For how may such an over-individual consciousness be conceived if not in analogy with our individual consciousness?

Thus we must turn from the logic of thought to the logic of objects. The terms *Denklogik* and *Gegenstandslogik*, used to denote these two sorts of logic, were first clearly defined by Honecker.<sup>8</sup> In an admirable little book he weighed them over against each other. *Gegenstandslogik* is bound up with a more universal theory, *Gegenstandstheorie*. The latter investigates everything that may be denoted by the word "object" in the very widest sense of the word—that is, every "something," entirely regardless of whether or not it is represented, whether it is a thing, a condition, a quality, a relation, or a concept, and whether it is physical or psychical, actual or non-actual; indeed, whether even it be impossible and irrational, as, for example, a round square. The founder of *Gegenstandstheorie* was A. Meinong.<sup>9</sup> His colleague, A. Höfler, incorporated the doctrine in his comprehensive presenta-

<sup>8</sup> Honecker, *Gegenstandslogik und Denklogik*. Berlin, 1921.

<sup>9</sup> Meinong, *Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften*.

tion of logic;<sup>10</sup> and Mally, Meinong's successor in Graz, took particular pains to indicate the close relation between *Gegenstandstheorie* and logic.

Nevertheless, the views also of these thinkers, the Graz school, are not free from a psychological strain. This appears most clearly of all in their *Gestalttheorie*. By *Gestalten*, or, to refer to the original term, *Gestaltqualitäten*, Chr. v. Ehrenfels<sup>11</sup> meant such complexes as contain a peculiar "more," that is, something not contained within the parts of which they are constituted. An illustration would be a melody in its relation to its constituent tones. Meinong and his school regard this "more" as "founded" in the parts, and they therefore designate the *Gestalten*, as likewise all relations resembling them, "founded objects," or "objects of a higher order." The process of "founding" is interpreted as a particular sort of productive process. The supposition of the latter, and the attempt to exhibit it by the methods of experimental psychology, is characteristic of the Graz school in the persons of Witasek and Benussi. The more modern investigators of *Gestalt*, however, as represented on the one hand by the group of Wertheimer,<sup>12</sup> Koffka and Köhler, and on the other by the present writer,<sup>13</sup> have been unable to discover such a productive process, even though making the most careful theoretical and experimental studies.

For us, the most noteworthy fact is that the hypothesis of a productive process brings the Graz school, as indeed its representatives clearly recognize, close to the position of neo-Kantianism. For this latter school also, as we know, emphasizes creative processes, syntheses by which

<sup>10</sup> Höfler, *Logik*. 2. sehr verm. Aufl. mit vier Beiträgen als Überleitung zur Logistik von E. Mally. Wien, 1922.

<sup>11</sup> von Ehrenfels, *Über Gestaltqualitäten*. Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., Bd. 14 (1890).

<sup>12</sup> Wertheimer, *Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt*. Psychologische Forschungen, I., 1921.

<sup>13</sup> Linke, *Grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre*. München, 1918. (2. Aufl. in Vorbereitung.)

objects are constituted. Neo-Kantianism, of course, explicitly contends that these processes are logical. This, to be sure, lessens the kinship between the two schools, but it very materially adds to the limitations of neo-Kantianism. For, the nature of the logical, or, let us say, the scientific, is misconceived if one ascribes to it a capacity to create things. Science is creative only in the sense that it creates ways by which we may attain to that which has heretofore been unattainable, and may come to know that which has thus far been unknown. At this point, also, there is a difference between the two schools. For the Graz philosophers, it is only the objects of a higher order that are produced, whereas for the neo-Kantians it is all objects whatsoever. It is precisely this radicalism which the latter proudly seek to maintain to the last. "How is it possible to begin with objects?" they ask their opponents. Transcendental philosophy regards the object itself as a problem; it shows that the object is constituted through the categories. This criticism, however, in no wise touches an upholder of the *Gegenstandstheorie*. For, inasmuch as he identifies "object" with "something," and inasmuch as every category is, of course, also a "something," the process whereby an object is said to be constituted by categories would be a process whereby an object is constituted by objects. Thus we would be in the toils of a *circulus vitiosus*.

The particular point of concern, however, was doubtless the well-known theory that everything temporal and empirical depends upon timeless, super-empirical conditions. Insofar, the new logic, championing as it did the doctrine of timeless truths in themselves, proved very opportune to the Kantians, more especially where the Lotzean traditions were strong, as, for example, in the Southwest German school. The doctrine seemed to have been developed with such clarity and keenness of thought

by Bolzano that the thinkers of this school at once accepted it as a confirmation of their own viewpoint. What was antithetical to their view—and Bolzano, as stated above, always thought of himself as an outright opponent of Kantianism—they disregarded as much as possible. The inevitable result was that precisely the deepest thinkers among them fell into difficulties and conflicts, as is exemplified most conspicuously by Emil Lask, who unfortunately fell a victim to the World War.

More or less closely connected with this turn to objectivity are the activities of other representatives of the same movement. Jonas Cohn, for example, ascribes a decisive importance to non-logical or, as they are sometimes called, irrational factors in the development of the object. This is a tendency that appears more clearly in the Southwest German school than among the Marburg thinkers. It invites a reference to Fritz Münch and especially to Bruno Bauch.<sup>14</sup> The latter, through a thorough study of the historical Kant, and by placing the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* in the foreground, arrived at an interpretation of Kant that was in many respects original. His divergence from Rickert was marked. Though retaining the transcendental consciousness in name, he, in fact, discarded it. In other respects also he energetically sought to develop the philosophy of values and of validity in such a way that it might do full justice to the realistic procedure of the natural sciences and the historical disciplines. Bauch, just as Hönigswald, whose thought is closely allied to that of Bauch, was vigorously stimulated by Rickert. He was, moreover, influenced also by Frege. This decided opponent of idealism, however, who directed very sharp words more especially against H. Cohen, could, of course, not shake Bauch's fundamental position. This perhaps only shows that the terms "idealism" and "realism" have

<sup>14</sup> Bauch, *Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit*. Leipzig, 1923.

many meanings and must be used with caution. The "realistic" school of Graz and the "idealistic" school of Southwest Germany are in many respects so similar that thinkers such as Hans Pilcher and Ferdinand Weinhandl may with equal justification be counted to either school. The same holds of Friedrich Kuntze, though his alliances, to be sure, are not so much with *Gegenstandstheorie* as with logic.

To me, of course, it seems that there is a completely unspannable gulf between a consistently developed *Gegenstandstheorie* and every form of transcendental idealism.<sup>18</sup> The former alone, in my judgment, is in the right. I charge the latter with "rationalism." By this I mean something quite other than "rationalism." I mean the doctrine that seeks to understand truth and objects in terms of the "ratio" and the logical, instead, conversely, of conceiving the "ratio" and the logical by reference to truth and objects—the only really natural thing to do. For in the widest sense, "ratio" is but the capacity to discover and to establish truth. Truth, and in this contention the Kantians are sound, does not consist in copying objects or in a correspondence with them. It resides within the objects or somethings—indeed, if these are actual things, it is even comprised within actual things. Truth itself is simply the existence (by which we mean the aspect of "in itself") of a status of fact. Meinong calls it an *Objektiv*, this term denoting the fact that a characteristic attaches to an object—the blueness, for example, to the heavens. Truth (that is, an existing factual status) is expressed in propositions; and thus we again establish a connection with the definition above given of logic. Logic indeed presupposes nothing but objects and their characteristics in some wise apprehended. If we are governed in our conscious life by the laws of logical objects, then we think logically.

<sup>18</sup> Linke, *Die Existentialtheorie der Wahrheit und der Psychologismus der Geltungslogik*. Kant-Studien, Bd. 29.



Here, of course, Kantianism springs forward anew with the question as to how such a "direction by laws," such an "apprehension," "comprehension," or "knowing" of objects is at all possible. The question is certainly a legitimate one. Kantianism, however, at once answers it by invoking its dogma that the world is "logically" conditioned. We can achieve a logical mastery of objects, it alleges, only because objects themselves are already of a logical structure and are dependent upon "thinking." This, of course, at the very least presupposes an independent "logical sphere" distinguishable from psychological thinking no less truly than are the objects that are thought. In establishing this view, use is made of the doctrine that truth is timeless or supra-temporal. The true content or status of fact in the proposition, "Socrates was a wise man" is valid throughout all changes of time. Being timeless or eternal, how could it reside within or attach to Socrates, this real being who, in common with everything that is real, is a temporally determined and transient "something"? Socrates has ceased to exist. The truth referring to him, however, abides throughout all time. In reference to an assertion, we say that it *is* true, and not that it *was* true, or *will be* true. Now this is, indeed, the case. But in explanation we need not in the least appeal to a particular sphere conceived as logical validity. The feature to which attention has been called is to be found in the stratum of being and, in the particular case in question, of reality. That to which reference is made in the assertion that Socrates was a wise man, is and remains something that has been; it today no longer exists and it may therefore be contrasted with everything that *now* has being. It may not, however, be contrasted with everything that has being if, as language certainly permits us to do, we include under the head of being all entities to which the character "being" either now does or

once did belong—quite immaterial which; if, in other words, we look aside from the particular temporal locus of being. Thus considered, the status of fact expressed by the affirmation that Socrates was a wise man must most certainly be regarded as being or existing. Such an existing status of fact, however, is called a true status of fact, or a truth. Thus it follows that the particular status of fact which we have been discussing *is* true. Were one to say that it *was* true, one would bring it into contrast with the comprehensive realm of entities that have being, inclusive of those that have been. This would be equivalent to now placing it in the realm of that which is not and has not been, and thus of the untrue. This is the whole secret regarding timeless validity. It is obvious how thoroughly it harmonizes with our contention that truths concerning real entities always lie within them or attach to them. The line of argument above indicated in no wise establishes a logical order that forms a bridge between a thinking consciousness and things that are thought.

All the more insistently, however, there again arises the question as to how thinking arrives at things. Are those philosophers perhaps after all in the right who, after the manner of a psychologistic interpretation of Kant, regard things as complexes of sense data or, at any rate, of conscious contents organized in accordance with law? This indeed seems to promise at least the simplest solution of the problem. Thinking or consciousness, it contends, does not pass out beyond itself, but only experiences, even though in particular modifications, its own contents. E. von Aster, perhaps the keenest and most profound of the present-day representatives of this general tendency of thought, has attempted a new formulation of nominalism.<sup>10</sup> In sharp opposition to Husserl, he conceives a thing as a functional organization of series of expectations. In so

<sup>10</sup> von Aster, *Prinzipien der Erkenntnislehre. Versuch zu einer Neubegründung des Nominalismus*. Leipzig, 1913.

doing, as in his nominalism in general, he carries further the ideas of his master, H. Cornelius. With the latter he has bonds of connection not only in the Kantianism common to them, but also in E. Mach's and R. Avenarius' interpretation of thought in terms of economy, and, in general, in positivism and empirio-criticism as also in the so-called philosophy of immanentism.

All of these movements must be regarded as mere variants of one and the same fundamental tendency, that of conscientianism or empirical-subjective idealism. In Germany this is at the present time on the wane. To some this statement might seem disputable, in view of the unparalleled success of H. Vaihinger's *Die Philosophie des Als-Ob*. In this work the well-known founder of the *Kantgesellschaft* interprets the categories as economical methods of thought, as mere instruments for the mastery of experienced data. Accordingly, he regards all knowledge as a tissue of fictions. Vaihinger's success, we would urge, may be accounted for not merely by the similarity of his doctrines to pragmatism, which had just then appeared in Germany, but even more by the fact that a talented author for the first time brought together a comprehensive body of material exhibiting the role which fictions play in science—a point theretofore but little noticed. This achievement naturally aroused interest quite independently of the author's particular point of view. The only independent representative of German positivism now living is Th. Ziehen.<sup>17</sup> His *Logik* exhibits remarkable learning but it nevertheless shows a surprising failure to understand the logical problems that have today become decisive. For the living science of logic it is therefore no longer of importance.

Joh. Rehmke, the last thinker to uphold the philosophy of immanentism, on the other hand, has long since aban-

<sup>17</sup> Ziehen, *Logik auf positivistischer Grundlage mit Berücksichtigung der Geschichte der Logik*. Bonn, 1920.

done this doctrine. His *Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft* espouses a distinctly anti-psychologistic point of view.<sup>18</sup> In this, as in its denial of a separate logical order, it approximates very closely to the *Gegenstandstheorie* which we have been defending—strange as this may seem in view of the fact that Rehmke appears to acknowledge as “being” only that which is “given.” Günther Jakoby, who was formerly likewise inclined to positivism (more specifically, to pragmatism) has most definitely developed into an adherent of a genuine *Gegenstandstheorie*, or, in his own terminology, into an ontologist.<sup>19</sup> Representing the same tendency is also R. Herbertz. Originally a follower of B. Erdmann, he came to be an outspoken anti-psychologist, thinking of logic as concerned with being. Mention should be made also of the *Kulturphilosoph*, G. Simmel, who died in 1918. Prior even to William James he gave expression to the fundamental thought of pragmatism. Later, however, he became untrue to biological relativism. It must indeed be acknowledged that the striking successes of Einstein’s theory of relativity led to a certain reinforcement of current relativistic and positivistic tendencies. And thus it happened that J. Petzoldt again received attention. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that most investigators are agreed in regarding the theory of relativity as purely a doctrine of physical science and, in the last analysis, as bound up but very loosely with positivism in its epistemological sense.<sup>20</sup> It is also worthy of note that so prominent a scholar as Hugo Dingler, who is as well versed in the physical as in the philosophical aspects of the problem, must be counted among the opponents of the theory of relativity.<sup>21</sup> Hence it is not surprising that, though a student of Mach’s, he developed into an anti-psy-

<sup>18</sup> Rehmke, *Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft*. Leipzig u. Frankfurt, 1910.

<sup>19</sup> Jakoby, *Allgemeine Ontologie der Wirklichkeit*. 1. Bd., Halle, 1925.

<sup>20</sup> *Annalen der Philosophie: Relativitätstheorie-Heft* (Bd. 2. Heft 3.).

<sup>21</sup> Dingler, *Physik und Hypothese. Versuch einer induktiven Wissenschaftslehre nebst einer kritischen Analyse der Relativitätstheorie*. Berlin, 1921.

chologist. In spite of distinctly noticeable strains of earlier tendencies, he must rather be said to approximate to the position of Husserl and of O. Kraus, the latter of whom is the most energetic critic of Einstein among the philosophers.

These various tendencies converge upon the recognition of ontology, the doctrine of being or *Gegenstandstheorie*, as the truly fundamental philosophical science. This has always been the standpoint of scholasticism (as it was that of Aristotle), and it is therefore also that of the so-called Catholic philosophy. In consequence, the latter at the present time enjoys an ever-increasing importance even in non-Catholic circles. As its representatives, so far as our present problem is concerned, we may mention, in addition to Honecker, to whom we have already referred: von Hertling (the former Imperial Chancellor), M. Grabmann, B. W. Switalski, and, especially, Joseph Geyser,<sup>22</sup> who so untiringly strove to deepen his epistemological views. They all are decidedly opposed to Kantianism in any form, though most of all to positivism and the doctrine of immanence. Their viewpoint is that of "critical" realism, and it is in so far not Aristotelian. On the basis of ancient traditions, they champion a doctrine which, after long struggles, is at length again becoming to prevail in non-Catholic Germany, where it is regarded as the truly modern philosophy. In this connection mention should be made of Frischeisen-Köhler,<sup>23</sup> a student of Dilthey, of G. Störing, and of E. Becher, the philosopher of nature. It was particularly, however, Oswald Külpe, unfortunately so early deceased (1915), who strove, in exceptionally thorough studies, to exhibit the untenability of all views opposed to the recognition of things in themselves that are

<sup>22</sup> Geyser, *Erkenntnistheorie*. Münster i. W., 1922.

<sup>23</sup> Frischeisen-Köhler, *Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit*. Sammlung, Wissenschaft und Hypothese, XV, Leipzig, 1912.

knowable and yet not conditioned either psychologically or logically.<sup>24</sup>

To be sure, one must admit that, however successfully Külpe—as, after him, his student, A. Messer—disclosed the weaknesses of Kantianism, he nevertheless failed to appreciate the most fundamental aims of the movement. He gave no adequate answer to the simple question as to how consciousness reaches objects. He indeed had the key to the right answer, yet he did not recognize it as such and so he failed to make adequate use of it. This key was Franz Brentano's well-known doctrine of the "intentional" character of consciousness. We will proceed to sketch it, while at the same time adding certain elements to it. Things exist and exercise an influence upon the psychological subject. As a rule, however, the latter experiences and notices but very little of their direct effect. Rather does a mechanism of which the psychological subject is not conscious effect a transformation that brings into the forefront the object which is at the time exercising the influence. What is directly experienced, or, more accurately, noted in the experience, is not the state of consciousness evoked, for example, by certain vibrations; rather is it that which evokes the states of consciousness, though this, to be sure, is very considerably modified, indeed, is even transposed into a different sphere which once it is experienced, no longer really exercises an influence upon the real subject. In short, it becomes the heard tone.

Here we have the setting of Brentano's doctrine.<sup>25</sup> Phenomenological analysis, it insists, reveals the necessity of distinguishing between two factors: on the one hand, we have the "intentional"—the experiencing, the representing—*act*, instanced in our illustration by the hearing; on

<sup>24</sup> Külpe, *Die Realisierung. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaften*. Bd. 1, Leipzig, 1912; Bd. 2-4 aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von A. Messer.

<sup>25</sup> Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*. 1. (einziger) Bd., 2. Aufl. neu herausgegeben u. eingeleitet von O. Kraus, Leipzig, 1925.

the other hand, the "intentional" *object*—that which is comprehended or represented by the act—instanced in our illustration by the tone. A marked difference between the act and the object is to be found in the fact that the former is *always* actual whereas the latter may or may not be actual. The acts are through and through psychical. Everything, on the other hand, that is not an act, not a process or state of consciousness, is external to consciousness, being perhaps in certain instances physical. Hearing, seeing, representing, recalling, judging, doubting, striving and all kinds of feeling are psychical; colors, tones, figures, landscapes, etc., on the other hand, are physical. And they remain physical under all circumstances. When they are perceived or even only imagined, they do not become "contents of consciousness" or mere "pictures." Even when I as yet do not know whether they are actually present or not, and even when they are as a matter of fact not really present, they, as everything that is represented, are entities that "stand over against" me; they do not belong to the apprehending consciousness. In the process of perception and imagination, consciousness does not draw objects into itself as "contents," as Brentano himself at the outset still believed. It leaves them in their externality; it merely lays hold upon them. They themselves may perhaps be actual, but again they may not, in which latter case, the present writer would add, they are transformed or perhaps even first created by the psychophysical mechanism operative prior to all perception and representation. Whether or not they are actual only empirical investigation is able to determine with any measure of certainty.

The important bearings of this doctrine are not recognized by realists of the ordinary type. In certain cases, indeed, they even combat the doctrine, as does M. Schlick, though his outlook, to be sure, is semi-positivistic. Nevertheless, it is alone the standpoint which we have sketched

that enables realism to face the problem as to how consciousness seizes upon things, and to solve this problem without falling back upon the copy theory—which has already sufficiently been proven to be false—or upon other inadequate doctrines. The problem is an illusory one. Consciousness, or better, the subject, the ego, “has” the things from the very beginning; and the property of “having” things, or, at any rate, objects (that is, an “intentional” character), belongs to its nature. The real problem is that of finding in the objects criteria on the basis of which one may classify them first of all as actual or non-actual and subsequently along other lines in accordance with their particular natures. In brief, the problem consists in placing objects in orderly arrangement.

But now there arises a new and extremely important question which we have hitherto been careful to ignore. To a certain extent I am able correctly to establish the order of actually given things—that is, I can attain to a valid knowledge concerning them—without a direct examination of them. Without reference to trees, hills or any objects of the external world, for example, I can develop the laws of mathematics, and I find to my surprise that these hold true of the external objects. There are, to use a Kantian expression, “a priori” laws, “subjective” conditions of “thought,” that are nevertheless valid for objective experience. May also this, the most important problem of the “transcendental deduction,” be solved on the basis of the new conceptions we have sketched?

It devolves upon an exact descriptive analysis of the given, upon a thorough phenomenology, as Brentano had already designated this standpoint, to give an answer to this question. Husserl, to whom the eyes of all investigators were turned after the publication of his stimulating *Logische Untersuchungen*, had intimated that he would set forth the fundamental principles of such a phenom-



ology. They were awaited with high expectation. When they finally appeared they proved disappointing.<sup>26</sup> Husserl defined phenomenology as "eidetic" in character, as the science of essences. To utilize the terminology of others, he conceived of it as concerned not with *Dasein* but with *Sosein*. The latter, Husserl refers to as the "essence" which we can immediately apprehend or intuit; he speaks of *Wesensschauung*. Connected with this doctrine is that of a "pure (transcendental) consciousness" which, after we abstract from all actuality, is supposed to remain as the factor that provides meanings. This is truly a remarkable diversion, and one that renews the errors of transcendental philosophy; indeed, it does this at a time when the chief representatives of the latter had already in reality abandoned the conception of pure consciousness. Husserl was led also to a radical rejection of thorough-going realism. "An absolute reality," he says, "signifies no more than does a round square."

Husserl was a student of Brentano's, as were also Meinong and Ehrenfels. It is he, however, who doubtless deserves the credit of having exposed the weaknesses in his teacher's theory of judgment. For his critique he found a point of departure in the superior doctrines of Bolzano. But, as has lately been shown by O. Kraus,<sup>27</sup> a student of Brentano's as also of Marty's, an earlier student of Brentano's, Husserl misunderstood precisely the most important and profound thought of the extraordinary thinker he was criticizing. He interpreted the "intentionality" and also the pure consciousness described by Brentano as signifying comprehension, or a process of conferring meanings. In antithesis, "sense data"—colors, tones, etc.—he interpreted, in the manner of the traditional psychology, as mere contents of consciousness, as phenomena or "reflec-

<sup>26</sup> Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie u. phänomenologische Philosophie*. Halle, 1913; (auch im Jahrbuch f. Phil. u. phän. Forschung, I.).

<sup>27</sup> Kraus, *F. Brentano*, München, 1919.

tions," which come to constitute objects only through "intentional acts." O. Janssen<sup>28</sup> and the present writer have shown that this is untenable. Sense data—very misleadingly called "sensations"—are already themselves intentional objects; they are *given* to us, precisely as are actual objects, as something distinct from the consciousness "having" them. That they are nevertheless dependent upon the subject is revealed only by experience.

It follows that the purely objective aspect of the phenomenological situation—called by Husserl himself "noema"—possesses a thoroughly overshadowing importance in comparison with the act-aspect, called "noesis." Instead of Husserl's act-phenomenology we reach an object-phenomenology, and this appears to the present writer to be only the method of the *Gegenstandstheorie* now familiar to us. The fundamental thought of object-phenomenology is that whatever we find or intuit in any specific *Sosein* in general, quite regardless of whether or not it is actual, must also be present in the corresponding actual *Sosein*. For *Sosein* in general is related to actual *Sosein* precisely as is, for example, the ball in general to a red ball. Just as everything included within the ball in general must also be present in the red ball, so likewise must everything in a specific *Sosein* in general be discoverable in all corresponding actual instances. In the case of *Sosein* in general one need not take into account whether or not the aspect of actuality is to be found. Hence it may be adequately intuited in imagination; we are not dependent upon observations of anything actual, and thus not upon empirical facts. By reference to any merely imagined movement I can determine that movement is impossible without direction and velocity. We have here a connection purely of *Sosein*. I am, however, totally unable to determine, by reference to a merely imagined movement,

<sup>28</sup> Janssen, *Vorstudien zur Metaphysik*. Halle, 1921.

that every actual movement gradually comes to an end and is eventually transformed into heat. For here we have a connection of empirical facts. The connections of *Sosein* represent for us the justifiable kernel, though of course also an important modification, of Kant's a priori, of his forms and categories. What has been said implies so clear and simple a solution of the problem from which we set out that it is superfluous specifically to formulate it in words. It likewise follows from our position that the categories must be valid not only within experience but also beyond it, and thus for all being. Here again it appears that the categories are to be found within being itself, representing simply the most general characteristics of it. The logical ground falls within being; the supposition of a separate logical sphere is superfluous. We may even say that the "universal" is in a certain sense within things, which means that Husserl has refuted only the psychological and not all theories of abstraction. *Gegenstandssphä-nomenologie* has been applied to the philosophy of nature by Leo Hartmann.<sup>29</sup>

It is a characteristic fact that Husserl's doctrine of a pure consciousness found no echo even among his immediate followers. It was not acknowledged by A. Reinach, who fell a victim to the War; nor was it by M. Geiger or M. Scheler, the latter of whom rather approximates to the *Gegenstandssphä-nomenologie* which we have been sketching. And the *Logik* of the Husserl school, the text-book by A. Pfänder, also finds no place for a pure consciousness. Nevertheless Pfänder introduces an independent logical order in the form of "thoughts"; and, as Mally has already emphasized, he refuses to admit the fundamental importance of an objectively oriented logic. The same is true of Külpe, who in a similarly one-sided way introduces the notion of "meanings."<sup>30</sup> While we chance to be speaking of

<sup>29</sup> Hartmann, *Sind Naturgesetze veränderlich?* Halle, 1926.

<sup>30</sup> Külpe, *Vorlesungen über Logik*. Leipzig, 1923.

comprehensive treatments of logic, we would mention, in addition to the works of Höfler and Ziehen described some distance above, the book of von Kries.<sup>81</sup> Its orientation is Kantian. Its importance, however, lies in the fact that its author is a student of nature, a physiologist, and exhibits an often amazingly penetrating understanding of the logical problems immanent within the sciences.

Hans Driesch holds a position similar to *Gegenstandsphänomenologie*.<sup>82</sup> His starting-point reminds one of Descartes. The further development of his ideas, however, is most apt to call to mind J. Volkelt's well-known doctrine of the self-certainty of consciousness,<sup>83</sup> and, in so far also, Brentano. The proposition, "I have consciously something," is for Driesch the basis of all philosophical certainty. This something is ordered; it stands over against us as ordered. Very properly Driesch identifies thinking and knowing not, as it were, with an ordering activity, as is done by Kantianism and, with especial emphasis, by P. Menzer, but exclusively with intuiting the order that already prevails. Thus this prominent thinker likewise is in disagreement with Kant. He calls his basic science *Ordnungslehre* (also *Logik*) and he regards the latter as the propaedeutic to metaphysics, which he also designates as *Wirklichkeitslehre*. Driesch's science of order includes his doctrine of the categories. He enriches the categories by adding that of individuality. The latter has to do with the relation of a whole to its parts and is regarded by Driesch as the basis of his renowned vitalistic theory. In contrast with the doctrine we uphold, he maintains that the categories can not be demonstrated to be valid beyond experience. Driesch, whose thoughts we

<sup>81</sup> von Kries, *Logik. Grundzüge einer kritischen u. formalen Urteilslehre*. Tübingen, 1916.

<sup>82</sup> Driesch, *Ordnungslehre. Ein System des nichtmetaphysischen Teiles der Philosophie*. 2. umgearb. Aufl., Jena, 1923.

<sup>83</sup> Volkelt, *Gewissheit und Wahrheit. Untersuchung der Geltungsfragen als Grundlage der Erkenntnistheorie*. München, 1918.

have been able to present but very partially, has also made contributions to the doctrine of causality. Along with the students of Brentano, of whom, in addition to Kraus, we would mention A. Kastil, he must be counted among those who reject the theory of relativity.<sup>84</sup> He belongs to that now ever-increasing group of thinkers who regard logic as the mere propaedeutic to metaphysics. Very similar to his view is that of T. K. Oesterreich,<sup>85</sup> also significant as a religious philosopher.

This revival of metaphysics, so thoroughly characteristic of our times, is very naturally in particular evidence within the camp of new realism. It had already manifested itself in the thought of Külpe. More remarkable is the fact that it is to be found also among the Kantians. We might here mention A. Liebert of the Marburg school and, very especially, the theologian E. Troeltsch, recently deceased (1923). At first under the influence of Windelband, Troeltsch gradually drew away from Kantianism and, with an orientation primarily religious and historical, more and more adopted Leibnizian and Hegelian ideas.

Most significant of all is the fact that one of the men most thoroughly informed in the traditions of Kantianism, Nicolai Hartmann, a student of Natorp's and the latter's successor in Marburg, came to espouse both metaphysics and realism at the same time.<sup>86</sup> In sharpest contrast to the rest of the school with which he has been associated, he has even come to regard epistemology itself as a metaphysical discipline. On the other hand, it must be admitted that he still exhibits a surviving bit of Kantian influence in that he conceives the primary task of metaphysics to be a scientific comprehension of problems that are in themselves insoluble. The importance of analyzing such prob-

<sup>84</sup> Driesch, *Relativitätstheorie und Philosophie*. Karlsruhe, 1924.

<sup>85</sup> Oesterreich, *Die Phänomenologie des Ich*. Leipzig, 1910.

<sup>86</sup> Hartmann, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. 2. Aufl., Berlin, 1925.

lems and others related to them (that is, the significance of aporetics, to use the term which he has derived from Aristotle) is very properly emphasized by him. He subsumes aporetics, along with phenomenology, under what he calls the analysis of phenomena (*Phänomenanalyse*). Thus he is led to lay strong emphasis upon the irrational factors of knowledge. Insofar as "irrational" denotes simply that which is purely actual and is not reducible to logical terms, his position is thoroughly tenable; but it ceases to be so insofar as the reference involves the logical elements as well. For, in the latter case, we have but a remnant of the old mystical interpretation of the logical and of knowledge. As a matter of fact, Hartmann conceives the logical as an independent order. He holds, moreover, that the question as to how consciousness draws the object within itself, that is, overcomes the transcendence of the object—a question falsely formulated, as we know—presents an almost insoluble difficulty.

Because of his emphasis upon the aspect of irrationality, Hartmann has a kinship with all the various movements that stress the presence of an intuitive factor in the knowledge process. But one must consider what is to be understood by the latter. The phenomenologists to whom we have already alluded speak of a direct consciousness (*Schauen*) of the object. Distinguishable therefrom, in the second place, is the emphasis sometimes placed upon intuitive comprehension, that is, upon reproducing in one's own experience, through an act of sympathy, the experiences of others and the spiritual complexes within historical life. We already find this in Th. Lipps, Brentano, and J. Volkelt. But it was W. Dilthey who first saw in the doctrine something novel, namely, its important bearing on the problem as to the logical foundations of the social sciences. Of his students it was particularly E. Spranger,<sup>87</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Spranger, *Lebensformen*. 3. verb. Aufl., Halle, 1922.

and Th. Litt who worked further in the same direction. The point of view of K. Jaspers and Th. Erismann likewise shows a kinship with that of Dilthey. In the third place and finally, intuition is sometimes identified with that romantic and irrational attitude which approaches precisely the decisive and fundamental problems of life naively and instinctively, and thus fundamentally renounces the endeavor for scientific certainty—indeed, in the manner of pragmatism frequently renounces all objective truth. This attitude is indeed intelligible as a reaction against antiquated methods. In the absolute form in which it commonly appears, however, it represents a serious spiritual danger, perhaps the greatest danger that now threatens our culture. For it gives the right of way, not to the truth of an idea but to the suggestive power of its expression. Thus it defers to the suggestibility of those who are intellectually inferior and these, of course, everywhere constitute the majority, even among persons interested in philosophy. Moreover, it makes portentous concessions to that tendency to confusion of thought now so widespread precisely in Germany. Here one might mention the epistemological views of O. Spengl. Reference might be made with a certain justification also to Graf. H. Keyserling and R. Müller-Freienfels; and likewise to some of the Protestant theologians, most definitely perhaps to F. Gogarten and K. Barth, similar to whose position is that of E. Griesebach. The school of Husserl likewise has of late here and there made concessions to the view we have indicated.

L. Nelson, though not hostile to scientific procedure in the attainment of knowledge, as are the thinkers just mentioned, nevertheless attacks epistemology, at least verbally. His attacks, however, are due to a misunderstanding of the tasks of epistemology. For Nelson has, as a matter of fact, doubtless devoted himself to epistemology,

that is, in its psychologistic form. Ever since his youth he has held with remarkable persistence to the uncommon view that the system of the Kantian Fries (died in 1843) offers the only key to philosophical truth. Nelson founded a neo-Friesian school which includes a number of thinkers, such as G. Hessenberg and O. Apelt, who, with the outlook of their master, are active particularly in the fields of mathematical, of legal and of political philosophy. In spite of what his psychologism might lead one to expect, Nelson is not at all a relativist, but precisely the opposite. With superb irony his keen thought discloses the pseudo-brilliant absurdities with which the fool's philosophy of Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* so successfully capitalized the craving for sensation prevalent among the culture-crazed German philistines.<sup>88</sup>

To summarize: German logic and epistemology at present exhibit a fairly universal tendency more and more to draw away from Kant; to overcome "rationalism," psychological as well as anti-psychological; and, in consequence, to construct, on the basis of a pure *Gegenstandstheorie*, a logic that no longer places obstacles in the path of a scientific and critical realism and of metaphysics. The men who deserve the greatest credit for the increasing success of this tendency are B. Bolzano and F. Brentano. Both of them were opponents of Kant and of German idealism. Indeed, the epoch of the latter was always regarded by Brentano as a period of extreme philosophical decadence. Both Bolzano and Brentano, it is worthy of mention, were pacifists and hostile to all narrow-spirited nationalism.

<sup>88</sup> Nelson, *Spuk. Einweihung in das Geheimnis der Wahrsagekunst O. Spenglers*. Leipzig, 1921.



# PHILOSOPHY OF THE EXACT SCIENCES<sup>1</sup>

KURT GRELLING

## I

**B**ETWEEN the exact natural sciences on the one hand, and the dominant philosophy on the other, there is still lacking in Germany that intimate connection which is really desirable in the interests of both. In part this state of affairs must be charged to the representatives of natural science. Because their subjects are highly specialized, they easily lose a view of the whole and then face philosophical problems quite without comprehension. Nevertheless it is precisely in recent years that a lively philosophical interest is appearing among German physicists and mathematicians. Indeed a number of them, as we shall see, have themselves done significant philosophical work on the borderlands of their sciences.

In contrast herewith, it must be admitted that it is particularly among those representatives of German philosophy who are playing a leading rôle in the philosophical life of Germany that we find but a slight insight into those philosophical problems which emerge from the work of mathematicians and physicists. **Even today we have the spectacle of philosophers who lay claim to a guardianship over natural scientists. We still find philosophers rejecting scientific results which are verifiable only through experimentation or mathematical calculation because these results conflict with the allegedly apodictic truths of phil-**

<sup>1</sup>Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

osophy. Another favorite attitude of technical philosophers expresses itself in the assertion that the conclusions reached by natural science through painstaking experimental labor are but a confirmation of the results which the philosopher has long since attained through pure thought.

In antithesis hereto is the philosophical work which it is our purpose to report. It has been carried on in close junction with the exact sciences, partly by the representatives themselves of these sciences, and partly by such philosophers as have included this subject in their studies and are therefore able comprehendingly to follow the developments in this field.

This latter group of investigators may not really be called a school of philosophy. Nevertheless, all of the scholars that here deserve mention hold certain fundamental principles in common. In the first place, they repudiate the premature construction of a philosophical system. Further, they are at one in their unreserved respect for the conclusions of natural science. This does not mean that they unconditionally recognize as valid everything which any scholar proclaims as the outcome of his investigations. But, in their view, the results of a science must be confirmed or refuted, as the case may be, by the methods and devices of this science itself.

One representative of this movement, Hans Reichenbach, has at times described its method as "scientific-analytical"; another, Kurt Lewin, has developed a sort of program of what he designates the "comparative doctrine of science."<sup>2</sup> He delimits the science of knowledge from other sciences, more especially from epistemology and logic. It becomes manifest, however, that, in its present stage of development, epistemology in particular shares with the science of knowledge a number of essential methodological traits. Among these, in addition to the

<sup>2</sup> *Über die vergleichende Wissenschaftslehre*, reprinted from the Symposium. Erlangen, 1926.

features already referred to, are a relatively strong emphasis upon "description" as contrasted with theory, and a preference for specialized problems, in distinction from general and fundamental questions which in consequence tend to recede into the background.

## II

The publications which I must consider in this paper fall into two entirely distinct groups. The one is linked with investigations of the foundations of arithmetic and has more the character of logic; the other deals with the bases of physics (including applied geometry) and is more epistemological in its nature. We will first take up the former of these groups of studies.

In their philosophical aspects, the foundations of mathematics, and especially of arithmetic, have in the past been examined for the most part with a view to determining whether arithmetic is an independent science with a thought structure all its own, or whether it is but a branch of logic. This question continues to play a rôle even today. But in general we have in more recent years passed, in this field, to more concrete and specific questions.

As regards Germany, three tendencies demand our notice—tendencies which in part originated in this country and in part, at the very least, here found adherents and collaborators. We would mention first of all the intuitionists. Their leader is the Hollander, L. E. J. Brouwer, but they have also found a zealous champion in the German mathematician, Herman Weyl. Brouwer has presented his ideas in a long series of essays published in various mathematical journals. One of his studies of importance philosophically has appeared in the English language.<sup>8</sup> Weyl has expounded his and Brouwer's views in his essay, *Über*

<sup>8</sup>"Intuitionism and Formalism," *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*, Vol. 20, 1913.

*die neue Grundlagenkrise der Mathematik*,<sup>4</sup> in a wider framework he presents them, together with the other tendencies which it will devolve upon us to notice, in *Die heutige Erkenntnislage in der Mathematik*,<sup>5</sup> and in *Philosophie der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaft*.<sup>6</sup> A cursory exposition of intuitionism, based however not on Brouwer but on Weyl, has been furnished by Betsch in his *Fiktionen in der Mathematik*.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the best brief presentation of Brouwer's ideas is that in Fraenkel's book *Zehn Vorlesungen über die Grundlegung der Mengenlehre*.<sup>8</sup> Finally we would also mention a short essay which, in a popular but very clear manner, furnishes orientation on the controversy between the intuitionists and the formalists: *Formalismus und Intuitionismus in der Mathematik*,<sup>9</sup> by Baldus.

In the philosophical world, the doctrine of Brouwer has become known primarily because it contests the validity of the logical principle of the excluded middle. To understand this we must know that, as regards the relation of logic to mathematics, Brouwer espouses a view antipodal to that, for example, of Frege and Russell. Whereas the latter hold that mathematics is a branch of logic, Brouwer maintains, conversely, that logic has its foundations in mathematics. He declares that the Aristotelian logic originated by abstraction from the mathematics of finite classes and was then erroneously universalized. The transfer of logical principles from finite to infinite classes leads at times to meaningless proportions—in particular is this true in the case of the just mentioned principle of the excluded middle. The question whether a class includes things of a given nature may, in the case of a finite class,

<sup>4</sup>*Mathematische Zeitschrift*, Bd. 10, 1921.

<sup>5</sup>Reprinted from the Symposium, Erlangen, 1926.

<sup>6</sup>*Handbuch der Philosophie*, München und Berlin, 1927.

<sup>7</sup>Stuttgart, 1926.

<sup>8</sup>Leipzig, 1927.

<sup>9</sup>Karlsruhe, 1924.

be answered, theoretically, by an examination of every single element comprised therein. Either we thus find a thing with the requisite character or we learn that the class contains none such: *tertium non datur*. Quite otherwise in the case of an infinite class. Here it may be true that we are neither able to prove that no element of the requisite character is comprised within the class nor to exhibit such an element, that is, to construct it. According to the classical logic, one might in a case of this sort nevertheless affirm that such an element either does or does not exist. This contention is regarded by Brouwer as meaningless, and all of the conclusions derived therefrom he considers false. This will further explain why he rejects the thesis that all mathematical problems are solvable. Moreover, the concept of "existence" in mathematics thus acquires a new meaning. In distinction from those who hold that (mathematical) objects may be said to exist if they are consistent with mathematical axioms Brouwer predicates existence of only such objects as may be constructed.

The possibility of such construction, however, presupposes an intuition or *Anschauung*; hence the name "intuitionists." The primal intuition of mathematics is expressed in the inference from  $n$  to  $n + 1$ , in so-called "complete induction." By its aid the mathematician, according to Brouwer, can even secure an infinite number of conclusions.

We may not here enter upon the consequences of this doctrine for mathematics. For philosophy its chief feature is its critique of logic. To be sure this critique has not as yet found wide acceptance in philosophical circles. Nevertheless Heinrich Scholz refers to a *Grundlagenkrise der Logik* in a book, shortly to appear, wherein Brouwer's criticism of the Aristotelian logic is brought into parallel with that of Hegel.

In contrast with the intuitionism of Brouwer and Weyl

we find the doctrine of the so-called "formalists," whose leader is the well known Göttingen mathematician, David Hilbert.<sup>10</sup> Among his collaborators we should mention W. Ackermann,<sup>11</sup> Paul Bernays,<sup>12</sup> and J. v. Neumann.<sup>13</sup> The aim of the "formalists" is very similar to that of the intuitionists. They desire, as Hilbert puts it, "definitively to banish from the world all universal doubt as regards the trustworthiness of mathematical inference." In common with the intuitionists, the members of the Hilbert school regard it as impossible to base mathematics exclusively on logic. Moreover, the latter also contend that mathematics requires "certain extra-logical, concrete objects present to intuition, prior to all thought, as immediate experience." Mathematical conclusions are certain only so long as the mathematician restricts himself to "finite" assertions concerning these objects and their combinations, that is, to assertions which may be verified through a finite number of steps. In so far, the formalists and intuitionists seem to be at one. Whereas, however, Brouwer and his adherents are thence led to reject all mathematical propositions which cannot be thus established, Hilbert advances a procedure whereby it is possible to establish also "transfinite" propositions in a finite manner. This procedure is an adaptation of one which mathematicians have long employed with great success in progressively extending the concept of number or in introducing into geometry so-called "ideal" elements (such as infinitely distant points,

<sup>10</sup>The most important of his works relating to arithmetic are: *Über die Grundlagen der Logik und Arithmetik* (Verhandl. d. III intern. Mathematiker-kongresses zu Heidelberg, 1904); *Neubegründung der Mathematik*, Abhandlung a. d. math. Seminar der Hamburger Universität, I, 1922; *Die logischen Grundlagen der Mathematik*, Math. Annalen, Bd. 88, 1923; *Über das Unendliche*, Math. Annalen, Bd. 95, 1925.

<sup>11</sup>*Begründung des tertium non datur mittels der Hilbertschen Theorie der Widerspruchsfreiheit*, Math. Annalen, Bd. 93, 1924; *Die Widerspruchsfreiheit des Auswahlaxioms*, Nachrichten der Göttinger Ges. d. Wissenschaften, 1924.

<sup>12</sup>*Zur Hilbertschen Beweistheorie*, Math. Zeitschrift, 1926.  
d. deutschen Mathematikervereinigung, Bd. 31, 1922.

<sup>13</sup>*Zur Hilbertschen Beweistheorie*, Math. Zeitschrift, 1926.

straight lines and planes). We here have to do with deliberate fictions devised in order to guarantee the universal validity of certain simple laws, as for example the axioms of projective geometry. In Hilbert's view (which is at this point in sharp contrast with that of Brouwer), we may be sure that this procedure is justified if (1) the extended system is free from contradiction and (2) the procedure really leads to the desired result. In order to demonstrate that the enlarged system reached through transfinite modes of inference is free from contradiction, all of mathematics is "formalized." That is to say, the meaning of mathematical symbols is disregarded and every mathematical proof is thought of as a figure constructed from certain fundamental elements in accordance with determinate rules. (These symbols, of course, must include not merely some of a strictly mathematical lineage but also others involved in logical calculation.) Mathematics thus formalized is constituted the object of a new branch of science, "metamathematics." In the latter, which employs only finite modes of inference, it is demonstrated that in formalized mathematics no contradiction can arise. Thus in mathematics we may without hesitation employ, among other principles, that of the excluded middle, inasmuch as we may be sure that we will not, through its use, land in contradiction. We cannot enter upon the interesting philosophical questions to which this theory gives rise. In concluding our account we would but characterize the two main tendencies already described by an analogy from political life. If intuitionists have been characterized with a certain propriety as revolutionists who overturned the *ancien regime*, Hilbert might be compared with a Napoleon who, without regard to considerations of legitimacy, established, through a brilliant political stroke, a new order whose success is the substitute for legitimacy.

The third distinguishable tendency in investigations of

the foundations of arithmetic continues the work of George Cantor, the originator of the theory of classes. That arithmetic might be based on the theory of classes was known even to Cantor. However, the contradictions which revealed themselves in the further development of this line of thought generated doubt with respect to the solidity of this basis. Ernst Zermelo, in a number of treatises published in 1908 and 1909, was the first to set up a system of axioms from which all of the then known theory of classes could be deduced with the exception of the antinomies. In my dissertation of 1910, I myself showed that the doctrine of integral numbers might even be based on a narrower system of axioms. This axiomatization of the theory of classes has in recent years been continued more especially by Adolph Fraenkel.<sup>14</sup> Of late, however, serious doubts have been urged (particularly by J. v. Neumann) against the possibility of such an axiomatization. The controversy thus arising has not as yet been terminated.

We must now refer also to a number of logical-mathematical pieces of work which are more or less closely connected with the researches already mentioned without, however, belonging to any one of the three tendencies described. The logical theory of axiomatics is discussed by Paul Hertz in two treatises on *Axiomensysteme für beliebige Satzsysteme*.<sup>15</sup> This interesting attempt remains, thus far, incomplete. More psychological in character is a work by the same author on *Über das Denken*.<sup>16</sup> A number of investigations by Walter Dubislav relate to *Das Verhältnis der Logik zur Mathematik*. An essay under this title<sup>17</sup> has as its chief aim a new and original proof that mathematics is not deducible from logic. To me this

<sup>14</sup>Cf. his *Einleitung in die Mengenlehre*, 3. Aufl., Berlin, 1927; also the above mentioned *Zehn Vorlesungen*; in addition, a number of scattered treatises.

<sup>15</sup>Mathematische Annalen, Bd. 87, 89, 1922-23.

<sup>16</sup>Berlin, 1923.

<sup>17</sup>In Annalen der Philosophie, Bd. V, 1925-26.



proof seems unsuccessful. In distinguishing logic from mathematics it is a frequent practice to introduce the Kantian classification of judgments into "analytical" and "synthetical." Dubislav discusses this classification in an essay, *Über die so genannten analytischen und synthetischen Urteile*.<sup>18</sup> He analyzes a number of attempts to improve this classification and concludes with a proposal for a classification relative to a system of axioms. To differentiate mathematics from logic such a relative classification is certainly not adapted. Finally, we would mention another publication by the same writer, *Über die Definition*,<sup>19</sup> which deals with related questions. To the problem of definition Rudolph Carnap likewise turns in his brochure, *Über eigentliche und uneigentliche Begriffe*.<sup>20</sup> In a more comprehensive work, as yet unpublished, he is undertaking to erect a system of the sciences on the basis of a construction of concepts.

As is well known, Hans Vaihinger, in his *Philosophie des Als-ob*, relied in a particular degree upon the fictitious character of certain mathematical concepts. He utilized, as his most authoritative witness, primarily the celebrated geometer, Moritz Pasch, though in this, to be sure, he was scarcely justified. Pasch, in numerous philosophical discussions of the nature and foundations of mathematics, adopted a distinctly empirical standpoint. As his latest publication I refer to *Mathematik am Ursprung*.<sup>21</sup> I cannot touch upon the details of these problems. A very searching investigation of the rôle of fictions in mathematics can be found in the above-mentioned book by Betsch. This writer comes to the conclusion that mathematics does not operate, as Vaihinger maintained, with fictions.

<sup>18</sup>Berlin, 1926.

<sup>19</sup>Berlin, 1927.

<sup>20</sup>Reprinted from Symposium, Berlin, 1927.

<sup>21</sup>Leipzig, 1927.

## III

We now turn to our second group of philosophical investigations, namely to those that relate to the foundations of physics, including physical geometry, and that are bound up more or less closely with the theory of relativity. It is particularly the following thinkers—some of them already mentioned in other connections—who have made contributions in this field: R. Carnap, M. Born, H. Dingler, A. Einstein, H. Reichenbach, M. Schlick, and H. Weyl.

Let us begin with the general epistemological problem of physics: What is the relation, in this field, of rational knowledge, experience, and deliberate postulation?

The older doctrine, in dependence chiefly upon Kant, maintained that empirical natural science has, as its basis, a "pure" science consisting of *a priori* truths. Only upon this basis, it was believed, could one, with the aid of experimentation and observation, erect a theoretical natural science. In opposition hereto there came, more especially from England (J. S. Mill), an extremely empirical view, which, however, was unable to maintain itself. Today there are essentially three competing doctrines: (1) the rationalistic, already mentioned; (2) the conventionalistic, which insists that all non-empirical elements of science are derived from convention—indeed in its most extreme form it even maintains that all universal assertions of science are postulations (Dingler); (3) the moderately empirical, to which we will need to give somewhat closer attention. Recent discussions of these questions for the most part take their departure from the theory of relativity. The following publications should here be mentioned: Representing the conventionalistic view, first of all the numerous works of Hugo Dingler.<sup>23</sup> A moderate conventionalism char-

<sup>23</sup>The most important of which are *Physik und Hypothese* (Leipzig, 1921), *Grundlagen der Physik* (2 Aufl., Berlin, 1923), *Relativitätstheorie und Ökonomieprinzip* (Leipzig, 1922), and *Der Zusammenbruch der Wissenschaft* (München, 1927).

acterizes Carnap's essay, *Über die Aufgabe der Physik*.<sup>24</sup> Of the empirical group: Max Born, *Die Relativitätstheorie Einsteins*;<sup>25</sup> Einstein, *Geometrie und Erfahrung*;<sup>26</sup> Hans Reichenbach, *Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis a priori*;<sup>27</sup> *Der gegenwärtige Stand der Relativitätsdiskussion*,<sup>28</sup> *Axiomatik der relativistischen Raum-Zeitlehre*,<sup>29</sup> and *Philosophie der Raum-Zeitlehre* (soon to be published); Schlick, *Raum und Zeit in der gegenwärtigen Physik*,<sup>30</sup> *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre*,<sup>31</sup> and *Kritische oder empiristische Deutung der neueren Physik*.<sup>32</sup> Here also belong, though to be sure with certain reservations, the writings of Hermann Weyl: in addition to his already mentioned contribution to the *Handbuch der Philosophie*, his *Raum, Zeit und Materie*.<sup>33</sup>

The train of thought of Dingler's conventionalism may be briefly summarized as follows: The results of observation and experimentation do not by themselves yield theories unambiguously. On the contrary, it is always possible, through the introduction of suitable auxiliary hypotheses, to bring any accepted theory into harmony with experience. To construct a theory of natural phenomena, therefore, one always requires a framework of principles which are not derived from experience. (Indeed, according to Dingler, universal assertions can never be derived from experience.) In so far Dingler's view is in entire harmony with that of Kant. But Dingler rejects the *a priorism* of the Kantians on the ground that the alleged self-evidence of the axioms is no criterion of their truth. He therefore regards axioms as postulates that depend upon the decision of the scientist.

<sup>24</sup>Kantstudien, Bd. 28, 1923.

<sup>25</sup>2. Aufl., Berlin, 1921.

<sup>26</sup>Berlin, 1921.

<sup>27</sup>Berlin, 1920.

<sup>28</sup>Logos, Bd. X, 1922.

<sup>29</sup>Braunschweig, 1924.

<sup>30</sup>4. Aufl., Berlin, 1922.

<sup>31</sup>2. Aufl., Berlin, 1925.

<sup>32</sup>Kantstudien, Bd. 26, 1921.

<sup>33</sup>5. Aufl., Berlin, 1923.

If, now, science is not to dissolve completely into chaos, the selection of postulates may not be left to the arbitrary choice of the individual investigator, but must be guided by a superior principle. The latter is the principle of economy—the principle that had previously been stressed by Ernst Mach. In this case it requires that, of all possible sets of axioms, the simplest be selected. For geometry, these are the axioms of Euclidean geometry; for mechanics, those of the Newtonian mechanics. The theory of relativity is rejected by Dingler because he believes that it violates the principle of economy. In his judgment, Einstein, in order to gain simplicity in a limited field, sacrifices the simplicity and therewith, above all else, the unambiguity of the entire structure of physics. If we were to reconstruct the entire system from the ground up whenever we were unable forthwith to include some new feature into the established system, we would witness what Dingler in his last great publication describes with moving words as the “collapse of science.”

In contrast herewith, critical empiricism, as we might designate the modern form of empiricism, in distinction, perhaps, from that of a J. S. Mill, holds to the following standpoint.<sup>84</sup> It concedes to a *priorism* and conventionalism that single physical laws cannot be derived solely from observations and experiments. Indeed one may not, either with certainty or probability, proceed by inference from one or several observations to other observations; consequently, also, one may not infer the existence of a law. For such a conclusion there is in every instance required a principle which Reichenbach calls the “principle of normal induction.” It states that for a given body of experiential data one always utilizes the most probable inter- and extra-

<sup>84</sup>In our account we shall follow essentially the line of thought pursued in Reichenbach's essay, *Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis a priori*. The other above-mentioned publications of the empirical tendency, however, in the by and large move in about the same channels.

pulation. But in general this principle does not suffice. On the contrary, in the theoretical interpretation of any physical observations a large number of assumptions are generally made, and as a rule these assumptions may not be completely envisaged. Doubtless they include, more especially, geometrical axioms and the fundamental equations of mechanics. If these propositions are themselves in turn to be based on observations and experiments, we apparently have a logical circle. For this reason the rationalists as well as the conventionalists maintain that these propositions are known or established independently of all experience. Were this view valid, it would follow that the data of observation could be incorporated into every proposed system of principles, unless one assumed a pre-established harmony between the principles prescribed by reason, or by the principle of economy, on the one hand, and the facts of observation on the other. Now, the development of the theory of relativity has proved—and herein consists its epistemological importance—that there is a system of principles which is irreconcilable with the facts of observation. Furthermore, this system comprises precisely such principles as physicists and philosophers had hitherto recognized as valid and therefore made the basis of their inductions. This, however, proves that it is possible, on the basis of experience, to make a selection from among the various systems of principles. But we have still to face the above-mentioned objection of a logical circle. This objection may be removed as follows: If B follows from A, and non-A follows from A and B together, we may infer the falsity of A. Applied to our case this tells us that from a system of principles, A, there follows a certain interpretation of observed facts, B, which however, together with A, yields a law (non-A) that is in contradiction with A. From this it follows that the system A is false. It becomes clear, also, that, without becoming involved in a circle, it is possible

to reason from the interpretation of observations that result when certain principles are taken as foundational back to the *falsity* of these principles. The *validity* of these principles, of course, could not be inferred without circular reasoning. In all strictness such a conclusion is, in general, impossible. In other words, the validity of any system of principles may never be inferred with certainty from any mass of observations however large. From this, however, we may not conclude, as conventionalism does, that the principles are entirely independent of the facts; we may single out a certain system as the most probable, though always leaving open the possibility that new facts may expel it from this status.

The problem of space, or of geometry, has been studied with special thoroughness by the group of thinkers whom we are now considering. In addition to the above mentioned publications, we would refer especially to Carnap's *Der Raum*.<sup>85</sup> Carnap distinguishes three conceptions of space: "formal space," "intuitional space," and "physical space." Formal space is an abstract logical-mathematical structure. It is the proper object of pure geometry. Intuitional space is that in which we generally represent to ourselves geometric figures. Its relations and laws are known through *Wesensanschauung*, that is, through the intuition or immediate apprehension of essence. In opposition to Kant's doctrine Carnap holds that the intuition is that of only a limited spatial field. Assertions regarding space as a whole may not be derived from intuition; the latter, however, may be supplemented by freely selected postulates. Schlick, indeed, disputes the existence of such an intuition. He maintains that each of the senses has its own space, so that we have a visual space, a tactual space, et cetera. Carnap and Schlick are at one, however, in the view that the psychological facts of intuition tell us noth-

<sup>85</sup>Berlin, 1923.

ing of the structure of physical space. The most important part of Carnap's treatise is concerned with physical space. His exposition directly discusses the relation of geometry to experience and is perhaps the clearest and most exact account of this problem published in recent years.

If we designate as "the body of fact" all that may be derived directly from experience as regards the spatial relations of objects, then this body of fact must be differentiated from the interpretations of theoretical science. It is manifest that the body of fact can afford a characterization of only the topological features of physical space. All assertions on the other hand, as to whether lines are straight, surfaces plane and figures congruent depend upon postulates which are arbitrary in the sense that they are not univocally determined by the body of fact. If we select a specific mode of measurement, as, for example, the one customary in physics (according to which the two marks on the standard meter in Paris represent a distance equal to 100 cm. multiplied by a certain empirically determinable function of temperature, pressure, electrical charge, etc.) we derive a very specific metrical space whose structure, to be sure, still depends upon the degree of accuracy attainable at the time. Until 1919 the entire known body of physical facts, with the exception of the movements of the perihelion of Mercury, could without contradiction be put into terms of the Euclidean geometry. Even at that time an entirely different geometry might have been arrived at—for example, one in which the surface of the earth is a plane with a curvature everywhere positive and uniform. This, of course, would have demanded a different, and indeed a more complicated mode of measurement than the customary one. This same situation would make it possible, even today, after observations have confirmed the general theory of relativity, to preserve intact the strict validity of the Euclidean geometry, provided we assume that the length of a

rod depends not alone on temperature, pressure, etc., but also in a very determinate way upon its position in the gravitational field. If, on the other hand, we adhere to the mode of measurement hitherto customary, we find that space is no longer everywhere Euclidean but that it possesses a degree of curvature dependent upon the gravitational field.

Carnap comes to the following conclusion: The body of fact leaves us with a choice either between different modes of measurement or between different geometries. If we have come to a decision in one of these two regards, the outcome in the other follows of necessity. In the choice, the consideration of simplicity is authoritative. This, however, does not itself unambiguously determine the choice, for the principle of simplicity might be employed with respect to the mode of measurement as well as to the geometry, and it would lead to different results in the two cases. As a matter of fact, however, physics proceeds neither according to the one nor according to the other alternative, but it makes its choice in such a way that its development as a whole becomes the simplest possible. This, to be sure, carries with it the fact that neither the mode of measurement nor the type of geometry is completely determined at any stage.

Against this view an objection may be raised which we would here mention because it is of importance for the controversy between conventionalism and empiricism. Carnap always sets out, in his reflections, from a finished body of fact already lying at hand, and he investigates the possibility of expounding it theoretically. This, however, does not exhaust the task of theory. One of its most important functions—if not, indeed, its most important function—consists precisely in this, that it enables us to predict facts as yet unknown. But it is not at all certain that two theories which equally well present the known facts



are of equal value also for the prediction of unknown facts.

Reichenbach has investigated this problem of Carnap's from a somewhat different point of view. He defines as rigid (*Starr*) a solid body which is isolated from all external forces. This is a physical definition of a rigid body which makes no reference to any system of measurement. It then is a fact of experience (of course only approximately verifiable) that two rigid rods which at any one time, when both are at rest, cover each other, will do so always and everywhere. To be sure, the concept of "isolation" involves a still further difficulty. It is obvious that this isolation may never be strictly realized. But even to achieve it approximately, one condition must be fulfilled. If there are "metrical forces," that is such forces as on the one hand operate uniformly on all substances, and on the other hand penetrate undiminished all isolating walls, obviously it would be impossible to construct an isolated system. To render the definition of a rigid body univocal and applicable one must therefore postulate that there are no "metrical forces." Such a postulate may be made without contradiction of experience, if one makes no assertions regarding the metrical structure of the world. The Newtonian physics proceeds conversely. It regards metrics as given *a priori* by the Euclidean geometry, and accordingly it is compelled to introduce a "metrical force," namely, gravitation.

The above-given definition of rigidity, together with the exclusion of "metrical forces," is an axiomatization of the traditional mode of measurement. Now it appears that at the present stage of knowledge the geometry which one thus obtains is in complete harmony with that which follows if light signals exclusively are utilized for purposes of measurement. This is one of the most important results of Reichenbach's axiomatics of the relativistic doctrine of

space-time . This axiomatics, into the details of which we cannot here enter, has the aim of differentiating the empirical from the conventional elements of the space-time doctrine. The axioms formulate the empirical facts (of course, after a generalization on the basis of the previously mentioned principle of normal induction) which are affirmed by the theory of relativity; the postulates, on the other hand, are laid down in definitions. This excursus into the theory of science is of great value in that it enables us for the first time to form a clear-cut and definite judgment as to the degree of justification with which the theory of relativity may appeal to physical experience. It appears here, as so often, that, the moment a controversial question is really formulated with strictness, it is fairly simple to settle the controversy in as much as each of the contenders is partly in the right and none of them entirely so. The theory of relativity rests to some extent upon empirical principles which are in part well confirmed and in part as yet unconfirmed but in principle verifiable; in some degree, however, it likewise depends upon certain postulates which are neither true nor false but may be evaluated only with respect to their suitability. In a new work, presently to be published, Reichenbach has laid broad, philosophical foundations for the entire doctrine of space-time.

Philosophical viewpoints similar to those of Carnap and Reichenbach, are maintained by Weyl in his works, *Raum, Zeit und Materie*, and *Mathematische Analyse des Raumproblems*.<sup>36</sup> But the main emphases of his investigations are purely mathematical, and we must therefore here pass them by.

A further problem closely bound up with the development of modern physics is that of causality, or rather that complex of issues which group themselves about this con-

<sup>36</sup>The latter was published in Berlin in 1925.

cept.<sup>87</sup> Physicists and mathematicians above all have succeeded in their attempts to reach an exact formulation of the causal law. Weyl has expressed it as follows: The temporal derivations of the quantitative aspects of conditions<sup>88</sup> in one part of the world are mathematical functions of the quantitative aspects of the conditions themselves and of their spatial derivatives at that position." In less mathematical, and therefore less exact language, this affirms that the temporal changes in the quantitative aspects of conditions (for example, the intensity of electrical and magnetic fields) at any specific time and place are completely determined by the values of these quantitative aspects of conditions at that particular time and place and in their immediate environment. If one compares this with Kant's formulation: "Every change in nature has a cause upon which it follows according to a law," one realizes at once the progress that has been made in the precision of the definition. But it is precisely this more exact formulation which discloses the "law" to be a completely meaningless triviality. In the spirit of the "classical" physics ("classical" in contrast with the "quantum" physics) the further demand might perhaps be made that the functions remain continuous. But even then one might say that the principle remains insignificant in that no observable facts can be conceived which would contradict it. The reason why the principle does not ordinarily strike us as thoroughly trivial is indicated by Weyl when he points out that the functions which control the course of the process are extraordinarily

<sup>87</sup>The following works should here be cited: Schlick, *Naturphilosophische Betrachtungen über das Kausalprinzip*, Die Naturwissenschaften, 1920, H. 20, and *Naturphilosophie in Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten*, edited by Max Dessoir, Berlin, 1926; Reichenbach, (in addition to the works already mentioned) *Kausalstruktur der Welt und der Unterschied von Vergangenheit und Zukunft*, Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Math. Naturw. Abt., 1925; Carnap, *Dreidimensionalität*, Annalen der Philosophie, Bd. 4, 1924; Weyl, *Philosophie der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaft*.

<sup>88</sup>The term translated by this phrase is *Zustandsgrösze*; it might perhaps better be rendered "co-ordinates," except for the fact that to many this might tend to have an exclusively geometrical connotation. [Tr.]

simple; functions as simple as these we expect to find also in the future. But even with this modification nothing of importance can be inferred from the principle. Rather should we credit it with being a guiding maxim for investigation (and for everyday experience). As such, one would not be inclined to deny to it a certain *a priori*. But herein it would be very difficult to discover any *a priori knowledge*.

More important than this very insignificant principle is the order of events made possible by the causal relation. As is well known, the theory of relativity has disclosed the relativity of simultaneity. This, moreover, also brings a realization that the temporal succession of distant events is objectively indeterminate. Now, however, it has appeared that it is both possible and useful to define the temporal succession of distant events by reference to the causal relation. The causal relation reveals itself to be objectively knowable, independently of any system of reference. Thus it would be fitting to define simultaneity in such a way that in any system only such events could be called simultaneous between which no causal relation could exist. According to Kant, simultaneity is the schema of reciprocal activity, and temporal succession that of causality. The intuitive knowledge of the temporal order was thus supposed to furnish the criterion for the applicability of the categories. According to modern physics precisely the reverse obtains. The temporal order (of spatially distant events) is in itself arbitrary and is not determined by the data of observation. The causal connection of two events, on the other hand, can be known empirically, and this gives to the time order its arrangement.

The causal relation, furthermore, enables us also to determine the direction of the temporal sequence. For the cause-effect relation, as Reichenbach has shown, is not symmetrical. These investigations lead to a further interest-

ing problem, namely that of the difference between past and future and the definition of the "now." In his above mentioned treatise on the structure of causality, Reichenbach shows that if we accept the hypothesis of determination, past and future are not objectively distinguishable. The hypothesis of determination affirms that the quantitative aspect of conditions in any moment of time, together with their derivatives, determine the course of these magnitudes for all moments of time. It appears, however, that this hypothesis asserts more than may be justified through our experiences of the physical order. In its stead, one may make the assumption that the connection between the events is one of probability. If we adopt this supposition, which in any case is not in contradiction with any experiences derived from the physical order, we obtain a characteristic difference between past and future. Objectively, the former is determined, even though we know only a brief section of it; the future, on the other hand, is indeterminate, not only subjectively, because of our lack of knowledge, but also objectively, because it is determined by the present only with probability. The present is defined as the boundary between the determined and the indeterminate. But we must refrain from a further discussion of the interesting questions raised by these investigations.

Of the other problems in the philosophy of nature to which modern physics has given an entirely different form we would refer only to the problem of matter, or of substance. The literature relating to it is comprehensive. From it I single out only the following important items: Schlick's paper, already mentioned, on *Naturphilosophie*; Weyl's essay in the *Handbuch der Philosophie* to which we have also already referred, and his small but important book, *Was ist Materie*.<sup>89</sup> Even though the problem of matter is just at the present time in rapid flux and the most re-

<sup>89</sup>Berlin, 1924.

cent developments of "quantum mechanics" open up entirely new outlooks, one may nevertheless regard it as established that the old metaphysical concept of substance has no place in the natural science of today. The fact that we may trace the life history of the "things," including the living beings, of our environment and find it to be an approximately continuous course is indeed the reason why we conceive a "thing" as an essence persisting throughout a change of conditions. But when we descend into the world of atoms and electrons, this permanence and continuity reveal themselves as merely statistical. We indeed have an almost insuperable tendency to represent also the ultimate constituents of things as enduring, but in this physics in no wise justifies us. The wonderfully intuitable model of the atom constructed by Rutherford and Niels Bohr is today recognized as inadequate. In this model the electrons revolve, similarly to small planets, about the nucleus as the central sun, but this representation involves features to which nothing which we experience of the physical order corresponds. The individual electrons indeed have orbits with spatial and temporal features, physically real, but it appears impossible to ascribe to the individual electron a determinate place in its course at a determinate time. What is true of permanence is true also of the "space-filling" nature which earlier views ascribed to matter. Upon closer examination this also vanishes. Thus it seems necessary to abandon the "substance theory" of matter. Up to the present time, however, it has been impossible to develop without contradictions either of the two other views competing with it: the "dynamic" and the "field" theory. According to Weyl, a mediating doctrine is today the most probable, that is, the "agent" theory, according to which matter is an extensionless agency which arouses or stimulates the extended field. But this entire question, as al-

ready stated, is as yet altogether too much in flux to permit of any final assertions.

There are quite a number of other important philosophical issues and researches which are more or less closely connected with the development of the exact sciences. I would call attention only to the problems connected with the concept of probability, and to those bearing on the delimitation of strictly valid laws of nature from merely statistical laws. Unfortunately I must renounce a discussion of these matters. It has been my purpose to characterize that recent philosophical work in Germany which developed in close relations with mathematics and physics. Completeness could not be achieved within the space limits at our disposal, but I trust that I have clearly indicated the characteristic traits of this work and have given my readers an idea of how fruitful the results of a close co-operation with the exact sciences may be to philosophy.

# PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

HANS DRIESCH

## I. INTRODUCTION

THE concept of a *philosophy of nature* depends on the concept you have of philosophy in general, and this concept varies according to whether you admit the possibility of *metaphysics* or not. If you do not admit metaphysics, philosophy remains a mere theory of order and cannot be more: the logical schema or structure of all that I consciously possess, of my "objects" in the broadest sense of the word, is its only theme, and this in particular with regard to the objects of nature. But if you admit that the words *absolute* or *in itself* have a meaning and, more, that the quality of the absolute may be known, to a certain extent at least (in other words, if you admit the possibility of a metaphysics) not only the structure of nature but also the *meaning* of nature is the object of discussion.

Until about 1900 most philosophers of recent times denied that metaphysics is possible. There were many who did not even admit that the word "in itself," i. e., "not only for myself," has any meaning at all. And of those who were of the opinion that "absolute" or "in itself" are legitimate concepts, the majority were to such an extent influenced by the philosophy of Kant that they regarded the investigation of the quality of the absolute as an impossibility. These were the real agnostics; for them the absolute exists, but is unknowable.

This attitude has changed in all countries since about 1900. Subjectivism or, rather, solipsism, as well as agnos-



ticism, has broken down. The "in itself" does not only exist, but we may even know a little of it; this is the opinion of almost all modern philosophers. We may therefore study the actual state of the philosophy of nature from the logical as well as from the philosophical point of view. Our own conception of both, of logic and of metaphysics, will, of course, be explained in full.

Let us begin with *logic* in the broadest meaning of the word. Logic is the *theory of order*. There cannot be any doubt that logic must stand before metaphysics; for, in order to know what the meaning of *essence* of nature is, one must first know in its very details the structure of that which is supposed to possess an absolute meaning or essence.

Much discussed in our days is the old problem of a sound starting-point of all philosophy. And this with the result that Augustine and Descartes are seen to have been right in putting the *scio* or *cogito* in the first place. Personally, I have proposed to translate these words by the phrase, *I have consciously something*, the word "have" being designed to exclude any sort of activity on the part of the conscious "ego." For such a conscious activity certainly does not exist; as to this almost all modern thinkers are agreed. An unconscious mental activity must, of course, be admitted; but this is a theoretical concept, and is not anything that is immediately experienced.

The *cogito*, though indubitable, can yet not be the foundation of philosophy without a certain addition. And this addition is possible; for I know by intuition that the something which I consciously possess is *ordered*, and I also know what *order* means, though I am unable to define the word. And now the first theme of philosophy has appeared: In what respect is there an *order* in the midst of my "something?" To make this out is the endeavor of logic.

Logic, in the first place, has to deal with a number of

indefinable concepts, such as *this*, *not*, *such*, *relation*, *so many*, *because*, *whole* and *part*; and with systems of relations prevailing in the realm of these concepts. It finds the principles of identity, contradiction and *exclusi tertii*; it prepares the formulations of syllogism, arithmetic, geometry, etc. In these fields logic has to do exclusively with what I call *immediate objects*, i. e., with objects which "exist" only insofar as they are consciously possessed by an "ego." Some authors deal with all these subjects in a neo-Platonic or neo-realistic way—in the scholastic sense of the word "realism"—but I believe that neo-realism is hidden metaphysics and must not stand at the beginning of philosophy. I have "somethings" in order; and I try to discover this order in detail—that is all at first.

From immediate objects I proceed to *mediate* objects. For I see by intuition that there is more of *order* in the realm of the "something" if I say that certain—not all!—of my immediate possessions *mean* or *denote* or *indicate* somethings or objects, as if they existed in an independent way. Part of these mediate objects I call mental (unconscious) objects, such as "associative affinities," "determining tendencies," etc.; they form the basis of all psychology. The other part I call *objects of nature*.

An object of nature, then, is a something which I *mean* by an immediate conscious possession or content, such as a perception or thought, *as if* it existed independently. Note the "as if": it is designed to *exclude* metaphysics at this point. Natural objects continue to remain my objects; something absolute or "in itself" does not yet stand in question.

It is a rather difficult problem, the problem of a so-called theory of knowledge, to find out *which* of my immediate possessions *may* denote objects of nature and which may not. In other words: what is the difference between objects of nature and objects of dreams?

The concept of nature being established, logic proceeds to define the concepts of being, becoming, causality, etc.; and here it comes into clear contact with science proper. Science, in fact, may be defined as a part of logic; and the scientist is a logician, even if he himself does not know it.

## II. LOGIC OF NATURE

### I

The main questions of discussion in the field of a logic of nature are, at present, the following:

First, the question concerning the value of the concepts *substance* and *causality*; this is more or less a question of method.

Second, the theory of so-called matter and force in the inorganic world.

Third, the problem of life, both personal and superpersonal. The question "mechanism or vitalism" here stands in the center of interest.

"Thing" and "cause" are popular concepts; and they are at the same time concepts that can withstand logical criticism. They are concepts that have quite a clear and definite logical meaning; the one being, under the name of *substance*, the purely logical concept of *identity* thrown out, so to say, into the realm of Nature, and the other, the natural correspondent to logical *consequence*.

Mathematical physicists of today usually reject these concepts. And there are even some who call them mystical or mythological. And they put mathematical equations in their place, conceiving nature under the aspects of a system of such equations. This means that they only know and apply the concept of functional dependence in the mathematical sense, but nothing more.

What I object to in mathematical physics, if it believes itself to be the last word about nature, is this: caus-

ality means more than mere functional dependence. And, since this "more" is possible in a legitimate way, as general logic is able to prove, it must be recognized. There is the one change, which is later, and the other change, which is earlier; and between the two stands the "why," i. e., causality. It would be absurd, of course, to deny the value of mathematics as applied to physics and chemistry. But mathematics applied in this way can only deal with relations of quantity which accompany causal natural events, but never with the *propter* in the causal sense. Mathematical formulation, therefore, is never the last word in physics and chemistry.

Think of what "pushing" means—the clearest instance of a truly causal event. I do not forget that every equation may be read from both sides. This fact alone is sufficient to show, so it seems to me, that the concept of functional dependence can never replace causality. Mathematical physics is not "wrong," of course, but it leaves open many questions, which *are* legitimate logical questions; and among them is the question as to *why* the one occurs *after* the other has happened. Mathematics is even unable to deal with the concept of *becoming*; the more is it unable to replace causality.

Einstein's so-called theory of relativity must shortly be mentioned in this connection. It shows where mathematical physics may lead the mind. While being mathematically beyond any doubts, Einstein's theory is in strict contradiction with ontology (or phenomenology, as you may like to call it). It speaks of "many times," measured, however, by different units; and it speaks of a so-called meta-geometrical space. But time is one by its essence; and space is ontologically Euclidean. Of course, you may speak of an *n*-dimensional manifoldness and of "curved" manifoldness in the general theory of relations; but space is a thing for itself. No objections are to be made here if you

only say that we are *practically* unable to know about simultaneity in a definite way. But the Einsteinians prefer to make statements about essence and not only about practical possibilities. Quite rightly most *philosophers* have declined to follow the theory of Einstein, if it sets itself up as more than a mathematical formulation of what we are able to observe. For time and space in their very *essence* are not matters of "observation."

## 2

The second problem of a philosophy of nature as part of logic relates to what may briefly be called *matter* and *force*; the concepts of substance and causality being conceived now as legitimate concepts.

The main result in this field is this: there are only very few really elemental sorts of matter, namely the positive electron, the negative electron and, perhaps, ether. Probably even the electra may be nothing but specific states of the latter. We are on the way to a theory of matter that operates with but one sort of material element—the dream of the old atomists.

Chemistry, in this way, has become a part of physics. The modern "metachemistry" is a wonderful thing.

And, on the other hand, there is but *one* kind of physics. The old doctrine of various so-called "forces of nature," as advocated by Schelling and Schopenhauer, but also by many physicists in earlier times, has been completely given up. There is one sort of matter and one sort of "force." And what seem to be differences in forces are only "subjective"; our psychophysical organism accounts for them. For this organization can only be affected by certain special distinct areas of "force," in the electromagnetic fields for example, every area giving us specific sensations. Thus there is a break only in the realm of psychophysics,

but not in the realm of physics; for qualitative differences in inorganic nature do not exist.

We may call this doctrine the doctrine of *physical continuity*. There exist in nature *all* possible forms of, say, wavelengths, but some give us the sensation of light, some that of heat, while others may only be known by their physical effects (Hertz waves, X-rays, etc.).

Theoretically this doctrine is old, but for a long time it could not be proved. And for a short period at the end of the last century it even seemed as if the theory of qualitatively different "forces of nature," under the form of qualitatively different forms of "energy," might be the last word of physics. Ostwald has advocated this view. But at the present time the doctrine of one matter and one "force," i. e., the doctrine of physical continuity may really be said to be proved.

The question is merely what the "one" matter and the "one" force are; or, mathematically, of what form the fundamental equations are, whether of that of Newton-Lagrange, or of Maxwell, or of some other sort. Yet the hope that Newtonism will some day be the last word of physics must not be given up. For Newtonism is the most rational form of physics, i. e., that form which we should "like" to find realized—the word "like" taken in the logical sense.

### 3

We leave inorganic nature and proceed to the organic world.

Here, no doubt, vitalism is the original theory, if, at least, one includes under "theory" the view of the unscientific man. Primitive peoples and also primitive individuals of our day regard everything as "living." This sort of an all-vitalism prevails even in the system of Aristotle. By and by the concept of the "non-living" is created. And

then science comes and finds that it can "understand" only that which does *not* live. Dogmatic mechanism is the result: life is nothing *sui generis*, but only a very complex sort of mechanics. The living does not "live," for living is not a thing for itself and is not bound to specific laws of its own.

This attitude of dogmatic mechanism in the field of biology began with Descartes—although he excepted the conscious actions of man—and with but very few exceptions (E. von Hartmann, Bergson) prevailed in science and philosophy until about 1900.

In 1899 the writer of this article tried to show by a proof *per exclusionem* that certain embryological facts are opposed to any "mechanical" explanation whatever. The word "mechanical" is taken here in its widest sense, irrespective of any particular physical theory. We mean that the facts in question cannot be explained in what might be called the summative way, i. e., the way which goes from the parts to the whole.

Other proofs were added to the first one; and today we may say that but very few philosophers defend mechanical biology. And there is no biologist who pretends that he can explain the phenomena of life on a mechanistic basis.

The way in which a vital individualizing or totalizing agent—called *entelechy* by the present writer, *élan vital* by Bergson, *das Unbewusste* by E. von Hartmann—may act upon the material world, may be formulated in various ways, and even in such a way that the principle of the conservation of energy is not violated.

Of great importance is the logical justification of such a conception as *entelechy*. Here the present writer has tried to show, first, that *individuality* is a real category in the Kantian sense, and that it may even be "deduced" from the "table of judgments," if only you add the "complete-conjunctive judgment" ( $S_1, P_1$  and  $P_2$  and  $P_3$  and . . .  $P_n$ )

to the list as given by Kant; and, second, that we are able to deduce *a priori*, from the very essence of the concept of "causality," the *possibility* of four different forms of natural causality, one of them being *individualizing causality*.

The vitalistic biology breaks nature into two parts. There are "two sciences of nature," biology and physics, as J. A. Thomson has well formulated the matter. Here, then, we have a great gap in nature, whilst we are unable to admit any such gap in its inorganic part. The adoption of a vitalistic biology carries with it a rejection of the theory of ordinary, or psycho-physical, parallelism in the field of psychology. I say "ordinary," because a certain sort of parallelism between what is "natural" and what is conscious must also be accepted by the vitalist: conscious living goes parallel with the (unconscious) action of entelechy. But there is no parallelism between conscious life and a mechanics of the brain. For the brain, as the whole living organism, as an object of nature, is, though a natural, yet not a mechanical system, i. e., not a "machine."

But all this does not belong to the sphere of this article, which has to do solely with a philosophy of *nature*. Let me then only add that there are still many other special objections to the common form of parallelism, and let me close with the remark that among psychologists proper the number of mechanical parallelists is decreasing from year to year. It may suffice to mention the names of E. von Hartmann, W. James, W. McDougall, Bergson, Külpe, Becher, Husserl, Volkelt, Scheler and Krüger.

There is one strange doctrine that is, so to speak, beyond the diversity of mechanism and vitalism. I refer to the view, inaugurated by Leibniz and advocated in our days most consistently by Julius Schultz, that the whole material world is one inorganic "machine" of absolute precision. According to this view there is no "law of nature," as there are no independent cases of becoming that form a



"class." Each single event is what it is in a predetermined whole. Each single movement is nothing but itself. And now Schultz tells us that the totality of events in the One World-Machine is nothing but the realm of conscious life with all its "values" seen from the other side. I myself, though admiring the consistency of the theory in question, feel unable to appreciate how the events in a machine might form that realm "from the other side." And, besides, all experimentation becomes valueless under this view. For the experimenting scientist, taken as a body, is part of the One World-Machine. In the case of embryological experiment, then, you would therefore have to assume that there exists a predetermined harmony between the experimenter and the *particular* object with which he is working. The experimenter is not allowed to say: "I have worked upon this egg, separating the blastomere and getting two whole organisms; I *might* have worked upon another one." Nothing of "I might"! But from the beginning of things it has been determined that the experimenter A works on the egg B and that this very egg was determined by its structure to give two organisms, whilst all other eggs were determined by their structure to give but one. The theory of the One World-Machine cannot be properly refuted. But it can be led into absurdities, as we believe to have shown.

As to the suprapersonal problems of biology, i. e., the phylogenetic ones, not much is really *known* at the present time, and probably this accounts for the fact that phylogeny has ceased to be popular. We know that the factors introduced by Darwin and Lamarck are only secondary agents. But what the primary evolutionary agent in phylogeny is, we do not know. And we shall *never* know this agent. For there is but *one* phylogeny, and of this we ourselves form a part. Hence we cannot "experiment" with phylogeny. To compare phylogeny with *one* embryological case

—of a suprapersonal nature, of course—is the only thing we can do. And we say that most probably there is at work a suprapersonal entelechy, making all living things basically one. This is the view of Bergson, Becher and myself. But we have here only suggestion, not knowledge.

At the end of all biological problems stand those connected with so-called “psychical research.” It is my opinion that the physical phenomena established in this realm, i. e., levitation, telekinesis, etc., *are facts*. But the time is not ripe for theory. A sort of supravitalism is in question; that is all we can say. Psychical phenomena, such as telepathy, do not belong to the field of a philosophy of nature.

### III. METAPHYSICS OF NATURE

#### I

The second part of philosophy, as we have said, or, rather, the second philosophical aspect of that which is consciously given, is metaphysics. There are those who begin with it without any critical justification. In my opinion metaphysics must be derived, so to speak, from logic, or the theory of order, and this in the following way: A good deal of order can be found within the realm of nature (as well as within the realm of the mind or soul), but *why* there is such a thing as *nature* (and soul) at all, or, otherwise put, how it comes *that* the concept of *nature* (and soul) may be established among the “somethings” which I consciously have or possess—this question is unanswerable for logic as such. But I see intuitively<sup>1</sup> that the concept *real* or *in itself* has a clear meaning, and that by admitting it I get more of order than without it.

The theory of order or logic, therefore, is led beyond itself by the *ideal* of “order.” It becomes theory of reality or metaphysics. And the whole content of so-called experience, in the widest sense of the term, may *now*, but not

<sup>1</sup> In German I should say: *Ich schaue*.

earlier, be called *appearance*, namely, appearance to the ego of something that exists in itself.

The method of metaphysics can only be induction, for that which we have, appearance, is like a "consequence" of which we are in search of the "reason." And, according to a well-known logical principle, the way from the consequence to the reason is never univocal.

The relation between reality and appearance, however, must not be taken as a form of causality, as if there were reality *and* something else, the ego. This would simply be nonsense. That relation may be called a "function" of the relation *consequence* ( $f(c)$ ), causality being another "function" of it ( $p(c)$ ). In other terms: Reality is such that parts of it appear to other parts, the egos, under the forms of experience.

## 2

Now with respect to nature in particular, we may say that what we call space, time, matter, and causality in logic, have each a corresponding system of relations in reality, the *suchness* of which in itself we are unable to know. We may speak of a real S-, T-, M-, and C-system. And the only thing we know about these systems of relations in reality is that they contain at least as many specificities and differences as are contained in the corresponding systems of relations in experience. In other terms: cube and tetrahedron, ellipse and parabola in the realm of appearance mark differences and specificities, of an unknown *suchness* in itself, in Reality and are not in the last resort "the same."

Here, as you will have seen, we do not agree with Kant who has said that space, time, etc., are of a *merely* subjective nature. It may be that our space is not "space" in itself—we are unable to decide that—but differences in space *are* "real" differences. This was the view held by

Herbart and Lotze. It rests, of course, upon one foundation, which is merely a postulate, namely, that Reality is *rational*, or, rather, approachable in a rational way. But without this postulate—and this eliminates all mystics—metaphysics is impossible.

Vitalism is not in itself metaphysics but a mere doctrine of order. But if you accept vitalism, you have at once gained a very important metaphysical conclusion, for vitalism tells you that appearance so far as it is spatial does *not* characterize Reality in *full*, but only in part. And this conclusion is in contradiction to the philosophy of Spinoza according to which all *modi* of the absolute *extensio* are a *complete* expression of the *substantia* or the *natura naturans* or *deus*.

### 3

The only point where we approach Reality *as it is*, is in our conscious possession, our knowing of what “consciously possessed” or “knowing” means. Knowing knows itself *as it is*. In my knowing or consciously having, Reality, or, at least a part of Reality, knows itself in its very suchness.

And we know about real knowing also in an indirect way. Wherever we find wholeness or individuality in appearance and, in particular, wherever we meet acts of totalizing or whole-making or individualizing causality, we have “knowing subjects” among our objects. Some of these “knowing subjects,” namely, the other human egos, we understand. But there are forms of knowing which we understand only in part, e. g., the egos of higher animals—while all instinctive and entelechial “knowing” is quite incomprehensible to us. We only know that the *genus* “knowing” is in question here, but we are unable to understand the *species*.

Reality, therefore, is such that it knows itself in various

forms, only one of which—I may call it the “ego-knowing”—is comprehensible to me. And I am myself a part of Reality.

Spirituality, thus, personal and suprapersonal, pervades Reality everywhere. But it only pervades Reality. Reality is not throughout spiritual. For there is matter; and there is no basis for the hypothesis that the “real” correspondent of that which appears under the form of matter is something spiritual. Leibniz, Schelling, and Schopenhauer have advocated such a monistic view. But I see no reason for it; in any case, it is not self-evident.

## 4

This, now, brings us to the question of *dualism*. Dualism, in our opinion, must be the last word of metaphysics, even if we should like to be monists. But we cannot be monists with a good conscience. For there is the diversity and discrepancy between what is *whole* and what is *not-whole*, or contingent; the logical contradiction between wholeness and contingency being, in our opinion, the very foundation of all dualism.

Empirical dualism is an illustration of logical dualism: individuality (a frog) and mere sum (a heap of stones), healthy and sick, truth and error, good and bad are forms in which the fundamental logical dualism is empirically illustrated. And there is nothing in nature which is *quite* free from contingency (in the sense of non-wholeness). For, even if you accept vitalism, entelechy guarantees only the type in general; the position of the single cells in the different organs is contingent and is different in each individual.

*Why* is wholeness never pure? *Why* does it mix itself with the principle of non-wholeness, i. e., with that side of Reality which appears in the form of *matter*? Or, exists there even a principle that is not only *non-whole*, but *anti-*

whole? Let us leave this question also and let us admit, hypothetically, that there is merely the Whole-making, the "Spiritual," and the "Neutral," i. e., matter. Or, in Aristotelian form, εἶδος and ὕλη. In any case there *is* dualism. *Why* must it be?

## 5

Here we meet the highest problems of all metaphysics: the problems of death, of freedom and of God, all of them being very legitimate *problems*, even if answers are not possible.

We may speak here of a metaphysics of the second degree in contrast with the metaphysics of the first degree which we have thus far treated. The first metaphysics inquires only concerning "the real" in general, starting from its "consequence," i. e., experience. But the second metaphysics must take into consideration the possibility that there may be various phases of Reality, following one another in timeless "sequence" and having their ultimate source in an all-embracing One.

Let me speak a word about this second metaphysics insofar only as the interpretation of nature is concerned. The problem of *freedom* is in a certain way the connecting link between the two types of metaphysics. Causality in appearance means something real metaphysically. So it is at least with regard to inorganic causality and to biological causality, so far as the individual is in question. Vitalism does not break the principle of universal determinism. But what about suprapersonal biology, i. e., phylogeny, and about its continuation, history? Here the determining factor, supra-entelechy, endowed with a fixed *essentia*, is only postulated by logic, but cannot be discovered; for we have before us a "class" with but "one" case, as we have said before. It *may* be that phylogeny is a process that "makes itself in freedom," as Bergson believes of his *élan vital*, of

the *dieu qui se fait*. I have shown elsewhere that the problem of freedom is insoluble, both cosmologically and psychologically, i. e., when it relates to the so-called freedom of the will.

What is usually called pantheism, as for instance the theory of Spinoza and Schelling in his younger years, is by no means a theory of freedom. For the *substantia* or the *Absolute* of these thinkers has a fixed *essentia* out of which the world "*sequitur*." Bergson's *dieu* has no *essentia*, but is "making" it!

Half-way between Bergson's freedom and determinism stands what we may call the freedom of *realization*, or, in short, the freedom of the "that" (not of "such"). This means that it is thinkable that the *suchness* of the world is determined by the *suchness* of God, but that a free act of God determines whether there will *exist* a world or not. The same relation may prevail between the *suchness* of willing in men and the realization of that willing.

We must never forget that the word "freedom" is used in a rather easy way by many philosophers. Freedom *ought* always to denote indeterminism. But when Spinoza (also Kant) speak of freedom, they only mean behavior according to the proper essence, and nothing more. Real freedom, however, negates *essence*. It is very interesting to note that the problem of real freedom has now again become quite central after having been put almost completely aside during the materialistic and mechanistic period.

## 6

About death and immortality no proper answers are possible. But the problem of immortality has also again become popular, and by no means among spiritualists exclusively. Vitalism has opened the door to it, as Uexkull has once well said. I believe that in a certain sense immortality

may even be regarded as a fact, for wholeness and knowing are inherent attributes of the real and are therefore indestructible. But whether there is a personal immortality we cannot know, nor can we know whether there are phases or states of Reality which are not bound to that system of relations which we call "time" in the form of appearance.

And, finally, the problem of the all-embracing or God. There are many possibilities, and dualism is the greatest crux for them all. If we agree to call God, or at least a side of God, the whole-making and knowing essence of Reality, we may even say the existence of God has been proved. But this covers only one part of the general theological problem. The rest is mystery. And dualism remains a mystery. Is contingency in God or extraneous to Him? And if it comes from Him, why does it? If it exists without Him, in the appearing form of matter, why does the knowing wholeness of Reality mingle with it? Why does it not remain in purity?

Here the word is given to religion. Our short survey of the present state of the philosophy of nature must end at this point. And perhaps you may say that we have already gone beyond our boundaries.



## THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS<sup>1</sup>

BRUNO BAUCH

WITH the loss and the ruinous aftermath of the war, there fell upon German intellectual activity sore distress, which because of the collapse of the currency increased beyond endurance. The homes of science could not be amplified, in fact in many cases they had to be abandoned; institutes of research were paralysed by financial pressure; libraries, once our pride, could no longer serve the exchange of ideas; valuable works of scholars lay stored away in drawers. . . . In the tragedy of an afflicted people whose culture was of the highest standing those who were responsible for the intellectual enterprise are the chief mourners. . . . But despite all this the suffering group of intellectual leaders has made the least outcry on the streets, in the press, and in parliaments.

### I

In these few sentences a man familiar with German intellectual endeavor and German economic affairs, Dr. Otto Everling, chairman of the "Protective Association for the Suffering Intellectuals of Germany," has given expression, equally simple and true, to the distress of German intellectual life in general and German science in particular. Indeed, the simple fact that there is a "Protective Association for the Suffering Intellectuals of Germany," likewise a "Brotherhood of German Scientists in Need," attests this distress more plainly than any words could do, so plainly that even the embarrassment of poverty could not quite hide our poverty from the world.

To the effects of the losing of the war, of the forced settlement of Versailles, of the revolution, must also doubtless be

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edwin A. Burtt.

ascribed the restriction of scientific production for the general public. To make this clear I need only point to the single fact that for years German universities had to give up the printing of theses. Only this year the first dissertations are again becoming accessible to the public in printed form. Nevertheless, the inner vitality, the intensity of scientific effort, had not relaxed. Perhaps the war itself with its unhappy outcome has increased reflection on problems, and of course not merely (as might be supposed) problems of economic life, but also those of the intellectual life. One might perhaps maintain that this very reflection in the form of thoughtful and well-balanced "discretion"—the Greek *σωφροσύνη*—has been of profit in large measure to ethics itself by returning thus as a genuine ethical concept. For when we speak of reflection on the problems, not merely of economic life, but also of intellectual life, the union of both types of problem in their widest extent seems quite characteristic of ethical thinking in the Germany of our time. We strive for exactly the right balance in the problem of social justice—not solely to reveal the difference, but also the mutual relations and implications of both spheres in the whole of social life. Yet that is simply one part within the whole of our ethical task, not the whole itself. And if in the course of the following essay we have to come back to just this part, still we must not place it at the peak of the enquiry. For at the peak of interest in our ethical work stand those fundamental questions out of which the problem of that union of economic and intellectual life derives its meaning.

Moreover, ethics shares its interest in that problem with another discipline which especially since the war has been cultivated in Germany, namely sociology. Hence it has become for us of particular scientific interest to distinguish ethics and sociology clearly and precisely from each other. We try to conceive ethics as a strictly philosophical science

of first principles, which investigates the values and tasks out of which alone human life as expressed in will and deed derives its meaning. By contrast, sociology always starts with historical events, in which not only economics and morality, but also law, religion, art, science, appear together, in the real world. And it is simply this factual union as revealed in social processes, institutions, and relations that sociology tries to understand and to investigate in terms of its causes, laws, patterns, impulses, means, and ends. But sociology is not in the strict sense a philosophical science of first principles.

## II

So far as regards the fundamental problems in the ethical field with which we have been especially busied since the war, it is unmistakable that all work, at least to the degree in which it can lay claim to philosophical and scientific value, shows continuity with the great traditions of German idealism. Even in the last year of the war a new philosophical journal was born, which, under the name *Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, took as its special task the cultivation of this tradition, but which has had such a struggle for existence against economic difficulties that it is questionable whether it will be able to continue. But however obvious the continuity with the great conceptions of German idealism, in the ethical field as elsewhere, it is just as obvious, and especially in the same field, that such continuity does not merely take the form of dogmatic acceptance of those conceptions. We are trying rather to develop them from their originally more formal side toward the material side, and to expand ethics into an ethic of values with special reference to its content. Hence appears anew an effort to come to terms with Kant's fundamental ethical ideas.

How powerful an influence Kant's thought is exerting in

this most recent ethical development is shown in very interesting fashion on the side of a definite ethical movement, namely Catholic ethics. In Germany, Catholic ethics has perennially stood in the sharpest opposition to philosophical ethics, especially to the Kantian. This opposition of Catholic to philosophical ethics is now represented with unusual vigor by Scheler. Now it is very interesting to observe on this point that—as W. Koppelman has shown with much pertinence and penetration—this Catholic opposition cannot do Kant justice at all, it must needs always reinterpret or misinterpret him in order to combat him, and that it has to take a position in “obvious contradiction” to Kant’s own “clear utterances” in order to carry on its attacks. We might add to this that the Kantian formalism, as M. Wittmann has correctly shown, is attacked with a certain justice. But what this opposition offers on its own account cannot satisfy. Already the “formalism” is misunderstood and misinterpreted, and the assertions brought forward on the “a priori structure” of the ethical “kingdom of values” could be presented better and more clearly in terms of the main and central ideas of Kant himself, in such wise that a sheer formalism would be avoided. However, the most interesting aspect of the new opposition of Catholic to philosophical ethics, particularly the Kantian, lies in the fact that it too stresses an “a priori structure” of the ethical “realm of values” and acknowledges that for itself it is unable to determine that structure sharply and precisely, but in the end holds fast to a merely formal statement. This almost suggests the suspicion that it has itself been more deeply influenced by Kant than it suspects. The peculiar feature of this situation is that the Catholic ethics, while seeking of course to transcend sheer formalism, falls into vagueness and obscurity in the very attempt, while from the fundamental ideas of Kant, without stopping at formalism, we are able to discover with real clarity and distinctness the

content of the "a priori structure" of the ethical "realm of values." Of course, it is characteristic of the so-called formalism of Kant that one cannot actually remain in it. But neither does one need to remain in it, even if in other respects he recognizes and acknowledges in the ideas of Kant a framework of enduring worth for the foundation of ethics. Under these general points of view my own investigations in the ethical field coincide with those of H. Barth and A. Görland, the harmony here being consistent with not unessential differences from other viewpoints.

I myself have distinguished two forms of the principle of law in ethics. These have equal objective validity, but a different relation to the willing and acting subject. Both equally would require acknowledgment, but would require a different form of realization. The one would be able to address itself to the will of every rational being, the other would depend on conditions necessary for its being realized. The principle of ethical autonomy as a universal basal law of ethics would represent the first form. Its discovery will always remain the merit of Kant. Kant's fault, on the other hand, lies in not having given sufficient attention to the second form of ethical law. While he brings the principle of autonomy to a clear expression in the "categorical imperative," he touches upon the second form only in the "hypothetical imperatives," but with respect to it remains without a sure and clear decision. Now this is a problem which ethics at the present time must attack with unusual energy. I have established, with sufficient precision in detail, that autonomy is indeed the basis of ethics, but that it does not comprise on that account the whole system of ethical law. In distinguishing ethics and morals from each other, and in relating them, I was able to show that autonomy as such could include the realm of moral values, but not the entire realm of ethical values. On this principle of autonomy every deed must of course be based if it is to be

called ethically good. But it does not need to be based solely on that principle to claim ethical value. The totality of ethical values is then more inclusive than the principle of autonomy. To such a totality belongs, besides autonomy, that second form of ethical law which, to distinguish it from the "categorical imperative," I have designated not merely, as did Kant, the "hypothetical imperative," but the "cultural imperative" (*Kulturimperativ*). Since between autonomy and cultural imperatives there exists an inseparable connection, an indissoluble interrelation, there will also obtain between morality and culture an inner mutual dependence. And only in that relationship can the entire realm of ethical values be revealed. Hence we may admit a legitimacy in the Kantian demand to "act from duty," likewise in the Fichtean demand to "act from consciousness of duty." But beyond this general and still formal demand we can then speak, still in the ethical field, and with concrete reference to their content, not merely of moral duties, but also of religious duties, of legal duties, of political duties, of logical duties, of duties of the scholar, the artist—briefly, too, of the duties of one's calling, etc.

### III

In this way alone, even in philosophical ethics, can those central problems be treated fruitfully and hopefully, which in the period since the war have acquired large significance in the public life of Germany and especially in social movements. I mean the problems of personality and community. It is indeed no accident that on these problems in recent years philosophy and life have met in exceedingly close contact. The distress of the time and the state of social relations have placed these problems directly in the foreground of interest in the general consciousness of our public. And although it is the philosophy of Germany which has from time immemorial in its ethics devoted especial attention to

these problems, yet in the period since the war this has been done in continually increasing measure. In the vital interrelation of philosophy and life, philosophers in the field of ethics have applied themselves to these problems in the most varied manner. I might name especially in this connection Brunstäd, Eucken, Spranger, M. Wundt, Litt, and also myself.

It is only from this entire realm of ethical values that the meaning of the concept of personality becomes clear. And to the ethics of personality Spranger has devoted unusually fine studies. The law of ethical values demands, in order to be represented in actual life, a will that can relate itself to values. "To relate itself to values"—I have expressed the state of affairs thus—"is something which is only possible for a will that is conscious of itself and of the values, that is able to distinguish itself from them so as to relate itself again to them, thus a self-conscious and a value-conscious will, or in short, a rationally willing self-consciousness." Self-conscious, because conscious of law and value and uniting itself to them—only through such a being, as possessing will, can the law gain expression. But a self-consciousness which can consciously attach itself to the law as a value, which can voluntarily represent it, is what we mean by a moral personality. Its specifically moral meaning lies in the fact that, conscious of the law and of itself, and thus self-conscious, it is able to relate itself to the law and give the latter representation through the process of willing. It is irrelevant whether it does actually thus relate itself and actually give the law representation. If it does this through a deed, then just on that account the deed is moral. But in itself it is always a condition of the possibility of moral conduct. And just in this lies its properly moral character. It has, as on an earlier occasion I formulated the matter, ethical potentiality. This ethical-personal potentiality is the presupposition of all ethical reality. Hence it is also neces-

sary not to confuse ethical personality with the real individual. The latter as such—the individual merely as individual—is no more moral than the real in general, which as such is always individual. For the individual himself personality remains a task. The individual is a moral personality only potentially, as personality represents the law only potentially. But because the law does not require the individual, but does require the personality, it is not the individual but the personality that has this ethical potentiality. As the moral law remains a task for it, so it remains itself a task for the individual in the ladder of teleological dependence, which corresponds to the movement toward entelechy in Aristotle. Although in the real world personality always presents itself only as individual, nevertheless the individual (for everything real is individual) does not present itself as personality (for not everything real is a personality). Even if it were possible to attribute to the individual potential personality, yet it is only personality which as such possesses ethical potentiality. For it is precisely personality, not barely or merely individuality, that is required to bring the law to expression. (Cf. my "Ethics" in the *Kultur der Gegenwart*, Vol. entitled *Systematische Philosophie*, pp. 252 ff.) Although then the validity of the values in the ethical system subsists independent of all subjectivity, it can find its expression in reality only through a subject which can relate itself to it—that is, however, a personality. The latter is "the subject in which the moral law becomes actual."

As such a subject, new value comes to it by transfer from the ethical value-system. This leads at once from the problem of personality to the problem of the community, purely on the basis of its ethical potentiality, that is, solely on this account, that personality is the subject of the possibility of ethical conduct, while simply as personality it is also the object of moral treatment. However we may describe its ob-



jective character as the object of moral treatment, whether we call personality "object of reverence," whether we give it the more religious name, conceived in its deepest meaning by Christianity, of "object of love," yet this, its specifically ethical character as object, is always based on its specifically ethical character as subject, as personality. Both stand in inseparable interrelation. And this interrelation is what we call community. This makes it necessary to conceive of personality and community as themselves correlative concepts. Personalism and socialism in the ethical sense do not exclude each other, they require each other reciprocally and include each the other. No ethical community is possible which is not a community between ethical personalities. Likewise no ethical personality is possible which is not the member of an ethical community because it is just in such a community that the possibility of ethical conduct and of ethical relations with others imply each other. But because personality gains ethical potentiality solely from the realm of ethical values by transfer, the ethical community always appears both as a community between ethical personalities and also as a community of ethical values. It is always, at one and the same time, a community of personality and a community of value, and its character as personal is just as inseparable from it as its character as value.

This likewise distinguishes the ethical community from real society. The same relation as obtains between individual and personality holds between society and community. As personality to the individual is something to be achieved, community likewise remains for society as something to be achieved. Again, society is ethical community only potentially, just as the individual is a moral personality only potentially; and just as personality is a condition of the possible realization of ethical values, so is likewise the community. Hence it is community and not society which possesses ethical potentiality, because it is community of per-

sonality and not merely of individuality. As in the real world personality reveals itself only as individuality while individuality does not necessarily reveal itself as personality (because of course everything real is also individual, but is not necessarily personal) so likewise community naturally reveals itself in the real world only as society, while society does not thus reveal itself as community. On this account we can, for example, speak of societies even among the animals—it is enough to mention wasps and bees for illustration—but we speak of community only in reference to men. Solely in human community is found a community between personalities and one that has ethical value.

While earlier in German philosophy the contrast between individualism and socialism in the ethical field was much discussed, now we are beginning to perceive that this alternative was set up in a form that was really false. The relation between personality and community as treated in German ethics during recent years has at least carried us far beyond the old opposition between individualism and socialism in ethics. Today, so far as ethics is concerned, we would properly speak rather of personalism and socialism, but we should have to add at once that these do not stand in opposition to each other but have found a synthesis. For they are alike factors in a higher relationship. Hence the ethical relativism which was frequently championed in Germany at an earlier time and which is still occasionally supported, has been approaching extinction more and more. Just in the all-embracing correlation of personalism and socialism, of personality and community, in the community as community between personalities and as community of values, the relation between these factors gains a meaning that reaches beyond all relativism, a meaning which even makes possible the attribution to personalities of a super-personal worth. And if one were to attempt to work out a theory of relativity in the ethical field, as Herberzt is doing,

it would be only in a sense analogous to the physical theory of relativity at one point, namely, in so far as the latter, rightly understood, would be able to transcend all physical relativity in the highest and most general relations. Solely from the insight that in the most personal relationship there is something of personality achieved reaching beyond the bare moment, yes beyond all time, in and for the community of good will, can the discussions about socialism and Christianity, as Rudolf Stammeler says at the end of his fine and profound volume on *Socialism and Christianity*, "find a solution and a liberating outcome."

#### IV

We have said that in the interest in problems of personality and community, philosophy and life in general among us in Germany have come together in a special way during recent years, and the contact has been close. Our last paragraph brings us to the field of life in which this meeting and contact is especially noteworthy. For when Stammeler writes on *Socialism and Christianity*, or Eucken on *Idealism and Socialism*, or Brunstäd on *Germany and Socialism*, these thinkers mean unanimously political socialism. So it is actually and primarily political life which has set new problems for the most recent development of ethics in Germany. The general public consciousness in Germany has been forced to observe in the concrete facts of politics too sharp a contrast between politics and ethics to be passed by carelessly and easily. The political treatment which Germany experienced through the forced settlement at Versailles, the lie involved in loading upon her the entire and sole guilt for the war, and many other thing besides, stand in such sharp contradiction to the demands and commands of ethics, that this very contradiction necessarily stimulated our minds to make of the relation between politics and ethics a problem. The challenge is generally felt to view

politics and ethics no longer merely as contrasts, but to win a positive relation between them, to ethicize politics, place it on an ethical foundation. Whoever has read German newspapers attentively during recent years must have noticed in them that an infinite amount of writing has been done not only against the Versailles Treaty and the lie about the guilt of the war, but also on the peace and reconciliation of peoples. Of course for the most part the purpose in such efforts was very much better than the result. Frequently, also, these writers have not been quite clear as to the difficulty of the problems attacked. Without having thought through deeply the fundamental ethical questions themselves, one cannot get at the bottom of such problems. Hence necessarily the task of collaborating upon such problems fell upon philosophical ethics. This has likewise been done in many different ways, whether in general terms as by Eucken in his *Ethics as the Foundation of Political Life*, whether by sketching in broad outline with Max Wundt a new *Philosophy of the State* or still more generally the *Spirit of Our Time*, whether finally by discussing specific problems as I have done in *The Dialectic of War and Peace in the Philosophy of Kant*, or *Fichte and the German Idea of the State*, or *The Concept of Nationality*, etc. It can be appreciated that we in Germany have likewise taken under ethical-political points of view a position on such questions as those of the pros and cons of pacifism, of the ethical meaning of a political constitution, whether republic, democracy, monarchy, aristocracy, etc. It will be easily intelligible that opinions on these matters in detail are very diverse. But in this connection we cannot enter upon such details. Only so much will I observe, that measured by philosophical points of view in social ethics the parliamentary principle cannot win particularly high valuation, and that we today, following Kant, are not at all inclined to identify genuine republicanism merely with democracy, as

of course they have not been identified in America, whose war once for independence and freedom found nowhere in Europe so great sympathy as with Germany's greatest philosopher, Immanuel Kant.

What Kant viewed as the proper end of the state, in which point his great successors such as Fichte and Hegel were in essential harmony with him, has again become the vital crux of ethical discussion on the problem of the state in our time, and thus reveals once more the continuity of present work in ethics with the tradition of German idealism. However impossible it is, as noted, to enter upon details here because of the limited scope of this essay, yet at least the principal thought must be clearly emphasized, viz., that from the ethical point of view it is the meaning and goal of the state to develop and cultivate its members within the community for freedom and for an intelligent vocation in the service of the community, so that everyone will be able to work out within the political unit to which he belongs a meaning and value for his life in its individuality and in its contribution to the community. Since it is the duty of every member of the political community as a personality to work out for himself meaning and value in life, every personality within the community has a right to the opportunity of fulfilling this duty, and to a guaranty of freedom in the state for such fulfilment of duty through governmental control of the community life.

With this arise a whole series of further problems for ethics such as the problem of law, of freedom, of work, of industry, of culture and education, all of which are complicated in their ethical bearing, and have assumed, especially in the ethical work of recent years, an unusual significance.

## V

It is a natural corollary of the ethical meaning of the problem of personality and community, and of the endeavor

to advance from the merely formal aspect to the material content of the entire realm of ethical values, that in the most recent development of ethics this meaning should be related systematically to those sciences which stand in a close connection with it as regards this problem. Cohen had already related ethics closely to jurisprudence; Albert Görland had followed him in this in his *New Basis of Ethics*. But Görland goes far beyond Cohen in not limiting this relation merely to jurisprudence. Görland extends it to what he calls the sciences of community life (*Gemeinschaftswissenschaften*). As such, besides jurisprudence and political science he treats economics and education. In the attempt at such an extension lies doubtless a valuable contribution of Görland, even though we may perhaps not be able to find in his idea of the sciences of community life the entire content of the field of ethical values. I have been seeking to bring out this content especially in the direction of those sciences which we in Germany since the basic contributions of Rickert describe as the field of the "cultural sciences," so that I bring ethics into very close relation to philosophy of history. Its connection on the side of philosophy of law finds expression also in such essays in that field as have recently been written by jurists. The paper of Radbruch on "Elements of the Philosophy of Law" was an earlier example of what I mean. In a yet higher degree this is now illustrated by the great *Philosophy of Law* by Julius Binder, a work of truly monumental significance which is of the greatest importance not only for the philosophy of law but also for ethics.

Ethically the idea of law is based precisely on this, that everyone has the duty of working out for his life within the community a meaning and value, and that just for the reason that he has this duty he has also the right to the conditions of its fulfilment. In its deepest basis, then, from the ethical point of view, what the caprice of the individual

might claim as right is not necessarily right, but only that is true right in its ethical significance which Radbruck has expressed in his formula, "the right to the fulfilment of duty." All true right gains its proper justification always and solely from duty. Such a conception also reflects in every respect the consciousness of daily life, which says, "Where there is no duty there is likewise no right," or, "Without duties there can be no rights."

It is the deepest meaning of law that the fulfilment of duty shall be made possible for a personality within a community, that his freedom for the fulfilment of duty shall be guaranteed. In the ethical sense, as has again been expressed in agreement with Kant, but with still sharper emphasis than in his case, law covers precisely the totality of conditions under which the freedom of each can subsist in the same community with the freedom of all others. In this way we are trying to gain for the problem of freedom a new and deeper meaning. The battle between determinism and indeterminism is, to be sure, not yet entirely ended in peace. Indeterminism has found support again, occasionally, in this period, as with Messer; even natural scientists of Planck's rank have sought to give it support. But it is also frequently rejected by determinist opponents as a mere "illusion." However, the alternative—determinism or indeterminism—has not stood in the most recent movements in the field of ethics any longer in the foreground of philosophical interest. We could rather assert that the deeper endeavors in the most recent development are characterized just by the attempt to transcend this alternative; indeed we might perhaps maintain that our attempt is to prove that it is a false way of putting the question. Determinism or indeterminism—thus it might be maintained against them and has been maintained against them—neither of them signifies genuine freedom. And not everything that people call freedom is the freedom with which ethics is concerned. Not

only is freedom no mere absence of constraint and independence of law. Freedom is also not always superior to obligation, but freedom in its highest and deepest ethical sense is simply obligation, not of course the obligation submitted to by the slavish soul, but self-devotion to the law of duty and value. In this connection, in our time, a profound phrase in the poetry of Goethe has found philosophical justification, the phrase namely that "law alone can give us freedom." It is evident likewise from this that freedom in the ethical sense is to be sharply distinguished from every form of mere caprice. Caprice simply means freedom from compulsion. It is therefore merely negative freedom. It does not understand that compulsion itself can be only a means in the service of positive freedom, by which we mean freedom to realize values through personality in the totality of community life.

Now for the ethical meaning of the problem of law and the state this is of the very greatest importance, and on it I have ventured extensively in several of my writings. Here I can only mention the following point very briefly: since, as I have already said, law appears ethically as the sum of conditions under which the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all others in the community, a corollary is obvious which Stammler has called its significance as the expression of community control. On this rests also the unique character of law as compulsion, which distinguishes law from properly ethical obligation even as it indicates the relation between them. Ethical conduct is never compulsory. Forced ethical conduct is a contradiction in terms. But of course legal conduct is always compulsory. The character of compulsion, of law as enforcement, is precisely what may appear as its most obvious nature, as much to the unsophisticated mind as to the philosopher or jurist. Although now the layman may recognize the relation of law to duty, although he may



easily discern the enforcement bound up in the nature of law, he will still find a certain difficulty in the thought that the compulsoriness of law serves its function only as guaranteeing freedom for the fulfilment of duty.

## VI

This difficulty is avoided precisely by our distinction, that freedom is not absence of compulsion, but is freedom for law and purpose, for duty and value. Freedom and compulsion are therefore not simply contradictories. Hence compulsion can itself be a servant to freedom, a means to the end of freedom. For it does not need to be directed against freedom but just against everything that disturbs and hinders true freedom as self-determination in the fulfilment of duty for the sake of purpose and value. In this is revealed again the relation between law and duty. As compulsory, of course, law is distinguished from properly ethical obligation. But as a compulsion which is directed against those things that disturb and hinder ethical freedom, it stands in the closest relation with ethical obligation itself. Compulsion does not destroy ethical freedom. Of course it limits subjective caprice just because the latter hinders ethical freedom. While, then, compulsion hinders caprice, precisely by that very fact it serves freedom. Law, with its compulsory obligation, is therefore no compulsion against freedom but against subjective caprice, which it limits directly in the service of freedom. Hence it is by law alone that the life of the community can be ruled in the interest of ethical values.

For the ethical meaning of political life this is of far-reaching significance. Just on this problem, too, much emphasis is placed in the ethical work of our time. If right as regards its deepest ethical basis is "right to the fulfilment of duty" for a personality in a community, and if it is a condition of the regulation of community life, then it also

requires (for it lies in its very nature to restrain caprice and thereby serve freedom) force to express right and make it effective. All rightful government of community life is thus only expressed and realized through the state in so far as it possesses the force necessary to control social life in accordance with right and hence justly. Force is therefore inseparable from the ethical meaning of the state. But however important force is for the state, nevertheless it is never its final and highest end. It can only be a means to the end of the social regulation of the state. It must derive its justification solely from the idea of right, as the latter must derive its justification from the idea of duty. As right can exist solely on the ground of duty if it is to be a just and justified right (*ius iustum*), so force derives its right solely from the idea of right itself—it is the force requisite to make right actual. The assertion “force takes precedence of right” is therefore ethically entirely false. At most it could have a merely temporal meaning in the sense that force appears earlier than right. But that would concern merely the natural side of the relation. Yet the mere state of nature is in general of course no state in which right exists, as Fritz Münch has especially emphasized in his endeavor to establish the proper meaning of right as a cultural concept. For every true state of right is always also a state of culture, with ethical value. Hence, even if force appears before right in the course of nature, since right always lifts us into the sphere of culture, force remains in its ethical meaning and value always subordinate to right. Should it wish to make itself superior to right it would become itself decidedly in the wrong. So far as the ethical meaning is concerned, it can be only a means to the end of right. And because right in turn is a means to the end of duty we could say: Force is the means of a means to the properly ethical end of duty, hence as means it has in general only a secondary ethical significance, how-

ever necessary it may be as a servant of the just regulation of the community life.

## VII

With the ethical problem of the state stands in very close connection the problem of the ethical meaning of nationality and humanity. It is no accident, but follows in close actual and necessary connection with the political events of the last decade, that ethics in Germany has applied itself with especial energy to these problems too. In fact it was not possible to leave them in the hands of political thinkers alone. Ethics too must give them her interest, for it is above all in this field, of course, that the realm of ethical values gains its concrete form. However necessary the state is for the regulation of community life, there is always something formal about it. The content, however, which under the form of the state gives the significance of spiritual life to the life of the community, can only take shape in the development of the nationality of peoples. The nation is the most concrete form which community life gains historically. In it alone does the individual citizen discover tasks, purposes, and duties for which he has to work in order to fulfil his end in the community and in order that the community as a whole shall itself realize its end.

The right to the fulfilment of duty thus becomes at the same time the duty and the right to work. But with work the right to compensation stands in necessary interrelation. The problems of work and wage thus appear in their ethical significance. Man has the duty to work in order to give his life a meaning in the community of the nation and the state. Hence he has also a right to work, but he must be able through his work to assure for himself a wage, in order to live and to be able to fill his life with meaning and to express by his life his duties to the community and to himself.

In this way we reach also as an ethical problem the rela-

tion between intellectual life and economic life. For Germany this relation has, of course, gained a quite unusual importance. I do not need to say much about it in general. I might only indicate briefly along two lines the way in which we in ethics view the problem. One point concerns the relative rank of intellectual life and economic life in their relation to each other, the other concerns the organic connection between intellectual endeavor and economic endeavor. It was just the dominance of economic interests over intellectual interests in all countries of the earth and particularly in the field of politics, which led to the catastrophe that has certainly fallen upon Germany most heavily, but which—to make this clear we need only think of materialistic Marxism and Bolshevism with their dangers for the whole world—can lead to the darkest and most woeful doom for all lands and nations if politicians do not before it is too late gain an ethical point of view, such as would yield to intellectual interests, in truth and in deed, not alone with fine phrases, pre-eminence over economic interests. Life itself has taught us this in Germany with peculiar emphasis. And we have tried to give this lesson a consistent basis in the ethics of our time. I think that I have shown in my writings with especial clearness that however great importance economic considerations have for the life of nations they can never furnish its final and highest end, but must always take the place of mere means in the service of intellectual activity, from which alone they receive their meaning. Similar ideas have been expressed also by Heinrich Rickert. This is all that I am able to indicate briefly on the relative rank of these interests. The connection between intellectual and economic endeavor, with reference precisely to its illustration in Germany, Otto Everling has described in the following manner.

Without the significant contributions of German intellectual effort German industry would never have had its successes. Without it our people in their limited territory could never have reached such

a standard of living before the war; without it it will be quite impossible to preserve unimpaired living conditions for the German people on the still more limited soil of Germany. The entire economic structure of Germany, her industry not least, has a living interest in maintaining science along with economic effort, in keeping the brain-worker active beside the hand-worker, with all the tools that the new day has made possible. But on the other hand these intellectual workers in Germany who are an indispensable means for the preservation and development of our best national powers can only continue to exist if they are supported by a vigorous, healthy, German industry.

Then Everling points to the fact that the intellectual contributions of German culture have not only been of great value to Germany industry, its leaders and workers, "but also have benefited the peoples of all the earth."

Here we have touched also the ethical problem of humanity, which has likewise won a peculiar significance in the ethical work of our time.

## VIII

Of course when we say that this problem has won a peculiar significance in our time, that does not mean that ethics in Germany has just now begun reflection on it. We should not be maintaining too much if we opined that in the philosophy of no land has this problem been so busily attacked as in Germany herself from Leibniz, through the whole of the so-called "Philosophy of the Enlightenment" to Kant, Fichte, Schiller, W. von Humboldt, and their successors. The idea of "humanity" stirred men's minds so vigorously that often the idea of nationality was forgotten. Thinkers fell into an entirely too nebulous and abstract ethical cosmopolitanism. This was shown with peculiar clearness in the so-called "Philosophy of the Enlightenment." In our day, especially in the period since the war, the problem while thus not being newly discovered has yet been faced anew. And the earlier tendencies continue to influence our present

ethical attack on it. In the socialistic *Internationale* the old abstract cosmopolitanism has been preserved unchanged. But on the basis of its materialistic position it has given a merely economic stamp to these endeavors. Another position on the problem is being taken by the ethical enquiries, which are characterized at the same time by a keener historical consciousness and a deeper philosophical appreciation. Although it is impossible now, in the limited scope of this article, to develop all the various opinions expressed in present attacks on this problem, yet at least a few striking points must be noted. It is necessary to observe at once that community as such is more, and greater, than any national community by itself. A personality has duties not merely to the members of his nation but to the community as the sum-total of personalities. This indeed is its character just as personality, in which as the subject of moral conduct and as the object of ethical treatment the relation of community subsists. Thus ethical values have validity not merely for this or that nation, but because they are valid in and for themselves, they are valid for all nations. As the totality of all tasks which grow out of these objective ethical values which give meaning and content to human life, humanity itself looms up as the international goal for all peoples and nations that find themselves called and equipped to work together in the intellectual and spiritual life. But in the next place we must observe that humanity can only win a concrete historical life through the original, independent spiritual and intellectual toil of nations. Without the concrete historical form of nationality humanity would be and remain an empty name, a mere abstraction. It is in the relation of people to people that it has a vital, historical life. But there is no relation of people to people without a vigorous nationality, without nations themselves—no *inter nationes* without *nationes ipsae*. Thus, however supernational ethical values are, their concrete realization and representa-

tion is always and only possible in history, and in the history of the culture of intellectually independent and original peoples. Between such cultures, certainly, relations can be established, because the ethical values, on which they are grounded, are valid in and for themselves independently of nations. But because nations can share in these ethical values, they can likewise in those relations, both as regards their own intellectual life as nations and as regards their union with the intellectual life of other nations, bring into actuality the idea of humanity itself. In the third place, finally, it must be remarked in this connection that to have ethical value those relations of nations to each other must not be sought mainly where still today the mass of men and a fairly large number of politicians as well are seeking them, namely in economic matters alone. They must rather above all be found in intellectual and spiritual endeavor. It is indeed obvious that in the field of intellectual activity, more especially of scientific activity, lies a quite unusual ethical task of working for such a goal.

In conclusion, the fact may be emphasized that even the theory of education in Germany conceives the idea of "humanity" in this sense, and that particularly in recent times it has been trying to attain very close relations to the philosophy of values, especially to ethics as the science of ethical values. To make this clear by illustrations I should like to mention before all others the names Hönigswald, Johannsen, Litt, and Spranger. However independent of each other these authors may be in other respects, the realization is equally strong in all of them that all education, as regards its meaning and essence, is education for values, and that values therefore stand both at the beginning and at the end of all theory of education. Hence ethics must have an especial significance for such a theory.

In the preceding pages I have attempted to draw at least a general picture of the work with which in the field of

ethics in recent years we have been unusually busied and are yet occupied. The modest compass of the essay did not of course permit me to take up individual variations in this ethical work. I had to limit myself to the endeavor, first of all to make clear the fundamental problems which compose the content of our work in the field of ethics, and then to point out the general direction and manner in which we seek the solution of these problems. I hope I have succeeded in this, and that I have at least given my American readers a general picture of the state of our ethical activity. If I shall have accomplished this, some contribution will have been made to the attainment of the end of humanity as I have just described it, the end, namely, that in the interest of humanity nations should learn to know each other, particularly in the field of intellectual endeavor, and should understand each other's intellectual labors—that indeed to this end scientific work has a very special contribution to make.

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# AESTHETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART<sup>1</sup>

MAX DESSOIR

THE two disciplines mentioned in the title have, at the present time in Germany, reached a certain degree of independence. This manifests itself even externally, namely in the fact that for the last twenty years there has been published a journal<sup>2</sup> devoted exclusively to aesthetics and to the general science of art; that in Berlin two congresses<sup>3</sup> have been held; and that now again there has been launched a society for aesthetics and the general science of art<sup>4</sup> as a continuation of an organization existing prior to the war. It might thus appear that we are here concerned with an object of investigation which has emancipated itself from philosophy. Nevertheless, this is not the case in the true sense of the word. For the most reliable indication of such an independence, namely, the establishment of separate professorships in the universities, is still lacking. Among the European countries, France, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have special professorships for aesthetics; in Germany, however, the philosopher still carries also the main responsibility for aesthetic

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und Kunstwissenschaft*, herausgegeben von Max Dessoir. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart. Bd. Iff., 1906ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Kongress für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, Berlin, 7-9, Oktober, 1913. *Bericht herausgegeben vom Ortsausschuss*. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1914. *Zweiter Kongress fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, Berlin, 16-18, Oktober, 1924. *Bericht herausgegeben vom Arbeitsausschuss*. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1925. [Since the preparation of this paper, the third Congress has convened—in Halle a. d. Saale, June 7-9, 1927. Ed.]

<sup>4</sup> *Gesellschaft für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft (E. V.)*. *Anfragen und Anmeldungen sind zu richten an den Ersten Schriftführer*, Dr. Werner Wolffheim, Berlin W. 9, Bellevuestr., 16-18.

instruction. This undoubtedly has its drawbacks, but, as in the similar case of psychology, it likewise has its advantages. For, as a result of this connection with philosophy, the aesthetician is compelled to keep his investigations within the nexus of the mental life as a whole. Just as, up to the present time, German psychology has not suffered, at least in my opinion, as a result of having retained its connection with philosophy, so likewise I see no disadvantage in the fact that aesthetics remains conscious of its original place within philosophy. What most gives rise to question is doubtless the fact that the interpretation of art demands an inner relation to the arts, a direct comprehension of artistic values, such as not every philosopher possesses. An intimate understanding of music, more especially, is possessed by only few philosophers. And so it may occur that one philosophizes about art not from within the subject itself but from a point of view extraneous to it. And, therefore, it is cause for distinct gratification that German historians of art, of literature, and of music are devoting themselves in an ever-increasing degree to aesthetic problems. In our exposition, therefore, we will first refer to philosophic tendencies insofar as they are reflected in aesthetics and then to the contributions to aesthetics for which we are indebted to the specialized sciences of art.

There are few comprehensive expositions of the field if, as is necessary in this instance, we disregard the smaller handbooks. We must mention the large work of Hermann Cohen,<sup>5</sup> who regards aesthetics as the doctrine of pure feeling. Alongside of this theory of pure feeling are the theories of pure cognition and of pure will. Pure feeling is first of all feeling with reference to form, and, indeed, to rhythmic form. It is also, however, feeling with reference to content and, insofar, is love and communication.

<sup>5</sup> Cohen, Hermann: *Asthetik des reinen Gefühls*. 2 Bde. Verlag Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, 1912. 2. Auflage, 1923.

From these fundamental principles Cohen derives specific conclusions, the most valuable of which, to be sure, could also hold good, as it seems to me, apart from the former. On a different basis is erected the aesthetics of Theodore Lipps.<sup>6</sup> As even the subtitle of his volume indicates, the theory maintains a strictly psychological character—not in the sense of a purely experimental psychology, but of the Lippsonian psychology in general. With a unique energy and with an unexcelled plasticity of thought as well as of exposition, Lipps develops the theory of empathy (*Einfühlung*), that is, the doctrine according to which aesthetic value and aesthetic experience involve the transference to the object of the subject's feeling. Volkmelt,<sup>7</sup> likewise, makes fruitful use of the empathy theory in his three-volume work. But he distinguishes between psychological and normative aesthetics and is more unbiased than Lipps in his evaluation of facts; moreover, he does not center his attention so exclusively on the formative arts as does Lipps but is particularly happy precisely in his choice of poetic illustrations and analyses. I myself<sup>8</sup> have attempted to bring together into a volume the conclusions yielded by my own experience and by the critical examination of other doctrines. I stress the thesis that aesthetics and the science of art do not coincide; and in aesthetics I attempt to carry through an objectivism which insures to the object an existence of independent worth. Following these views, Emil Utitz<sup>9</sup> wrote his work, *Fundamental Principles of the General Science of Art*, which contains everything that may be said with reference to the world of art, the structure of the art object, and the creative activity of the artist.

<sup>6</sup> Lipps, Theodor: *Asthetik. Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst*. 2 Bde. Verlag Leopold Voss. Hamburg u. Leipzig, 1903, 1906. 3. Auflage, 1923.

<sup>7</sup> Volkelt, Johannes: *System der Ästhetik*. 3 Bde. Verlag C. H. Beck, Muenchen, 1905, 1910, 1914.

<sup>8</sup> Dessoir, Max: *Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1906. 2 Auflage, 1923.

<sup>9</sup> Utitz, Emil: *Grundlegung der allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*, 2 Bde. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1914, 1920.

I now turn to a brief portrayal of the influence of the main philosophical tendencies upon the problems of aesthetics. The school of Cohen has only of late occupied itself with aesthetic problems. Ernst Cassirer has published single essays on the science and philosophy of art<sup>10</sup> and has recently devoted himself to the connection of art and the myth.<sup>11</sup> He points out that the beginnings of art are to be found in the immediate and undifferentiated unity of the myth-consciousness; and he explains further that this connection is not merely genetic in character. According to the principle of neo-Kantianism, even ordinary thinking concerning being and objectivity involves a system of synthetic formal principles which invest every object with its objectivity and give it a place in the system of nature. Insofar, now, as art also exists and, indeed, exists as something distinctive, it can not free itself from the laws of space and time and of causal connection. Even the creative activity in the soul of the artist is not conceivable without reference to the synthetic principles fundamental to theoretical reasoning.<sup>12</sup> Thus the point of departure is here a fact which is particularly striking in the realm of the formative arts, namely, that every statue, for example, certainly constitutes a part of empirical reality, fills a space which belongs to real space, and belongs to the same temporal order and is subject to the same causality as an unformed block of stone. In addition to this relation between art and empirical reality, the relation of art to historical reality is a favorite topic of the Marburg philosophers. The conception of the will to art (*Kunstwollen*) has led to a history of art which calls itself interpretative science and which seeks to connect the theory of art with a purely

<sup>10</sup> Cassirer, Ernst: *Idee und Gestalt, Goethe, Schiller, Hoelderlin, Kleist*. Verlag Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, 1921. 2. Auflage, 1924.

<sup>11</sup> Cassirer, Ernst: *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. 1 Teil: *Die Sprache*, 1923. 2. Teil: *Das mythische Denken*. 1925. Verlag Bruno Cassirer, Berlin.

<sup>12</sup> Vgl., Pavet, Hans: *Konrad Fiedler. Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, XVI, 1922, S. 320ff.*

empirical history of art. Here, also, the viewpoints and the empirical orientation of the neo-Kantianism founded by Cohen and Natorp have remained authoritative.<sup>13</sup>

These typical references may suffice, and we now raise the question as to the results for aesthetics of the philosophical movement founded by Windelband and led by Rickert. Inasmuch as this Southwest German school of neo-Kantianism finds its central concern in the problem of value and locates value in the transcendent sphere of the *ought*, it must first create a transition to the actualities of art. This transition is achieved by presupposing that things possess a meaning which connects the realm of values with the realm of actuality. Whereas the mere perception of a color, for example, is void of meaning and significance, the aesthetic impression of a color in itself contains a non-theoretical meaning—that is to say, we understand the color and take pleasure in it without conceptually reflecting upon it. Upon this simple basic thought the attempt has been made to erect a value-aesthetics<sup>14</sup> which, to be sure, exhibits a weakness in the fact that it must be based upon intuition.

As concerns the influence of the phenomenological school<sup>15</sup> upon aesthetics, this is to be found less in developed doctrines than in the transformation of the methods of aesthetics and the science of art. We need not here concern ourselves with an analysis of the nature of phenomenology, so difficult to understand and to define. We will

<sup>13</sup> Vgl. Panofsky, E.: *Über das Verhältnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie. Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XVIII, 1925, S. 129ff.

<sup>14</sup> Vgl. Münsterberg, Hugo: *Philosophie der Werte*. Verlag Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig, 1908.

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<sup>15</sup> Vgl., Utitz, Emil: *Die Gegenständlichkeit des Kunstwerkes, Philosophische Vorträge veröffentlicht von der Kant-Gesellschaft*, No. 17. Pan-Verlag, Rolf Heyse, Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1917.

Geiger, Moritz: *Phänomenologische Aesthetik. Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XIX, 1925, S. 29ff.

simply point out that this philosophy explains the peculiar category of the aesthetic by advancing the more general doctrine that not everything that is "given" need be located in the nexus of empirical reality but that we are enabled to intuit pure phenomena. The previously mentioned problems of neo-Kantianism which arise from the inclusion of art objects in the actual world here accordingly disappear. For, in the opinion of the phenomenologists, the phenomenon of a tone, for example, may be adequately described without reference to the nature of its physical origin or of its psychological functioning. One might advance the comment that this procedure of investigating given phenomena objectively has always been followed by historians of the individual arts who are concerned with the criticism of style. When the historian of art describes the draping of a garment or the historian of music sets forth the construction of a particular symphony, he is dealing with phenomena, for the fact that the particular drapery in question, as a manifold of color surfaces or color points, belongs to the realm of the actual concerns him not at all. And the same is true as regards the nature of the feelings and associated ideas experienced by the individual in hearing a symphony. However, the aesthetics of the phenomenologists goes further than does the analytical historian of art and of music. It aims not merely to understand the style of an individual painter or of a certain specific historical period by reference, for example, to the draping of a particular garment; it seeks not merely to elucidate the structure, for example, of the third or fifth symphony of Beethoven, but it is concerned with determining the structure of a symphony as such. To be sure, it believes that one may ascertain the essence of the thing in general from a specific instance. And it cannot avoid the presupposition that the individual investigator must possess a special endowment in order to achieve such



a comprehension of essences. In the case of a number of writers, phenomenological aesthetics is carried to the point of proclaiming the existence of indemonstrable intuitions concerning the essential nature of a type of art, for example, architecture, but such works may no longer be included within the field of scientific aesthetics.

Psychology has contributed to German aesthetics a large number of experimental methods. For a long time it seemed as if one could not, by experimental methods, go beyond the traditional investigation of proportions and rhythms. Very recently, however, Schultze of Königsberg and Kroh of Tübingen have blazed new trails concerning which, unfortunately, it is impossible as yet to say anything definite inasmuch as adequate publications are lacking. New vistas are opened also by the investigations of the modern psychology of youth.<sup>16</sup> The familiar doctrine that the child is, in a definite sense, man in his early state, and that the artist has preserved much of this child nature, has been most brilliantly confirmed by the psychology of youth. We can no longer doubt that mental characteristics which, in the case of adults are, as a rule, displaced or preserved only in an impoverished state, are widely prevalent and clearly defined in the case of children. This is particularly true as regards the relation of the observing person to the visible world. Most children have visual experiences of perceptual pictures; that is to say, in their case, perception and imagination (or memory imagery) are not as sharply differentiated as among adults. Otherwise expressed, many children have experiences intermediate between imagination and sensation, and these intermediate forms are experienced as something external. A similar inten-

<sup>16</sup>Jaensch, Erich R.: *Über den Aufbau der Wahrnehmungswelt und ihre Struktur im Jugendalter*. Verlag Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig, 1923. *Psychologie und Aesthetik*. Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, XIX, 1925, S. 11ff. *Über das Wesen der Kunst und die Kunst des Kindes (Neuer Versuch einer Grundlegung der "Aesthetik von unten")*. Verlag Benno Filser, Augsburg, in Vorbereitung.

sity of visual imagery is elsewhere to be found only in the case of the pictorial artist or the poet, or of an adult who is gifted with endowments for one of the two arts, even though not actually making contributions to it. On the basis of these recent investigations, we may emphasize with all the precision one might desire a fact which was formerly only surmised and advanced as an ingenious suggestion: the artist is a person who has preserved the characteristics of the child mind in the realm of visual experience.

Another movement in psychology which has likewise been carried over into aesthetics goes back to Wilhelm Dilthey.<sup>17</sup> As opposed to the psychology which seeks to build up consciousness out of elements, Dilthey advanced a doctrine that regards mind as a functional complex. This complex, he believed, may without difficulty be understood. In his view, every single mind, although individual, maintains a very close relation with that which is universally human. But this relation is mediated by types. One such type, according to him, is the aesthetic person. The aesthetic person and, even better, the artist, affords the proper avenue for the comprehension of art. These ideas have of late received further development.<sup>18</sup> At their basis there lies this truth: one can indeed more easily understand the nature of the particular mental fields, such as that of art or of philosophy, after one has attained a clear insight into the nature of the artistic or the philosophic person. The attempt, however, to derive the characteristic laws governing the art object from the nature of the artistic conscious-

<sup>17</sup> Dilthey, Wilhelm: *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie. Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. V*, S. 133ff. Verlag B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1924.

<sup>18</sup> Vgl. Spranger, Eduard: *Lebensformen. Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik der Persönlichkeit*. Verlag Max Niemeyer, Halle (Saale). 2. Aufl., 1921.

ness is misguided. The latest tendency along these lines<sup>19</sup> seeks to combine life and work in the concept of *Gestalt*. Nor does this attempt appear to me entirely successful. For the meaning of *Gestalt* suffers from a serious indefiniteness. One must not confuse this concept, which we owe to the followers of the poet Stefan George, with the concept of like designation which has recently been introduced into experimental psychology.<sup>20</sup> Common to them, indeed, is the fact that both are designed to connote an inner structure which is meaningful and intelligible. But in the one case the term has been coined primarily for the purposes of the history of mind; in the other, however, for the purposes of psychological experimentation and of psychological theory. In any event, aesthetics may enter into very much more intimate relations with *Gestalt*-psychology than with the atomistic and constructive psychology of past decades.

Closely related to the attempts just mentioned is the so-called philosophy of life. For Georg Simmel<sup>21</sup> philosophy was a form of life. He also, as does the *Gestalt*-psychology of today, entered into opposition to atomistic thinking. The impression made by a work of art, he maintained, is not equivalent to a summation of the impressions produced by all of the aspects and qualities emphasized by an

<sup>19</sup> Vgl. Gundolf, Friedrich: *Goethe*. Verlag Georg Bondi, Berlin. 11. Aufl., 1922.

Bertram, Ernst: *Friedrich Nietzsche*. Verlag Georg Bondi, Berlin. 6. Aufl., 1922.

Kahler, Erich von: *Der Beruf der Wissenschaft*. Verlag Georg Bondi, Berlin, 1920.

<sup>20</sup> Vgl. Koehler, Wolfgang: *Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand*. Verlag Vieweg Sohn, Braunschweig, 1920.

Wertheimer, Max: *Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie*. Verlag der philosophischen Akademie, Erlangen, 1925.

Koffka, Kurt: *Zur Analyse der Vorstellungen und ihre Gesetze*. Verlag Quelle und Meyer, Berlin, 1912. *Beiträge zur Psychologie der Gestalt*. (Koffka Hrsg.). Bd. 1. Verlag Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig, 1919. *Psychologie. Lehrbuch der Philosophie, herausgegeben von Max Dessoir*. Bd. II. *Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten*, S. 497ff. Verlag Ullstein, Berlin. 1925. *Die Grundlagen der psychischen Entwicklung. Eine Einführung in die Kinderpsychologie*. Verlag Zickfeldt, Osterwieck, 1921.

<sup>21</sup> Simmel, Georg: *Lebensanschauung*. Verlag Duncker und Humblot, München. 2. Aufl., 1922.

analytical aesthetics. Its distinctive feature, much rather, consists in a thoroughly unified character which arises out of or which transcends these separate impressions. This unitary character present throughout experience and prominent also in art, is designated in Simmel's philosophy by the term *life*. "Every moment of life is life in its totality, whose constant flux—and this precisely is its unique form—possesses reality only in that wave-height to which it rises at a given moment; every immediate moment is determined by the previous course of life as a whole—it is the efflux of all previous moments and, for this reason alone, every living present is the form in which the life of the subject possesses actuality." Hence psychology can do justice neither to life nor to art. For psychological treatment always involves a certain solidification. It would be erroneous to refer to great portrait painters as good psychologists. The portrayal of the human being by Rembrandt, for example, is, according to Simmel, animated to an extreme degree, but not in a psychological sense. From these essentially negative reflections Simmel then advanced to positive conclusions. Actuality and art, he tells us, are related to each other as are two languages which seek to express the same idea. Nature and spirit, actuality and value, reveal their profound unity in the individual creation of the artist.

The problem of art has been attacked from an entirely different side by the philosophy of the "as-if." To the thinkers of this school, art appears as the capacity of peculiarly endowed persons to interpret phenomena, by virtue of their creative imagination and by means of a valuable "fiction," with greater unity and depth than other people.<sup>22</sup> This interpretation comes by way of illusion or of conscious self-deception. Thereby he who sees or hears acquires the feel-

<sup>22</sup> Volkmann, Ludwig: *Das Kunstwerk als wertvolle Fiktion. Ein Beitrag zur Aesthetik des Als-ob. Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, XVI, 1922, S 69ff.*

ing of a deeper comprehension of phenomena and of a satisfying enjoyment. Representatives of this fictionalism concede that such a definition does not completely exhaust the nature of the functioning or the purpose of art. But it is doubtful whether the meaning of art is thereby adequately described even as regards pure aesthetic enjoyment.

From the above survey it is not difficult to see how strongly certain tendencies of contemporary German philosophy have affected aesthetics and the philosophy of art. On their part, however, investigators of the various fields of art have now also pressed forward to philosophical considerations and have made their own contributions to the enrichment of aesthetics. It is not here pertinent to go into details. It will suffice to mention the names of Wölfflin<sup>23</sup> and Worringer,<sup>24</sup> Schmarsow<sup>25</sup> and Dvorak,<sup>26</sup> Unger,<sup>27</sup> Strich<sup>28</sup> and Walzel,<sup>29</sup> Riemann<sup>30</sup> and Mersmann.<sup>31</sup> Among the historians of formative art, as well as among the historians of literature and of music, there are now a number of investigators whose interest is likewise directed to systematic treatment. They all seek purely theoretical con-

<sup>23</sup> Wölfflin, Heinrich: *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe*. Verlag Bruckmann. 6. Aufl., 1922.

<sup>24</sup> Worringer, Wilhelm: *Abstraktion und Einfühlung*. Verlag Piper, München. 5-8. Aufl., 1919.

<sup>25</sup> Schmarsow, August: *Die reine Form in der Ornamentik aller Künste*. *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XVI, 1922, S. 491ff.; XVII, 1924, S. 129ff., 209ff., 305ff.

<sup>26</sup> Dvorak, Max: *Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei*. Verlag Oldenburg, München, 1918.

<sup>27</sup> Unger, Rudolf: *Weltanschauung und Dichtung*. Verlag Rascher, Zürich, 1917. *Literaturgeschichte als Problemgeschichte*. Verlag Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fuer Politik und Geschichte m. C. H. Berlin, 1924.

<sup>28</sup> Strich, Fritz: *Klassik und Romantik*. Verlag Meyer und Jessen, München, 2. Aufl., 1924.

<sup>29</sup> Walzel, Oskar: *Wechselseitige Erhellung der Künste*. *Philosophische Vorträge der Kant-Gesellschaft*, Nr. 15. Pan-Verlag, Rolf Heyse, Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1917.

<sup>30</sup> Riemann, Hugo: *Die Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen*. Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek. Verlag Peters, Berlin, 1914-16.

<sup>31</sup> Mersmann, Hans: *Zur Phänomenologie der Musik*. *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XIX, 1925, S. 372ff.

cepts and strictly systematic ideas. Their work has already born rich fruit and will doubtless constantly continue to expand. Participating in this work are Austria,<sup>82</sup> Switzerland<sup>83</sup> and Holland<sup>84</sup>; but it is not necessary to describe their participation in detail.

<sup>82</sup> Strzygowski, Josef: *Die Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften vorgeführt am Beispiele der Forschung über bildende Kunst. Ein grundsätzlicher Rahmenversuch.* Kunstverlag Anton Schroll u. Co., Wien, 1923.

<sup>83</sup> Ermatinger, Emil: *Das dichterische Kunstwerk, Grundbegriffe der Urteilsbildung in der Literaturgeschichte.* Verlag Teubner, Leipzig, 2. Aufl., 1923.

<sup>84</sup> Haveloær, Just: *De symbolik der kunst.* Verlag Bohm, Haarlem, 1918.  
Berlage, H. P.: *Schoonheid in samenleving.* Verlag Brusse, Rotterdam, 1919.

Holst, R. N. Roland: *Over kunst an kunstmaan.* Verlag Meulenhoff, Amsterdam, 1925.

# LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

S. BOVENSIEPEN

## I. THE MATERIALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY ADVANCED BY SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

THE materialistic conception of history is based on the fundamental doctrine that the production and exchange of goods forms the basis for every form of State, society, and law; that in each and every society the distribution of goods and the social differentiation into classes or ranks is governed by the objects and the mode of production as well as by the manner in which that which is produced is exchanged. In every social investigation, in every critical evaluation of law, State, and society, the basic consideration is the particular nature of the economic order. According to this doctrine, the legal and political systems of every people are always *causally* conditioned by the peculiar character of its economic life; this relation is one of rigid, inescapable, natural necessity. The theory may perhaps be best characterized by quoting from its creator and master, Karl Marx.<sup>2</sup> In the preface to his famous

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> Marx was born on May 5, 1818, in Trier; he died in exile, in London, March 14, 1883. In his youth an enthusiastic admirer of the Hegelian philosophy with its doctrine of the absolute primacy of the *logos* as the demi-urge of reality, he later turned into its bitter opponent. His inseparable friend, Friedrich Engels, lived from 1820 to 1895. Their most important writings are: Marx's *Das Kapital*, the first volume of which appeared in 1867, volumes two and three being literary remains published posthumously by F. Engels in 1885 and 1894 respectively; and Engels' *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (1878) of which three chapters have appeared in separate print under the title, *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*.

work, *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, which appeared in 1859, he has portrayed his doctrine with striking significance and terseness:

"In the productive processes of society man enters into determinate and necessary relations, independent of his will—a mode of production which corresponds to a particular developmental level of his powers of material production. In its totality, this mode of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis from which a juristic and political superstructure arises. To it there corresponds a specific form of social consciousness. The mode of production in the sphere of material life conditions the social, political, and mental life-processes in general. It is not the consciousness of man that determines his mode of existence but, conversely, his social state that determines his consciousness. At a certain level of development the powers of material production within society come into conflict with the prevailing conditions of production, or, to state the same in juristic terms, with the property relations within which they have previously functioned. These relations are thenceforth no longer specific forms of productive power; they are transformed into chains that bind the latter. There then appears an epoch of social revolution. With the shifting of the economic basis there come more or less abrupt upheavals throughout the whole of the enormous superstructure. In considering such upheavals, the material transformations and the economic conditions of production, always to be established with scientific accuracy, must always be distinguished from the juristic, political, religious, artistic, or philosophic—in brief, the ideological—formulae under which men become conscious of this conflict and in terms of which they carry it on. One's conclusions regarding the nature of an individual should not be made to accord with the opinions which the latter forms of himself; just as little may one judge a period of social



upheaval by reference to its own consciousness. On the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained in terms of the conflicts within the sphere of material life—in particular, the existing conflict between the powers of production and the conditions of production. A form of society never disappears before all the powers of production are developed for which it affords adequate scope; and new and higher conditions of production never arise before the material conditions of their existence have come to life within the old society itself.”<sup>8</sup>

The materialistic interpretation of history in no wise denies, as is often thought, the significance of ideas and the presence within human thought and effort of ideal purposes. Nor is it oblivious to the undeniable fact that such ideas have often been the immediate causes of historic changes in legal and political organization. However, it most emphatically denies that the pursuit of such ideal purposes is the *ultimate* cause of social changes. On the contrary, it represents ideal purposes as merely phenomenal manifestations, as mirroring specific economic conditions. According to Marx and Engels, the socialistic order of society will some day come to mankind with the same iron necessity as winter follows upon autumn; all human efforts for reform in state and society are in the last analysis causally conditioned; not the conception, or the law, of purpose but the law of causality is dominant. Freedom may not be predicated of the human will. All economic phenomena are *manifestations of nature*. Their origin and their nature are to be explained in terms of the laws of *natural science*, not those of social science. If the socialistic order of society with its collectivization, that is, socialization, of all the means of production must come with logical necessity, then all purposive action is fundamentally meaningless. Let us note the famous contention of Karl Marx: “The working

<sup>8</sup> *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, sixth edition, (1920), p. lv.

class need not realize any ideals; it need only release those elements of a new society which have already formed themselves within the very midst of the crumbling bourgeois society." With the emergence of the new social order, wherein class distinctions disappear and property becomes collective as regards all the means of production—factories, machines, implements, and lands—the State will completely vanish and the institution wherein the propertyless classes are forcibly exploited by the capitalists will exist no more. Taking its place will be the new socialized society.

This doctrine, which we have very briefly sketched in only its salient features, is unquestionably of basic importance in two respects. On the one hand, it was the *first* doctrine to undertake a critical examination of the bases and laws of social life; through it the relation of law to the economic order and the question as to which of them is primary was illumined for the first time and in a manner which is indisputably ingenious and penetrating. On the other hand, the doctrine has a *practical* importance of incalculable magnitude. In the largest political party of the German Commonwealth as well as of Austria, it represents down to the very present the inviolable dogma which serves as the Holy Grail for all but a few of the less devoted disciples of the socialistic faith. True, Eduard Bernstein, who is scientifically the most prominent leader of present-day socialism and of the social-democratic party of Germany, sought in his intrinsically valuable works, *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (1899) and *Der Revisionismus in der Sozialdemokratie* (1909), to tone down and to develop further the doctrinal system transmitted as precious dogma to socialistic disciples. His attempts, however, encountered indignant opposition on the part of the guardians of the Grail, particularly von Mehring and Karl Kautsky, and

this, indeed, in spite of the fact that the changes proposed were not at all extreme. For many hundreds of thousands, perhaps even for millions of Germans, within and without the boundaries of the German Commonwealth, the Marxian doctrine represents the last word of wisdom, presumably the most mature conclusions ever pronounced concerning law, the State and society. They adhere to it with an almost blind faith in its dogmas. And yet it is only a creation of the imagination, though indeed a creation of magnificent proportions.

The demonstration that this Marxian doctrine does not fully develop its logical conclusions and in no wise exhibits thoroughly clarified thought represents a great and imperishable achievement which we owe to the gifted legal and political philosopher, Rudolf Stammmler.<sup>4</sup> Stammmler points out that Marx and Engels have nowhere given an explanation of what they meant by "economic phenomena" and by "conditions of production." There is every indication that they had in mind corporeal, spacial, tangible, natural phenomena. But this is a thoroughly untenable notion. As a matter of fact, these terms connote but legal relations; their whole being must be conceived as subject to legal regulation. Throughout all known history, regulation of the relations of men to one another has been dependent upon legal norms. The coöperation of men for the achievement of economic results is *logically* conceivable only under the presupposition of an external control. The so-called "powers of production" which Marx and Engels represent as the dynamic element in all social, legal, and political development are not at all economic but are purely *technological* phenomena, as is, for example, our modern power machin-

<sup>4</sup> Born in 1856, now a professor of law living secludedly in Wernigerode, a beautiful spot in the Harz Mountains. Stammmler's comprehensive and basic works, more especially *Recht und Wirtschaft* (first edition, 1896; fifth edition, 1924) and his magnificent *Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie* (second edition, Berlin, 1923) may be most warmly recommended to all who seek a deeper insight into these matters.

ery. They become economic phenomena only when they are incorporated within some particular legal order. It is only their inclusion within the externally regulated coöperation of men that is of social interest. If, however, any legal regulation is to be undertaken, the legislator must proceed with specific ideas and teleological considerations. "The mode of regulation . . . has the *logical* priority, even though it is not necessarily the temporal antecedent. Without it the phenomena of social-economic life can not be understood. Take away the concepts of private property, of freedom of contract and of the particular legal institutions of today and not a single trace of the concepts of bourgeoisie and proletariat, of surplus value and of rate of profit will remain. . . . Economic phenomena are nothing other than uniform phenomena of groups with legal relations." <sup>5</sup> In the concept of the social existence of man, law represents the form, that is, the logically conditioning aspect, whereas the economic life represents the matter, that is, the logically conditioned element. The Marxian doctrine remains undeveloped, "for it has not logically arrived at the thought that social life is subject to law." The question whether an attempt or result is justifiable cannot be answered by reference to its history. "Error and condemnable efforts likewise arise with causal necessity. . . . Social history treats of the development of the modes of human coöperation. It is, accordingly, a history of purposes. . . . In its entirety, it is a continuous chain of human strivings." <sup>6</sup> Not the economic but the legal order may therefore lay claim to the logical, even though not to the temporal, priority. There can be no economic order without a controlling activity which logically preconditions it and makes it possible.

<sup>5</sup> Stammer, R., *Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung* in the *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, fourth ed., Vol. 6, p. 530.

<sup>6</sup> Stammer, R., *Rechts-und Staatstheorien der Neuzeit*, second ed., 1925, o 80.

## II. THE SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL

In his essays on contemporary sociology, Ward discusses no less than twelve distinct meanings of that many-colored and highly ambiguous collective term "sociology." Perhaps it might have been possible to discover even more. The very fact that the term has received so many different meanings renders it useless for the delimitation of a specific discipline and unsuitable as a method for legal and political philosophy. Sociology's greatest defect lies in its use of analogies drawn from natural science. It is particularly attracted to the so-called "organismic" conception of law and of the State.<sup>7</sup> The State is compared with an organism, and its organization and differentiation are described after the pattern of the human body. Toennies compares the city of mediaeval Germany, which supplied its needs from within itself and its immediate environment, with an organism. The modern city and world metropolis, on the other hand, he likens to a mechanism. In very recent times Rudolf Steiner and his anthroposophic school have advocated a three-fold differentiation of the social organism. Corresponding to the head, chest, and digestive system of the human body are the mental, the political-legal, and the economic orders within the social organism; each of these possesses a certain independence and is governed by laws of its own. This confused doctrine fails to make clear how the legal and economic orders can be administered without reliance upon the mental order. The untenability of the thesis that there are independent economic laws, free from connection with a legal system, we

<sup>7</sup> We would refer to the works of the late Otto von Gierke of Berlin—the great German historian of law; also to the various writings of the famous German national economist, Schaeffle, likewise deceased; and still further to the thoughtful and stimulating book, *Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft* (fifth ed., 1924) by the well-known sociologist, Ferdinand Toennies, of Kiel.

have already shown above. The concept "organic," as also its antithesis "mechanical," belongs exclusively to the field of natural science, as Kant has argued in his *Kritik der Urteilkraft*. The science of law, however, is a *teleological* science. Its proper method of investigation is teleological and not causal. Law and the State, as must ever again be expressly emphasized, are conscious and freely willed creations. For their interpretation, therefore, natural science can furnish at most certain illustrations, and even these must be used with great caution; never can it supply the principle for the organization of ideas.

### III. RELATIVISM IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

In recent times this movement may count a numerous following in Germany. Its main leaders are: the elder Jellinek (1830-1905) with his very stimulating book, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (third ed., 1923); Müller-Erbacher; Radbruch, of Kiel, author of *Grundlinien der Rechtsphilosophie* (1914); the well-known national economist, Max Weber, now some time deceased; and Bendix. Historically, it may be traced back to the positivism of the French philosopher, Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Though exhibiting differences in matters of emphasis and of detail, these thinkers are thoroughly at one in their unqualified denial that legal and political philosophy possesses absolute validity. A weary skepticism is apparent in all their writings and theories; likewise, resignation and acceptance of a limited status. Only thorough-going relativities are recognized, more especially only subjective and historically conditioned value-judgments relating to law, the State and society. "This is a view as weak as it is inconsistent. . . . The possibility of science depends upon the principle of unity. The latter definitely determines the synthesis of the relativities, and without a unitary synthesis we

would have only a wild confusion of unmeaning accidentalities.”<sup>8</sup>

This unifying principle, fundamental in every investigation of law, we will describe in the last section of our paper, where we set forth the legal and political philosophy of Stammler.

#### IV. THE MOVEMENT FOR EMANCIPATION FROM THE DOMINANCE OF LAW

This school envisages a legal system that is plastic and adaptable to the requirements of individual cases as these arise. The judge is to be bound as little as possible by compulsory legal prescriptions. Dominated by the spirit of *Treu und Glauben*, in all instances, he is to shape his decisions by reference to the requirements of the case in question. At first glance this contention is attractive. However, it cannot withstand close, critical examination. Its adoption would lead to an unparalleled legal uncertainty. In numerous legal relationships, rigid formalism is inseparable from legal security. This is apparent, for example, if we consider the law of exchange, with its rigor and its prescriptions with respect to legal forms; or, likewise, checks, and all public registers, such as that of real estate, of commerce, and of property held jointly by husband and wife. Similarly, legal security often requires strict time specifications as, for example, in the case of terms of limitation and the attainment of majority. “The insistence, on the part of those who advocate emancipation from the dominance of law, that the legislator shall be prohibited from using a rigidly formulated system of law as the means for the attainment of desirable social conditions is a doctrinaire limitation without parallel. Such

<sup>8</sup> Stammler, R., *Die grundsätzlichen Richtungen der neueren Jurisprudenz*, No. 38 in *Rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen und Vorträge*, Vol. 2, p. 326.

action would impoverish our legal condition without yielding any moral advantage.”<sup>9</sup> This movement, to be sure, has not been without significant results, more especially as it is represented by the university professors, Stampe of Greifswald and Kantorowicz of Freiburg. These thinkers energetically insist that the judgments of the courts should not represent an uncritical application of, or appeal to, the so-called “ruling ideas.” The content of the latter is very difficult to determine; moreover, they occasionally diverge completely from the standards of *Treu und Glauben*, and thus of that which is really valid. The thought movement now under discussion, however, exhibits its unsystematic character and its great weakness in the fact that it does not know what should be set up as the objective criteria in place of the ruling ideas. To refer the individual judge to his own “free decision” would be to create a complete vacuum; subjective inclination can not be our goal, and, indeed, is not that for which we strive. A satisfactory outlook is afforded solely by a legal and political theory which is most recent in point of time and which stands alone in being completely elaborated. To this we now turn.

## V. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW AND OF THE STATE

The founder of this theory is the profound social philosopher, Rudolf Stammler, the only one in Germany, and indeed in German-speaking countries, who deserves the name of legal philosopher. Thanks to his contributions, we, for the first time since the death of Hegel, again have a philosophy of law. Joseph Kohler and von Jhering are frequently described as legal thinkers, but only inappropriately. Kohler was a general historian, and von Jhering an empiricist. The fundamental conceptions of the imposing thought-structure

<sup>9</sup> Stammler, *ibid.*, p. 382.



erected by Stammler are about as follows: Legal philosophy is concerned with that which is universally valid within the field of law. But that which is thus universally valid is alone the mode of organization of our thoughts. Legal philosophy, therefore, has to do with pure *forms* of the law. By form, however, is meant that which conditions the manner in which thoughts may be organized into a unity; and this is accordingly the object of separate, independent investigation. Law is a manifestation of human *will*, and is governed throughout by purposiveness. In contrast with natural science, it is based on the teleological principle. It does not fall within the field of external phenomena. It is not an object in the spacial order; and for this reason it is likewise not subject to the causal law, the latter being simply a formal method for the organization of corporeal changes within space. Law differs fundamentally from morality and from ethics in that their commands are directed towards the purification of man's inner life whereas law seeks to regulate the external relations of men to one another. Conceptually, law connotes a will that is autocratic and in its intent inviolably valid. It lays claim to a validity that is independent of the consent of those subject to it. It itself prescribes that the citizen shall be subject to it, and it determines with sovereignty whether and under what conditions the citizen may separate himself from it by withdrawal or emigration. The claim to inviolable validity, conceptually intrinsic to law, cannot, of course, at all times be completely carried through in the sphere of every day life—consider the numerous violations of law by theft, bodily injuries, fraud, and a host of other crimes. Nevertheless, it is by this claim that law may be distinguished from so-called “rules of convention” and from social customs such as expressions of politeness. Social custom, of course, often becomes evil in character, as in the case of a social compulsion to duel. Logically, or

conceptually, the validity of the rule of convention depends upon the consent of those to whom it is addressed; and the conventional society, represented for the most part by classes or other special groups, is such that those comprised therein have the liberty of withdrawing according to their pleasure. If the member of a certain feudal or semi-feudal social group in former Germany (as, for example, of the Prussian officer-group) refused a challenge to duel, he was automatically excluded from the circles of those "privileged to satisfaction"; but so far as concerns the reserve officer, at any rate, there never was any legal compulsion to participate in the "knightly" duel. Indeed, the law in Germany *universally* prohibited duelling on the part of officers. Herein is exemplified a direct clash between law and the customs of a social class. To be sure, the rule of convention often possessed, as it still continues to do, a far greater *psychological* power than the opposing regulation of the legal order; for the failure to observe the rule of convention seriously prejudiced one's social standing, if, indeed, it did not even lead to a boycott. This circumstance, however, in no wise affects the logical distinction between the legal system and the rules of convention.

The ideal goal of the law, that is, the *idea* of law, is the free community, an order representing that which is objectively valid, free from the turbid, purely subjective desires and feelings of pleasure characteristic of man as a volitional being. As a matter of actual fact, of course, this ideal can never be completely realized, any more than can any other idea or ideal.

"Earth's residue to bear  
Hath sorely pressed us;  
It were not pure and fair,  
Though 'twere asbestos."

—(*Goethe*).

But this social ideal, this concept of community, must ever be the goal of our thought and the guiding star on our earthly voyage. Upon this star we must fix our eyes as does the sailor upon the pole-star gleaming in the heavens.

Justice consists in judging a particular empirical content by reference to the concept of community in such wise, and with such an orientation, that each person respects every other as a member of the social community, and, following the admonition of the great sage of Königsberg, Kant, never uses him as a means to his personal ends. Much rather must every debtor be regarded as obligated in the first instance to himself. Without the concept of will in accordance with law, there can be no permanent norms that bind the volitions of man, and therefore no universal social regulations. The latter, however, are indispensable if those activities that possess a social import are to be regulated along universally valid lines. For, conventional regulation, briefly described above, by its very nature makes itself felt only from case to case as these arise. Herein lies the "right of law," so strongly contested by theoretical anarchism. The latter seeks to dissolve the entire legal and political order into merely loose, and always easily terminable, associations of free egoists.<sup>10</sup> Anarchism can never be applicable to all of the infinitely numerous social phenomena, for it takes into account only persons capable of entering into contracts and conducting business affairs; in the case of persons lacking such capacities—children, and individuals requiring tutelage and guardianship—it must resort to the legal compulsion which it rigorously proscribes in principle. We have here an inadequately considered and an inconsistent theory.

In the first section of our paper we referred to the exceedingly important role that has been played in the history

<sup>10</sup> One might refer to a work, well known though in ill repute, by Max Stirner (1806-1856) on *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*.

of ideas by Stammler, as the scientific conqueror of the historical materialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. In the present connection we would again offer a warning against the fatal, though popular and ever-recurring, misconception that Stammler asserts a *temporal* primacy of law over the economic order. According to him the primacy of law obtains only for *systematic, logical* investigation. And in thus contending, he is entirely in the right. As a matter of temporal fact, there was never, of course, even in the earliest times, an economic order without law, or law without an economic order. The two belong inseparably together, just as in life there is never matter without form. Law is simply the logically conditioning form of the economic order; and the economic order is the content whose eternal flux of becoming is regulated by law. It is only the organization, however, the regulating form of our social will, that is universally valid; the material itself of law, the content of social life, is in eternal flux. There are—and this is a further and important insight that we owe to Stammler—no natural rights which, in their content, are the same for all ages and peoples. Not a single legal dictate may lay claim to unchangeable and unconditional validity as regards its content. The objects of human desire differ, and are necessarily always involved in change. The conception of permanent natural rights is no less untenable than the doctrine, advanced by the romantics and the historical school of legal thinkers in Germany, of a mystical, ineffable folk-mind represented as the invisible creator of law.<sup>11</sup>

Stammler's critical philosophy of law, necessarily sketched but briefly above, rests on a Kantian basis. But building beyond Kant, so far as concerns political philosophy, it erects a proud and imposingly complete thought-

<sup>11</sup> Leaders of this movement are: Karl Friedrich von Savigny (1779-1861) and Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846).

structure for which Kant laid not even so much as the foundation walls. Just as the work of the great "all-destroyer," Kant, will ever remain indestructible in general philosophy, so Stammler's monumental edifice will remain for legal and political philosophy a κτῆμα εἰς αἶν, that is, an abiding possession.

## PSYCHOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

A. WENZL

MORE than any other single science psychology may be described as the daughter of philosophy. In terms of the objective data studied, psychology is very closely allied with logic, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics; its crucial task, the question of the relation of mind and body, is at the same time the central problem of metaphysics. We can therefore understand why psychology has freed itself only lately from the mother discipline of philosophy. This close affiliation expresses itself today in the fact that as a rule both disciplines are still united in the personalities of their representatives. The tendency toward emancipation, on the other hand, is unmistakably strong. If possible psychology wishes to enjoy the same relationship to philosophy in which its older sister sciences stand. Then too its subject matter has for a long time accumulated to such an extent that it can rightly set forth its claim to be recognized as an independent science. The directions in which it has developed are indeed quite manifold. These directions, furthermore, could not be at all unitary, because diverse lines of inquiry have pursued different objectives.

A comprehensive exposition of "Contemporary Psychology" (*Psychologie der Gegenwart*) written in a vital and appealing style, even if it does not evaluate all branches of psychology with uniform justice, appeared in 1925 from the pen of H. Henning. But for the purposes of our report, its principle of classification is not serviceable. We prefer to make a survey of the main currents of modern

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by C. A. Ruckmick.

psychology in German-speaking regions by foregoing for the moment an attempt at systematic classification and adopting four divisions which permit of easy separation on the basis of their fundamental attitudes and their lines of activity: (1) experimental psychology and its applications, (2) so-called *Gestalt* psychology, (3) intuitive<sup>2</sup> psychology and the investigation of personality, (4) psychology of the unconscious, specific psychoanalysis and individual psychology. As an appendix short discussions will be devoted to comparative psychology and to the theoretical metaphysical psychology. In developing each division and its literature, the report must confine itself to sketching the thought processes of a few but, so far as possible, typical representatives in the separate spheres and directions of activity and to mentioning a number of characteristic publications.

### 1. *Experimental Psychology and its Application*

Particularly through its transition to experimentation, psychology seems to have justly achieved its freedom as an independent science. At the same time a characteristic of its progress is to be noted in the fact that G. Fechner, the founder of experimental psychology, set out in this direction from metaphysical lines of reasoning. The experimental procedure is closely allied to the analytical methods of the natural sciences. The elements of the mental life are sought for and investigated. This attitude and the experimental procedure itself were directed first of all to the investigation of sensory experiences, a phase of research that is still today in full swing. At the same time a certain characteristic turn has manifested itself in the development of

<sup>2</sup> Translator's note: A literal translation would require the active participial adjective, "understanding" (*verstehende*). But since this is ambiguous, I have preferred "intuitive" as the nearest approach, although this term is also equivocal. Further explication must be postponed until the matter is more fully discussed in a separate section. A. A. Roback (*The Psychology of Character*, 1927, pp. 331-337) uses "intuitive", "interpretative," and "understanding," quite interchangeably in referring to this school.

this direction of investigation. The older sensory psychology was more bent on the study of the conditions of stimulation and of the interdependence of stimulus, sense-organ, and sensation; in short, it moved in the direction of physiology. The law of specific sense-energies and the Weber-Fechner law were its points of crystallization. The more recent turn that the psychology of sensation has taken is more toward the purely psychological inquiry into the characteristics of sensation. But the field of activity first mentioned is by no means to be considered as relinquished.

On account of the limitations of space it does not seem feasible to give an abstract of the separate researches that have appeared in the psychology of sensation and perception. A survey will furnish at least an orientation in connection with a bifurcation that has already taken place in this field of activity.

Of the more physiologically biased type of investigation we will mention studies of the so-called lower senses, which in more recent times have attracted keen interest.

First of all we must consider the work of the M. von Frey school (Würzburg) on the kinaesthetic and cutaneous senses. The Weber-Fechner law was the point of departure of a series of studies by R. Paul (Munich) who drew up as a corollary of that law an analogous psychical regularity, a principle of relativity, in terms of which the subjective magnitude, the psychical activity, depends upon the objectively independent variables in such a way, that it increases at first rapidly, then ever more slowly, and finally approaches a liminal value. A long series of publications is devoted to a qualitative investigation of various sensory fields. A very recent volume (1926) of the *New Psychological Studies* published by F. Krueger and A. Kirschmann, psychologists at Leipzig, is concerned with the problem of "Light and Color." This comprehensive joint volume brings together studies on the threshold, on color-sensitiv-



ity, on the construction of the color-pyramid, and on the so-called reversed spectrum (caused by a small opaque body which serves to replace the refraction that occurs in connection with a refracting prism, and by means of which the complementary colors appear instead of the colors of the usual spectrum). The volume clearly shows how much fundamental work is still to be done in the systematic organization of qualities and in the investigation of optical phenomena from the psychological standpoint. In the first part of the *Handbook of Psychology* (1922) K. Bühler treats the manner of appearance of the colors and submits his work as a project in the optics of painting. Under a similar title, *Concerning the Manner of Appearances of the Colors and their Modification through Individual Experience*, a work by D. Katz had already appeared in 1911 as Monog. Supp. No. 7 of the *Zeits. f. Psychol.* The same author had published as Monog. Supp. No. 11, of the same periodical (1925) a fundamental investigation called, *The Structure of the World of Touch*, which is methodologically related, in part, to the first mentioned study. Finally, further studies have come from this author in an attempt to prove, contrary to v. Frey, that the sense of vibration is an independent sense. C. Stumpf, who reported at the Sixth Congress of Experimental Psychology in 1914 on *Recent Investigations concerning Tonal Theory*, (a subject which has been developed almost to the point of an independent discipline) has continued his researches, since his investigations of the structure of vowels (1918) and the pitch of consonants (1921), and has just now published (1926) a comprehensive work entitled *Speech Sounds; Experimental-phonetic Investigations*. Stumpf's results support the Helmholtzian theory of vowels. Independently of Stumpf, this same problem has been investigated also in American laboratories where these results have for the most part been confirmed.

H. Henning has published a comprehensive book entitled

*Smell* (1924)<sup>3</sup> which serves as a "reference work in the field of psychology, physiology, zoology, botany, chemistry, physics, neurology, ethnology, philology, literature, aesthetics, and cultural history." Studies concerning the gustatory sense appeared from the same psychologist in 1921 and 1922.

Considerable attention has been directed to the "eidetic" phenomena which E. R. Jaensch (Marburg) and his followers have investigated in a pioneering way.<sup>4</sup> Eidetics are people whose ideas can be transposed into literally visual aspects, as Jaensch stated in his address before the Munich Psychological Congress in 1925. In a certain sense the "aspect-images" of eidetics stand midway between ideational images and (sensory) after-images. On account of their peculiar nature eidetics appear to be particularly suited for investigation of objective and pictorial thinking. Among adults eidetic phenomena appear more rarely and less distinctly, but even among the youthful, the frequency of their occurrence is apparently regional, varying with local conditions. According to the nature of the aspect-images, with respect to their modifiability or constancy, the eidetics fall into two groups, which are also distinguishable typically, on the basis of their constitution. According to the clinical picture of which they remind us, they have become designated as type B (basedovoid)<sup>5</sup> and type T (tetanoid). Type B is determined mostly through mental vivacity accompanied by shining eyes and lively complexion, whereas type T is more reserved, as indeed its outward manifestations would also indicate. The classification can be made also along other lines in accordance with the nature and content of the primary images which precede the eidetic aspect-images, for eidetics do not respond

<sup>3</sup> Translator's note: The first edition appeared in 1917.

<sup>4</sup> E. R. Jaensch, *Concerning the Development of the Perceptual World and Its Structure in the Years of Youth*, 1923; O. Kroh, *Concerning Subjective Aspect Images among the Youthful*, 1922.

<sup>5</sup> Translator's note: Cases of ophthalmic goitre are our nearest equivalents.

in the same manner to all objects presented to them. Jaensch surmised that these phenomena involve older functional levels which are, nevertheless, still effective among average individuals. At one stage below this lies the pre-aspective layer, which can be observed in the so-called synaesthetic group. The synaesthetics, who are closely allied to the eidetics, but who can nevertheless be distinguished from them, experience colors more or less intensively with stimulation of tonal sensations (audition colorée). But a certain coördination of tones and colors appears also to be the rule among those who are not peculiarly characterized by synaesthesia. Eidetic phenomena would naturally be effective in explaining reports of religious hallucinations. Eidetic and synaesthetic phenomena, which are also found in other sense-departments, are of course not only psychologically interesting, but are to be studied also for their pedagogical importance. On experimental grounds, therefore, the possibility of a classification into types has emerged, a classification which could be combined with other attempts to distinguish types, about which we shall speak in detail later.

Interest has been manifested more and more strongly in the direction of the higher, so to say, the peculiarly psychical functions. Thus there has developed especially an experimental psychology of thought.<sup>6</sup>

The classical association psychology, whose outstanding contemporary representative is perhaps Th. Ziehen, had reduced thought activity, as well as all psychical processes, to associative reproduction. The memorial traces of simultaneous conscious processes are bound together and the reinstatement of one content revives those processes that are connected with it. Thus, finally, there emerge from each idea very many reproductive tendencies, and a system

<sup>6</sup> Foremost here are to be mentioned the extensive studies of Otto Selz, *Concerning the Laws of Consistent Thought Processes* (1913) and its comprehensive supplementary, *On the Psychology of Productive Thought and Error* (1922), of which Selz himself gives a short summary in *The Laws of Productive and Reproductive Mental Activity* (1924).

of diffuse reproduction, Selz says, develops in which the strongest reproductive tendency in any given case inhibits the others and thereby determines the flow of ideas. But correctness and strength in the association of an idea do not have anything to do with each other. It can therefore be assumed that the reproductive tendencies strengthen one another when they point in the same direction. This is the fundamental concept of the "constellation theory" of consistent thought processes as G. E. Müller interprets it. A thought-problem, for example, fashions a favorable constellation for its solution. It serves as a guide, since the nature of the task [*Aufgabe*] itself already arranges a series of memorial traces in increasing readiness, from which, through the peculiarity of the concrete content of the task, the corresponding contents are selected. But it can be shown that this hypothesis does not suffice to explain the actual procedure of thought. This procedure is conditioned by *determining tendencies*, as N. Ach has called them, which we can take to be primarily a collective term for all guiding factors. Along with this development, in which the associative explanation of the thought process tends to make the assumption of determining tendencies, goes side by side the development of the notion that thoughts are concerned with specific psychic contents which are not to be conceived as sums of ideas.

As a point of departure, O. Selz makes an hypothesis that is diametrically opposed to that of a system of diffuse reproductions among which a choice must be made. In place of such a system, he presents one of specific reactions in which a given single stimulus is constantly attached to a single reaction, like a reflex response to a stimulus, so that one can speak of a reflexoidal (reflex-like) arrangement. The proposed task corresponds to a stimulus, while the specific reaction which alone or together with others solves the task, is called the operation or method of solving. Every

solution is accomplished through a chain of methods of solving. The method of solving may be intelligent or unintelligent, depending upon whether or not the thinking individual, in its application, realizes that the operation is a means to the solution. For example, we have the knowledge complex  $R_1 \text{ } ^\text{r} \text{ } R_2$ , *i. e.*, two *related objects*<sup>7</sup>, *e. g.*, "hunting" and "fishing" stand in a relationship  $r$  (coordination). If I should search for a concept coördinate with "hunting," then the consciousness of the task is represented by the schema  $R_1 \text{ } ^\text{r} \text{ } X$ , which Selz calls the anticipatory schema. The task is solved through the operation of complementing the complex, which results in this case reproductively. The experience of launching a consciously intended intellectual operation, according to Selz, is always a schematic anticipation of the goal, even in the case of other intellectual operations, such as abstraction and combination. Furthermore, through the realization of methods of solving, it should be possible to explain also those productive mental performances that are undoubtedly necessary to the establishment of scientific systems, to technical construction, and to artistic composition. Selz distinguishes the following principal instances which the reviewer wishes to illustrate by mathematical examples:<sup>8</sup> (1) Routine realizations, out of original elaborations arise methods of solution: a method of solving is reproduced and applied to new material. A student, for example, knows the method of solving quadratic equations and uses them in connection with a given case or applies them as a partial method, *e. g.*, for the solution also of the equations in the text of the next higher degree of difficulty. (2) Intermediate abstraction: a method of solving must first be discovered, it emerges from a total situation, is abstracted from it either (a) reproductively,—

<sup>7</sup> Translator's note: "object" in the sense of Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie*.

<sup>8</sup> The *Os* in Selz's experiment received problems as, for example, to find the super—, sub—, or co-ordinate concept to a given one, the part for the whole, and the whole for the part.

a process suggests itself that offers a partial solution—in the case of the equation,  $5x^3 + 15x^2 + 15x = 1710$  we recall for example the method of completing the square by means of which a mixed quadratic equation becomes a pure quadratic equation; we proceed then as if it were a quadratic equation and obtain  $x^3 + 3x^2 + 3x + 1 = 342 + 1$ ,  $(x+1)^3$  or  $x=6$ ; (b) conditioned by chance,—Darwin found the struggle of mankind for existence described in Malthus; he abstracted the method for use in biology; or the student of mathematics learns incidentally that  $x^4 + x^2 = a$  may be solved by substituting  $y = x^2$ —he then can also solve  $\sin x + \sqrt{\sin x} = a$ ; (c) immediately,—the method of solving follows from the structure of the task itself, *e. g.*,  $\sqrt[4]{625} = \sqrt{\sqrt{625}}$ . (3) Voluntary or involuntary processes of abstraction initiated without the setting up of a goal are subsequently elaborated constructively, *e. g.*, a fortunate experience while writing poetry, or a chance observation in science.

Selz is led by his investigation to a position opposed to that of Bergson, for whom interminably new phenomena arise in a manner inexplicable by scientific law. Selz's work shows how precisely these constant, uniform coördinations of mental operations and the recurrence of the factors of solving form the prerequisites for the arousal of new operations and productions. In these terms an outlook is afforded toward a "biology from within," by means of which the development of new types of reaction is explained in terms of old ones.

In the field of the psychology of thought other studies may be mentioned, though limited space forbids more detailed accounts: the quite comprehensive investigations of the school of N. Ach concerning naming, abstraction, and the building of concepts; the investigation of Willwoll, in which the observer was given two concepts and was asked to form one that is superordinate to them, a concept that

could not be easily reproduced, *e. g.*, the concept superordinate to "steps" and "ladder"; finally the researches of Lindworsky and Störring on the forming of conclusions in thinking.

In the field of the psychology of feeling are to be mentioned G. Störring's *Psychology of the Human Affective Life* (1916); in the field of the psychology of volition, J. Lindworsky's *The Will, Its Appearance and Control in Accordance with the Results of Experimental Psychology* (1919).

Naturally psychology has not confined itself even in Germany to the establishment of general uniform principles, but it has also concerned itself with the discernment of characteristic individual differences. As in the fields of sensation and perception, there appear specific differences also in the spheres of memory, ideas, attention, reaction, and the thought processes, and all these individual peculiarities are adapted to serve as foundation-stones for a differential psychology (W. Stern, *Differential Psychology*, 1921)<sup>9</sup> and as an application in time to psychotechnics.

Pedagogy, medicine, the science of law, and industrial science represent enlarged fields of application of psychology, especially of experimental psychology. Since 1914 applied psychology has been very energetically developed in Germany. In industrial psychology there press forward the complex questions concerning the rationalization of the work-process, the testing of special ability, and vocational guidance, all of which involve a long series of investigations. The problem of rationalizing salesmanship, the "psychotechnics of advertising," has likewise been brought

<sup>9</sup> Translator's note: The first edition of this work appeared in 1900 under the title *Concerning the Psychology of Individual Differences*. In place of a second edition, a totally rewritten and much larger work was published in 1911 under the present title.

within the scope of research.<sup>10</sup> Even if the rather too great hopes which were directed toward psychotechnics have not all been fulfilled and a certain rebound of disillusionment must be faced, nevertheless psychotechnics has already proved its justification within natural limits and has been assured the recognition of industry.

We close this review of experimental psychology and its application with the citation of several general text-books and collective works: Abderhalden's, *Manual of Biological Methods of Research*; J. Fröbes's two-volume *Text-book of Experimental Psychology* (1920 and 1923)<sup>11</sup> and R. Pauli, *Psychological Manual* (1923).

## 2. *Gestalt Psychology*

In the organic development of experimental psychology the tendency had already emerged to abandon the closed systems which the association psychology portrayed, and to comprehend the mental structures in their specific peculiarity and totality rather than to destroy them through an extensive ramification. And yet this development did not satisfy many psychologists. With the revolutionary claim to the production of a "new" psychology, the so-called *Gestaltpsychologie* appeared on the stage. As its chief representatives may be named W. Köhler, M. Wertheimer, and K. Koffka<sup>12</sup>. The psychology of *Gestalt*, influenced as it was from the direction of behaviorism and the psychology of intuition, raised against conventional psychology the charge

<sup>10</sup> Among the works in the field of applied psychology are to be cited, H. Münsterberg, *Fundamentals of Psychotechnic*, edited by H. Henning (1920); F. Giese, *Psychotechnic Manual* (1923), and *Manual of Psychotechnic Aptitude Tests* (1925); W. Moede, *Experimental Psychology in the Service of Industrial Life* (1923).

<sup>11</sup> Translator's note: The third edition appeared in 1926.

<sup>12</sup> Köhler, *The Physical Forms at Rest and in a Stationary Condition* (1920); Wertheimer, *Three Essays concerning the Psychology of Gestalt* (1925); Koffka, *Psychology* in M. Dessoir's collective work, *Philosophy in its Separate Fields* (1925).



that analysis into elements is an unsuitable method of research for psychology. Its accusations were primarily pointed, it is true, toward association psychology, which might anyway be considered as exploded, but they also affect every type of psychology which does not fundamentally break relations with the principle of dissection. The actual mental structures are entities, they are "forms." Even in perception more is given us than a sum of sensations. The perceptual experiences, moreover, are mental entities. Geometric figures, geometric-optical illusions, and melodies are especially characteristic examples of perceptual *Gestalten* [or "forms"].<sup>18</sup> Their characteristics are not only the narrower interrelationship of their parts as over against the environment, but they are altogether more than the sum of their parts and are not to be built up out of single elements. They show their character as entities also through the possibility of their transposition: the single tones of a melody may be replaced in part with suitable other notes or an entirely new set may be introduced, without disturbing the melody. So objects may depict themselves on our retina in the most varied perspective positions without losing their unitary character. Experiments with animals have shown that for these animals also it matters not what the absolute colors are, but what the "color-formation" is. When chickens, for example, had been trained to look for their food on the darker of two surfaces, when the darker surface was retained, but the lighter one was replaced by one that was still darker, somewhat in the direction of black, they went not in the direction of the one which remained absolutely the same, but in the direction of the relatively darker, that is the black. Similar observations could also be made with children. In short, our entire world

<sup>18</sup> Translator's note: *Gestalt* has been variously translated, more frequently as "form," less frequently as "shape," "figure," "configuration." Köhler himself prefers "form." The terms "*Gestalt*" and "form," will therefore be used interchangeably in what follows.

of perception is normally built upon *Gestalten*, not on "and-combinations." Such "and-combinations," mere sums (*e. g.*, the perception of a pair of lines as two separated lines) are products of abstraction. The sensations themselves, which experimental psychology regards as elements, are artificial abstractions. The fundamental thing is the perception, which is concerned with "forms." Where no "form" can develop itself, there arises the impression of a chaos.

All of these emphatically intoned thoughts are certainly very worthy of consideration. They are at any rate not entirely new; furthermore, the building of "forms" naturally has long been an object of attention among psychologists. In his *Introduction to Psychology* Wundt had already advanced as the first psychological law, "the creative resultant," according to which it is the inherent nature of the combined contents of consciousness that their peculiarity is not created from a sum of the parts out of which they combine themselves. In 1890 C. von Ehrenfels had already coined the name, "form-qualities" (*Gestaltqualitäten*). The Austrian school (Meinong, Witasek, Benussi, etc.) had spoken of "funded contents" which arise through a mental construction of elements. In 1913, in his book, *The Perceptions of Form*, Bühler had discussed the question of the development of "form." G. E. Müller has recently investigated the conditions for the formation of complexes<sup>14</sup> and has directed a thorough-going critique against the Köhler - Wertheimer - Koffka theory of *Gestalt*. The difference between the more recent and the earlier views of mental formations lies in the fact that, according to the more recent interpretation, the primary concern is not the elements, from which, through a creative act of the mind, the *Gestalt*, which is more than a sum, is thought to arise; the *Gestalt* rather is the primary unit, while its parts

<sup>14</sup> *The Theory of Complexes and the Theory of Gestalt*, 1923.

are products of abstraction. The envisagement is therefore not from below upward, but from above downward.

Just as the association psychology sought to produce a physiological hypothesis, in which the associations were traced back to circuits in the central nervous system which had formed themselves between simultaneously arising elementary impressions, so the psychology of *Gestalt* looked for a physiological hypothesis corresponding to its demand. The mental forms must correlate with physical forms of the nervous system. W. Köhler called attention to the fact that inorganic nature likewise exhibits phenomena which could be called "forms." Thus, for example, the distribution of electricity in a conductor fulfills the requirements of *Gestalt*. It is not to be understood as a sum of single charges, but the distribution of charges is dependent upon the total surface of the conductor. Subtraction or addition of charges does not alter any part of the distribution. *Gestalt* is therefore capable of transposition. Physico-chemical "forms" of such a nature as run their course in the nervous system, among which each partial process is conditioned by the whole, are thought to represent the physical correlate to the mental *Gestalt*. Wertheimer has furnished us with an especially concrete expression of this idea through his introduction of so-called cross-functions. A specific unit results from the stimulation of individual cells and the cross-processes that run their course between the excited areas of the brain.

*Gestalt* psychology finally encompasses as "forms" all psychic processes. Especially, for example, are the reflexes and instincts "forms" which are to be traced back to the physical "forms" of the nervous system. In the visual sense modality, the sensorium and the motorium would build a unity that would initiate itself on the basis of the simplest conditions. Thus are explained the reflex eye-movements which are observed so early in

life. Instincts are not regarded as chain-reflexes, but contrariwise reflexes are "frozen" instincts. The situation, in which an instinct is operative, is designated as an open *Gestalt*,—the instinct concerns itself with the task of closing this *Gestalt*. In principle the concept of *Gestalt* and the explanation of instincts built up around it are expanded also to include thinking. A problem presents an open *Gestalt* of thought, which yearns for solution (closure). The thought process does not come to rest until the situation is transformed into a closed *Gestalt*. This transforming or translation of thinking, which as a matter of fact is very important, and which Wertheimer has illustrated with interesting examples, recalls the creation of an anticipatory subject in the theory advanced by Selz. The solving follows often when an object, which before this played its own rôle, changes its significance in such a manner that it becomes adapted to close the open *Gestalt* which the situation presents. Productive thinking is in this manner exactly suited to the task, in that the situation must first be transformed into an open *Gestalt*, that such a "form" must first be found.

A number of criticisms have rightly been raised against the psychology of *Gestalt*. The most effective are perhaps the following. The physiological hypothesis is a variety of materialism. It is as little in a position to explain the sensory mental process as the outlawed atomistic physiological hypothesis. What Köhler calls *Gestalten* are fundamentally only conditions that are equalized in effect. These conditions are not more reasonable than were the elementary processes. They also are really not more than their sum, at least if one uses the term "sum" not only in the spatial, but also in the dynamic sense. It may well be that such equivalent conditions play a large part in neural reactions; perhaps, also, they are at the foundation of the perceptual "forms." These separate points are still to be

proved. Undoubtedly the grave difficulties which the theory faces, and which especially E. Becher has revealed, must not be misinterpreted. An explanation of those psychical processes, however, which we designate as meaningful, especially thinking, is not afforded by means of this hypothesis.

A second criticism is that the concept of *Gestalt* becomes much too broad, so that it grows vague and confused. Every psychic process is called a *Gestalt*. But what Koffka calls "thought-forms" is surely something essentially and altogether different from the perceptual "forms." It is certainly very useful to regard the thought processes as wholes, but on closer acquaintance nothing emerges that is of more fundamental importance than what the traditional, in particular the thought psychology—as for example the writings of Selz and Bühler—has brought to light. Everything only appears in a new dress.

Basically the entire personality may be called a *Gestalt*, an entity, but when we undertake an investigation of mental contents and processes, we must certainly ever again (somehow) select entities, and where the cross section shall be made depends essentially upon where the psychologist wishes to cut. The psychology of *Gestalt* desires also to become affiliated with behaviorism and with the doctrine of emotion advanced by McDougall. The behaviorism in the doctrine of Thorndike and McDougall's theory of instincts have of course not been neglected in German psychology. Thus, in the Psychological Congress at Munich in 1925, these tendencies in American psychology were introduced through a summary read by Karl Bühler. But then these theories have merely been followed with interest rather than having become absorbed. The psychology of *Gestalt* is in that respect an exception to this situation, inasmuch as it tries to embody particularly the doctrine of instincts and emotions in its system. The situation which makes instincts

operative Koffka calls an open *Gestalt*. The closure entails the formation of a physical *Gestalt* in the central nervous system. The *Aufgabe* is the detection of essential and fundamental instinctive "forms." The relation between the psychology of *Gestalt* and behaviorism appears to the reviewer to a certain extent to be artificially drawn, but the tendency to get close to everyday life and to observe organisms as wholes is in either case common to both points of view.

### 3. *Intuitive Psychology and Investigation of Personality*

The requirements of everyday life, which are effective everywhere in modern psychology, are not satisfied, to be sure, with the psychology of *Gestalt*. So-called *intuitive psychology* places itself in a still more fundamental contrast to traditional psychology than did the psychology of *Gestalt*. The charge that it brings is two-fold. (1) The traditional experimental psychology is a psychology of elements, instead of an envisagement of its objectivity in a developing and perfect mental life. (2) It would explain mental events in a causal connection after the manner of the natural sciences instead of permitting them to be understood. The intuitive psychology therefore has in common with the psychology of *Gestalt* the aversion for the mechanical and atomizing point of view which traditional psychology presents. But it is not true, as Koffka thinks, that the psychology of "form" in a certain measure builds a bridge between "explanatory" psychology which is directed toward the natural sciences and "intuitive" psychology which is orientated toward the humanistic sciences. From the standpoint of intuitive psychology, undoubtedly traditional experimental psychology and the psychology of *Gestalt* rather belong together. What intuitive psychology offers is another type of comprehension. W. Dilthey, to whom intuitive psychology traces its origin, has formulated the

contrast as follows: "We explain [the life of] nature, we understand the life of mind." Since then the representatives of intuitive psychology have not become weary of discussing this contrast. Thus H. Erismann has designated as unintelligible all knowledge in general that has been inductively obtained, in terms of the uniform operation of causal laws. Explanation in the natural sciences, according to him, consists in organizing an inductively obtained event which proceeds unintelligibly according to law. Every research involving a further analysis points only to other not less unintelligible laws. The situation is different in the mental realm where the relations are intelligible from within outward (*The Peculiarity of the Mental*, 1924). But the concept of "intuition" is manifold in meaning. A very thoughtful explanation has been achieved in a book, *The Problem of Psychological Understanding*, by G. Roffenstein (Vienna, 1926).

K. Jaspers distinguishes static and genetic intuition. The first is a self-realized mental state; genetic intuition inquires how mental processes develop out of mental processes. The demand for a static understanding faces that point of view which one tries to designate as the phenomenological method. Phenomenology demands of every conceptual elaboration of phenomena that it should envisage itself, that it should possess itself of the quality of experience, that it should set itself into the circumstances of the observation, and that it should comprehend its essence in terms of natural appearances. If this point of view is applied to mental contents, then the conditions for a psychologically static understanding are established. Detailed presentations, as that given for example by M. Scheler of the feeling of sympathy, owe their existence to such an attitude. Love in its manifold forms and meanings, sympathy together with joy and sorrow, are subclassified in accordance with their intrinsic nature. In the class of phenomenological interpre-

tations belong, in addition to the works of Scheler, those of A. Pfänder, P. Haeberlin, and others. We can not here discuss in detail the differences in the points of view nor their justification ([in terms of] empathy, re-living, intuition).

To understand the mental life genetically does not imply an understanding of the underlying organic motivation. If intuitive psychology has a fundamental category it is that of purpose. (Anna Tumarkin, *Prolegomena to a Scientific Psychology*, Berne, 1923).

An especially important task in the realm of intuitive psychology is naturally that of comprehending and describing the peculiar nature of personality as a unit. Even W. Stern, who does not really belong to the movement known as intuitive psychology, writes in his *Differential Psychology*: "Personalities, in so far as they are entities and also present mental wholes, can be understood only through re-living them." Differential psychology can only deliver building-stones.

The representatives of that type of psychology which is directed toward an understanding of personality labor, to be sure, above all with the not-univocal term, "concept of structure." All mental impulses and strivings together build a framework, in which one factor depends upon another, and these essentially uniform, ever-changing, dependent relations make up the structure of personality. Therefore only through re-living, empathy, and intuition is it possible to understand this framework in terms of its nature and meaning, to indicate its interdependence, and to follow the coöperation of characteristically individual experiences and performances of personality. It serves to show how the mental life of a personality and its expressions can be understood from the point of view of structure. The inquiry concerns the lawful uniformity of the structure, not the single causal laws. Several factors must



be analyzed out as being influential regarding structure, with the result that personalities will be classified into types in accordance with the similarities in the factors governing the structure. Thus intuitive psychology becomes the psychology of types. The representatives of intuitive psychology as a rule come from the humanistic scientific disciplines; they are orientated toward inquiries into the philosophy of culture and of values. The points of view regarding the formation of types are manifold. The foremost follows the division of personalities according to the attitude assumed in their views of life and according to their systems of values.

E. Spranger of Berlin is the most famous representative of intuitive psychology today. In his *The Forms of Life* he proceeds from his basic premise that the structure of a personality is given in terms of the predominating evaluative tendencies. He finds the main evaluative tendencies objectively operative in the six great spheres of culture: in science, art, religion, industry, the state, and society. To these six spheres of culture, corresponding to the systems of value which are respectively grounded in them, he allies six types of personality that are governed through interest in these spheres: science, theoretical persons; art, aesthetic persons; religion, religious persons; industry, economic persons; society, social persons; and the state, political men or rulers. From the preponderance of one evaluative tendency results a characteristic dependence of the others. A pure politician, for example, has no longer any peculiar mechanism for the objectivity which science demands. His theoretical training is therefore that of the rhetorician who wishes to convince through speech. In the artistic sphere he will lean toward an art that has power to impress you. The possession of this ability is for him material for might. God for him is a ruler. In so far as social acts in social relationships tend toward super- or

sub-ordination, he leans toward a patriarchal conception. Naturally not all men can be classified under one of the six rubrics. There are mixed types, to which Spranger assigns the modern technical individual in whom the theoretical and economic evaluative tendencies fuse. But there are also duplex forms in which several structures are wrestling for leadership, often at the expense of the harmony of the personality and its performance, often with the unavoidable result of a dangerous conflict.

Spranger's book, *The Psychology of Youth*, has made a strong impression, especially in pedagogical circles. Spranger here describes in a series of essays the method of classifying juveniles in terms of the problems which particularly concern them (politics, social intercourse, love, sexuality, —among youthful persons love and sexuality are not yet fused, but are separate spheres of experience in their consciousness) and presents the characteristic features of a number of juvenile types.

From a point of view different from that of Spranger, Jaspers develops a classification of types (*The Psychology of Philosophies*, 1925). As Dilthey had made the philosophical attitude (naturalistic, idealistic, contemplative interpretations of the world and of life) a basis for the characterization of personality; as Spranger, the system of values, so in the case of Jaspers the points of view of philosophizing and of evaluating become fused by means of the strong influence of historical necessity. In his survey, *On the Personality-types and the Method of their Determination* (1924), O. Felz designates as the most important principle of demarcation underlying the psychology of Jaspers, the constancy or instability of those evaluating tendencies which afford the conduct of life a firm guide. If the fundamentals of traditionally bound men are shattered through reflection and scepticism, there results the type of unprincipled, nihilistic, chaotic person. But life demands new bond-

age. The "demoniacal"<sup>15</sup> person who can keep in touch with the tendencies toward historical development but at the same time has discovered new evaluations and is inspired by them, secures for himself and for others a new fulcrum. He makes the transition to new crystallizations in conventional forms. The consistent rigorist who is grounded in firmly established principles follows him. Thus there is developed a tripartite division: consistent, chaotic, and demoniacal persons. As in the case of Spranger, the division into types by Jasper bears also the character of metaphysics and the philosophy of culture. While Spranger's classification is obtained in a measure by means of a cross section through the principal spheres of culture, the Jasper division suggests a longitudinal section. Today our youths stand in the magnetic field of attraction of both poles: the longing for traditional bondage, on the one hand, and for newer evaluations, on the other. K. Jaspers has also published a work, *General Psychopathology* (1923). Finally, the point of view of intuitive psychology has also been brought to bear on the fields of historical science and of sociology.<sup>16</sup>

Against intuitive psychology the charge is immediately brought that it delivers us no really teachable system. It is more an art than a science. Two further suggestions are added: (a) The meshes of the typification are altogether too large. If we look out upon the world, we are relatively seldom in a position, except in the case of striking personalities, to designate with any certainty the conformity of an individual to a given type. The majority does not lend itself without constraint to the classification. (b) To this charge must be added that the point of view of classifying

<sup>15</sup> *Translator's note*: This term in our language usually signifies a "demon" in a malicious sense. Originally, of course, as in the use of "daimōn" by Socrates it denoted divine inspiration. In the German, the meaning is allied to this and means "endowed with genius."

<sup>16</sup> G. Simmel, *Concerning the Nature of Historical Interpretation* (1918) and *Problems of the Philosophy of History* (1923); M. Weber, *Concerning Several Categories of Intuitive Sociology*, Book IV.

into types does not belong in the first instance to psychology, but to the sphere of the philosophy of culture and of metaphysics. These ideas are justified in the humanistic science of characterology, into which the psychology of types finally emerges through greater ramification of the guiding lines which envelop the structure of a personality. Very valuable in this direction is certainly the *Characterology* (1925) by Utitz, in which a great array of characterological guiding lines are set up, of which the scarcity of space does not permit reproduction here. Utitz also publishes a characterological year-book in which the various characterological currents are expounded.

Jaspers' psychology, as well as that of Spranger, established ideal types derived from the humanistic sciences. Side by side with these there has matured another investigation of personality which aims to characterize the expressional forms in which the character of the personality manifests itself: body-development (Kretschmer); body-posture, head and facial development, and handwriting (Klages). Here we are again very much concerned with the structural uniformities which apply to the personality as a whole, but in this psychology of expression the characterization rests not, at any rate not only, on the point of view of psychological intuition, but in part also on a procedure in accordance with empirically inductive methods which can not make claims to a complete intuitiveness.

Entirely from the point of view of psychopathology E. Kretschmer tries to solve the problem of typification. His book, *Bodily Structure and Character* (1926), which has become well known especially among physicians, proceeds from the basic supposition that the peculiarity of the relationship between corporeal and mental habits is more easily and more sharply comprehended in pathological than in normal cases. He carries over, then, to normal persons the relationship of characteristic mental and constitutional

symptoms which were observed in both great endogenous psychoses, schizophrenia and circular insanity, since he interprets disease as a distortion and an unhealthy exaggeration of normal dispositions. The constitutional forms are classified into three great groups: athletic, aesthenic, and pyknotic (compact) bodily build. The last is found especially among those of circular pathology; the first two forms, among the schizophrenic. Thus Kretschmer obtains a principle of classification for normal persons also, in that he divides them according to their constitutional form into cyclothymics (with pyknotic bodily build) and schizothymics (with aesthenic or athletic bodily build). The type of experience of the first recalls the pathological picture of the circular type when one thinks of it as exaggerated by disease; that of the schizothymic approaches the schizophrenic type. Accordingly it is characteristic of the schizothymic that they are oversensitive or without sensitivity, of the cyclothymics that they are hypomanic or depressive. Indeed the schizothymics fluctuate between extremes. They are problematic natures whose inner being in many ways does not correspond with their outward behavior. The cyclothymics are simple, steady folk. According to the temperament of the cyclothymic individual, he is weary or versatile, conservative or extravagant; thus the schizothymic also is stiff or hasty, apathetic or exuberant. There are a series of subclasses: for the schizothymic—the cool, aristocratic dispositions, the cold egoists, the sensitive aesthetes, the irascible and the fanatic; for the cyclothymic—the gay hypomanics who are always stimulated, the quietly contented or those of thick blood. The cyclothymics tend to be realists when they are poets, objectively descriptive empiricists when they are investigators, stolid progressives when they are political leaders, happy-go-lucky organizers or sensible middlemen. The schizothymic as a poet is pathetic, romantic, or aesthetic; as a scientist, precisely log-

ical or metaphysically speculative; as a politician, idealistic and fanatic or despotic and coldly calculating. The typification of Kretschmer can be made serviceable for investigations of heredity and contrariwise it can attempt to substantiate the relation between the symptoms of both types through the investigations of families.<sup>17</sup>

#### 4. *The Psychology of the Unconscious, Especially Psychoanalysis and Individual Psychology*

Neither experimental differential psychology, nor structure<sup>18</sup> psychology, nor expressive psychology regards the mental life of a single individual. For all of them the general organization is of primary importance, whether it be causal or typical in nature. To have moved the mental life of the single individual, on the basis of his individual experiences, into the focus of attention is by all accounts one of the contributions of psychoanalysis, a fact which even so incisive a critic as H. Henning recognizes. The position of psychoanalysis we can further designate in that, in addition to the realm of its own peculiar school, it has won a wider circle of modified adherents. These agree with its basic concepts, when we understand it to refer to the doctrine founded upon experience, that the wish and fear complexes which we do not consciously trust ourselves to separate and which we have suppressed into the unconscious, can manifest themselves in misdeeds (in mis-speaking oneself, in errors in writing) but above all in dreams, by means of which the basic ideas that appear in the dream seem to be masked through translation into symbolic pictures, often to the point of unrecognizability because in their original forms they can not pass the "dream censor." In neurotic

<sup>17</sup> In this direction we ought to mention especially the work of H. Hoffmann, *Inheritance in the Mental Life*, 1922. As related to the problem of inheritance we must here indicate also W. Peters' book, *The Inheritance of Mental Peculiarities and the Psychical Constitution*, 1925.

<sup>18</sup> *Translator's note*: Not to be confused with "structural" psychology in America. As explained in the text above, the term refers rather to the "structure" of the personality.

personalities particularly, these may lead to pathological disturbances, even to organic diseases, which can be relieved through the solution of the suppressed complex by making the unconsciously operating cause conscious. On the other hand, the more moderate adherents tend to deviate from every overdrawn and dogmatic theory. They deviate particularly from the notion that the dream is exclusively derived from suppressed dream-ideas, from the inclination to generalize from pathological to normal cases, and from the commanding position which is assumed in the Freudian system by the *libido*, or the pleasure principle. Indeed Freud himself repeatedly states, even in his newer publications, *e. g.*, in the work, *The I and the It* (1923), that the charge is unjustified, that psychoanalysis does not concern itself with the higher moral values in human beings. To the moral and aesthetic tendencies are directly assigned the rôle of initiating the suppression. But the position of the sexual impulse, the pleasure principle, love in the widest sense, still remains an overpowering one. The egoistic impulse is secondary; even the impulse toward self-preservation is finally subordinate to love. The sublimated, higher impulsive forces are developed out of it; the "ego-ideal" or the "super-ego," as Freud calls it, which rules over the ego as conscience, is comprehended as the "inheritance of the Oedipus-complex" and is led back to its relationship to the father. Briefly, the peculiar life-giving principle is the erotic impulse. Side by side with it Freud more recently puts a second principle, the death impulse, "to which is given the task to lead organic life back into its lifeless condition." But it has been well said that he regards sadism as the representative of this impulse. In contrasting the two classes of impulses, the polarity of love and hate could be introduced, love and the death impulse struggling in the "It" to which, as a part of the suppressed mental content, the dynamic unconscious also belongs. Out of the "It" the con-

scious ego raises itself and the merely latent, merely descriptive unconscious, the "pre-conscious" which on the basis of remnants of recall can become conscious at any time. In spite of all the one-sidedness and boldness of the symbolism and the creation of hypotheses, the conviction always arises that here we are concerned with a deep-seated organization which only slowly reveals itself.

Psychoanalysis has produced an enormous literature, most of it from the international psychoanalytic publishing house at Leipzig, Vienna, and Zürich, and in the international periodical *Imago*. Among the works on medical psychology the *Medical Psychology* of P. Schilder, published in 1924, stands entirely on a psychoanalytical basis. In one of his earliest publications Freud himself has defended analysis by the laity. Neither study nor predisposition can make every physician a talented analyst. Contrariwise medical studies are not necessary requirements for the application of the analytical method.

This very over-emphasis of the erotic through psychoanalysis has led many erstwhile Freudians to go over today to "individual psychology."<sup>19</sup> As the leader among these must be mentioned the Viennese physician A. Adler (*Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*, 1923). The conduct of a personality is to be understood on the basis of the "guiding lines" of its life which it has for the most part unconsciously given itself in earlier youth and by which it allows itself to be led in order to separate itself from its surroundings and to bring itself to fruition on the basis of the life-plan and the style of living that in the first years of childhood it had already almost unalterably built up. Here the "impulse to make good" stands at the focus, not the erotic impulse. More than that, every personality has that erotic impulse which best suits its total individuality. The

<sup>19</sup> *Translator's note*: This must not be confused with the psychology of individual differences. It concerns rather the mental life of the individual personality.



"feelings of being of little account" are the ones that are here suppressed. The girl who feels herself slighted by the boy staves off the "feeling of being of little account" in a "protest against men;" and so every one defends himself who has been handled in a stepmotherly fashion by nature or by his contemporaries, every mutilated, stunted, inwardly injured, neglected, intimidated person whose communal spirit has been disturbed. He establishes himself in many ways, he compensates for the actual or the assumed want, overcompensates for them very often, so that he surpasses those that are normally endowed and developed; or else he tries to make himself count in an anomalous or unsocial way in order that he may win recognition and love, which he demands, in order that he may divert attention to himself, or in order to maintain himself; or, finally, he takes flight in an imaginative life, revels in great plans whose consummation he can and must not attain in order not to disturb the aura which he casts about himself. The suppressed complexes of being of little value are not conscious to the personality; but they motivate its conduct on its own behalf, and for other individuals their behavior is correspondingly modified. In the dream, in erroneous responses, in neurotic diseases they come to the surface. The *milieu* is a deciding factor for individual psychology, the experiences of childhood determine the guiding-lines; the significance of hereditary tendencies and endowments are indeed not denied, but they play a minor rôle as contrasted with the influences of the *milieu* and with the directional power of past experiences. The task of the educator is to develop the endowment of the child, of every child, at the same time trying to understand the child on the basis of its guiding-lines. Noncompulsion in training and training with independence as the goal become, therefore, the cardinal demands of individual psychology. The child with organic deficiencies, the child that is hard to train, the only child, the first born,

the neglected, the supersensitive child are special problems in that field. It is clear that this doctrine makes its appeal to the physician, to the educator and to the criminalist just as it does to the psychologist. Like psychoanalysis the individual psychology of A. Adler has established a school. It has control over organizations which make theoretical and practical contributions to it (in child welfare stations and in consultation hours for parents) and over an extensive literature. The newly published comprehensive symposium, *Handbook of Individual Psychology* (1926) organizes the ideas of the movement in the various fields over which it has extended itself. By way of criticism it must be said primarily that the individual psychology of Adler, no more than the Freudian psychoanalytic psychology, should presume to make the attempt to establish an exhaustive psychology of the mental life; it is much rather—especially in borderline cases—a serviceable but always a one-sided point of view.

By means of an interesting plan for the classification of types, C. G. Jung, who like Freud and Adler started with the experience of a specialist in nervous diseases, has sought to reconstruct psychoanalysis and individual psychology (*The Psychology of the Unconscious Processes*, Zürich, 1917). He distinguishes an extravertive and an introvertive type. The former affectively yields to the object in his environment and suits himself to it; the latter avoids it, withdraws himself from it, and reflects upon it afterwards. The sexual theory of Freud, the psychoanalytic procedure, is a therapeutic method whose application corresponds to the extravertive type; individual psychology is more suited to the introvertive type. C. G. Jung, who introduced also the associative experiment, does not shut his eyes to the defects and limits of the analytic method. He designates the sexual theory as “unaesthetic and intellectual, little satisfying,” the theory of impulse as “decidedly poisonous.”

In the cited publication of Jung, it is the will to power which lies at the basis of the Adler theory; in the more recent development of individual psychology, the impulse to be effective has remained, the feelings of being of little worth have been allowed to become suppressed. These develop, however, above all from a disturbance of the communal feeling. The charge of "poisonousness" does not apply, indeed, to the modern individual psychology, at least not in the same measure. For the rest C. G. Jung emphasizes that one should apply both theories not to exaggerated ideals and to deep convictions which then are led back in a most painful manner to banal realities, but that both are essentially therapeutic instruments out of the equipment of the physician, whose task it is to obviate the dangerous incompatibility with the unconscious.

In his book *Psychological Types*, C. G. Jung relates his principle of classification (extraverts and introverts) in an interesting fashion to the distinction which Friedrich Schiller had made between the poets who write naively and those who write sentimentally.

In connection with this personality psychology of the unconscious, let us make a few remarks in general concerning the investigation and the interpretation of the unconscious mental life. The ideas of the French school at Nancy, which emphasizes with great stress the more positive influence of the unconscious through autosuggestion, have become available to a wider circle of German readers through a series of articles, mostly of a popular nature, concerning Coué's system and through a translation of Baudouin's works. H. Driesch published in 1926 an important book, *Fundamentals of Psychology* with the sub-title, *Its Present Crisis*, which gives a systematic synthesis of the anomalous phenomena of the mental life and the mental levels that belong to it (the normal ego, hypnotic ego, subhypnotic ego, dream ego, etc.). The fundamental idea of Driesch's psy-

chology is in general this: one only can *have* something consciously, one can not *do* something conscious. In particular the processes of thought and will complete themselves unconsciously. Without reference to pathological and anomalous phenomena, A. Drews has treated the normal mental life from the standpoint of the hypothesis of the unconscious in his comprehensive *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 1924, in accordance with the line of thought developed by Edward v. Hartmann in his philosophy of the unconscious.

In a few words we must finally refer here to the position of the so-called metapsychology or parapsychology in Germany. All the way from a clear cut disavowal (H. Henning, *Contemporary Psychology*), all shades of scepticism and critical foresight (M. Dessoir, *From Beyond the Mind*, 1917) to an optimistic approval of the justification of the new field of investigation (T. K. Oesterreich, *The Occult in the Modern World-Picture*, 1921)—all views are represented. Among the protagonists of the recognition of mediumistic phenomena (teleplasm, telekinesis) must be mentioned the nerve-specialist of Munich, Baron v. Schrenck-Notzing. A number of famous scholars have become convinced of the genuineness of the phenomena. On the other hand, the objectors have in no way been silenced. On the whole one can say that official science still regards this field with great reserve. Among those who have insisted on the necessity of breaking ground in the direction of scientific investigation in this field are above all the Tübingen philosopher, Oesterreich, and the well known vitalistic biologist and philosopher, Driesch, who is the present president of the Society for Psychical Research.

### *Comparative Psychology*

The term comparative psychology is used in Germany as a generic name with a very wide denotation, to designate those fields of research which assume the task simply to investigate the peculiarities of the mental life under certain conditions (stage of development, genealogical affiliation, condition of health, community life, field of culture, *etc.*) in comparison with the mental life of the normal adult man which is studied in general psychology. The following tabular survey will probably most easily afford an orientation toward its manifold activities:

#### A. Animal Psychology

#### B. Comparative Psychology of Mankind

##### I. Normal Mental Life

1. Mental Life of the Individual, with special reference to natural affiliations:
  - a. In the direction of age-levels  
(*e. g.*, Child Psychology)
  - b. In the direction of genealogy  
(*e. g.*, the Psychology of Women)
2. Mental Life in a Community, with special reference to social affiliations:
  - a. Simply to a mass, to a calling, to a class
  - b. To a people, a race, a culture-circle

##### II. Abnormal Mental Life

1. Abnormal Functions of Persons Normal in Themselves (dream)
2. Mental Life of Abnormal and Diseased Persons

#### C. Psychology of Particular Functions of the Mental Life (*e. g.*, speech, religion, art)

In 1923 G. Kafka published a three-volume *Handbook of Comparative Psychology* in which, to be sure, the above mentioned fields were classified differently. We have already discussed in previous sections many subjects that could also be included within comparative psychology.

We have yet to call attention particularly to the extensive literature on child psychology. The methods of investigation correspond to the particular school to which the respective psychologist in general belongs. So H. Volkelt reported in an interesting way to the Ninth Psychological Congress in Munich concerning the progress of experimental child psychology. This throughout no longer deserves the criticism that it remains a stranger to the natural mental life of the child. K. Koffka's *The Fundamentals of Mental Growth* is written throughout from the standpoint of the psychology of *Gestalt*. E. Spranger's *Psychology of Youth* has already been discussed in connection with intuitive psychology. Individual psychology is represented by a long series of monographs dealing with the psychology of the child. Of the larger treatises concerned with this subject are still to be mentioned the works of Clara and William Stern and Charlotte and Karl Bühler.<sup>20</sup> The whole psychology of childhood is very strongly influenced by the doctrine of development.

In the field of animal psychology must be mentioned the significant investigations of W. Köhler in connection with apes, which have indicated unmistakable acts of intelligence on the part of animals; furthermore the researches of von Frisch on *The Speech of Bees* (1924). The bees which have found nourishment communicate their manner of satisfaction in the bee-hive through dances which differ with the kind of nourishment. The distinguishing rôle in the

<sup>20</sup> C. and W. Stern, *Monographs concerning the Mental Development of the Child*, 1922; W. Stern, *The Psychology of Early Childhood*, 1923; *The Intelligence of Children and Youth*, 1920; K. Bühler, *The Mental Development of the Child*, 1924; Ch. Bühler, *The Mental Life of Youth, An Analysis and Theory of Psychological Puberty*, 1925.

vehicle of communication seems to be played by smell incidentally distributed.

### *Metaphysical Psychology*

The final philosophical and uncommonly significant metaphysical questions in relation to psychology are:

1. How is the mutual dependence of the mental and bodily processes to be explained: do the series of conscious events and those of neural processes simply run parallel, or are they in a condition of interaction?
2. Is there a real unconsciousness?
3. Does the bodily event correspond only to a sign of the mental or is it by inner necessity a symbolic expression?
4. What is the meaning of the mental life?
5. Can the mental exist by itself, is there a personal immortality?
6. Is the mental life determined, or is there a genuine freedom of the will?

It is not within the scope of this report to discuss these questions in detail. Only a few remarks may be devoted to these border-line issues. Toward the first of them is aimed the question which arises in connection with almost every investigation in experimental psychology: does the observed uniformity of occurrence permit of a physiological explanation or must it be explained psychologically (Weber-Fechner law, scope of consciousness, geometric-optical illusions, spatial perception, *etc.*). The question does not indeed decide the old controversy between parallelism and interactionism, but it can be brought in relation to it. E. Becher of Munich must be mentioned as a representative of a refined doctrine of interactionism (doctrine of double purpose and double effect) according to which the mental as well as the neural event at each temporal moment depends simultaneously upon the preceding mental and neural events,

both of which therefore continuously influence each other. The mind plays the part of leader in the events of the organism and especially of the brain. The residuals of memory are unconscious mental contents. The development of thought in Becher's system is closely allied to that of the psycho-vitalistic Driesch. From the Catholic point of view the relationship of the soul to consciousness and to the body has been set forth by J. Geyser in his book, *The Soul* (1914). As representatives of the parallelistic standpoint are to be mentioned Th. Ziehen, T. Schultz, and Heymans.

A special significance, also of a theoretical sort, attaches to the bearing of the second of the above-mentioned questions upon psychoanalysis. Is the unconscious anything more than a mental phenomenon in the shade? Does it lead a peculiarly real, dynamic existence? Also the question of a super-personal unconscious arises in this connection. A comprehensive discussion of these problems has been developed recently in G. Giese's, *The Extrapersonal Unconscious* (1924). The remaining questions develop discussions that lead too far afield into the realm of pure metaphysics.

### *Summary*

The preceding sketch might easily arouse the impression of a confusing multiplicity of tendencies. A survey, with the exclusion of applied and comparative psychology, is offered in the table on the next page. This tabular survey in itself shows that the chaos is not as bad as it may seem at first glance and as it is occasionally claimed. The various currents and tendencies can very well be justified in part when considered as proceeding side by side. Their methodological differences correspond indeed to fundamentally different problems that have been set up. A point which has perhaps not yet been sufficiently emphasized is the fun-



## Psychological Movements Exclusive of Applied and Comparative Psychology

	1. Experimental Method, (introspection of the observer)	2. Intuitive Method, (empathy, re-living, intuition, natural observation)	3. Objective Procedure (through observa- tion of others)
1. General Psychology (investigation of single psychical contents and processes)	a. Psychology built up out of elements b. Psychology of <i>Gestalt</i>	Phenomenological point of view	a. Psychology of expression b. Psychology of behavior
2. Personality Psychology (systematic character- ization of the total personality)	Differential psychology .	"Structure" point of view, ideal types	Classification into types with reference to bodily-build, physiognomy, handwriting, bodily posture .
3. Explanation of the mental life by means of externalizing the unconscious on the basis of (past) experiences (psychoanalysis, individual psychology)			

damental difference between the mind and its content and processes as an *object*, and observing it as *subject*. In the first case the investigation is directed towards the objective mental life; in each case, towards the clear presentation and systematization of mental realities and their real uniformities according to law, towards the organization of characteristics of outward stimuli in connection with the neural events on the one hand and the psychical phenomena on the other, and towards the interrelationship of the conscious and the unconscious. The vanishing point in the perspective of this objective psychology, which deals with the assumption of the reality of the mental and with the question of the body-mind relationship, lies in a non-valuating metaphysics, in the question concerning the rôle of the mental in the scheme of total reality. This question naturally will no longer lie beyond the pale of the experimental method which is recognized as adequate in its own realm, by which it is assumed that experimental psychology also can justify its own inner principles which correspond to the peculiar nature of the objects of its science, the mental phenomena. In the second of the above-mentioned cases the question is directed toward the subjective mental life, towards the significance of the individual experiences within the limits of the total personality of the experiencing subject. This question involves those of pre-scientific mental and human knowledge. It interests itself in the manifestations of the mental life as an outflow and an expression of the personality. In the first attitude, for example, we are concerned with the ideas and feelings as objects, with the establishment of the integrative characteristics of these mental contents, how they arise and proceed; in the case of the second attitude, to understand their inner nature as experiences and their meaning for the personality which experiences them, to show how the single experience arises out of the total structure and how contrariwise the person-

ality is to be understood in terms of it, and how the personality reflects itself in the experience. This psychology, which as a science should of course likewise aim at systematization, must naturally employ the intuitive method, the observation of structure, and must try to investigate the relationship between the peculiarity of the experience and the peculiarity of the forms of expression, especially of the body. The vanishing point of the perspective of this subjectivistic psychology lies in evaluative metaphysics and in the cultural sciences. The type first described seeks after relationships of reality; subjectivistic psychology, after the integrity of meaning. For the former, therefore, causal observation is of most service; for the latter the observation of end is more important. Inasmuch as the object is intrinsically the same for both, namely the mental event, the various fields naturally overlap and both points of view struggle for priority. But this is no loss. A personality investigation of the future must call into its service methods of the most varied nature: the experimental conception of individual peculiarities, the observation of structure in accordance with a philosophy of life, and a feeling for standards of value; the causal and the purposive categories; the study of inherited dispositions, and the influence of experiences conditioned by the environment; the indices which psychopathology affords, and knowledge of the manner in which the mental life expresses itself in bodily forms and manifestations; psychoanalysis, and the method of observation of individual psychology. But also on behalf of the objectivistic, theoretical, systematic, metaphysical psychology must various tendencies coöperate: the analytical and the *Gestalt* attitude, the investigation of the consciousness and unconsciousness of both the normal and the pathological. This report has endeavored to afford a survey of the way in which the science is at work, in Germany just as it is in the rest of the world, in all of these fields of activity.

The reviewer closes in the hope that the coöperation of the scientists of all lands will lead to the further classification also of the psychological problems.

## HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHODOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

ALBERT GÖRLAND

THE last ten years, which we propose to survey in this paper, have certainly not been favorable as regards furnishing steady nourishment for the growth of the historiography of philosophy in Germany. That we can here report really notable contributions in this field speaks well for the spirit of the German people. There are two reasons why the break caused in our life by the war has not been felt more severely. The more peaceful times that followed did not have to return to successful traditions of pre-war times, for the coming of the war coincided with a stage in the historiography of philosophy that harbored matured principles and invited the initiation of a new phase of development. One reason for this state of affairs lies in the fact that the generation that had brought the writing of the history of philosophy to a culmination during the second half of the nineteenth century had either passed away or was devoting itself, in its old age, to original thought. Men like Trendelenburg, Brandis, Prantl, Zeller, Kuno Fischer and Ueberweg come to one's mind as representing the beginning of the past generation, while the works of Cohen, Windelband and Natorp characterize its end. The new generation, of which we are to report here, is linked with the old in the person of Cassirer, who is at the same time also the leader of the new. His influence extends over all

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Hans Kurath and Edward L. Schaub.

the active forces in the historiography of philosophy on account of the immense scope of his knowledge and his refined aesthetic sense. The other reason for the condition referred to is connected with the intensified interest in the methodology of historiography and its peculiar problems. I refer the reader to the excellent paper by Julius Stenzel on *Zum Problem der Philosophiegeschichte* (*Kant-Studien*, 1921, pp. 416-453), and the article by Hans Hess concerning *Epochen und Typen der philosophischen Historiographie* (*Kant-Studien*, 1923, pp. 340-363) where this idea is advanced.

Let us turn to the *studies* in the history of philosophy before taking up the *problem* of a history of philosophy. We do not propose to give an exhaustive catalogue of all the literature that has appeared in recent years. We only wish to call attention to some of the recent publications from which we ourselves have drawn information and inspiration.

First we must mention the new printing of the second edition of a work of pre-war times which is as yet unexcelled in certain respects, the *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, which appeared as part of *Kultur der Gegenwart* (Teubner, Leipzig). The section dealing with modern philosophy is by Windelband. It is a masterpiece of refined diction and artistic sense, plastically presenting the various minds, each in its own peculiar cast. We do not fail to see the dangers that lurk in the virtuosity of this type of historiography. We are apt to admire the large bold lines while the problems discussed evade our attention and fail to take root in us. Windelband's contribution thus makes enjoyable reading but it does not show clearly how inexhaustible the problems of the history of philosophy are. The patristic and Christian philosophy is treated by Baeumker, the philosophy of Islam and the Jews, by Goldziher. Both were abreast of their times in their respective

fields. Baeumker's work is still important because of the wealth of his knowledge and his exact formulations. In Hans von Arnim's treatment of the history of European antiquity I consider his discussion of the Stoics the best. As the critical study of the sources in this field has still not arrived at definite conclusions, even the most recent treatises on the Stoics are heavily indebted to Arnim's work.

Starting with this comprehensive history of philosophy one comes to realize that the work of the new generation must measure up to a very high standard if it is to compete with that of the older. A large collective work on the history of philosophy is now being published by de Gruyter & Co., Berlin. I have before me Hönigswald's *Die Philosophie von der Renaissance bis Kant* (Vol. VI of this series, 300 pages), Bauch's *Immanuel Kant* (Vol. VII, 3rd ed., 482 pages), Nicolai Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, 1. Teil: *Fichte, Schelling und die Romantik* (Vol. VIII, 282 pages). Hönigswald's book is a history of the problems of philosophy; it is designed to reveal in the constant flux of the historical forms of philosophic thought "the intrinsic connection between objective motives." To be sure, "the presentation is interspersed with references of a biographical nature and allusions to the times" in order to do justice to individual philosophemes. It is in the very nature of philosophy, as Hönigswald says, "that its history must be approached again and again," to which one should add that each new approach should be made with increased vigor and improved strategy. Anyone who has mastered Cassirer's books on the problems of epistemology will not refer to Hönigswald's book; but his book will be welcome to those who are in need of a simpler statement of approximately the same problems.

Bauch's Kant is a book of different dimensions. It has as predecessors the classic book of Cohen and innumerable

other attempts at an "interpretation of Kant." There is, for example, Cassirer's work representing the last volume of the Marburg edition of Kant's works. This volume excels through the usual energy of the author in carrying a striking and illuminating idea through a maze of historical facts—in this case, the idea that the work of a genius must be comprehended from the point of view of his life. At the present time a book on Kant must have a novel viewpoint if it is to receive attention. Bauch finds a new basis for constructive procedure in the consciousness to which Kant had attained in his *Kritik der Urteilkraft* regarding the systematic character of the critical philosophy as a whole. From this basis Bauch attempts to understand Kant's system in its entirety. The "problem of experience" is thus relieved of the burden imposed on it by reason of its having been generated by the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* which centered upon the peculiar character of mathematical science. Because of the problems set by the faculty of judgment the merely theoretic scope of experience had to be expanded to include the teleological structure of biological experience, inasmuch as "nature" must be "the totality of all objects of experience." And thus Bauch finds the transition to the *praktische Vernunft*. For, firstly, theoretic teleology is only an aspect of teleology in general; and secondly, the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is regarded by Bauch under the "aspect of value, validity, norm." To the latter it remains subordinated down to its very culmination in the teleological "idea of systematic unity." Thus it appears that the scope of the theoretic is included in that of the practical; and that the primacy of the practical asserts itself. Bauch's path indicates that he is a follower of the Kantians of the Windelband—Rickert school and insofar we depart from him. We see in his generalization of the concept of values but another sort of one-sidedness, a criticism which he urges against the Marburg school of



Kantian interpretation in connection with their separation of pure reason from practical reason. The idea of values is, in his interpretation, carried so far as to lose all its significance. In an account of Kant's system, if anywhere, the distinct significance of the idea of values ranging between price and dignity must be scrupulously observed, otherwise one imports into Kant a mode of thought entirely foreign to him. How the clearness of the Kantian system suffers through the use of a generalized concept of values appears clearly in Bauch's attempt to subsume various significant realms of value under one head, namely, those of ethics, religion, law, and the State, so that "practical philosophy" is differentiated into ethics, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of law and of the State. Here Kant's highly important philosophy of history is practically overlooked. Indeed, in the appendix to the third edition, Bauch even justifies the omission by claiming that Kant's philosophy of history has no importance for his philosophic system as such. We are of a different opinion. In Bauch's procedure, then, branches are joined together that are independent in their worth. To treat the philosophy of religion as a chapter of practical philosophy does violence to its place within the system of thought, even though Kant himself treated it thus; for Bauch emphasizes repeatedly that "this book on Kant is intended to be historical, to be sure, but wholly in the interest of critical idealism" inasmuch as it aims to smooth the way "to philosophy itself, by pointing out the shortcomings and the weaknesses of the Kantian philosophy." We can not enter upon a detailed criticism of Bauch's book. Our evaluation of it may be summarized as follows: The selection of the *Kritik der Urteilstkraft* as the point of departure for systematic construction was a happy thought. As a result many things are seen in a new light, as, for instance, the relation of the concept of the *Ding-an-sich* to the "particular object." But Bauch's gen-

eralized idea of values betrays him into a closed system of too simple a structure. On the other hand, Bauch has such an intimate knowledge of Kant's ideas that even where we must reject his not always dignified polemic and where we object to his one-sidedness we find his book suggestive and provocative of new thought. So one may assert that Bauch's work must be reckoned as an important contribution to the vast literature on Kant.

Vorländer's *Immanuel Kant, der Mann und das Werk* (2 vol., Leipzig, Felix Meiner) is of a different nature. This author had the intention of filling a serious gap by giving the German people a comprehensive, scientific, and yet easily readable, story of Kant's life, showing how Kant's work grew out of his life and his personality and the background of his times. Kant's life is told in great detail and in the objective fashion characteristic of Vorländer. His description of Kant's philosophy in its three branches is not intended to be a contribution to philosophy; it is purposely limited to a presentation of the fundamental motives in simple form. The reader's interest is again and again aroused by significant anecdotes and terse, striking statements. The beginning of the second volume is devoted to Kant, the man, at the height of his intellectual powers, while the larger part of it deals with "the aged Kant." The chapters on Kant's conflict with the government regarding his treatise on religion and on Kant as a *Politiker der Freiheit* are written with delightful sympathy (at this point so utterly lacking in Bauch's book) and are especially well done. The chapter concerning the significant and but slightly known *Opus Postumum*, soon to be published by de Gruyter & Co., aims to give some idea of its importance and its fate. The last stage of the latter, one may hope, is Adickes' prodigy of scholarship relating to this as yet unpublished manuscript of Kant's. Incidentally I may state that Vorländer is mistaken when he con-

siders himself the first to point out "that idealism as a method is most emphatically retained precisely in this posthumous work." In my *Aristoteles und Kant*, reviewed by Cassirer in the *Kant-Studien*, this point is brought out in detail. Vorländer's two volumes contain two good contemporary pictures of Kant. All in all, they represent a very thorough popular treatise, as well as a scientific contribution of the first rank to Kant biography.

Before taking up Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, we shall consider another book on the same subject. Kroner published through Mohr, Tübingen, a work of two volumes entitled *Von Kant bis Hegel* (Vol. I, 612 pages, in 1921; Vol. II, 526 pages, in 1924). Kroner attempts to show the unity of this entire development. His work is characterized by his slogans: "To understand Kant is to go beyond him" and "To understand Hegel is to see that one can in no way get beyond him; if there is to be a post-Hegelian philosophy, a new start must be made." He is especially concerned to interpret the Hegelian system; and as this can best be done by following the path taken by German Idealism, Kroner begins with Kant. For the same reason he slights the rationalistic in favor of the anti-rationalistic aspect of the Dialectic, "even at the risk of bringing about new misunderstandings through this sort of emphasis." So it is but natural that Kant becomes a mere mile-stone in the history of philosophic problems, the study of which opens a scientific gateway to the problems of metaphysics. For in Hegel's philosophy the intentions of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling find their fullest realization. If we are to understand Hegel by following Kroner, we must accept the view that we can not get beyond him. To essay a new beginning, not to mention a new development with Kant as a starting-point, lies outside both the intention and the hope of Kroner. Hegel must then be our guide in sounding the depths through

which our own present is to be interpreted, for there is a *philosophia perennis* according to Hegel, and, says the author, "in this respect I agree with him."

One easily understands that Bauch's and Kroner's works on Kant have no essential traits in common, unless it be the methodic and systematic utilization of the primacy of the will. While Bauch's book is the work of a Kantian, Kroner gives a fundamentally wrong view of Kant's place in the history of philosophic problems. He plays the glaring searchlight of the Hegelian mind on Kant's field of ideas and as a result his picture is full of high lights and shadows, totally unlike the real Kant.

But in spite of all this I must confess that no other book has of late so powerfully impelled me to reflection. By its stimulating and skillful employment of antitheses it has forced me to a conceptual opposition even more than have outright philosophical opponents. The work is least of all suitable as a text. It is rather a book of confessions by an Hegelian desirous of settling the doctrinal conflicts of the present through the power of his philosophical master. I regret that I can do no more within the scope of this article than simply set my views over against those of Kroner. Although I am sure that the philosophy of the Marburg school to which I adhere can never lead to Hegelianism, I feel it my duty to recognize Kroner's book as a significant indication of the speculative tendencies of the time. I shall therefore briefly portray Kroner's attitude toward Kant.

Kroner says that Kant was the first to introduce into logic the concept of self-reflection; that he substituted for the philosophy of ideas represented by Plato and Aristotle the philosophy of the self; that he made the self the creator of the causal order of the universe. Was it this that made Kant the critic of Hume and the disciple of Newton? Kroner's view is disclosed in his statements that Kant's ideal-

ism was essentially ethical and religious, being derived from the same source as the mysticism of Eckhart, the piety of Luther, and even the mysticism of Boehme; that he places the individual self in every respect above the objective order of things, the individual soul above the visible church, the person above the State, conscience above science; that in his philosophy the spirit for the first time triumphs over perception and understanding, the will over ideas, action over being, the practical reason over theoretic reason. Does, then, the historian Kroner attach no value at all to the self-reflection of the *thinker* as such?

In his critical observations, appended to the discussions of all the philosophers except Hegel, Kroner contends that Kant treated the *a posteriori* as absolutely opposed to the *a priori*, as separated from the latter by an unspanned gulf. When he further contends that the Kantian forms fulfill their function by impressing their *a priori* nature on matter and thus transforming the *a posteriori* into something *a priori*, Kant's short-comings indeed blaze forth. Kroner presents us also with the only possible remedy: "Consciousness resolves the antithesis between itself and its object through its own activity." At this point no comparison is possible between Kroner as the advocate of post-Kantian idealism and the critical philosopher of the Marburger school. "Absolute consciousness" and all absolute concepts are conceptual perversions of correlations or members of correlations. "Objectivity" cannot be annulled by "consciousness." It must be regarded as a *correlative category*. It must not merely be retained in its correlativity with laws but it must also be given a part in the correlative-categorical determination of the unity of experience. There is a *principium rationis sufficientis*, but there is also a *principium individuationis*. One is not absorbed in the other, but serves rather to determine its significance by functioning in reciprocity with it as a factor of correlation. To seek

a deeper basis for this correlativity in an "absolute consciousness" or "ego" may indeed afford delight to the metaphysician. For the criticist, however, these are pretentious but empty words. He is concerned with the unity of a system of correlations, i. e., the unity of experience, and not with dependence upon an "absolute." Maimon's concept of "complete determination," and with it annulment of objectivity, by an "infinite reason," and the further development of this thought by Fichte and Hegel are speculative attempts that are indeed imposing but that fail to reach their goal. The procedure of scientific experimentation and that of an "axiomatics" seeking bases through deductive and reductive reasoning are alike dominated by a demand for totality; they are not reducible but are polar correlatives. Hermann Cohen says that the individual is the most difficult problem of logic; Kroner, the Hegelian, that it can be completely absorbed by the "ego." Problems like that of the so-called constants of nature, or of the requirement for the translation in terms of one another of different systems of interpretation of one and the same fact are of such a nature that no help can be found in an appeal to an "infinite understanding" with *its* powers of complete determination. Kroner follows Hegel also in not seeking close contacts with "empirical" science but in holding himself aloof. And this explains many things in his book, among others his attitude to the Marburg school. Kroner says: The study and interpretation of Kant during the nineteenth century was as yet too much under the influence of a materialistic age to see the unity of Kant and the philosophers following him. The natural sciences were so dominant and their methods seemed so authoritative for all the sciences that the interpretation of Kant's philosophy fell a victim to their overpowering influence. The critical theory of knowledge was turned into a handmaid of the natural sciences, designed to safeguard their existence. The

Marburg school, too, did not entirely escape the danger of regarding the reasoning of the transcendental logic in the light of the mathematical natural sciences. It is not to be denied that all these elements are to be found in Kant; or even that his personal attitudes may perhaps at times have been similar to that of his interpreters. Yet the "real essence," the "deepest significance" of his philosophy is lost in the type of interpretation characteristic of the nineteenth century.

Such statements must not be made by a historian. Otherwise he risks losing his reputation even if his critics allow him considerable latitude because of his interest in the history of philosophical problems. The "philosopher in himself" is but a poor creature; philosophy will be respected as part of the work of the human spirit only insofar as it respects the work of the sciences, not that of the natural sciences alone, to be sure, and yet not excluding this. All thought, philosophy not excepted, has but *one* problem: to achieve the unity of experience. According to Kant's immortal formulation of the question, this problem is set for philosophy by the multiplicity of the specific sciences. This requires a close linking of the efforts of all. This multiplicity compels philosophy to inquire into the conditions of its unity and thus of the unity of the multiplicity of experience itself. And so the philosophy of today may rejoice over the wealth of problems presented to it because of the powerful originality of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian mathematics and natural science. This insight the Marburg school, which has its origin in the philosophy of Kant, will continue to maintain; thus will it fulfill the "true mission" of philosophy at the present time.

In conclusion, let us turn to a brief consideration of Kroner's treatment of Hegel, which forms the culmination of his volume. The slight attention given to the so-called romantic philosophy as it appears in Herder's *Ideen*, in

Schleiermacher's *Monologen* and in several of his later academic addresses, for instance in *Über den Begriff des grossen Mannes*, seems to me a defect. These writings give expression to an idea which furnished the vague "aesthetic idealism" with its central principle of method: the idea of the *Lebensstil*. In it is to be found the indestructible energy of the experience of self and Herder's conception of "happiness"; from it, and not from religious experience, sprang the pantheistic conception of totality. The decisive feature in Kroner's interpretation of Hegel is his section on *Grundzüge der Philosophie des Geistes*. Here the aim is to apply the results obtained in the introductory portion of the book to the main problems, and thus to furnish an introduction to Hegel's philosophy. The section is divided into three parts, dealing, respectively, with Hegel's relation to Kant's critique of reason and Fichte's critique of science, with Hegel's most characteristic work, his *Logik*, and with the methodical role of contradiction as the central problem connected with dialectic procedure.

The nucleus of Kroner's interpretation of Hegel may be indicated by reference to the following contention: The logical-metaphysical root of the identity of the mind that manifests itself in art and religion becomes evident only if the All exhibits itself in logic not only as the All but likewise as a Self inclusive of all determinations, if the Logos is understood not merely as a work of art but also as a creative personality which comprehends itself in the wealth of its thoughts.

The discussion of the dialectic process is naturally introduced by a discussion of identity. Identity is regarded under the form of  $A=A$ , and it is shown that the principle of identity involves that of contradiction. For in  $A=A$ ,  $A$  identifies itself with itself. In this process  $A$  first differentiates itself from itself and then annuls this differentiation. This is the dialectics of the *principium identitatis*



*indiscernibilium*; but here, in contrast with the thought of Leibniz, it is turned into a principle of (speculative) logic. Unfortunately, I can not enter into a discussion of this matter, but the reader may be referred to Cohen's criticism in his *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*.

Kroner distinguishes between empirical and speculative contradiction. The former finds application, for instance, in the sciences; the latter, in the philosophy of mind. For in the sciences, including mathematics, cognition is not self-knowledge aware of itself as such; it thinks contents only as contents; it expresses itself in principles without positing itself in antithesis thereto, that is, without contradicting itself. In the realm of the sciences (that is, empirically) the principle of contradiction has significance only as a prohibition, not as a command. In its speculative use, on the contrary, the "principle of contradiction" signifies a "principle for the avoidance of a (mere) freedom from contradiction." Here lies the weakness of the Hegelian dialectics. Each sphere of thought requires the principle of contradiction as a principle of destruction; Hegel himself is a master in such destroying judgments, and not least so in his logic. The homogeneity of any sphere of thought must be secured by some principle, and that principle is the Aristotelian principle of apophasis. All else that is represented as contradiction is enantiosis; the one is "rejection," the latter, "opposition," *contrast*. Why does not Hegel formulate his central dialectic principle as the "principle of contrast" rather than as the "principle of contradiction?" The principle of contrast is creative, especially in the sciences (that is, in the empirical realm). I would refer to the genesis of non-Euclidean geometry. The problems relating to contradiction and contrast are very complicated, much more so than they appear in Kroner. Here, too, the limits of space preclude further discussion. In concluding my discussion of Kroner's book, I would repeat

that it has greatly fascinated me. In spite of its bold one-sidedness it is a notable contribution, and it will certainly have a deep influence upon our times.

If we now turn to Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, we find a work of calm historical investigation. One is strongly impressed by the wide difference in intention between this and Kroner's work when Hartmann states it is not his purpose to enter upon the grandiose one-sidedness of the point of view of the great masters but rather the multiplicity of the problems they discuss and the power of their penetration. From this it appears that Hartmann does not write in defense of any one philosopher or group of philosophers but aims to exhibit the immanent movement of philosophic thought expressed in the writings of the post-Kantian period. Hartmann is clearly conscious of his contrast with Kroner. He refers to the latter's first volume as a pioneer work in method, which for the first time presents a dialectically thorough analysis of the problems of the early Fichte and Schelling, and is based entirely on a fresh investigation of the materials. It must certainly be unpleasant for Hartmann to present his conception of Hegel so shortly after Kroner's *legerdemain* (the present volume is concerned only with Fichte, Schelling and Romanticism; Part II, Hegel, has not yet appeared). But considering his penetrating mind, Hartmann will certainly produce a very valuable book on Hegel. We hope that it will disclose those formative influences on Hegel that are too much neglected by Kroner because of his decided slant: namely, the systems of Aristotle and Spinoza. Kroner, in his second volume, praises Hartmann's book for the emphasis it gives to Romanticism in this period of German philosophy. But despite this more thorough presentation in Hartmann's book, I, here too, as in the case of Kroner's treatment, find grounds for dissatisfaction. Hartmann, as well as Kroner, fails to

grasp the essence of Schleiermacher's philosophic significance in this speculative period and in the history of philosophic systematization as well. Schleiermacher understands, with all the one-sidedness of the genius, the "idioma," the problem of the *Lebensstil*, and that of the unique "personality." Up to his time aesthetics as a philosophic discipline had dealt only with the genius of the artist, in contrast with whom all others were merely receptive lovers of art. The Romanticists, beginning with Herder, treat personality (the moral ego is called "person") as a principle of creative activity and a subject for systematic philosophy. To deal satisfactorily with it the earlier methodology of aesthetics is too narrow. (I may here refer, for example, to my own work, *Die Idee der Glückseligkeit* in the Natorp *Festschrift*, published by de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.) But, as already stated, this criticism is not leveled specifically at Hartmann's book. It is a very useful handbook because of its plastic delineation and the objective poise of its thought.

Let us now turn to the co-operative work edited by Dessoir under the general title of *Lehrbuch der Philosophie* (Ullstein, Berlin, 1925). This work falls into two parts, one dealing with the separate branches of philosophy, the other with the history of philosophy. We are concerned only with the latter, *Die Geschichte der Philosophie* (645 pages), in which Cassirer treats Greek philosophy down to and including Plato; Ernst Hoffmann, Aristotle and late antiquity; Geyser, medieval philosophy; von Aster, modern philosophy, while the late Frischeisen-Köhler offers an outline of the philosophy of the present. According to Dessoir's preface, the book aims to give the "essentials of what can be taught and learned in philosophy." The leading idea was "to limit the treatment to the established facts" and "to sacrifice all non-essentials in order that the important points might stand out with the utmost

clearness." It was the intention to establish a vital connection with the systematic portion of the work. Thus this history of philosophy was designed to be an "introduction to philosophy." It is its task to show "how metaphysical thought unfolds in controversy and exercises a decisive influence on philosophic thought even today." Cassirer tends to emphasize this "unfolding," whereas Hoffmann, extremely cautious, lays more stress on the "established results"; Geyser and von Aster lean toward the usual type of the cursory manual; Frischeisen-Köhler realizes that he is on the threshold of history and living speculation where the task of the historian becomes illusory.

Cassirer sets himself the most fascinating task. Incidentally, his treatment seems like a protest against Kroner's removal of Greek philosophy far from the present—the result of his claim that the philosophy of the *ego* begins with Kant. Kroner says, for example: "In the Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics, logical self-analysis and knowledge of the objective world are confused. There is no recognition that the two are distinct; reflection on self and knowledge of being are not distinguished. The relation between logico-ontological essences and sensuous objects must on this basis remain an insoluble problem. For the metaphysics of the ontological *ideai* and *eide*, the two spheres dissolve into each other. Greek thought failed to reach an abstract and pure conception of the logical." In contrast with this view, Cassirer, disregarding all that is irrelevant to his purpose, treats the history of Greek philosophy precisely as the "history of the self-discovery of the logos" on which is based in all clarity philosophy's self-consciousness of its nature as pure knowledge. It is not possible here to follow out Cassirer's splendid line of argument. But for the sake of setting it off against Kroner's conception we quote two sentences from his discussion of Plato: "Not how objects are possible in space and time or

how they have come into being is Plato's problem, but from what sources we derive our knowledge, our understanding of these objects." "The ideas are not simply data of consciousness, creations of our ego; the situation is rather the reverse, for our true ego can only be conceived, can only be constructed, on the basis of these ideas."

Hoffmann's *Aristoteles* unfortunately does not continue this direction of thought. His lines are all clear, sharp, exact. For this reason his exposition does not really develop problems, as does that of Cassirer with its dramatic verve. I realize that Aristotle is a philosopher of a different type from Plato. Yet, he, too, is part of the philosophic drama of the Greek mind, and the history of the problems of the *philosophia perennis* must remove him from his rationalistic, sharp lines into the dimmer light of the motive forces of the human spirit. To mention but a single point in this connection, I would call attention to the fact that the constructive-dialectic intent of the principles of contradiction, opposition and excluded middle, which furnish our metaphysical conclusions with their dialectic justification, lead directly by way of scholasticism to Hegel. Hoffmann's chapter on Aristotle's criticism of Plato's doctrine of ideas is likewise very illuminating. Hoffmann has also published a remarkably solid and exemplarily careful, scientific outline of *Die griechische Philosophie bis Platon* in the valuable Teubner series *Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*.

I would refer further to three additional works recently published on ancient philosophy. All of them, though for different reasons, are important publications. Joel's great *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*, Volume I, carries the account through Socrates. This book, which is part of the series including Kroner's volume, is a simply astounding piece of work. The material, which is thoroughly elaborated in the light of the results of other historical scholars, is presented in a remarkably fine style. Philosophy is rep-

resented as the flower of the mind that grows out of the total life of the age. Economic, political and cultural life furnish the conditions that receive their homogeneous, cosmic form in philosophy. From this point of view, time and temporal life, together with philosophy, are seen as an infinitely active and significant whole. Joel has a style that enables him to make the deepest thoughts and the most sublime speculations appear as the natural issue of events strikingly real and intimately connected with life. Were I asked to name a book that would arouse in the highest degree a sense of the value of philosophy for our times and our civilization—I am thinking of the modern man of general culture, not versed in technical philosophy—I could think of none better than that of Joel. It at all points seeks analogies to our own times; in illustration, I mention only the brilliant reference to the kinship between Heraclitus' and Robert Mayer's mentalities.

The other two books above referred to are *Die Philosophie des Aristoteles als Naturerklärung und Weltanschauung*, by Rolfes (Meiner, Leipzig, 1923; 380 pages), and *Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland*, by Petersen (Meiner, Leipzig, 1921; 542 pages). Rolfes, long esteemed as a translator and interpreter of Aristotle, characterizes his book, as well as himself, by saying in his preface that he seeks not indeed tacitly to assume the truth of the Aristotelian teachings but primarily to confirm it. "The philosophy of Aristotle is historically the philosophy of educated mankind; if it is at fault, the basis of all science is still to be sought, and this without the hope of finding it. The Aristotelian system is the unshifting basis of all sound speculation." Aristotle's logic, ethics and politics are not treated, but reference is made by Rolfes to the notes in his various translations. This book discusses only the Aristotelian philosophy of nature and metaphysics, which bear close relations with each

other. In direct connection with the freely quoted Aristotelian text it presents Aristotle's doctrines of knowledge, nature and God, together with the numerous proofs for the existence of God and his attributes.

Petersen's *Habilitationsschrift* is a work of earnest scholarship on a new subject. It for the first time gathers all the material relating to the influence of Aristotle on Protestant Germany. For this reason it is of extraordinary value. On reading it one is impressed by the fact that for constructive and critical power Protestantism can in no way compare with Catholicism. As regards his bearing upon the religious (or, better, the ecclesiastical) interest, Aristotle was fully exhausted by Catholicism. So Protestantism could not compete with the tremendous achievements of Scholasticism. It had sprung from different sources. But this is in no wise derogatory to the task which Petersen very fortunately set himself, and which at some time called for attack.

Let us now turn briefly to the current methodology of the history of philosophy. Here I shall refrain from expressions of personal views, even by way of criticism, and shall simply report. In volume one (pp. 17ff.) of the work above discussed, Kroner distinguishes three types of historiographic methods in the field of philosophy. One proceeds from the standpoint of cultural development, as does Joel in the book reviewed above; another is biographic, as is Cassirer's *Kants Leben und Lehre* (Vol. XI of Bruno Cassirer's edition of Kant); and the third is systematic, combining historical and critical aims, as does Kroner. The systematic method, which today doubtless enjoys the preference, is sometimes referred to as the history of problems. It permits of two procedures. One may subsume the multiplicity of problems under several general problems and then, having determined which of these is dominant in a certain period, select it for historical treatment. This is the

method pursued by Windelband in his *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Mohr, Tübingen, 11th ed., 1924, prepared by Rothacker). Windelband divides Greek philosophy into three periods: the cosmological, the anthropological, and the systematic; and the Hellenistic-Roman philosophy into the ethical and the religious periods. Kroner, from his point of view, remarks concerning this method: "The substantial advantages in thus viewing and organizing the problems is not to be underestimated. But the development of German Idealism offers no real opportunity for this sort of grouping. In the section which he devotes to it, Windelband adopts a three-fold division: the *Ding-an-sich*, the system of reason, and the metaphysics of the irrational. But in fact the problem of the *Ding-an-sich* can not be sundered from that of the system of reason. Hence the particular head under which the ideas of Fichte, for example, are brought, must be arbitrarily determined. Through such separations the systematic nucleus of problems is obscured rather than clarified. Nor is any other division of the subject-matter—into theoretical and practical philosophy, for example, or the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of mind—tenable. For the relation between these groups of problems undergoes changes in the course of development, and it is precisely the nature of these changes that constitutes the essential feature of the development." For this reason, Kroner concludes that the second method, namely, the chronological unfolding of the whole set of problems, including their entanglements and their disentanglements, is the only practical one for the particular period of his study.

After these methodological remarks of Kroner, written largely *pro domo*, we must in conclusion consider a study of Stenzel's devoted solely for its own sake to the methodology of the historiography of philosophy. Stenzel's central question is: What is the relation of philosophy



to the history of philosophy? He approaches it from two extreme positions: (1) Philosophy bears the same relation to its history as the special sciences bear to theirs. But can philosophy dispense with its history as can, for instance, mathematics? (2) Philosophy is not an exact science, but a view of the world (*Weltanschauung*). The history of philosophy would then be merely a description of existing philosophemes. But the phenomenon of manifoldness must be rendered intelligible by reference to the concept of truth and science as found in philosophy. Philosophy thus has problems connected with the specific approaches of the various sciences to empirical facts; also with extra-scientific subjects, namely, morality, art and religion; and, lastly, in general with the consciousness that is aware of an outer world.

Scientific history of philosophy begins with Hegel. He harmonizes the historical and the systematic interests. Philosophy becomes historical and vice versa; the development of philosophy (and culture) is the unfolding of the objective mind. In this there is danger of arbitrary construction, of "metaphysical teleology." Philosophy must exhibit the individual, unique, concrete facts of history. Windelband, to be sure, recognizes that his task has two aspects, the philosophic and the historical, but he takes up only the one, namely the history of problems. Cohen is the first to realize the weight of the question: namely, the "actual significance" (*tatsächlichen Sinn*) of a fact of the past. The historical itself becomes a direct problem. Even in history philosophic content does not lie at hand, needing simply to be read off. It comes into being only through the relations into which individual data are put. "This hitherto disregarded and seemingly insignificant fact is of the greatest importance!" The individual datum must be considered as an element with significant interrelations. By virtue of his philosophic method the observer

(that is, the historian) discerns a new meaning in this or that series of motives of a philosopher.

Is it admissible to base historical investigation on a particular philosophical system? Or is there such a thing as "pure" historio-philological history of philosophy? All history is interpretation, and one must be "free" in one's interpretation if one is to be "faithful." Interpretation is possible only when there is an anticipated sense of the whole (cf. Schleiermacher's "anticipation of the whole"). Without a system of one's own, one must rely, in the study of a philosopher, upon the problematic power of intuition or empathy. He who lacks a system is subject to a merely empirical time-consciousness.

The history of special problems is of the greatest importance for the history of philosophy. For systematic clearness regarding the place of these problems in the whole of philosophy, and in their nexus with other problems, alone exhibits their ramifications and obscurity, and reveals the role of the philosopher in the evolution of truth. The concern with the history of problems is therefore a prerequisite for research in the history of philosophy, and represents its earliest form. The history of philosophical problems must never lose sight of fundamental historical requirements. It must assume stages that appear in individuals or periods. It aims to establish connections between philosophers, even though not describing the individual systems as such. But the movements immanent within thought at all times have an historical index. And therefore, attention to the history of problems is one of the coördinates of historical writing in philosophy.

But what is the criterion of historical truth? And to what extent were the various philosophers whose ideas are treated in the history of problems conscious of the latter? Our procedure here must be to determine whether the consequences that the problem has for us can be reconciled

with the utterances of the philosophers in question. One must always try to grasp the earlier consciousness as a system free from contradictions, as an immanent, concrete, unique complex. The significance of the history of philosophy stands or falls with the idea that the problems in some way always form a totality; that one problem or another of this totality presses forth into conscious attention, but is determined to some extent, and shaped, under the influence of those not consciously present. In part still retaining their original connections, the problems emerge, obstruct and illuminate one another. An infinite number of connections result, all of which, however, must be referred to a general system if they are to enter into consciousness and be at all understood. This view of the systems of thought is individual as regards the arrangement and the selection of the problems, but its underlying idea of the oneness and the wholeness of mind has universal validity. It opens up the inexhaustible task of understanding systematic possibilities as such.

Complementary to an account of the development of problems is the history of the systems of philosophy. This discloses the degree of consciousness to which any specific problem attains in the case of any one philosopher. The aim of a history of philosophy that aspires to historical concreteness is thus two-fold, namely, historical and philosophical. First, it is through the history of the problems, which is a *conditio sine qua non*, that the history of *philosophy* is delimited within the general field of history; second, it is through its application to historical individualities that the *history* of philosophy becomes historically defined. The individual whole in its specific consciousness must be fixated within the flux of the history of problems. The two approaches, namely the history of problems and the history of systems, mutually condition each other. The former accepts historically fixed stages whereas the latter

presupposes connections that link the present formulations of problems with those of the past. Both approaches are based on the system involved in the inquiry as to what questions may rationally be raised, that is, in the search to ascertain the scope and the content of what can intelligently be investigated. They are thus based on the same conception of system that must be attributed to every true philosopher of the past, if we are to understand the whole of his conscious mental life as a totality.

The study of the history of philosophy has its value, not in affording comparisons with current doctrines, but in disclosing systems which exhibit in their own peculiar illuminations and shadings the problems that likewise stir our minds and which thus clarify and enrich our problems. The wealth of the thought of the past is at the basis of our own thought. If we grasp the former we also comprehend the latter, and vice versa. Hence the task of the history of philosophy is unending. Every age must translate the past into its own language, and so the old text is ever read afresh. But, on the other hand, a certain age may lack the key to a certain philosophy of the past. The close connection between philosophy and its history does not indicate a systemless relativism. It rather serves to overcome the temporal limitations to which the point of view of every age is subject; and thus philosophy is spared the necessity of perpetually starting anew.

Let us conclude with an assertion which, in view of the subject we are discussing, may seem strongly paradoxical: the ability to forget is an indispensable condition for the maintenance of the energy of life. It is, of course, true that life never really discards anything. Forgetting is merely a technique of memory in the regulation of life. It is the wonderful process of removing that which thought has achieved; through it the rigidity of present experiences is resolved into the rich flux out of which creative thought

ever rises anew. Just as the essential content of "what was" reverts from its individual existence into the depth whence all its powers are derived (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), so the mind, in forgetting, removes its eternal content from the accidental conditions of the present in order to justify life eternally in the face of the present. It is the passing that cradles the future; the present has only the hardness of the accidental.



CONTEMPORARY  
RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY





## CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

S. FRANK

TO give to a non-Russian reader an approximate idea of the meaning and content of recent Russian philosophy it is necessary to characterize the position of Russian philosophy in the nineteenth century. This position is determined by two historical conditions of a general nature: on the one hand, by the originality and the creative individuality of the Russian mental disposition, of the general tendencies and motives of the Russian mind; and, on the other hand, by the weakness of Russian science, its late development, and its dependence on the research of Western Europe.

Consider the large number of original and, in part at least, indisputably eminent thinkers which the Russian literature of the nineteenth century discloses—for instance, the leading spirits of the so-called “Slavophil” movement, Ivan Kireyevski and Alexi Chomyakov, or the most important representatives of the opposing “Western” direction, Chaadayev, Alexander Herze and Byelinski (in the 40’s of the nineteenth century); the original and gifted philosopher of history and religious thinker, Konstantin Liontyev (in the 70’s and 80’s of the nineteenth century); his contemporary, Pirogov, student of philosophical pedagogy; the Russian geniuses, thinkers and poets, Tyuchev, Dostoievski and Leo Tolstoi; the religious writer Rosanov (in the 80’s and 90’s), and the founder of the distinctive

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Karl Schmidt and Edward L. Schaub.

Russian school of religious philosophy, VI. Solovyev. While each one of these thinkers is a pronounced individuality, they nevertheless together present a general picture setting forth an absolutely original and unified national type of thought and philosophy which we venture to call "the Russian world-view" and which is sharply distinguished from the traditional thought of Western Europe.<sup>2</sup> None of the thinkers whom we have mentioned is a philosophical investigator in the strictly scientific meaning of the word; at least, strictly scientific work with them plays but a subordinate part. As for the great artists, this is self-evident. But the others also were not scientific investigators; they were freely creating writers and intuitive thinkers, comparable, perhaps, to Nietzsche in Germany or Emerson in America.

There has, of course, also been another movement in Russia. After the founding of the universities (the first, Moscow University, was founded in 1755; the second, St. Petersburg, and the third, Charkov, in the beginning of the nineteenth century), there arose an academic systematic philosophy in the West-European form. Active in it were a number of rather able investigators. In general, however, its representatives remained considerably below the niveau of European philosophic investigation and were in their main ideas wholly dependent on it. Beginning with the 20's and 30's of the nineteenth century, there was a succession of Russian Hegelians and Schellingians who, in parallel with the development of European, and especially of German, philosophy, were succeeded by positivists, materialists, and later still even by neo-Kantians. But from the point of view of systematic philosophy there is scarcely

<sup>2</sup> An attempt to give a presentation of this "Russian world-view" in its typical outlines I have made in my brochure, *Die russische Weltanschauung*, recently published in the series of the *Kant-Studien*. Cf. also S. Frank, *Wesen und Richtlinien der russischen Philosophie*, in the German journal, *Der Gral*, 1925, No. 8.

any value in studying this whole body of literature. With a very few exceptions, it contains nothing of real importance or originality as compared with West-European philosophy. If one looks back upon this condition of Russian scientific philosophy in the nineteenth century, one is struck by the glaring contrast between the products of the original, intuitive thinking of Russian writers and the weakness of Russian scientific philosophy.

This condition underwent an essential change toward the end of the nineteenth century, in the 80's and 90's, primarily under the powerful influence of the philosophical activity of Vladimir Solovyev. During these decades—at a time of relative decline or stagnation in West-European philosophy—there began a powerful development of Russian philosophy, which from then on rested upon a union between science and intuitive national tendencies. The center of this movement was Moscow University, where, toward the end of the 80's, there was founded the first philosophical association (under the pressure of the censor, who was then inimical to philosophy, it had to be named "Psychological Association"); also the first purely philosophical journal (*Woprosy filosofii i psichologii*—*Problems of Philosophy and Psychology*). At about the same time there appeared the original and profoundly important scientific work of Leo Lopatin, *The Positive Tasks of Philosophy* (two volumes, 1884-1886) which, with fine dialectics and great thoroughness, demonstrates the untenability of the positivistic and criticistic points of view and finds the main task of philosophy to be a positive metaphysical ontology. Lopatin's analyses of the main problems of epistemology and causality, and of the concepts of time and of the soul, belong without doubt to the most important results of modern philosophical research. A decade afterwards, a highly gifted investigator in the history of philosophy, Prince Sergius Trubetzkoi (who, like Lopatin, was professor at

the University of Moscow) published two important books: *Metaphysics in Ancient Greece* and *History of the Logos-Doctrine*, in which new light was thrown on the mystical and metaphysical meaning of ancient philosophy. Therewith was founded the Moscow school of metaphysical idealism. At the same time, in the 80's and 90's, we find at Kiev an original philosophical thinker, Koslov, who, in a journal written by him alone (*Swoje Slowo—My Own Word*), un-masks with biting irony the thoughtlessness of the ruling positivism and develops in a series of papers a metaphysics somewhat akin to that of Leibniz.

The movement just mentioned extended over into the twentieth century and gave rise to a powerful development in all fields of scientific philosophy in Russia. This philosophy on the one hand depended upon the contemporaneous development of systematic philosophy in western Europe, with the results of whose conceptual analysis it endeavored to equip itself. On the other hand, it attempted to absorb and scientifically to digest the original motifs of the Russian national mentality. Thenceforth Russian scientific philosophy was no longer the pupil of West-European philosophy, but felt itself—and we think rightly—its peer, and at the same time the guardian of a national Russian philosophical tradition. Unfortunately this promising development has during late years been strongly interfered with by the communistic revolution and the policy inaugurated therewith in higher education. During the terrible years of civil war and hunger, 1918 to 1921, there was scarcely any possibility of scientific work, and then, beginning with 1922, there started a systematic persecution (reminiscent of the Middle Ages and of the Inquisition) of all non-materialistic philosophy, and an expulsion or a banishment from Russia of all philosophers not in accord with materialistic thought. In consequence, the greater number

and the most influential of the Russian philosophers, who were at all able to save their lives, now live abroad; in Russia itself, pedagogical and literary activities in philosophy have, since 1922, become wholly impossible. We may only hope that this sad condition will not continue long enough to sever completely the thread of philosophical tradition.

We will now attempt to give a brief synoptic view of the principal results in the main fields of Russian philosophy during the last fifteen or twenty years.

### I. Theory of Knowledge

The theory of knowledge in its German form, as determined by Kantianism, has never had a lasting or deep influence on Russian philosophy because it runs counter to the peculiar motives of Russian thought. The Russian Kantians were as individuals either wholly unoriginal or they appropriated Criticism in a form that completely falsified it. To this latter category belongs Alexander Vwedenski, recently professor at the St. Petersburg University. In his work, *Logic as Part of Theory of Knowledge* (1913), he develops Criticism into a sort of universal skepticism. He maintains that not only the forms of intuition and of judgment (categories), and the synthetic judgments *a priori* determined by them, but also the logical laws are nothing but subjective forms of human consciousness, so that all human knowledge rests on blind, unprovable belief. Therewith the logical law of contradiction becomes dubious in its ontological status. Every human judgment is thus put in doubt. Nay, even the difference between subjective and objective, between phenomena and things in themselves, is designated as purely subjective. This theory of knowledge, therefore, cannot escape the inevitable defect of skepticism that it must appear dubious

to itself. The deeper interpretations of Criticism, represented in classical German idealism as well as in the modern neo-Kantian schools, remained closed to Vvedenski. In all of them he suspected a dogmatic metaphysics condemned by Criticism.

Vvedenski's philosophical world-view remained isolated in modern Russian epistemology. The main current of the latter has run in a different, a primarily ontological, direction. To the typical Russian philosopher the theory of knowledge does not appear, after the manner of Kant, as a science which precedes metaphysics and holds the metaphysical needs within bounds, but (somewhat as is now maintained in Germany by Nicolai Hartmann) as the science which lays the foundations for metaphysics. After the above-mentioned attempt by Leo Lopatin to give a new justification for metaphysics, another Russian philosopher, also referred to above, Prince Sergius Trubetzkoi, published, in the 90's of the nineteenth century, a sketch of epistemology in which he maintains that the essence of knowledge consists in an actual transcendence of the limits of the knowing subject.

But the really fundamental work of the Russian theory of knowledge is Nicolai Losski's *Fundamental Principles of Intuitionism* (1905). Losski bases his doctrine upon a wholly original theory of consciousness, which is striking in its simplicity and which may be considered as a scientific renewal of so-called "naïve realism." Consciousness is not, as is usually supposed, a closed realm—or a vessel, so to speak—which has its contents within itself. On the contrary, it is open; it is essentially a relation, a "co-ordination," between knowing subject and known object. It is therefore not necessary that consciousness should in some way or other appropriate the objects, duplicate them within itself, or represent them. At one stroke there are thus overcome all the difficulties connected with the problem,

How does consciousness attain to a knowledge of Being? or, How does Being, which lies eternally external to consciousness, enter the latter? Thus also one need not follow the path of escape adopted by the Kantian criticism. For the essential relation between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge is a primary fact concerning whose possibility no question may be raised. The principal problem of traditional epistemology, namely, how knowledge is possible, is generated simply by a false naturalistic and materialistic conception of consciousness which represents consciousness as residing somewhere in the brain, in the human head, and divorced from Being. But if we guard against confusing the ideal supra-temporal and supra-spacial character of the knowing consciousness as such with the natural conditions of interaction between the external environment and the human nervous system (which should be regarded simply as the external occasion for the knowledge process), then the whole difficulty is recognized as purely imagined.

A somewhat different method of establishing an ontological theory of knowledge is adopted in my work, *The Object of Knowledge: On the Foundations and Limits of Conceptual Knowledge* (1915). This book is devoted to the justification, in principle, of ontologism, i. e., of the primacy of the concept of Being over that of consciousness or knowledge. It is hopeless to attempt to reach a concept of Being if we take our start from consciousness as the only primary point. If we have an idea of Being itself, in its complete transcendence—and without this idea the whole meaning of knowledge collapses—we must have it in a thoroughly primary and immediate form. And we actually and indubitably do so have it, not only in our own Being, but also, in order that the latter itself may be possible, in Being itself; that is, in the all-embracing unity of Being

to which we ourselves belong. That there is anything at all, and that therefore Being itself is, is much more evident than that "I am" or that I have consciousness. To the question of critical philosophy, Is Being external to us or only within us, in our consciousness? we must answer that both are guaranteed at one and the same time by this, that *we ourselves are within Being*. All knowledge, all consciousness, all conception, is really a secondary and derived mode of the appropriation of Being, transferring Being into the ideal form. What is primary, wholly self-evident, is, so to speak, *Being in Being*, the immediate "stepping forth" and self-revelation of Being itself as found in the ontological nature of immediate experience. If the outer world and, in general, the world of objectivity consisted of single isolated fragments, wholly foreign to us, if our own Being were a realm totally self-enclosed and divorced from all else, then we could never be sure that anything really *is*, and not merely appears to us in the moment of knowing. But as every individual object can be thought only within the frame and on the basis of a single all-embracing Being, namely, Being itself—the same Being which also embraces and permeates ourselves—we have in this, in the becoming-aware of Being itself, which precedes every knowledge and is the basis of its meaning, the absolute guarantee for the objectivity and transcendence of our knowledge. Herewith the true meaning of the "ontological proof" (which is quite mistakenly in bad repute) becomes evident, at least in its application to the concept of Being itself. As regards any specific, temporally and spacially defined content of presentation, we may indeed properly ask whether it actually *exists*, or is *only* represented. But regarding Being itself, this question may not be put. For in this case it loses its meaning. Being itself cannot be "merely represented;" in having it we have it itself in its



true reality, and not merely a representation or concept of it. For, every representation and every concept, every existential judgment, even though negative, presupposes Being itself and receives its meaning only in relation thereto.

Somewhat different attempts to overcome Criticism and to open a road to ontology are contained in works by S. Askoldom Alexeyev on *Thought and Reality* (1912) and by Prince Eugene Trubetzkoi (the brother of the previously mentioned Sergius Trubetzkoi) on *Metaphysical Presuppositions of Knowledge* (1917). For an examination of these works, however, space is here lacking.

Both Losski and myself have developed an ontological theory of knowledge, not only in its fundamental principles, but also in its application to the problems of logic (Losski in a separate work, *Logic*, in two volumes, 1922). I must limit myself to the general remark that both authors relate their intuitionism to the immediate intuiting of universal essences, that is, to logical realism or the Platonic doctrine of ideas. Both authors attempt to deal afresh with the principal problems of logic from the view-point of logical realism. In so doing, Losski approaches more nearly to Husserl's phenomenology, with its presupposition of an immediate intuiting of each single essence or ideal, while I, emphasizing the thorough-going unity of Being and the consequent systematic unity of concepts, reach a point of view representing a reformulation and revaluation, in the direction of ontologism, of the Hegelian philosophy and of the logical doctrines of the so-called "Marburg school." The overcoming of idealism is in my opinion equivalent to the overcoming of rationalism: by recognizing that the world of ideas, the system of logical determinations, is a derived sphere which points beyond itself to the intuitive unity of concrete plenitude, we at once realize that our knowledge is not a self-sufficing cosmos, as idealism main-

tains, but that it is constituted by its relation to Being itself.

## II. Ontology and Psychology

For this ontologism, which is characteristic not only of the above-mentioned authors but which may be considered as a typically national trait of Russian philosophical thought, the division of philosophy into the theory of knowledge and ontology is untenable, because all philosophy, and therefore also the theory of knowledge itself, is already ontology. Only in a derived sense may the ontology of knowledge be distinguished from the other parts of ontology, somewhat as we can distinguish in Plato between the ontological theory of ideas as the basis of a theory of knowledge and the theory of ideas employed in the *Timaeus* as the foundation of a cosmology. If we now turn to this ontology in the narrower sense, as it is developed in modern Russian philosophy, we note, in spite of differences in individual conceptions, a general trait of decisive importance, namely, the doctrine of the organic structure of Being. This doctrine, though not yet sufficiently developed in its systematic philosophical aspect, formed the foundation of the whole conception of life even of the "Slavophil" thinkers. On it was based the profound doctrine that the church is a living spiritual organism, advanced by the great theologian Chomyakov; likewise Kireyevski's criticism of the West for its regnant tendency to disintegrate life into atoms, and his ideal of an organic totality in social life. Vladimir Solovyev's whole philosophy is centered in the doctrine of the "all-unity," i. e., of the organic structure of Being, in consequence of which every empirical manifold depends upon the absolute divine unity which permeates it.

Lopatin's metaphysics, which in general is akin to that of Leibniz, also contains a remarkable doctrine concern-

ing the nature of causality and teleology. It explains both these categorical relations by reference to the supra-temporal unity of Being. In modern Russian philosophy this same general view has been developed in a strict systematic form in Losski's book, *The World as an Organic Whole* (1916). Losski takes as his basis the Platonic doctrine of ideas: the world is dominated by supra-temporal and supra-spacial potencies. Every single being and every substance is penetrated and determined by these general potencies. Losski designates his view "concrete ideal-realism," and he opposes it alike to "abstract idealism" and to "inorganic naturalism" and "substantialism." To the problem of matter, Losski has devoted a special investigation, *Matter in the System of the Organic World-View*. From a different angle I myself have defended almost the same position in the last two parts of my above-mentioned book, *The Object of Knowledge*, as well as in my *Introduction to Philosophy* (1922). I attempt to show by a logical analysis of the concepts of number, time, law and causality, that timeless-ideal and temporal-real being are thinkable only in mutual relation to each other, and therefore in their dependency on the concrete and supra-temporal unity of being which combines timeless rest with living movement. But considerations of space here also compel me to pass over the very important details of the different systematic formulations.

The typically Russian philosophical ontologism has received an especially characteristic expression in Russian psychology. True, we find in Russia an empirical and experimental psychology carried on in the well-known European and American manner. And this psychology has developed rapidly during the past decades. I here pass it by, however, because it is really a special empirical discipline rather than a part of philosophy. But there is in Russia a purely philosophical psychology of a unique character.

It is in evident connection with the non-scientific psychology of the great Russian thinker-poets, Tychev, Dostoievski and Tolstoi. I will limit myself to a brief characterization of the general idea of this field of investigation.

In contrast with the so-called empirical psychology which approaches mental phenomena from without, and describes and logically fixes them as part of the empirical objective world, this kind of psychology attempts to describe the psychic life from within, as it appears to the one who experiences it at the moment of the experience. By this the whole ontological meaning of psychic life is changed, or rather the latter only now appears in its true ontological meaning. For if we thus consider psychic life—our dreams, emotions, passions—from within, we see in it not a small and derived part of the empirical-objective reality, but, on the contrary, a universe, a cosmos in itself, which has infinite depths and lives according to laws of its own—laws impossible and meaningless in the empirical outer world, but here obviously dominant. Not only are psychic phenomena spaceless, but, considered from within, purely in themselves, they are also timeless, in the sense that measurable mathematical time, as Bergson also has shown, is not applicable to them. Indeed, with reference to them even the logical laws of identity and contradiction have no immediate application, though, to be sure, they must be heeded by the investigator when he tries to achieve a conceptual fixation of psychical reality. In brief, psychical reality presents us, so to speak, with a wholly different dimension of the universe. Man, as a being in the outer world, appears as a minute part of the universe, and from this external point of view his nature is exhausted in this appearance. In reality, however, what we call "man" is in and for himself something infinitely larger and qualitatively wholly different from a small scrap of the world. He is a secret world of enormous, nay, potentially infinite powers com-

pressed within a small compass. And his subterranean depths are as little like his external appearance as the interior of a large, dark cavern containing immeasurable wealth as well as suffering within itself, is like the imperceptible opening which connects it with the bright and familiar world of the surface of the earth.

This general view is maintained in a series of modern works devoted to the philosophical treatment of the problem of the soul. Thus, Leo Lopatin's chief work, *The Positive Tasks of Philosophy* (1884-1886) develops a Leibnizian metaphysics of the soul which, through an analysis of the metaphysical meaning of memory, emphasizes principally the supra-temporal nature of consciousness. In many respects it is in accord with the now well-known doctrines of one who was then quite unknown, the French philosopher, Bergson. Koslov has likewise elaborated a monadological metaphysics of the soul. In the 90's of the nineteenth century Nesmelov developed a philosophical anthropology which, though purely theological, was nevertheless also of very great philosophical importance. In his *The Science of Man, naturalism*, in its common form, is refuted with trenchant arguments, and the supernatural character of the human spirit is emphasized in connection with the Christian dogma of the divine nature of man. The same direction is taken in recent literature by the work of the prominent philosopher of religion, N. Berdyayev, *The Meaning of Creation: An Essay in Anthropodicy* (1915). We here have an exposition of the meaning of man as a free co-operator in the divine work of creation. In my book, *The Soul of Man: A Metaphysical Introduction to Psychology* (1917), I have attempted a general metaphysical characterization of the concept of the soul, on the basis of a phenomenologicistic analysis of the psychic life. In sharp contrast to this tendency, however, is a book by the above-mentioned Alexander Vwedenski: *Psychology Free*

from *All Metaphysics* (1915). This book seeks to revive the associationistic and intellectualistic psychology from the standpoint of Criticism.

### III. History of Philosophy

The direction taken by research in the history of philosophy is always determined by the level and the direction of the interest in systematic philosophy. In Russia, therefore, the exploration of the older philosophical systems and doctrines has been devoted primarily to the discovery of the true metaphysical meaning of these doctrines. The important investigations of Sergius Trubetzkoi, *Metaphysics in Ancient Greece* (1893) and *History of the Doctrine of the Logos* (1900) have already been mentioned. An outstanding achievement is the two-volume work of the legal philosopher Ivan Ilyin on *The Philosophy of Hegel* (1916). The author emphasizes the mystic-intuitive basis of the Hegelian dialectic and the concrete-metaphysical nature of the "concept" in its Hegelian formulation. B. Vycheslavytzev has written a book on *The Ethics of Fichte* (1914) which also illumines the general metaphysical importance of Fichte's philosophy and its connection with modern German idealism. Vl. Ern has given a most interesting analysis of Italian Platonism in his essays on *Rosmini's Theory of Knowledge* (1914) and *Gioberti's Philosophy* (1916). A profound and path-breaking investigation of the principal concepts of Hindu metaphysics is contained in a book by the late young Indologist, O. Rosenberg, *The Problems of Buddhistic Philosophy* (1918).

### IV. The Philosophy of Religion

Russian philosophy has essentially a religious trend and is determined by religious interests. The most influential Russian thinker of modern times was Vladimir Solovyev

(1852-1900) whose whole life-work, though of almost un-circumscribed universality, was nevertheless devoted to the philosophy of religion. Whatever he did in the fields of epistemology, ontology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of history and social philosophy, was determined by his fundamental views in the philosophy of religion: his organic panentheism and his doctrine of the "divine in man," of "the becoming absolute," i. e., of the evolution of human and cosmic life toward the "deification" of all that now exists as mere creature.

It is typical of the Russian philosophical mind in general that it never seeks pure theoretical knowledge alone, but that the exploration of truth is always likewise a search for religious salvation. The most recent Russian philosophy has here again followed the national tradition. From the school of Solovyev have come in recent years several important philosophers of religion. I mention first the theologian Florenski. His important work, *The Pillar and Affirmation of Truth* (1914), is an attempt at a philosophical justification of the Greek orthodox belief. Florenski seeks to prove that human thinking is afflicted with unsolvable antinomies, salvation from which may be found only in the voluntary affirmation of a higher, supra-rational knowledge supplied by belief. In the dogma of the Trinity, which embraces all Being, inclusive of the human mind, is to be found the only adequate representation of this higher living truth. The divine is united with the human and with the cosmic through a special divine principle, "the holy Sophia," or divine wisdom, which forms the kernel of orthodox belief in the sanctity of the church as well as in the Mother of God. Sophia is the feminine receptive element in the concept of God; corresponding to it is that which is divine in the creature, the purity and holiness of humanity and of the cosmos, in its God-receptive status of a bride.

Florenski has influenced the philosopher of religion, S. Bulgakov. In his collection of essays, *The Two Kingdoms* (1913), containing a series of critical studies of modern intellectual currents and of movements in religious philosophy, the latter attempts to show the inconsistency of all forms of unbelief (of socialism, of Feuerbach's deification of man, of Nietzsche's doctrine of the heroic superman), as well as of philosophical idealism, and to present positive Christianity as the only true ethical world-view. Bulgakov's principal work, *Daylight* (1915), written in perfect literary style, develops a universal philosophy of religion on the basis of Greek orthodox belief. It advances a justification of the ontological religious consciousness in strong, though somewhat one-sided, opposition to the immanentism of German mysticism and idealism. Central in the exposition is the problem of a "cosmodicy," the search for the religious meaning of the cosmos, of the creature. This is found, in dependence upon Solovyev and Florenski, by disclosing the divine "Sophian" nature of the creature.

To the school of Solovyev belongs also the brother of the above-mentioned Sergius Trubetzkoi, Prince Eugene Trubetzkoi, who died in 1920 during the civil war. In his two-volume work, *St. Solovyev's Philosophy* (1913), the latter organizes into a coherent system the ideas which the various works of his master present in only a rather unsystematic form; at the same time he also takes sharp issue with the latter on a number of decisive points.

Nicolai Berdyayev is a distinguished philosopher of religion. Closely attached to the Russian religious tradition, he is nevertheless thoroughly original. His religious anthropodicy was mentioned above; and his works, now translated into German, have received wide acclaim in Germany. Berdyayev has published a whole series of works relating not merely to the philosophy of religion, but also to the philosophy of history, and to social philosophy. The principal



idea which dominates all of them is a combination of positive Christian belief with a peculiar humanism, namely, a belief in the divine task of humanity. To Feuerbach's atheistic deification of man and to Nietzsche's teachings regarding the superman, he seeks to give a positive mystical-religious foundation. God is not absolute, self-sufficient rest. His life is a *mysterium*, a drama, in which creation and man participate. God Himself suffers from the imperfection of the creature. He loves man and invokes his loving help. Revelation is God's call to man, to which man must respond with his free creating activity, with his efforts for the transfiguration and deification of the creature. The history of the world, the creative cultural development of humanity, is this responsive attempt of man to help God, which is of course accompanied by constant mistakes and failures. Of his works I mention only, in addition to the above, *Dostoievski's World-View*, *The Meaning of History*, and *The New Middle Ages* (all three of which have been translated into German). At the present time Berdyayev, in connection with the most important Russian philosophers of religion, is editing in Paris a Russian journal of the philosophy of religion, *The Way*.

The philosopher of religion Leo Karsavin is a purely systematic thinker. In his main work, *On Principles* (1925) (the title was selected in definite reminiscence of Origen), he constructs a religious philosophical system on a mystical foundation. The principal thought of this system is the concept of the all-unity. It combines within itself and overcomes theism and pantheism, the transcendence and the immanence of God, and establishes the divinity of man as the integral unity of the thinking human spirit and the divine reality. It is a daring attempt, undertaken with great learning and philosophical profundity, to represent the Greek orthodox belief as a logically coherent and strictly demonstrable philosophical system. Even though it re-

mains doubtful whether such an attempt (which wavers, so to speak, between dogmatic theology and presuppositionless systematic philosophy) can possibly succeed, it is incontestable that the book contains a wealth of profound ideas on the philosophy of religion and is distinguished by an extraordinary rigor and acumen of analytical thought.

In diametrical contrast with this purely logical and systematic movement in the philosophy of religion is the work of another original Russian philosophical writer, Leo Shestov, whose volumes (*Nietzsche and Dostoevski*, *Potestas Clavium*, *The Night of Gethsemane*, and others) have recently also been translated into German and French and have aroused considerable attention. In all of his works, Shestov defends a single idea: the idea that the true, divine basis of life, veritably indispensable to man, is ineffable, absolutely irrational, and capable of being grasped only through a living contact with it in religious experience. He insists upon the falsity of everything that is logically determined and universally valid, in theoretical thinking as well as in ethics. The belief in universal validity—in the “true” and the “good”—which has determined human thinking in philosophy and ethics from the first Greek thinkers, from Thales and Socrates, to Spinoza and, in our day, Husserl, is nothing but the consequence of a spiritual fall, a renunciation of spiritual freedom, a shrinking from a courageous affirmation of the terrifying absolute irrationality and unrepeatable uniqueness of life.

Russian philosophy of religion in general (as well as philosophy as a whole) has never been exclusively a purely academic affair, a task of theoretical investigation; it has always likewise been a religious effort, an expression of the quest for religious salvation. Because of the national collapse caused by atheistic communism, recent years have brought an even more intense consciousness of the need to find the way to a spiritual and national regeneration

through religious reflection and a deepening of the general world-view. Since the publication of books on religion and the philosophy of religion is absolutely impossible in Soviet Russia itself, the effort to meet this need is developing very strongly abroad, where, as mentioned above, most of the Russian philosophers and religious thinkers now live. In Berlin and Paris there have been Russian academies of religious philosophy since 1922. Here lectures on the philosophy of religion are delivered to the Russian youth. The official publication of these academies is the above-mentioned journal, *The Way*, in Paris. Their activity is very closely connected with the Russian Christian student movement, which started in recent years and is developing very rapidly. It is most liberally supported by the American Young Men's Christian Association. To the latter it owes also a Russian press (Y. M. C. A. Press) which has brought out a series of Russian publications on religion and the philosophy of religion, some of which are very important and, though for the most part popular and designed for the general reading public, may claim a purely theoretical interest. Without further comment, I here mention a few of these publications: A collection of essays, *Problems of the Russian Religious Consciousness* (with contributions from Berdyayev, Bulgakov, Losski, Frank, and others); *Dostoievski's World-View*, by N. Berdyayev; *The Fall of the Idols* and *On the Meaning of Life*, by S. Frank; *John and Peter*, by S. Bulgakov; *The Russian Element in Dostoievski*, by B. Vysheslavitzev; *The Doctrines of the Church Fathers*, by L. Karsavin.

#### IV. Social Philosophy, Philosophy of History, and Philosophy of Law .

Because of its religious character Russian philosophy is directed toward human life. In it, therefore, "practical philosophy" or ethics (in the wider sense of the term)

inevitably holds a dominating position. The most important and most original contributions made by Russian philosophy in the 19th century (apart from religious philosophy itself) belong to this field. It must be noted, however, that ethics in the narrower sense of the term, as the doctrine of individual human conduct, of values and virtues, is represented but poorly, and indeed only as an exception, in Russian philosophical literature. Hence we may here pass it by. The situation becomes explicable if we bear in mind that Russian thought is not inclined to conceive the "good" as an abstract ideal or as a norm, but, in accordance with its religious nature, always conceives the "good" ontologically, as the divine foundation of Being, as something concrete and existing. Thus ethics is linked up with problems of religious philosophy and ontology. On the other hand, moreover, it thinks of the "good," not individualistically, but invariably as collective, as the principle of salvation of mankind as a whole. In consequence, ethics of necessity becomes social philosophy, philosophy of history, and philosophy of law.

Thus, Russian philosophy, in its most characteristic expression, is always a religiously orientated or determined philosophy of social life. The history of Russian thought in the 19th century consists almost without exception of such religious social philosophy. The great thinkers of the "Slavophil" movement, Ivan Kireyevski and Chomjakov; their opponents, Chaadayev, Herzen, and Eyelinski; the positivists of the '60s and '70s, Chernishevski, Lavzov, Michailovski; the original genius Konstantin Leontyev, who might be called the Russian Nietzsche; and finally also Vladimir Solovyev—all have devoted themselves passionately to "practical philosophy" in the sense of a social philosophy. Everything else in their works serves only as a basis for a most earnest attempt to disclose the meaning of history and of the ideal of a just

and "true" common life of humanity. Socialism, which has played so prominent a part in Russian thought from the '60s of the 19th century to our own days, is in this sense, despite its Western origin, typical of Russian national thought. In Russia, it was almost never taken simply as a political movement, whether partisan or economic in nature; on the contrary, it was always understood as essentially a distinct religious world-view, an expression of an attempt to give life its ultimate meaning. The Bolsheviks also are not so much practical social politicians as fighting atheists, "stormers of heaven," as they once called themselves, who accept as their task the destruction of belief in God and the definite establishment of paradise on earth.

We would pass beyond the limits set for this paper if we undertook a general presentation of the most significant achievements in this very interesting field of Russian thought. We restrict ourselves to a mention of the most important publications of the last fifteen to twenty years. During this period the social philosophy of Russia has been determined primarily by a spiritual crisis leading to a thorough-going philosophical critique of socialism as well as of positivistic or materialistic humanism. The turning-point was the year of the revolution of 1905. Thereafter, Russian philosophical thought in this field began a search for new paths. In 1909 there appeared a collective work under the title, *Road Indicators*, with contributions from Berdyayev, Bulgarov, Struve, Frank, and others. It was devoted to a fundamental critique of revolutionary socialism and of the atheistic social utopia in general. Since then, especially since 1917 to 1918, when socialistic fanaticism became dominant and led to the tragic collapse of the whole Russian national life, several important philosophical works have appeared which combine a critique of socialism with a new and more profound

philosophical foundation of the social-political conception of life. To these publications belong Berdyayev's above-mentioned *The Meaning of History*, which gives a religious philosophy of history; and in addition thereto, especially his *Philosophy of Inequality* (1922), which, in sharp contrast with political views of a socialistic-democratic type, develops the conception of an hierarchical society on the basis of a religious philosophy. We would mention also the important works of the recently deceased legal philosopher, P. Novgorodzev, *The Crisis of the Modern Legal Consciousness* and *The Social Ideal*. With great learning and clear vision Novgorodzev exhibits, in the first of these works, the crisis of the liberal-democratic legal consciousness which now prevails in the European world. The other work is devoted to a critique of the social utopia. The social ideal should not be conceived as an absolutely perfect social condition capable of being realized in its perfection. It is justifiable merely as an ideal, though unattainable, guiding principle in the actual and necessarily relative work of social reform.

The social conception now dominant is criticized from a different angle by the above-mentioned philosopher of religion (who formerly was also a distinguished historian) Leo Karsavin, in his book, *Philosophy of History* (1923). His profound investigations, which are based on an analysis of the concept of the folk-soul, or the historical individuality, as the real subject of historical evolution, culminate in a sharp critique of the dominant concept of progress. History may not be considered as an evolution whose meaning and value can be determined by reference exclusively to its last and highest stage of development. On the contrary, every historical epoch has its own immanent value, as an irreplaceable historical individuality; every age participates in the supra-temporal

unity of spiritual life and from this it derives its justification.

In my book, *Outlines of a Methodology of the Social Sciences: An Introduction to Social Philosophy* (1922), which sets itself in opposition to every materialistic and naturalistic social philosophy, I have attempted to disclose the spiritual foundations of social life. I find the essence of social life in "subsisting" or "living" ideas, which are indeed realized by human activity but which, as regards their reality, are independent of individual human wills and must be considered as a peculiar over-individual and superhuman sphere of being.

This is not the place to discuss specialized investigations in social science, though they also represent highly important achievements in general social philosophy. I mention only briefly in this connection a work by the well-known Russian statesman and national economist, Peter Struve: *Economics and Price*, which presents a profound critique of socialism from the standpoint of a philosophy of economics; also B. Kistyakovski's *Social Science and Law* (1916), which emphasizes the reality of objective law and gives a critique of psychologism in legal science; and A. Chuproff's *Outlines of a Theory of Statistics* (1912), which contains discussions, of great importance also to philosophy, of the problems of the universal and the individual in social life, and of "determinism and freedom of the will."





CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN THE  
SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES



## CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY IN THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES<sup>1</sup>

HARALD HÖFFDING

HAVING been requested to give a characterization of contemporary philosophy in the three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden), I find a natural starting point in the year 1908, in which year an article of mine treating the same subject appeared in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. I will therefore confine myself to a particular consideration of those treatises which have appeared subsequently and will refer to previous works only when the connection makes it necessary.

Even though these three countries have in many respects the same culture, and although they have very closely related languages, their philosophies nevertheless exhibit characteristic differences. My presentation will undoubtedly bear evidence of being the work of a Danish writer. Furthermore, the character of it will quite naturally reflect my individual viewpoint; while my critical remarks will be conditioned by the standpoint I have finally adopted as my own.

At Upsala University, the oldest university of Sweden and the whole of Scandinavia, there had developed in the course of the nineteenth century a distinct idealistic-speculative movement which is known, after the actual founder, as *Boströmianism*, and which may be described as a personalistic metaphysics according to which true reality consists

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Danish by Merrill Egeland.

of a realm of spiritual beings. It was a revival of Plato's theory of the Idea, except that it conceived the Ideas as personal beings. In this way the monad theory of Leibniz could be combined with Plato's theory of the Idea. The movement saw as an error of Kant that he regarded self-consciousness as something merely subjective and did not recognize a perfect self-consciousness, the ideal knowledge, as the actual ultimate reality. Later, in opposition to this movement, a theory of epistemology sprang up which asked with Kant, how the consciousness of an absolute reality is at all possible. But *the new Upsala school*, whose most famous representatives are Hägerström and Phalen, raise against the theory of knowledge, as it had previously developed, a criticism analogous to that which the latter had raised against metaphysics; the new school finds in the theory of knowledge a hidden metaphysics insofar as it presupposes judgments and interpretations of judgments which are not capable of complete analysis. It is maintained that the error consists in false formulations of problems and that therefore a great deal of work is required to correct the premises from which the problems derive. Not only in popular thought but also in science, especially in philosophy, is this error found. Historical conditions constantly influence the manner in which problems are presented; and it is very important by sharp analysis to determine these influences so that the problems can be presented in their true form. According to the position of the new Upsala school such an analysis of concepts is philosophy's true task. The concepts especially requiring analysis, it is believed, are those relating to value and also those of reality and unreality, truth and falsity, positive and negative, and a series of concepts akin thereto. Difficulties arise when *the philosopher's* problems are formulated according to the popular forms of such conceptions. Kant overlooked the fact that both concepts and their com-

ponent elements (perception and reflection) are historical in nature and do not necessarily designate anything real. When, for instance, one defines reality as a certain condition, a certain relation between different elements, one takes for granted that the relation itself refers to something real. Similarly when reality is defined as a complete unity; for the concept of unity needs thorough clarification. It has been overlooked that the concept reality, as a term in a judgment, has no content but only indicates that a judgment refers beyond itself to something that is not a part of its content.

This movement which I have attempted to sketch, following the condensed exposition given by Professor Adolf Phalen in the fifth volume of *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen* (Leipzig, 1924), has, so far as I can see, a clear understanding that no thinking without qualifications is possible.

Even in ancient times the skeptics made this an issue in connection with Carneade's attempt to define the concept of reality; and in more recent times, it has been used to prove the impossibility of a theory of knowledge. The fact of the matter is that the problem of knowledge can never be fully solved, as consciousness constantly is given new tasks and more work under different conditions. But it occurs to me that more fruitful than an abstract dialectical discussion would be an investigation of the various ways in which, especially in our time, problems and problem-thoughts are conditioned by the culture of the time, especially by the development of science.

Particular concepts, and precisely those that are the most fundamental, have histories and can only be understood by closely connecting the history of philosophy with that of science. The history of philosophy is neither intelligible nor serviceable except in connection with the history of other sciences. Plato's and Descartes' philosophies were

determined by mathematics, Kant's by Newton's physics. A future theory of knowledge will hardly be able to avoid Einstein's theory. And in the domains of ethics or of the philosophy of religion a philosopher will not be able to escape a consideration of the way in which the subject matter has been affected by the cultural development. French sociology has particularly given itself the task of illuminating this point. The philosopher, then, may not refuse to consider historical influences but must investigate which methods of thought they provide or allow.

As Upsala is the intellectual center of North Sweden, so is Lund of South Sweden. There is evidently a certain contrast in viewpoint between the two schools. It is quite evident that whereas the Upsala school lays the main stress on the analysis of concepts, Hans Larsson, the Lund representative, especially emphasizes intuition. It is Larsson's conviction that reflection and analysis destroy the fundamental unity with which science begins and ends, and that this involves a disadvantage to science and to art as well.

Intuition, for Larsson, does not mean passive perception but an immediate, unitary apprehension, in which one can with ease pass from one datum to the other. All criticism and analysis is a stage between an initial and a final intuition—a stage which, when it becomes too protracted, can precipitate a spiritual crisis. A determining factor in this situation, no doubt, is the fact that the various elements in the unity demand that their intrinsic conditions and qualities be brought clearly to light. But their union is still upheld by intuition. We note here an interesting contrast between Larsson's notion of intuition and Bergson's. While Bergson contrasts intuition with reflection on the ground that the latter is concerned merely with relations, Larsson holds that intuition may be the culmination of reflection in a comprehensive synthesis. As intuition is

for Larsson a reality insistently active, he displays closer kinship with Fichte than with Bergson. According to Fichte, intuition, being of the nature of activity, cannot be completed in a simple perception; it is really a continual presupposition which can never be entirely revealed. In the opinion of Bergson, on the contrary, intuition, when it is freed from all reflection, is an immediate revelation of a higher reality. According to Larsson it is a consideration of utmost importance that intuition can have so large a content that no reflection or analysis can exhaust it; consequently no limited concept of existence can be formed. Through comparative studies of Plato and the romantic philosophy in Germany, Larsson has tried to show that intuition has played an important role in the history of philosophy. There has been developed a more and more definite break between intuition and reflection, between percepts and concepts. His *Critique of Kant's Theory of the Antinomies* is of special interest. According to Larsson the antinomies are unavoidable. For him they do not merely mark the limits of knowledge but become more and more compelling within experience. Our life is a constant struggle to join the unjoinable. The cultural and historical significance of German transcendentalism, according to Larsson, lies in its lesson that life is a *struggle* between contradictions whereas it seeks unification in the world of reality. Schiller was one who notably moved from speculation to cultural philosophy, although it was really in art that he saw the possibility of a harmony of contradictions. Larsson finds that Hegel's "dialectic" contains this truth, that both thinking and life are a constant struggle of antitheses. It is a common defect of the German philosophers, whose investigations Larsson thinks himself to be continuing, that they confine themselves too much to fundamental problems rather than focus attention upon the

relation between perception and concepts by investigating particular instances.

While Larsson's philosophy is occupied with the antitheses of life and thought, there is one antithesis it has especially attempted to elucidate, that between thought and poetry. His most interesting essay is *The Logic of Poetry* (*Poesiens Logik*; first edition, 1896; fourth edition, 1922; also translated into French). According to his own declaration, his aim in this work is not aesthetic but logical. He wishes to show that intuition, as he views it, is in fact governed by laws of logic—indeed, that it involves a finer logic than thought. It is for this reason that poetry can have its logic. Starting out from this point of view, Larsson presents a series of interesting observations. He gives, e. g., much weight to the fact that our psychological concepts are relative inasmuch as each can include in itself many kinds; there are, for instance, many kinds (or degrees) of sympathy, intuition, and so forth. This must not be overlooked when any such concept plays a part in discussion. Again, he finds the significance of intuition in the fact that it is through immediate perception, rather than through the abstract form of the concept, that knowledge influences feeling and will. From this angle also the necessity of individualizing concepts appears. Of particular interest is Larsson's discussion of what is usually called in grammar "synecdoche," that is, a perception in which a whole finds expression through an individual part, with which, however, all the elements of the whole are more or less connected. This is of course what Lévy-Bruhl has since called participation and which he has demonstrated to be a normal feature of the primitive mind. Psychology has long known it as partial recognition. Moreover, several world-views (metaphysical and religious), as I shall later, show, take a particular trait or a particular age as an expression of the whole of existence.



In accordance with his interpretation Larsson naturally comes to place great emphasis upon the significance of the picture for perception. On the other hand, a mere abstract concept can not be formed, he holds, without the aid of a graphic scheme. Language is through and through metaphorical. But a distinction must be made between basic metaphors, that is images which by constant use have become mere thought forms, and images of living nature. And further one must distinguish between the abstract and the concrete. Scientific thinking, which goes back constantly to basic metaphors and images, is thus in contrast with poetry, which abides with a living image (a single instance). Poetry by predilection is *personal description* because personality is a unity of such a sort that a single trait may suffice to characterize it. Here, as so often, art more easily than science penetrates into life; with that synthetic quality that art possesses in a higher degree than science, which works through analysis, art attains to life's inner nature, to an inner union of the one and the many.

It is no wonder that Hans Larsson, who so vigorously asserts the relation between perception and thought, has also the impulsion and talent for poetic production which in itself has won him recognition among his countrymen. With his ability to introduce the most stubborn questions into the daily conditions of life, and with his quiet humor, he has become an author of significance in the *Kulturgeschichte* of his native country; and philosophy at the same time may be enriched by his untrammelled and original thoughts.

In Denmark, the lately deceased Kristian Kroman was the first to become interested in epistemological studies. His main work, *The Conception of Nature* (translated into German), appeared as early as 1883 but its principal ideas have extended their influence into the period we are particularly considering here, in part through his instruction at

the university and also through his later writings. Kroman tries to demonstrate that the first principles of science (the principles of identity and causality) are established in the form of postulates by a spontaneous act. Scientific proofs are derivative from these but they themselves cannot be proven. Psychologically, he recognized that they are necessary conditions (qualifications) for the continuance of life in the world as we find it. Consequently, they satisfy a demand for self-preservation. While Kroman discusses, with untiring penetration, the significance of the postulates and their value for science, he does not go into the more basic problem as to how self-preservation requires the support of just those postulates that express the presuppositions of science. Further reflection upon this question would have led him in the direction of so-called pragmatism. He would also have been obliged to differentiate between various kinds of self-preservation and to consider the different demands that self-preservation would make under varying circumstances, especially in cases of new experiences.

Kroman's book was reviewed with high praise by Paul Tannery in the *Revue Philosophique*. Other writers found it precarious to stress so strongly the doctrine of postulates. The fundamental principles of science must coincide with the nature of the human mind as it actually is. They must express the various ways in which the human mind inevitably works. The forms which are revealed not merely in the common principles but also in working methods and hypotheses, may not be unchangeable; but they do not rest solely on volition so that they could be pushed aside when their consequences are to our inconvenience. On the mathematical side, there was doubt about Kroman's polemic against the non-Euclidean geometry (a polemic that he took up again in his later years). In spite of all this, the book nevertheless represents a turning-point in Danish

thought; although, prior to it, the postulate point of view had already been made influential by Kierkegaard in his doctrine relating to the conditions of a connected science.

Kroman was early drawn away from a pure philosophical interest and busied himself with pedagogical works, among which must be mentioned an acute and brilliant essay discussing higher education, wherein he vigorously championed the scientific courses in preference to the humanistic.

Whereas Kroman began his authorship with epistemological investigations, the writer of this review did not until later give a detailed discussion of the problem of knowledge. Researches in psychology, ethics, and philosophy of religion had first invited my attention. But it may be seen from the expositions I have elsewhere given of psychology, ethics, and the philosophy of religion (in works earlier than 1908) that I constantly had in mind the significance epistemological theory has for a clear formulation of the basic problems in the fields just mentioned. I have never been an empiricist, although from several sides I have been characterized as such. In my psychology I have always sharply distinguished between the psychological and the epistemological points of view, that is between the description of mental life, especially the *actual* nature of the thought-life, and the question of the validity of its functions. In ethics, the strict principles of scientific proof led me to doubt the possibility of a rational ethic. In my philosophy of religion, epistemology is the basis for my denial of the theoretical significance of religion. In the introduction to my exposition of the history of modern philosophy, I refer to epistemology as the central philosophical problem. And in the essay, *Problems of Philosophy*, I gave a preliminary discussion of the various problems and their mutual relations. Only after these and other preparatory works, did I write

as the exposition of my central thoughts, *The Human Mind, Its Forms and Tasks* (*Den Menneskelige Tanke, dens Former og dens Opgaver*, 1910; later, in German and French). In the present brief account of this work, I shall make use of an exposition which I have previously written in Danish and which has been published in German in the second volume of *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*.

Even before reflection, mental life manifests traces of the forms that scientific thought develops further, specializes and carries through with greater accuracy. Consequently the history of science shows us the various forms through which man in different ages has thought to find his way to true knowledge. The fundamental concepts of science are not at all times the same. It was Kant's fatal error that he believed he could establish once and for all these fundamental concepts (the categories) and arrange them in a closed system. Categories may appear and disappear. A category dies when it can no longer play a part in scientific knowledge. Thus, the category of substance will soon have disappeared, whereas the concept of evolution is still full of vitality. In my exposition of the categories, I discuss first those fundamental concepts with which the popular mind operates: synthesis and relation, continuity and discontinuity, similarity and difference; from these, I pass over to the formal (identity), the real (quality, totality, evolution), and the ideal (value concepts). A theory of categories would, according to this interpretation, be a schematic classification of the sciences. The categories, like the sciences, form a series within which each part presupposes the earlier without being evolved therefrom.

As knowledge is one of the enterprises in which the human mind reveals its nature, the categories contribute to the understanding of the human mind. Kant's great contribution lay in his emphatic assertion that the funda-

mental concepts of science are expressions of the nature of the human mind. But the human mind changes with new tasks and new work, and the categories may therefore undergo corresponding changes. The attractive thing about the study of the theory of knowledge is the insight it yields into the fact that the mind's structure is retained, in part, in new forms, and is changed, in part, in new work. It is through a misunderstanding at this point that William James, whom I remember with heart-felt friendship, in one of his letters, calls me a good pragmatist and pluralist. Pragmatism can indeed show how new tasks can determine new thought; but it fails to appreciate that both the new tasks and the new forms of thought will themselves be conditioned by the structure of the mental life as it then exists. And as far as pluralism is concerned, it represents for me an opposition that must be overcome, not a solution. If existence were an absolute plurality, so that its elements formed chaotic, changing successions, where parts could be arranged in any sort of manner, science would be impossible. The lowest level for scientific research—and this is a level not found within experience—would be a chaotic series of differences; the most favorable condition—likewise not discoverable within experience—would be an absolute series of identities. The former would denote the impossibility of knowledge; the latter its conclusion.

If I were asked to give my philosophy a name, I could call it critical positivism, for I place great emphasis upon the extent of experience and I consider experience itself a problem. But I could also designate it critical monism, inasmuch as I am striving toward a doctrine of unity but find fundamental difficulties in establishing monism. I consider metaphysics (in its proper meaning) subject to a basic difficulty. Existence cannot, and neither can the thought of it, be given us as a totality. In all metaphysical speculation (as I have already remarked in connection with

Hans Larsson's synecdoche) one confines oneself to a particular part, or branch, of existence and considers it a true expression of the whole. This is poetry rather than philosophy. I confess to a certain sympathy with the statement of the Swedish poet Tegner, that metaphysics is castrated poetry.

The exposition of thought-life and its forms that I offered in *The Human Mind* I have since supplemented by some special investigations in the theory of knowledge. First, I considered the concept of totality (1917). Our minds in thought actively endeavor to form a totality out of the often very diverse details present to them. But whereas experience itself brings us face to face with totalities (atom, organism, personality, community) we can, nevertheless, understand them only by separating them into elements whose mutual relations we must then discover. The value concept is closely allied to that of totality, because all value depends upon the relation between a whole, its parts, and its conditions. In an essay dealing with the concept of relation (1921) I endeavored to describe the significance of this concept at each stage of our thought-life. In all our thinking, we put down, as it were, one leg of the compass at one particular spot and seek a place for the other so that the relation between the two places can be determined, perhaps measured. We cannot always find a place for the second leg of the compass; we can ask more than we can answer.

A third investigation concerned itself with the concept of analogy (1923). Both in primitive thought and in science analogy plays an important role, though one that varies in the different sciences. Only the formal sciences are based on identities. Natural sciences, that operate with the elements of experience, are based on rational analogies, that is, on a parallelism between the laws that govern different domains, so that from the relation that exists be-

tween two parts within the one given domain one can learn the relation existing between two particular parts in the other domain. Where rational analogy is not possible, analogies may, nevertheless, play an important role; but in such cases they are poetic or religious symbols, and it is not science that we are discussing. These three essays are all translated into German, and the first two into French (under the common title of *Relativité Philosophique*).

The history of philosophy is zealously studied in the northern countries. Of recent publications two from Norway should be mentioned. Anathon Aall has produced a history of ancient and medieval philosophy. This subject has been of particular interest for him since he began as a church historian and wrote an important monograph on the Logos concept, a concept that not only played an important part in Greek philosophy but was also used by theologians in connecting Greek philosophy with the doctrines of the church.

More recently Harald Schjelderup has given an account of the history of philosophy from the Renaissance to the present, thus supplementing an earlier exposition (in German) of the development of philosophy from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present time. These works are of interest not only because of their content but also because of their points of view regarding philosophy as a whole.

Schjelderup's introductory remarks appear to me of particular significance. He sees the constant task of philosophy as the attempt to gain a unified view of existence, an understanding of the actual nature of existence, and of the significance and aim of life. In every man there is manifest an urge in this direction, and from this urge philosophy is born as "man's total intellectual reaction, in free thought, to existence." It is therefore the task of philos-

ophy to give us both a world-view, in which it develops points of view for the theoretical comprehension of the world, and a life-view, in which it develops points of view for our practical situations. Philosophy is, therefore, not purely scientific. It has always a personal background. The various philosophers experience their fundamental relations to the world and life in different ways and these differences express themselves in divergent reflections on the problems considered. The particular philosophy a man champions depends, as Fichte has said, on the sort of man he is. Philosophy herein approaches art. A genuine philosophical work can have the same eternal worth as a genuine piece of art. And the history of philosophy, just as truly as the history of art, must illumine its theme by reference to the cultural and historical conditions within which it appeared. Schjelderup's conception of philosophy as thus suggested is one with which I am in hearty sympathy. However, I would emphasize more strongly that the philosophical critic should give prominence to logical consistency and to actual connections even where personal attitudes and the state of contemporary culture may have blinded individual philosophers thereto.

Among the best historical studies in Danish literature is Frithjof Brandt's large and thorough monograph, *The Mechanical Interpretation of Nature of Thomas Hobbes* (*Den Mekaniske Naturopfattelse hos Thomas Hobbes*, 1922). This makes an interesting contribution to our understanding of the so-called "mechanical" interpretation of nature; that is, of that point of view which considers everything that exists in nature as motion, regardless of how it appears to the senses. This point of view originated in the mind of Hobbes before he became acquainted with the founders of the new natural science, and as a result of his own reflection. Making use of earlier writings of Hobbes that had not previously been taken into



consideration, the author with great acumen shows how scholasticism and modern reasoning clashed for Hobbes before he adopted his definite mechanical position. It was only after he had in solitude struggled with this new problem that he came in contact with the science of the day, became Galileo's friend and a critic of Descartes.

I, myself, have in recent years again taken up historical studies after having earlier (1895) published an exposition of the history of modern philosophy. Since my youth I have been much interested in Spinoza. I do not completely subscribe to his doctrine, but I have come independently to adopt several of his basic ideas, and the deep sincere philosophical spirit that animated his works has made him an example for everyone who attributes to the life of thought an actual significance for one's world-view.

As a university professor, I several times worked through Spinoza's *Ethics* with advanced students. In so doing, I prepared notes analyzing this, Spinoza's most important, work. For the convenience of those who wish independently to delve into this wonderful treatise I followed its exposition, publishing my study under the title *Spinoza's Ethics: Analysis and Characterization* (*Spinoza's Ethica, Analyse og Karakteristik*). It appeared in Danish in 1918 and later in German under the auspices of the international *Societas Spinozana*, which is furthering Spinoza research through the publication of essays and of a periodical, *Chronicum Spinozanum*. I have also in recent years turned back to Plato, writing about *Parmenides* (1920) and about Plato's *State* (1924). Finally, in *Leading Thoughts in the Nineteenth Century* (*Ledende Tanker i det Nittende Aarhundre*, 1920), I have endeavored to characterize the nineteenth century in contrast with the two previous centuries from which our cultural and scientific ideas originated, as an age of corroboration by experience, specialization, and technical application. I seek

to point out the characteristic importance of these features in their bearing upon the scientific, the religious, and the social situation. I consider the greatness of the nineteenth century to lie in the faithful, independent and exhaustive investigation of basic thoughts that unify the mind of modern times.

In the field of psychology, investigation here in the North has proceeded in the last ten years along both descriptive-analytical and experimental lines. Axel Herrlin, in his comprehensive work on the memory (*Minnet*—Stockholm, 1909), has employed the various methods to describe primary psychological phenomena, with special attention to the needs of teachers. In other works he has elucidated the differences between normal and pathological mental life. It is, of course, clear that in many ways the diseased mentality can throw light upon the sound. It is, accordingly, of particular interest that one of Sweden's foremost psychiatrists, Bror Gadelius, has discussed psychology in the light of observations he has been able to make of the abnormal mind. His work, *The Mental Life of Man in the Light of Experience with Insanity* (*Det Mannskliga Sjalslivet i belysning af Sindsygeläkarens Erfarenhet*, 1921), represents one of the most able contributions to an understanding of mental life from a psychiatric angle, a contribution for which psychologists should be highly thankful.

Sigurd Naesgaard has embodied the results of an essentially analytical research in a series of books of which *The Form of Consciousness* (*Bevisthedens Form*, 1922), is the first. He contrasts the interpretation which holds that the content of consciousness is inseparable from its form on the ground that each of the elements is determined in its nature by the connections in which it appears, with the doctrine, taught particularly by Brentano (not without scholastic influence), that "form" is an expression of the

activity of the mind toward its own content. Naesgaard favors this latter interpretation and attempts to substantiate it in a series of investigations relating to various active attitudes which consciousness may assume. Genetic investigation plays no important part in these studies.

As a sequel to my earlier psychological works (especially to the *Psychology*, which first appeared in 1882) I have investigated several complex mental phenomena. In *The Great Humor* (*Den Store Humor*, 1916; translated into German), I have tried to describe humor by a psychological-historical method as a sort of higher life-feeling which is determined by the relation between a serious background and life's multifarious evils, trifles, and peculiarities. Precisely because the humorist is dealing with the great, he can refer jokingly to the small. In another essay, *Experience and Interpretation* (1918), I found in the comparison between a Spanish mystic of the sixteenth century and a Swiss mystic of the twentieth century an example of how experiences of practically the same nature (ecstatic) may be differently interpreted under different cultural conditions.

In the field of experimental psychology especially, the three northern countries offer an imposing series of works. This results from the fact that at the various universities there are now well equipped laboratories. Alfred Lehmann, the Danish scientist, belongs in the foremost rank. He began as a student of natural science but through his study of Fechner's *Elemente der Psychophysik* he gained an interest in psychological questions susceptible of experimental verification. He studied in Wundt's laboratory at Leipzig. Untiringly occupied with research work until his death in 1921, Lehmann completed a long series of studies. He was constantly devising new instruments and discovering new methods for the exact determination and measurement of psychological phenomena. Very notice-

able in his books is a growing realization of the significance of the experimental method as well as of its limitations, particularly in connection with involuntary and very complex phenomena

Lehmann was capable of severely criticising his own work and he did not hesitate to withdraw an hypothesis if it was proved unsatisfactory. In his zeal for bringing psychology into close connection with physiology he had postulated a peculiar form of physical energy as the cause of psychical phenomena; but this suggestion he recalled when it was shown by a critic (myself) that it merely complicated the problem and did not solve it. But in a long series of special experiments upon elementary phenomena he showed his ability to illuminate mental phenomena by scientific methods. More particularly he made very valuable contributions to the theory of sense impressions and feelings. He also investigated hypnotic and spiritualistic phenomena, and occupied himself in addition with experimental pedagogy. His principal work is written in German, *Grundzüge der Psychophysilogie* (1912). While Lehmann endeavored to keep his standpoint distinct from philosophy proper, his work is nevertheless of great philosophical significance. He shows how elementary psychical phenomena, through analogy, cast light upon the more complex phenomena, and he endeavors wherever possible to discover the physical conditions that in one way or another accompany them.

Edgar Rubin, Lehmann's successor as Professor of Experimental Psychology in Copenhagen, in his important essay on visually experienced figures (*Synsoplevede Figurer*, 1915, translated into German), showed that in the perception of figured plane surfaces one must distinguish two different experiences, that of the surface (background) itself, and that of the form (contour). By an immediate perception of the background a whole with-

out a discernment of parts is given; whereas a perception of contour is received gradually as one follows the edges of the background. One and the same object, accordingly, may be experienced in two different ways under different conditions. Of the two experiences, that of the perception of a contour requires more psychic work than the perception of a surface; and, as a contour perception is of more significance for knowledge than a surface perception, an interesting fact now appears, namely, that it is the experience requiring most psychical work that is of most significance for our knowledge of the world. Rubin's interesting essay, which has naturally attracted the attention of the mathematicians, contains also suggestions of no mean interest in connection with the theory of knowledge. These suggestions have not been enlarged upon by Rubin, but in a series of shorter essays he has continued his studies in experimental psychology.

In Sweden the late Sidney Alrutz has worked zealously in the furtherance of experimental psychology. After extensive experiments on the sensations of heat and pain, he published a large work on the dynamics of the nervous system. He has described the contents of this work as an experimental investigation in sensibility, mobility, suggestibility, and nervous energy, in waking and hypnotic states (1915-1917). His results will surely be tested by other investigators but it will be admitted that he has done an energetic piece of work. One of the principal points Alrutz endeavored to ascertain was whether the passes of a hypnotist can without contact influence man's sensations and movements. He did not doubt after observation that the answer is necessarily in the affirmative. He was very confident but perhaps he was not quite self-critical enough in a question of this sort. He also devoted a great deal of work to so-called spiritualistic phenomena but he was not always cautious in his conduct of experiments with

them. A posthumous work of this indefatigable investigator of the obscure life of the mind, *The Unconscious* (*Det Ubevidte*), will soon be published. In addition to his research work he also served as a psychological "soul-physician." Many who were suffering from insomnia, nervousness, and mental disorders appealed of their own volition to the widely known psychologist, and came to look up to him as the one who had saved them for life. It is one of the signs of the times that people are now appealing to psychologists in their need. In the Genevan psychologist, Theodore Flournoy, we have another example of one who possesses ability as a psychological "soul-physician."

In Norway, Anathon Aall, to whom I have referred above as a historian of philosophy, has also devoted himself to experimental psychology. He has himself stated (in the 5th volume of *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*) that his philosophical labors have been concentrated on the history of philosophy and experimental psychology, and from the latter he believes it possible to derive a "doctrine of existence." Aall's psychological experiments concern themselves with perceptions of depth, memory, simultaneous impressions and reciprocal checking. In his theory regarding the perception of space, he is a confirmed nativist. In connection therewith, he stresses strongly the ability not only to perceive qualities but also to arrange the various contents of sensations in the different parts of space—an ability which cannot be attributed to mechanical influence and hence indicates a limitation of the mechanical interpretation of existence. Thus does Aall take psychology into metaphysics, especially through his theory of the perception of space; for space is represented as a cosmo-physical magnitude corresponding to the subjectively experienced space values. Aall does not attempt to meet the many and oft-recurring objections to such a leap from psychology to

metaphysics. According to his interpretation it becomes an easy task to construct a metaphysics.

I am not underestimating experimental psychology when I express the opinion that there will always be need for a descriptive-analytical psychology in which, analogously to the manner in which the history of science is utilized by the theory of knowledge, the history of the spiritual life of mankind will be used in its entirety. There will certainly be felt again and again a certain antagonism between investigators who come to psychology from humanistic studies and those who come from the natural sciences. But the work must some day be taken up from both sides and the boundary line between the demands of the two points of view cannot be established once and for all.





CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHIC  
TENDENCIES  
IN  
SOUTH AMERICA

With Special Reference to Argentina



CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHIC TENDENCIES  
IN SOUTH AMERICA, WITH SPECIAL  
REFERENCE TO ARGENTINA  
CORIOLANO ALBERINI

AN estimate of the philosophic culture in South America can be made by taking the word "philosophy" in either its general or its technical sense. Many historians who have written on the history of general ideas, and particularly when dealing with the history of the Argentine Republic, have preferred to give schematic outlines of the thought inherent in the political and pedagogical ideologies. In this manner, of course any civilized country has philosophic activities, since its educational and legal spheres involve cardinal principles of human conduct.

It may be said, moreover, that in South America philosophic thought—even in this sense—has generally been the result of the adoption and application of European philosophic speculation rather than the fruit of a preoccupation with the subject matter of philosophy proper. But was not the same, perhaps because in this country there European thought acquired a vernacular coloring which is in itself of no small interest to the historian. It represents a possession and a hope of South American culture. Thus in Argentina—to take one example—there are elements of thought that are specifically Argentinian, despite their European roots.

Keeping in mind, then, the fact that in South America the prevailing tendency has been to put European thought

to practical application, and using Argentina as a specific model, we may trace the evolution of South American culture under a large number of more or less diverse influences. We may note first of all the Scholastic philosophy dominant during the early period of colonization; then the contributions of French thought during the struggle for national independence; after that, the influence of the European romantic movements of the nineteenth century during the period of constitutional organization; and finally the overwhelming influence gained by positivism during the period of economic development and prosperity.

Positivism has dominated Argentina and South America as a whole during the last forty years. At the present time, it should be observed, the votaries of positivism tend to emphasize chiefly the negative aspect of the thought of Comte and Spencer. We say negative, first, because it neglects the fundamental problems of philosophy, and secondly, because it repudiates—at least in theory—all metaphysical preoccupations, professing instead a vague spirit of agnosticism. Moreover it also has neglected the analysis of the very logic of positivism. Some of those attached to positivism—the more dogmatic ones—have devoted themselves to the metaphysical interpretation of Darwinian biology in the manner of Haeckel. One result of this was the brief *Creed* of Ameghino—the great Argentinian paleontologist, who in that work makes a bold profession of philosophic faith on the basis of a mystically materialistic cosmology. The explanation of this phenomenon is simple. Haeckel is one of those chiefly responsible for the vague philosophic thought of Spanish America. A noisy and decrepit Haeckelian senility found in its ranks educational scientists and literary psychiatrists, whose pamphlets on “the future of philosophy” constitute valuable documents for the future historian of the philosophic dillettantism on the coast of the Plata.

Positivism, it may be said bluntly, did not produce anything valuable in philosophy proper in South America. It is fair to recognize, however, that it gave some fruit in the domains of the social, juridical and pedagogical sciences, especially under the influence of an evolutionary standpoint understood in the manner of Spencer. Here is reflected the interest in positivism taken as a method—an interest in harmony with Comte's repudiation of pure science and speculative philosophic effort.

But the devotion to fact for fact's sake has given rise in our Spanish-speaking countries to a situation in which science has been in a certain sense the victim of positivism. We have had an over-devotion to the technical truth at the expense of disinterested investigation. Something similar perhaps occurred in the United States. The effect here was not the same, perhaps because in this country there was always a ready sense for the Absolute left open by the Puritan tradition, and this was able to feed a future philosophic sensibility. Among other reasons this explains why, contrary to what happened in Spanish America, the United States should have had such conspicuous figures as Emerson, James, Royce and Dewey—transcendental absolutism and pragmatism side by side. It may be mentioned in passing that the introduction of pragmatism into Argentina was itself the work of some positivists who insisted that pragmatism was the logical culmination of English empiricism, forgetting that we have here a school based on an essentially anthropocentric theory of knowledge and generally tied up with religious tendencies. May we not consider pragmatism as a peculiarly North American form of the classical German voluntarism—interpreted, to be sure, in pluralistic terms? Our positivists of pragmatic leanings have not searched so deep—they did not even do this with positive empiricism. This is evident from the fact that they did not get from Spencer more than the me-

chanical concept of evolution, and they did not learn from John Stuart Mill more than what they read in his *Logic*. They said nothing about the *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, the metaphysical restlessness of which they did not appreciate.

As far as Comte is concerned, he did not do more than inspire a worship for positive reality which his followers in South America never stopped to analyze. Haeckel was more fortunate. It may be said that no university man, no member of a cultural society has neglected to read (in popular editions) *The Riddle of the Universe*. Haeckel has been given all the tributes of the stationery store. We have already said that Haeckel was one of the major prophets of South American thought. His followers devoted themselves—with great editorial shrewdness—to publishing all sorts of pseudo-scientific outlines of the master's thought, particularly on occasions of vague social reform movements and South American international troubles. In the last few years the homely opportunistic apologies of the Russian Revolution and the new-fangled movement of Spanish-Americanism have given additional opportunities for a large display of the same thing. In this way positivism attracted large groups of university men whose ideologic positions are determined by the exigencies of an economic or a political career.

Fortunately there are at the present time in Argentina evident symptoms of a new philosophic movement, set in operation by an increasing group of young university men who are coming to the philosophic field through the avenues of mathematics, biology, history, pure science, and also through philosophic studies directly. It is interesting to observe that this movement coincides with, if it is not the cause of, a gradual waning of the positivistic hold. It is a movement which has an authentic philosophic restlessness behind it, and which justifies many a hope for the fu-

ture. It is true that in this coming generation there is a hasty shift from the positivistic creed to the idealistic doctrine by virtue of contagion from philosophic reactions in Europe. Those of us who in Argentina are responsible for the growth of philosophic activities are now fervently hoping that this shift to idealism may not be a mere movement of fashion, and that the visitations to the idealistic camp may prove beneficent in the minds of those who will sooner or later reach well-defined positions on grounds of earnest and reflective convictions.

Not that positivism is altogether gone for the present. But it tends to take the form in which it has been of some historical value in the country. We refer especially to its efficacy in dissolving many a trait of the traditional religious dogmatism. And in this respect present-day positivism goes hand in hand with other doctrines dating back to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which continued to function in the heyday of the older positivism. It is, for instance, notorious that the individualistic rationalism of the French romantic and revolutionary liberalism insinuated itself in the social and political upheavals and constructive organization of the last century. The Argentine constitution—a brilliant specimen of social liberalism—is a legitimate child of that rationalism.

Aside from these political and social currents, the present outlook in South America is also determined by European thought. Among the European philosophers who are at present most influential in South America we should mention Renouvier, Boutroux, and Bergson among the French, and Croce and Gentile among the Italians. All of these have a considerable number of studious readers. A large group of students has felt the influence also of a distinguished Spanish thinker, Ortega Y. Gasset. Senor Gasset recently spent an entire year with us and gave his students an orientation towards Germanic depth, making

by-words for them of such names as Cohen, Rickert, Windelband, and others.

We are not under too great illusions regarding these contemporary influences. We see that these seeds often fall on the rocky ground of positivism and new-fangled views. And this is the problem, the problem of dilettantism in all its forms, that is faced in Argentina by the group of those earnest votaries of philosophy already mentioned. This group of students and teachers, their efforts often veiled in anonymity and shorn of tropical eloquence, constitute, in a sense, the welcoming committee for the European teachers who often visit our country.

This same group has been responsible for several activities which tend to lay the foundations for an incalculable future for philosophy in Argentina. One of the fruits of their work has been the recent organization of the Argentine Philosophic Society. This organization proposes to develop in Argentina some of the forms of philosophic devotion—periodical meetings, systematic publications, invitation of foreign philosophers, and the general co-ordination of the activities of students of philosophy with the activities of those devoted to pure science.

In conclusion, we may say that South American culture cannot be put in too stark a relief, especially if we take philosophy in its strict, technical sense. But to be aware of this does not imply a profession of pessimistic faith regarding Latin-American thought. We have seen that philosophy infiltrated its problems and solutions through the fissures of social and political life, long before there was any direct cultivation of philosophy in South America. And with the present efforts in the field, as well as with the encouragement given to philosophy by the government, there are many reasons for a decided optimism in regard to the future. These peoples, on account of their plethoric vitality and their unsurpassed racial and spiritual liberality, are



perhaps in the most fitting condition to achieve, within the very near future, a philosophic culture free from the traditional vices and capable of offering a vision of the universe and of human life that, in spite of its being an autochthonous growth, will have that which befits a real philosophy—a universal value.





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